Files
felhom-controller/controller/internal/report/dr_recipe.go
T
admin f3146ac7bf controller v0.73.0: DR recipe — emit secret-free customer+apps half in hub report
DR recipe slice (controller half), grounded in SPIKE-dr-recipe-2026-06-16. The
controller emitter is the BOUNDARY enforcement point: v1 ships an explicit
allowlist {catalog_ref, enabled, storage_bindings} and reads NOTHING from
AppConfig.Env, so no ENC:/token/password can leak. storage_bindings parsed from
the compose (${HDD_PATH}/${USERDATA_PATH} volume binds -> {container_path,
drive, subpath}).

Load-bearing tests: TestBuildAppRecipe_NoSecrets (synthetic-secret app -> none
leak) + TestBuildAppRecipe_AllowlistIsLoadBearing (red-proof companion) +
TestAppStorageBindings + TestBuildDRRecipeAppHalf. Red-proofed live: forcing the
emitter to dump Env makes the boundary test fail. recipe_version=1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 18:38:59 +02:00

162 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package report
import (
"bufio"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/stacks"
)
// readComposeFile is the production composeReader: best-effort read of a stack's docker-compose.yml
// (an unreadable file yields "" → no storage bindings for that app, never a failure).
func readComposeFile(path string) string {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return string(data)
}
// DR recipe — the controller (customer + apps) HALF of the secret-free reconstruction recipe
// (SPIKE-dr-recipe-2026-06-16). The recipe is the non-secret re-provision plan that complements escrow
// (keys) + PBS/restic (bytes). This emitter is THE BOUNDARY ENFORCEMENT POINT: the controller is the
// component that distinguishes secret from non-secret deploy fields (it encrypts ENC: secrets in
// app.yaml), so v1 ships ONLY an explicit allowlist — {catalog_ref, enabled, storage_bindings} — and
// NEVER touches AppConfig.Env. A new field cannot leak a secret because it is excluded by default
// (allowlist, not denylist). TestBuildAppRecipe_NoSecrets is the load-bearing proof.
//
// recipe_version=1; read is ignore-unknown (forward-compat). The hub assembles this half with the
// agent's storage/guest/PBS half into one customer recipe keyed by customer + recipe_version.
const DRRecipeVersion = 1
// DRRecipeAppHalf is the controller-emitted half.
type DRRecipeAppHalf struct {
RecipeVersion int `json:"recipe_version"`
Customer DRCustomer `json:"customer"`
Apps []AppRecipe `json:"apps"`
}
// DRCustomer is the customer identity — public identifiers only.
type DRCustomer struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Display string `json:"display"`
Domain string `json:"domain"`
}
// AppRecipe is the v1 per-app allowlist. NOTHING from AppConfig.Env is emitted — the three fields below
// are the entire surface, so no env secret (ENC: value, token, password) can ride along.
type AppRecipe struct {
CatalogRef string `json:"catalog_ref"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
StorageBindings []StorageBinding `json:"storage_bindings"`
}
// StorageBinding names WHERE an app's data lives on a user-data drive: the container mount target, the
// drive name, and the path under the drive. Identifiers/paths only — e.g. romm.library → felhom-flash
// : userdata/roms. The hub correlates `drive` to the agent half's durable-id.
type StorageBinding struct {
ContainerPath string `json:"container_path"`
Drive string `json:"drive"`
Subpath string `json:"subpath"`
}
// BuildDRRecipeAppHalf assembles the controller half: customer identity + an AppRecipe per DEPLOYED,
// non-protected stack. composeReader returns a stack's docker-compose.yml content (seam: tests inject a
// fake; production passes os.ReadFile-backed). Pure given the reader → unit-tested directly.
func BuildDRRecipeAppHalf(custID, custName, domain string, all []stacks.Stack, composeReader func(path string) string) *DRRecipeAppHalf {
half := &DRRecipeAppHalf{
RecipeVersion: DRRecipeVersion,
Customer: DRCustomer{ID: custID, Display: custName, Domain: domain},
Apps: []AppRecipe{},
}
for _, s := range all {
if s.Protected || !s.Deployed {
continue
}
var composeYAML string
if composeReader != nil && s.ComposePath != "" {
composeYAML = composeReader(s.ComposePath)
}
half.Apps = append(half.Apps, buildAppRecipe(s, composeYAML))
}
return half
}
// buildAppRecipe constructs ONE app's recipe from the allowlist ONLY. This function deliberately reads
// NOTHING from s.AppConfig.Env — that is the boundary. catalog_ref = the catalog slug (falls back to the
// stack name for an orphaned app); storage_bindings parsed from the compose against the app's HDD_PATH.
func buildAppRecipe(s stacks.Stack, composeYAML string) AppRecipe {
catalogRef := s.Meta.Slug
if catalogRef == "" {
catalogRef = s.Name
}
var hddPath string
if s.AppConfig != nil {
hddPath = s.AppConfig.Env["HDD_PATH"] // a path identifier, NOT a secret (secrets are ENC: in Env)
}
return AppRecipe{
CatalogRef: catalogRef,
Enabled: s.Deployed,
StorageBindings: appStorageBindings(composeYAML, hddPath),
}
}
// appStorageBindings parses a docker-compose.yml for volume binds that land on the app's user-data drive
// (under HDD_PATH, or its USERDATA_PATH=<HDD_PATH>/userdata sibling) and returns {container_path, drive,
// subpath}. Pure (operates on the compose text), so it is unit-tested without files. The drive name is
// the basename of HDD_PATH (e.g. /mnt/felhom-drives/felhom-flash → "felhom-flash").
func appStorageBindings(composeYAML, hddPath string) []StorageBinding {
if hddPath == "" || composeYAML == "" {
return []StorageBinding{}
}
cleanHDD := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(hddPath))
userdata := cleanHDD + "/userdata"
drive := filepath.Base(cleanHDD)
bindings := []StorageBinding{}
seen := map[string]bool{}
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(composeYAML))
inVolumes := false
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "volumes:") {
inVolumes = true
continue
}
if inVolumes && !strings.HasPrefix(line, "-") && !strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") && line != "" {
inVolumes = false
}
if !inVolumes || !strings.HasPrefix(line, "- ") {
continue
}
mountStr := strings.Trim(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "- "), "\"'")
parts := strings.SplitN(mountStr, ":", 3)
if len(parts) < 2 {
continue
}
host := parts[0]
host = strings.ReplaceAll(host, "${USERDATA_PATH}", userdata)
host = strings.ReplaceAll(host, "${HDD_PATH}", cleanHDD)
// Also tolerate the un-braced $VAR form.
host = strings.ReplaceAll(host, "$USERDATA_PATH", userdata)
host = strings.ReplaceAll(host, "$HDD_PATH", cleanHDD)
host = filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(host))
if host != cleanHDD && !strings.HasPrefix(host, cleanHDD+"/") {
continue // not on this drive
}
subpath := strings.TrimPrefix(host, cleanHDD)
subpath = strings.TrimPrefix(subpath, "/")
container := parts[1]
key := container + "\x00" + subpath
if seen[key] {
continue
}
seen[key] = true
bindings = append(bindings, StorageBinding{ContainerPath: container, Drive: drive, Subpath: subpath})
}
return bindings
}