0b9450e356
The restore paths (RestoreFromRecoveryUnit + the RestoreApp fallback) repopulated Docker volume tars but NEVER replayed the captured <stack>-<dbtype>.sql dump, so DB-resident data (e.g. rows in a DB whose data dir is a bind mount) did not come back — the romm marker round-trip in the audit lost the row. New appbackup.ImportDump (read-side counterpart to DumpOne) replays a .sql/.sql.gz into the running DB using the live container's OWN discovered credentials (no env threading; reuses DiscoveredDB + getMariaDBPassword). backup.reimportDBDumps orchestrates it AFTER volume restore + stack bring-up, so the logical dump WINS over any volume-tar copy of the DB (operator-chosen precedence). pg_dump --clean --if-exists and mariadb-dump (default --add-drop-table) make replay idempotent; psql ON_ERROR_STOP=1 surfaces real import errors. Also: volume-restore per-volume failures and DB-import failures now SURFACE (the restore returns an error) instead of a swallowed WARN, so a failed data restore cannot read as success. Tests (restore_db_test.go, injectable discover/import seams): imports when dump+DB present, failure surfaces, no-dump skips discovery, dump-but-no-matching-DB is a non-fatal skip. Live DB round-trip to be validated post-deploy.
155 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
155 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
package backup
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"time"
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"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
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)
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// reconcileRestoreSecrets merges the recovery unit's non-secret env with the secrets recovered from
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// the guest's own app.yaml, and applies the FAIL-CLOSED data-key gate. It is the safety-critical heart
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// of Phase 2b and is deliberately a pure function (no I/O) so it can be exhaustively unit-tested.
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//
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// Policy (per the Phase 2 design — see REPORT/CHANGELOG):
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// - Regenerate NOTHING. Every secret comes from the guest (live rootfs, or PBS whole-guest restore).
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// - A missing DATA-ENCRYPTING key (`dataKeyNames`) is FATAL: regenerating it would render the
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// restored data unreadable, so we refuse and tell the operator to do a PBS whole-guest restore.
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// - A missing resettable secret (DB password, admin password) is NON-fatal: it's returned in
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// `missing` so the caller can warn; the app may simply need a credential reset, no data is lost.
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func reconcileRestoreSecrets(nonSecretEnv, recoveredSecrets map[string]string, secretNames, dataKeyNames []string) (fullEnv map[string]string, missing []string, err error) {
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fullEnv = make(map[string]string, len(nonSecretEnv)+len(secretNames))
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for k, v := range nonSecretEnv {
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fullEnv[k] = v
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}
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have := func(n string) bool {
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v, ok := recoveredSecrets[n]
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return ok && v != ""
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}
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for _, n := range secretNames {
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if have(n) {
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fullEnv[n] = recoveredSecrets[n]
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} else {
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missing = append(missing, n)
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}
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}
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// Fail-closed: any unrecoverable data-encrypting key aborts the restore.
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var missingDataKeys []string
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for _, dk := range dataKeyNames {
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if !have(dk) {
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missingDataKeys = append(missingDataKeys, dk)
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}
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}
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if len(missingDataKeys) > 0 {
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return nil, missing, fmt.Errorf(
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"refusing to restore: data-encrypting key(s) %v could not be recovered from the guest's app.yaml — "+
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"a PBS whole-guest restore is required first (regenerating the key would render stored data unreadable)",
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missingDataKeys)
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}
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return fullEnv, missing, nil
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}
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// readStrippedEnv parses the non-secret env from a recovery unit's secret-stripped app.yaml.
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func readStrippedEnv(path string) map[string]string {
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data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return map[string]string{}
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}
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var s strippedAppYaml
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if yaml.Unmarshal(data, &s) != nil || s.Env == nil {
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return map[string]string{}
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}
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return s.Env
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}
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// RestoreFromRecoveryUnit recreates an app from its on-drive recovery unit + the guest's own secrets.
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//
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// It reads the unit manifest, recovers the secret values from the guest's live app.yaml, applies the
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// fail-closed data-key gate, restores the named-volume data from the unit's tars, then restores the
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// app's definition from the unit and redeploys it with the reconstructed env (re-pulling the pinned
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// image). No secret is ever regenerated, and no secret is read from the unit. If no unit exists it
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// falls back to the legacy volume-only RestoreApp.
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func (m *Manager) RestoreFromRecoveryUnit(stackName string) error {
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if m.stackProvider == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("stack provider not configured")
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}
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m.mu.Lock()
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if m.running {
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m.mu.Unlock()
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return fmt.Errorf("backup or restore already in progress")
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}
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m.running = true
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m.mu.Unlock()
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defer func() {
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m.mu.Lock()
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m.running = false
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m.mu.Unlock()
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}()
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drivePath := m.GetAppDrivePath(stackName)
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if drivePath == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(drivePath) {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot determine drive path for %s", stackName)
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}
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nsRoot := m.namespaceRoot(drivePath)
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manifest := readManifest(RecoveryUnitManifestPath(nsRoot, stackName))
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if manifest == nil {
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m.logger.Printf("[WARN] [backup] No recovery unit for %s — falling back to volume-only restore", stackName)
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m.mu.Lock()
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m.running = false // RestoreApp re-acquires the running flag
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m.mu.Unlock()
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return m.RestoreApp(stackName, "")
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}
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composeDir := RecoveryUnitComposePath(nsRoot, stackName)
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nonSecretEnv := readStrippedEnv(filepath.Join(composeDir, "app.yaml"))
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// Recover secrets from the GUEST (never the unit), then apply the fail-closed gate.
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recovered := m.stackProvider.RecoverStackSecrets(stackName, manifest.SecretEnvVars)
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fullEnv, missing, err := reconcileRestoreSecrets(nonSecretEnv, recovered, manifest.SecretEnvVars, manifest.DataKeyEnvVars)
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if err != nil {
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m.logger.Printf("[ERROR] [backup] Restore REFUSED for %s: %v", stackName, err)
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return err
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}
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if len(missing) > 0 {
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m.logger.Printf("[WARN] [backup] Restore %s: %d resettable secret(s) unrecoverable %v — proceeding (may need a credential reset; no data-key affected)",
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stackName, len(missing), missing)
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}
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m.logger.Printf("[INFO] [backup] Restoring %s from recovery unit: images=%d, secrets recovered=%d/%d, data_keys=%d",
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stackName, len(manifest.ImagePins), len(manifest.SecretEnvVars)-len(missing), len(manifest.SecretEnvVars), len(manifest.DataKeyEnvVars))
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// Stop, restore named-volume data, then recreate the definition + redeploy with the recovered env.
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// F17: surface a data-restore failure instead of swallowing it (we still bring the app back up).
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var dataErr error
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if err := m.stackProvider.StopStack(stackName); err != nil {
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m.logger.Printf("[WARN] [backup] could not stop %s before restore: %v (continuing)", stackName, err)
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}
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if err := m.restoreDockerVolumes(stackName, drivePath); err != nil {
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m.logger.Printf("[ERROR] [backup] volume restore for %s: %v", stackName, err)
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dataErr = err
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}
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if err := m.stackProvider.RecreateStackFromUnit(stackName, composeDir, fullEnv); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("recreating %s from unit: %w", stackName, err)
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}
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// F17: the captured .sql dump is the authoritative logical DB state — replay it into the now-running
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// DB container AFTER the volume restore, so the dump WINS over any volume-tar copy of the database.
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if _, err := m.reimportDBDumpsCtx(stackName, nsRoot); err != nil {
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m.logger.Printf("[ERROR] [backup] DB re-import for %s: %v", stackName, err)
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if dataErr == nil {
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dataErr = err
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}
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}
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if err := m.waitForHealthy(stackName, 90*time.Second); err != nil {
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m.logger.Printf("[WARN] [backup] %s restored but health check failed: %v", stackName, err)
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}
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if dataErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("restore of %s from unit completed with data errors: %w", stackName, dataErr)
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}
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m.logger.Printf("[INFO] [backup] Restore-from-unit completed: %s", stackName)
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return nil
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}
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