felhom-controller/controller/internal/backup/recovery_unit.go

package backup

import (
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"os"
	"path/filepath"
	"sort"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)

// RecoveryManifest describes an app's self-contained recovery unit.
//
// The unit on a drive is `<nsRoot>/backups/primary/<app>/` and contains:
//
//	compose/      docker-compose.yml + .felhom.yml + app.yaml (0600; carries the PORTABLE secrets)
//	db-dumps/     app-consistent DB dump(s)        (written by the dump flow)
//	volume-dumps/ named-volume tars                (written by the dump flow)
//	manifest.json this file
//
// D5 (schema 2) changed what the unit holds. Before it held NO secret at all, which made
// "restore from the drive alone" false: the fast, local, customer-doable Tier-1/2 restore secretly
// depended on the slow, operator-driven whole-guest restore, because a data-encrypting key or a DB
// password absent from the guest cannot be regenerated without rendering the restored data
// unreachable. The unit now carries the PORTABLE secret class (stacks.PortableSecretEnvVars) in its
// 0600 app.yaml, and Tier-1/2 needs the DRIVE AND NOTHING ELSE.
//
// It still holds NO `type: password` admin login (those are internet-reachable, so their blast radius
// is not bounded by the drive — they stay in the guest and are regenerated on restore) and NOT the
// Docker image, only the pinned tag(s), re-pulled on restore. SecretSource records the split.
//
// A schema-1 unit carries no secrets: the restore degrades to the pre-D5 guest-only behaviour rather
// than failing, and the next capture rewrites it (the app.yaml checksum changes).
type RecoveryManifest struct {
	SchemaVersion  int               `json:"schema_version"`
	AppName        string            `json:"app_name"`
	DisplayName    string            `json:"display_name"`
	ControllerVer  string            `json:"controller_version"`
	CreatedAt      string            `json:"created_at"`
	Drive          string            `json:"drive"`             // HDD_PATH (in-guest mount)
	NamespaceRoot  string            `json:"namespace_root"`    // resolved felhom-data namespace root
	ImagePins      []string          `json:"image_pins"`        // image NOT stored — re-pulled on restore
	SecretEnvVars  []string          `json:"secret_env_vars"`   // NAMES of every secret/password field
	DataKeyEnvVars []string          `json:"data_key_env_vars"` // fail-closed gate on restore
	SecretSource   string            `json:"secret_source"`     // human note: where secrets come from
	ConfigFiles    []string          `json:"config_files"`      // captured into compose/
	DBDumps        []string          `json:"db_dumps"`
	VolumeDumps    []string          `json:"volume_dumps"`
	Checksums      map[string]string `json:"checksums"` // sha256 of captured compose/ files
	// PortableSecretEnvVars (D5) are the NAMES of the secrets this unit's app.yaml CARRIES. Names only
	// — the manifest is 0644 and never holds a value. The restore reads it to know which app.yaml env
	// entries are secrets rather than plain config; absent (schema 1) ⇒ the unit carries none.
	PortableSecretEnvVars []string `json:"portable_secret_env_vars,omitempty"`
	// R-43/R-44 (v0.148.0): the coherence stamp. An offsite run refreshes the dumps FIRST and then
	// captures the unit, so a manifest carrying an OffsiteRunID asserts "the db-dumps/ in this unit
	// were taken by that run" — i.e. the snapshot is an internally coherent {DB@T, files@T} pair.
	// A manifest WITHOUT these fields is a pre-v0.148 unit whose dump age is unknown and may skew
	// arbitrarily from the files beside it (the DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19 failure); the restore
	// confirm surfaces that honestly rather than blocking. Empty on the periodic refresh, which must
	// never claim a coherence it did not establish — it carries the prior stamp forward instead.
	OffsiteRunID string `json:"offsite_run_id,omitempty"`
	DumpsAt      string `json:"dumps_at,omitempty"` // RFC3339 UTC — when this run's dump leg finished
}

// SetVersion records the controller version stamped into recovery-unit manifests.
func (m *Manager) SetVersion(v string) {
	m.mu.Lock()
	m.version = v
	m.mu.Unlock()
}

// SetTier2Notifier wires the notification callback invoked after each Tier 2 copy.
func (m *Manager) SetTier2Notifier(fn func(stackName, destLabel string, dur time.Duration, err error)) {
	m.tier2Notify = fn
}

// CaptureRecoveryUnit writes/refreshes an app's recovery unit: it captures the compose + metadata +
// an app.yaml carrying the PORTABLE secret class (D5) into compose/, enumerates the DB/volume dumps
// already present, and writes manifest.json. It never writes the Docker image (only the pinned tag),
// and never writes a WITHHELD secret — the split is decided in buildUnitAppYaml, pinned by
// TestCaptureRecoveryUnitCarriesPortableSecretsOnly.
//
// Idempotent: it builds the captured content in memory first and SKIPS all writes when the unit is
// already current (same config checksums, same dump set, same controller version) — so it can run on
// the periodic status refresh without thrashing a spinning USB drive.
func (m *Manager) CaptureRecoveryUnit(stackName string) error {
	if m.stackProvider == nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("no stack provider")
	}
	info, ok := m.stackProvider.GetStackRecoveryInfo(stackName)
	if !ok {
		return fmt.Errorf("stack %q not found", stackName)
	}
	drivePath := m.GetAppDrivePath(stackName)
	if drivePath == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(drivePath) {
		return fmt.Errorf("cannot determine absolute drive path for %s", stackName)
	}
	nsRoot := m.namespaceRoot(drivePath)

	// Build the captured config CONTENT in memory (no writes yet) so we can checksum-compare.
	type capFile struct {
		name string
		data []byte
		perm os.FileMode
	}
	var files []capFile
	checksums := make(map[string]string)
	var configFiles []string
	for _, fname := range []string{"docker-compose.yml", ".felhom.yml"} {
		data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(info.StackDir, fname))
		if err != nil {
			continue // optional — capture whichever exist
		}
		files = append(files, capFile{fname, data, 0644})
		checksums[fname] = sha256Hex(data)
		configFiles = append(configFiles, fname)
	}
	appYaml := buildUnitAppYaml(info)
	files = append(files, capFile{"app.yaml", appYaml, 0600})
	checksums["app.yaml"] = sha256Hex(appYaml)
	configFiles = append(configFiles, "app.yaml")

	dbDumps := listFileNames(AppDBDumpPath(nsRoot, stackName), ".sql")
	volDumps := listFileNames(AppVolumeDumpPath(nsRoot, stackName), ".tar")
	version := m.versionLocked()

	manifestPath := RecoveryUnitManifestPath(nsRoot, stackName)
	cur := readManifest(manifestPath)

	// R-43/R-44: the coherence stamp of the offsite run currently in flight ("" on the periodic
	// refresh and on the local dump run). When empty we CARRY THE PRIOR STAMP FORWARD rather than
	// blanking it — a periodic refresh must neither claim a coherence it did not establish nor
	// destroy the record of one that a real run did.
	runID, dumpsAt := m.offsiteRunStamp()
	if runID == "" && cur != nil {
		runID, dumpsAt = cur.OffsiteRunID, cur.DumpsAt
	}

	// Skip if the unit is already current — avoids needless drive writes on the periodic refresh.
	// The run-id is part of "current": an offsite run must re-stamp the manifest even when nothing
	// else changed, because the stamp is exactly the claim the restore path reads.
	if cur != nil &&
		cur.ControllerVer == version &&
		stringMapEqual(cur.Checksums, checksums) &&
		stringSliceEqual(cur.DBDumps, dbDumps) &&
		stringSliceEqual(cur.VolumeDumps, volDumps) &&
		cur.OffsiteRunID == runID {
		return nil
	}

	composeDir := RecoveryUnitComposePath(nsRoot, stackName)
	if err := os.MkdirAll(composeDir, 0755); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("creating recovery-unit compose dir: %w", err)
	}
	for _, f := range files {
		if err := atomicWrite(filepath.Join(composeDir, f.name), f.data, f.perm); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("capturing %s: %w", f.name, err)
		}
	}

	manifest := &RecoveryManifest{
		SchemaVersion:         2, // D5: compose/app.yaml carries the portable secret class
		AppName:               stackName,
		DisplayName:           info.DisplayName,
		ControllerVer:         version,
		CreatedAt:             time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
		Drive:                 drivePath,
		NamespaceRoot:         nsRoot,
		ImagePins:             info.ImagePins,
		SecretEnvVars:         info.SecretEnvVars,
		DataKeyEnvVars:        info.DataKeyEnvVars,
		PortableSecretEnvVars: info.PortableSecretEnvVars,
		SecretSource:          "portable secrets (data keys, DB passwords, internal signing secrets) are IN this unit's compose/app.yaml (0600); internet-reachable admin logins are NOT, and come from the guest's app.yaml or are regenerated on restore",
		ConfigFiles:           configFiles,
		DBDumps:               dbDumps,
		VolumeDumps:           volDumps,
		Checksums:             checksums,
		OffsiteRunID:          runID,
		DumpsAt:               dumpsAt,
	}
	if err := writeManifest(manifestPath, manifest); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("writing manifest: %w", err)
	}

	// Counts and NAMES only — never a value (D5 puts more secrets through this path than before).
	m.logger.Printf("[INFO] [backup] Recovery unit captured for %s → %s (images=%d, secrets-referenced=%d, data_keys=%d, portable-carried=%d/%d, withheld=%d)",
		stackName, RecoveryUnitPath(nsRoot, stackName), len(info.ImagePins), len(info.SecretEnvVars),
		len(info.DataKeyEnvVars), len(info.PortableSecrets), len(info.PortableSecretEnvVars),
		len(withheldSecretNames(info)))
	return nil
}

// captureAllRecoveryUnits refreshes the recovery unit for every deployed stack. Best-effort:
// a per-app failure is logged and does not abort the others.
func (m *Manager) captureAllRecoveryUnits() {
	if m.stackProvider == nil {
		return
	}
	for _, stack := range m.stackProvider.ListDeployedStacks() {
		drivePath := m.GetAppDrivePath(stack.Name)
		if m.settings != nil && (m.settings.IsDisconnected(drivePath) || m.settings.IsDecommissioned(drivePath)) {
			continue // drive not writable — skip, the existing unit stays as-is
		}
		if err := m.CaptureRecoveryUnit(stack.Name); err != nil {
			m.logger.Printf("[WARN] [backup] Recovery unit capture failed for %s: %v", stack.Name, err)
		}
	}
}

func (m *Manager) versionLocked() string {
	m.mu.Lock()
	defer m.mu.Unlock()
	return m.version
}

// strippedAppYaml is the on-disk shape of the app.yaml captured into the unit. The name is historical:
// since D5 the `env` map carries the PORTABLE secrets alongside the plain config (see buildUnitAppYaml).
type strippedAppYaml struct {
	Deployed bool              `yaml:"deployed"`
	Env      map[string]string `yaml:"env"`
}

// buildUnitAppYaml renders the unit's app.yaml as bytes: the non-secret env PLUS the portable secret
// values (D5). Deterministic: yaml.v3 sorts map keys and the name lists come in stable metadata order,
// so identical input yields identical bytes (needed for the checksum-skip guard).
//
// This is the ONE place the capture side decides what does and does not reach the drive — there is no
// second path that writes a unit app.yaml. The caller writes the result 0600.
func buildUnitAppYaml(info RecoveryInfo) []byte {
	env := make(map[string]string, len(info.NonSecretEnv)+len(info.PortableSecrets))
	for k, v := range info.NonSecretEnv {
		env[k] = v
	}
	// Portable secrets last: NonSecretEnv is disjoint from the secret set by construction
	// (GetStackRecoveryInfo), so this cannot shadow a plain config value.
	for k, v := range info.PortableSecrets {
		env[k] = v
	}
	body, err := yaml.Marshal(strippedAppYaml{Deployed: true, Env: env})
	if err != nil {
		body = []byte("deployed: true\nenv: {}\n")
	}
	header := "# Captured by felhom-controller recovery unit.\n" +
		"# This file CARRIES SECRETS (D5) so a Tier-1/2 restore needs the drive and nothing else:\n" +
		"# data-encrypting keys, database passwords and internal signing secrets. Mode 0600.\n"
	if len(info.PortableSecretEnvVars) > 0 {
		header += "# Carried: " + strings.Join(info.PortableSecretEnvVars, ", ") + "\n"
	}
	// The withheld class is named, not valued — an operator reading the unit must be able to see WHY a
	// credential is missing rather than suspecting a capture bug.
	if withheld := withheldSecretNames(info); len(withheld) > 0 {
		header += "# WITHHELD (internet-reachable logins — stay in the guest, regenerated on restore): " +
			strings.Join(withheld, ", ") + "\n"
	}
	return []byte(header + string(body))
}

// withheldSecretNames returns the secret names deliberately NOT carried by the unit, in stable order.
func withheldSecretNames(info RecoveryInfo) []string {
	portable := make(map[string]bool, len(info.PortableSecretEnvVars))
	for _, n := range info.PortableSecretEnvVars {
		portable[n] = true
	}
	var out []string
	for _, n := range info.SecretEnvVars {
		if !portable[n] {
			out = append(out, n)
		}
	}
	return out
}

// writeManifest writes the manifest JSON atomically.
func writeManifest(dst string, manifest *RecoveryManifest) error {
	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(manifest, "", "  ")
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return atomicWrite(dst, append(data, '\n'), 0644)
}

// readManifest reads an existing recovery-unit manifest (nil if absent or unparseable).
func readManifest(path string) *RecoveryManifest {
	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		return nil
	}
	var m RecoveryManifest
	if json.Unmarshal(data, &m) != nil {
		return nil
	}
	return &m
}

func sha256Hex(data []byte) string {
	sum := sha256.Sum256(data)
	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}

func stringMapEqual(a, b map[string]string) bool {
	if len(a) != len(b) {
		return false
	}
	for k, v := range a {
		if b[k] != v {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

func stringSliceEqual(a, b []string) bool {
	if len(a) != len(b) {
		return false
	}
	for i := range a {
		if a[i] != b[i] {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

// listFileNames returns the names of files with the given suffix in dir (sorted, none if absent).
func listFileNames(dir, suffix string) []string {
	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
	if err != nil {
		return nil
	}
	var names []string
	for _, e := range entries {
		if !e.IsDir() && strings.HasSuffix(e.Name(), suffix) {
			names = append(names, e.Name())
		}
	}
	sort.Strings(names)
	return names
}

// atomicWrite writes data to path via a .tmp file + rename.
func atomicWrite(path string, data []byte, perm os.FileMode) error {
	tmp := path + ".tmp"
	f, err := os.OpenFile(tmp, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, perm)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if _, err := io.Copy(f, strings.NewReader(string(data))); err != nil {
		f.Close()
		os.Remove(tmp)
		return err
	}
	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
		os.Remove(tmp)
		return err
	}
	if err := os.Rename(tmp, path); err != nil {
		os.Remove(tmp)
		return err
	}
	return nil
}