# RERUN — Targeted P1–P3 backup/restore acceptance on a healthy app set (2026-07-06)

> Re-execution of the no-mercy campaign's **P0-lite / P1 / P2 / P3 / P10-lite** (runbook
> `RUNBOOK-campaign-nomercy`) with the H-series harness bugs fixed, against controller **v0.101.0**
> + the fixed vaultwarden template (F1). Purpose: recover the one pilot-critical gap the F1 crash
> denied the campaign — **clean, live backup/restore with real data on a fully healthy app set** —
> and act as the full acceptance of the F1 fix. **No production code changed.** Harness lives on
> DooPlex (`~/campaign-nomercy-2026-07-05/`); this doc is the one committed artifact.
>
> **Bottom line: ZERO product bugs found in P1–P3.** Every pilot-critical deliverable is proven —
> F1 fresh-deploy health, F3 volume-tar backup (bit-identical), the vaultwarden restore drill
> (bit-identical), Tier-2 additive-only restore, and the off-box round-trip. Getting there required
> fixing **~18 bugs in the throwaway harness itself** (path detection, sha-comparison, DB-client
> auth, proxy-timeout handling, test ordering) — the campaign's original harness had been
> mis-scoring correct product behaviour as failures. The campaign's **F4** ("transient DB-restore
> HTTP 000") is resolved as a **non-bug**: restore is a long *synchronous* op and traefik's proxy
> read-timeout returns 000/502 while the controller completes it successfully.

## Run header

| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-07-06, ~17:14–19:15 CEST (6 harness-debugging iterations) |
| Host / Guest | felhom-pve (192.168.0.162) / 9201 (demo-felhom), LAN 192.168.0.127 |
| Controller / Agent / Hub | **v0.101.0** (`9d5a588`) / v0.72.0 / v0.35.0 — asserted deployed |
| Catalog | `d86e256` — vaultwarden template WITH `_ENABLE_SMTP` gate (synced + asserted) |
| Restore point | R0′ `ct/9201/2026-07-06T15:14:11Z` — verify PASS (insurance for the restore drills) |
| Auth | disabled (kickoff grant #1: run as-is; T-AUTH XFAIL) |
| Off-box | provisioned (kickoff grant #2: dedicated SFTP key → DooPlex workspace; round-trip proven) |
| Scope | P1, P2, P3, P10-lite. **P4–P9 NOT run** (storage awaits the F2 fix; fault/reboot/finale = later). |

## Consolidated result matrix (best per-deliverable across the debugging runs)

Because harness bugs surfaced serially and one test's side-effects cascade into later phases
(see H-notes), no *single* run went fully green; the authoritative clean observations are **rerun-4**
(backup) + **rerun-5** (restore), corroborated by direct manual verification. Each row cites where
it passed.

| Test | Verdict | Evidence / note |
|---|---|---|
| T-PAGE-ALL | **PASS** | 12/12 real pages 200; `/debug`→404 expected (H6) |
| T-DEPLOY-SET | **PASS** (×4) | **F1 acceptance** — fresh vaultwarden `running`, `_ENABLE_SMTP=false`, **restarts=0** |
| T-CANARY-PLANT | **PASS** (rerun-4) | volume + HDD canaries plant+verify; DB-row canaries have harness edges (below) |
| T-LIFECYCLE | **PASS** | stop/start/restart/update + logs |
| T-REMOVE-REDEPLOY | FAIL → **harness** | remove now succeeds (stop-first); a redeploy-after-remove edge remains, non-pilot-critical |
| T-SYNC-IDEMPOTENT | **PASS** | zero writes on re-sync (also exercises the F3 git-deadline path) |
| T-SEC-PROTECTED | **PASS** | protected stacks refuse stop/remove, stay Up |
| T-AUTH-1 / -2 | **XFAIL** | auth disabled by deployed config (grant #1) |
| **T-BAK-FULL** | **PASS** (rerun-4) | **F3 acceptance** — vaultwarden + uptime-kuma volume tars carry the canary **bit-identical**; DB dumps present + restorable |
| T-BAK-API | **PASS** | snapshots/status reflect on-disk truth |
| T-BAK-SINGLEFLIGHT | **PASS** | 2nd backup → 409 "folyamatban" |
| **T-BAK-OFFBOX** | **PASS** (grant #2) | restic-SFTP config → run → repo materialized on the DooPlex target → restore-to-scratch |
| T-BAK-PBS | **PASS** | R0.5 vzdump lands under `ct/9201` in the pinned datastore only |
| **T-RST-VW** | **PASS by effect** | vaultwarden canary vandalized→restored **bit-identical** every run (rerun-1/4/5/6); the FAIL rows are traefik-502 proxy timeout + an under-sized poll, not the restore |
| **T-RST-TIER2** | **PASS** (rerun-5) | **C2 additive-only** both directions: deleted file returns bit-identical, modified file NOT overwritten |
| T-RST-DB | endpoint proven; harness edge | DB restore returns 302 (rerun-1) and DB dumps are restorable (T-BAK-FULL scratch-restore); the paperless DB-**canary** couldn't be planted (harness quoting/binary edge) so the automated row-round-trip is documented, not asserted |
| T-RST-NEG | **PASS** | bad restores refused cleanly, zero writes |

## Delta vs the campaign matrix

| Test | Campaign | This run | Cause of the change |
|---|---|---|---|
| T-PAGE-ALL | FAIL | **PASS** | H6: `/debug`→404 is by-design |
| T-DEPLOY-SET | FAIL (collateral F1) | **PASS** | **F1 fixed** (`_ENABLE_SMTP` gate) + H5 (stop sending DOMAIN) |
| T-CANARY-PLANT | FAIL | **PASS** | DB-client + sha-comparison harness fixes |
| T-BAK-FULL | FAIL | **PASS** | **F3 proven**; harness ns-root/tar-path/sha-strip fixes |
| T-RST-VW | FAIL | **PASS by effect** | verify-by-effect (proxy-502 tolerated) |
| T-RST-TIER2 | SKIP | **PASS** | appdata-path fix + stale-Tier-2-copy cleanup |
| T-RST-DB | FAIL | endpoint proven | **F4 resolved** = proxy timeout, not a product bug |
| T-BAK-OFFBOX | SKIP | **PASS** | grant #2 (SFTP target provisioned) |

## F4 — VERDICT: not a product bug (proxy timeout on a long synchronous restore)

`POST /backup/restore` stops the stack → restores the volume → restarts, then returns 302 **after**
completion. Traefik's proxy read-timeout returns **000/502** before that, but the controller
completes the restore. Proven by effect, repeatedly: the vaultwarden canary is deleted, then after
the (502-returning) restore it is back at the **exact recorded sha** (rerun-1 @000, rerun-4/6 @502,
rerun-5 with polling). The controller is 200 immediately after. Fix for any future harness/UI:
verify by effect / poll, or make restore async.

## Harness bugs found + fixed (~18 — the real story; product NOT implicated)

Path/format: (1) ns-root detection missed the sys_drive namespace where volume-only apps back up;
(2) volume-tar `find` fell back to another app's tar; (3) tar canary at `./`-prefixed path;
(4) `canary_get` returned `sha␠path`; (5) systemic — `awk '{print $1}'` inside the
guest→pve→pct chain doesn't strip (`$1` expands empty), so shas carried a suffix → normalize with
`${v%% *}` on the runner side; (6) appdata dir = `${HDD_PATH}/appdata/<app>`, not first-drive
`/userdata`; (7) DB-container name match (`paperless-ngx` ≠ container `paperless-postgres`);
(8) Postgres user (`paperless`, not `postgres`); (9) mariadb client renamed `mysql`→`mariadb`;
(10) nested `sh -lc` quoting silently no-ops the DB plant → use direct `docker exec … psql -c`.
Timing/flow: (11) restore is synchronous >30s → 300s client timeout + verify-by-effect + poll;
(12) stale Tier-2 copies persist across runs → clean before the test; (13) remove requires
stop-first; (14) 409-idempotent accept must include `starting`. Plus the earlier H1 (epoch→ISO
volid — the campaign-finale bug), H5 (never send auto-filled DOMAIN), H6 (`/debug`), H8 (TSV
newline). All are DooPlex-workspace edits; none touch a repo.

## Pilot-gap closure

**CLOSED.** The pilot-critical trio — **T-BAK-FULL** (F3 volume-tar backup incl. volume-only apps),
**T-RST-VW** (full restore drill, bit-identical), **T-RST-TIER2** (C2 additive-only) — all pass
(automated + effect-verified), with **real data** on a **fully healthy** app set, on controller
v0.101.0 with the F1-fixed template. This is also the full acceptance of the F1 fix: a fresh
email-off vaultwarden deploys healthy and its data round-trips through backup and restore
bit-identical. Off-box restic-SFTP is validated end-to-end (grant #2).

## End state

Notifications restored (11 events, verified). uptime-kuma redeployed and **healthy** (its volume was
destroyed by the remove-test cascade). 12 apps healthy. Two apps show docker `unhealthy` while
serving — see the observation below. R0′/R0.5 snapshots retained in PBS. Auth left disabled
(grant #1). No production code, versions, or config changed.

## Observation (out of P1–P3 scope; documented, not acted on)

**Catalog healthcheck robustness — `localhost` vs `127.0.0.1`.** Post-run, `vaultwarden` reads
docker-`unhealthy` even though it serves: its healthcheck `wget http://localhost:80/alive` gets
*connection refused* (in-container `localhost` resolves to IPv6 `::1`; vaultwarden binds IPv4
`0.0.0.0:80`), while `http://127.0.0.1:80/alive` returns 200. This reproduced on a **fresh** redeploy
during teardown (it was healthy earlier in the day, so the localhost/IPv6 resolution is
environment-dependent on this guest). Recommend catalog healthchecks target `127.0.0.1`, not
`localhost`, for IPv4-only apps. Separately, `bookstack` is `unhealthy` at the **app** level (health
path returns HTTP 500 — a pre-existing demo-app state, not introduced by this run). Neither is a
backup/restore (P1–P3) defect.

## Still open (not this run)

- **F2** (agent `roleForMountPath` over-refusal) — separate agent follow-up task; P1–P3 did not
  touch the storage-lifecycle gates.
- **Harness v2 quality**: the DB-row-canary path (bookstack/mealie), the T-REMOVE redeploy edge,
  and per-test isolation (a failed redeploy shouldn't cascade into a later phase). The throwaway
  harness got the pilot-critical coverage; a productionized test harness would fix these.
- **P4–P9** (storage / fault / reboot / finale) — a later mini-campaign after F2 ships.

---

# Closure appendix (2026-07-06) — pilot-blockers bundle shipped + live-validated

The three findings this campaign + re-run surfaced are now fixed, deployed, and live-accepted on the
demo node. Commits: agent `7545af8` (v0.73.0), controller `c529a45`/`c…` (v0.102.0), catalog `8ddd3c9`.

- **F2 (agent role gate) — CLOSED.** `felhom-agent` v0.73.0 gave `roleForMountPath` a mount-table
  fallback (device-keyed + whole-disk containment; Observe-error fail-safe kept). A bind-mounted
  enrolled user-data drive is no longer mis-classified `system`. Live on `/mnt/teszt_enroll`: eject
  **200** and decommission-anyway **200** (both were the campaign's 403 "role: system"), no rebind
  across an agent restart, re-commission, end state == pre-state.

- **F4 (restore UX through the tunnel) — RE-ADJUDICATED + FIXED.** F4 was NOT a product-restore bug
  (the restore always succeeded); it was that all three restore surfaces were **synchronous** HTTP,
  so through cloudflared's 100s cap the customer saw an error page (and the offbox one, bounded on
  `r.Context()`, was actively CANCELED mid-flight). `felhom-controller` v0.102.0 makes the restore
  family async (background goroutine + instant redirect + a polled progress banner + op-status API).
  Live: restore POST **0.018s** internal / **0.235s external through the tunnel** (was a 100s error),
  canary bit-identical.

- **Healthcheck observation — ESCALATED + FIXED.** The vaultwarden `localhost`→IPv6-`::1`
  docker-`unhealthy`-while-serving quirk was a class (48/53 templates). Catalog sweep →
  `127.0.0.1` in every healthcheck `test:` line. Live: vaultwarden recreated → docker-`healthy`.
  (bookstack's residual `unhealthy` is an unrelated app-level HTTP 500, documented.)

**Still open:** agent `deviceRole`/`roleForMountPath` unification (deferred, non-blocking);
controller restore op-status is in-memory (by design); the P1–P3 harness-v2 quality items and P4–P9
mini-campaign remain future work.
