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REPORT — TASK-D Parts 12: dead-primary alerting (R-51) + boot reconciliation (R-52)

Controller v0.155.0 → v0.156.0. Session 2026-07-21, on DooPlex as kisfenyo. Status: SHIPPED, deployed via the floor save, and STOP-1 RAN — both legs passed (§6). P1 is answered (§4). The validation also surfaced a real pre-existing gap, filed as R-55 (§6). Nothing below claims live behaviour that was not observed.


1. Baselines (re-confirmed at session start)

Repo main @ start clean now
felhom-controller 0f9b29a yes 285dd10 (v0.156.0)
felhom-agent 08b55a1 yes 98adb72 (v0.92.1)
felhom.eu 50a7ffa yes docs commit (see §9)

Image: gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.156.0, pushed and never hand-deployed — the operator's floor save deployed it, which banked the R-23 single-fire datapoint for free: update successful (0.155.0 → 0.156.0) then Current version 0.156.0 is up to date. 9201 runs 0.156.0.


2. The defect R-51 actually fixes (the ROADMAP row was wrong)

The row says aggregation classifies a dead-primary stack unhealthy, and that IsDownState's deliberate unhealthy exclusion is therefore what suppresses the alarm. That is not what the code did. aggregateState's final branch was:

// Mix (some running, some stopped) — report as running (partial)
if running > 0 { return StateRunning }

So the immich stack read running, not unhealthy. IsDownState was never consulted about unhealthy at all, and the constraint the row protects was never in tension with the fix. The correction is recorded in the ROADMAP row itself.

The fix. New StateDegraded. The mixed branch asks each DOWN member for its docker restart policy: always / unless-stopped → docker was supposed to be keeping it up → the stack is degraded; no / on-failure → a finished one-shot init/migrate container → benign, stack stays running. IsDownState gains degraded and nothing elsedownstate_test.go is untouched and green, which is the fix-3 contract.

An unreadable policy counts as supervised — fail-CLOSED, deliberately the opposite of IsDownState's documented fail-open. They are different questions: there the state is ambiguous, here a member is known dead and only its excuse is missing. P2 backs it (§4).

Blast radius, decided per call site (StateDegraded is a stack-level aggregate and never a container state, so container-level code is untouched by construction):

Question the caller asks Sites Degraded counts as
"are there live containers to stop?" quiesce RunningAppStacks, delete stop-first guard ×2, export IsStackRunning, telemetry, health-probe eligibility up
"is this app working?" dashboard counter, stopped filter, dead-app banner + app_start_failed down
"did this come back healthy?" waitHealthy (migration), post-restore RefreshAndIsRunning, integrations readiness not healthy (left strict)

The health probe can no longer mask it: the probe result only ever overrides StateRunning, so a failing probe on a degraded stack cannot downgrade it to unhealthy (which would silence the alarm again). Asserted by the wiring test's second refresh.


3. R-52 — the recovery half

internal/bootrecon, one bounded sweep 5 s after startup (after the quiesce recovery, so the two never race for the same stack): at most 2 attempts, 30 s apart, then it stops and the alarm owns the problem. Never a loop. compose up -d exits 0 on a crash-loop, so success is decided by a fresh RefreshStatus, never by a nil error.

The safety argument is the container gate. The UI's Stop is compose down, which REMOVES the containers; a boot interruption leaves them behind as Exited. So "deployed, has containers, and they are down" is the boot-orphan signature, and a zero-container stack is never touched.

Worst case 5 s + 30 s = 35 s < the 90 s deadAppBootGrace, so a successful recovery never alerts and a failure alerts honestly. TestBootReconcileFitsInsideTheBootGrace asserts that arithmetic instead of leaving it in a comment.


4. Phase-0 probes

P2 (R-51 one-shot census) — DONE, and the answer is clean. All 53 catalog templates, 78 services: every single one is unless-stopped. Zero services with no / on-failure / absent. (The other 30 compose files under output/ are generated artifacts, not templates.) So the restart-policy guard protects a case that does not exist in today's catalog — it is there for future templates and for the fail-closed decision above, and it costs one cached docker inspect per down member of a mixed stack.

P1 (why unless-stopped did not resurrect immich/calibre-web) — ANSWERED during STOP-1, and the F5 hypothesis is CONFIRMED. It was never made a blocker (the reconciliation is correct either way), and it fell out of the R-52 leg for free, as predicted. bookstack carries restart=unless-stopped; the Docker daemon came up at ~10:53:15Z; the container's StartedAt is 10:53:28.05Z, the exact moment bootrecon's StartStack returned. Docker did not bring it back — a container stopped before shutdown is recorded user-stopped and stays down. Details in §6.

P3/P4 were agent-side — see felhom-agent/REPORT.md.


5. Tests and red-proofs

Green gate: go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...all 25 packages ok (full run, -count=1; internal/backup alone takes 174 s).

New: internal/stacks/degraded_test.go (8 cases incl. two production-path tests), internal/bootrecon/bootrecon_test.go (8 cases), cmd/controller/bootrecon_wiring_test.go (4).

# Red-proof Mutation Result
A dead primary must alert mix branch → return StateRunning FAIL ×3aggregateState = "running", want "degraded"; both production-path tests report immich state = "running". Restored, green.
C the boot sweep must be wired go runBootReconcile(...) commented out in main() FAILfunc main() no longer starts the R-52 boot reconciliation. Restored, green.
D a user-stopped app must stay stopped zero-container gate dropped from isBootOrphan FAIL ×2StartStack("jellyfin") called 1 times, want 0 — a deliberate Stop must survive a reboot. Restored, green.

A finding from red-proof C, worth more than the fix it guards. That wiring test was first written as strings.Contains(src, "go runBootReconcile(ctx, stackMgr, logger)"). Its red-proof passed — because commenting the call out leaves the string in the file. A test whose own red-proof cannot fail it is decoration. Rewritten as an AST walk over func main()'s body for a GoStmt calling runBootReconcile; the red-proof then failed as it must. Recorded in REUSE.md and promoted into documentation/PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md §10 (Part-5 rider).

Seam discipline (§9 rule 6). Both features have a production-path test:

  • R-51: TestRefreshStatus_WiresDegradedThroughTheRealPath drives the whole real chain — RefreshStatusdocker psaggregateStatedocker inspect — through a new execFn seam at the process boundary, and asserts the inspect COUNT (exactly 1: only the down member of the mixed stack, never the healthy stack; still 1 after a second refresh, proving the cache).
  • R-52: the sweep is asserted from package main, plus the AST wiring test above.

6. Live validation — STOP-1 RAN, both legs PASSED (operator-present)

Method: the exact endpoints the UI calls, driven from inside guest 9201 through traefik (--resolve felhom.demo-felhom.eu:443:127.0.0.1, session cookie + CSRF token), plus container-level truth from docker ps -a and the controller's own log. No browser (none on DooPlex). The session cookie jar was deleted from the guest afterwards.

Deploy first, per the resolved ordering: the operator saved the floor → 0.156.0, the box self-updated, and the R-23 datapoint came free — [selfupdate] Post-update startup: update successful (0.155.0 → 0.156.0) then Current version 0.156.0 is up to date: one swap, no re-fire.

Leg A — R-51, the dead primary (12:50:40 → 12:51:52 CEST)

Time Event
12:50:40 docker stop immich-server → `exited
12:50:53 stack state = degraded (13 s). `immich-server -> exited
10:51:11Z exactly ONE Event pushed: app_start_failed (warn) — Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: Immich — single-fire verified by grep -c, = 1
Dashboard: banner "Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: Immich (degraded)" + link Rendszermonitor, and the new „Részlegesen leállt" label present in the rendered page
12:51:37 docker start immich-server
12:51:52 state back to running; banner self-cleared (state-based, as designed)

The (degraded) in the banner is the English-state wart predicted in §7 — visible now, pre-existing, still a copy decision rather than a bug.

Leg B — R-52, the boot orphans (12:53:07 CEST reboot)

Fixture: docker stop on bookstack (2 containers) and calibre-web (containers left in place); UI Stop on immich via POST /api/stacks/immich/stop (compose down → 0 containers). Then pct reboot 9201.

10:53:22Z [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [bookstack] — up to 2 attempt(s)
10:53:28Z [bootrecon] attempt 1/2: started "bookstack" (took 6.0s)
10:53:28Z [bootrecon] complete: 1 app(s) recovered in 1 attempt(s): [bookstack]

Zero app_start_failed since the reboot — a successful recovery inside the boot grace is silent, which was the design claim. And the quiet path is observable on the healthy box too: the earlier 0.156.0 boot logged Boot reconciliation: no boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start), so "nothing to do" and "never ran" are distinguishable in production, not just in a test.

P1 — answered, and the F5 hypothesis CONFIRMED

bookstack carries restart=unless-stopped. The Docker daemon came up at ~10:53:15Z. The container's StartedAt is 10:53:28.05Z — the exact moment bootrecon's StartStack returned. Docker's own restart policy did not resurrect it: a container stopped before shutdown is recorded user-stopped and stays down across the reboot. Only R-52 brought it back. That is the F5 hypothesis the audit could not test, settled with direct evidence and at zero extra cost.

The finding this leg produced — new R-55 (it is the opposite of what the leg set out to prove)

Leg B was designed to show that a customer's deliberate Stop survives a reboot. It does not — for any drive-backed app. immich, stopped from the UI seconds earlier, came back running:

10:53:18Z [gate] boot …: live bind confirmed — recreating drive-backed app immich (state=stopped) onto /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1
10:53:18Z [stacks] Stopping stack: immich   →   Starting stack: immich

internal/web/intermediary.go's boot bind gate selects on cfg.Deployed && HDD_PATH alone and runs StopStack + StartStack on every match; the stack's state is passed in for the log line only and never consulted. calibre-web went the same way; bookstack, not drive-backed, fell through to R-52 — which is why the sweep found exactly one orphan.

R-52 is not implicated. Its own gate behaved exactly as specified: immich, at zero containers, was never a candidate. But two things follow and need an operator ruling rather than a drive-by fix (the gate exists to fix a real bind-ordering bug and must keep doing that):

  1. A customer's Stop is silently undone on drive-backed apps at every reboot.
  2. R-52's practical scope on a real box is narrower than the brief assumed — the gate reaches every drive-backed app first, so the boot-orphan sweep only ever sees the remainder.

Filed as R-55; likely shape is that the gate should recreate only apps that were RUNNING at shutdown, i.e. the same running/stopped distinction R-52 already draws.

6b. What was NOT claimed live

Nothing beyond the above. What is verified without the box: the full green gate, all four design gates (template_id_gate.py, emoji_gate.py, native_confirm_gate.py, offbox_rename_gate.py — all OK), and the image build+push.


7. UI surfaces (Hungarian)

New state label „Részlegesen leállt", warn colour token, icon (shared with unhealthy), counted with the stopped apps, filtered into the stopped bucket, and routeUnpublished → true (when the dead member is the routed one Traefik withholds the route and the URL 404s — the card must not imply the app is reachable). No new customer strings were needed for the alarm itself: the existing app_start_failed sentence („Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: …") is reused unchanged, which is why R-51 ships without touching the notifier.

One honest wart carried forward, not introduced: the dead-app banner appends the raw state in English — it will now read (degraded) where it read (stopped). Pre-existing behaviour; changing it is a copy decision, not part of this fix.


8. A workspace trap found the hard way (worth more than this task)

controller/.gitignore line 7 is controller — intended for the built binary. It also matches the directory controller/cmd/controller/. Two consequences, both live today:

  1. ripgrep (and therefore the Grep tool) silently skips cmd/controller/main.go — the entire production wiring file. Early in this session that produced a false "the whole fix-3 dead-app path has no production caller" reading — exactly the inert-seam conclusion this task is about. grep -rn --no-ignore / plain grep -rn (without --include) shows it.
  2. New files under cmd/controller/ need git add -f. bootrecon_wiring_test.go was refused by a plain git add — as part of a multi-path add, i.e. quietly. A wiring test that never reaches the repo is the same defect class it exists to prevent.

Recorded in the commit message and REUSE.md. Worth a .gitignore fix (anchored /controller) as its own XS change — deliberately not smuggled into this task.


9. Deliverables

  • 285dd10 — v0.156.0 code + tests + CHANGELOG + REUSE + README.
  • Image felhom-controller:0.156.0 pushed; not deployed.
  • Docs in felhom.eu: ROADMAP R-51/R-52 → SHIPPED (with the corrected R-51 diagnosis), new R-54 row, a new capability-map row (IMPLEMENTED — not PROVEN-LIVE, the live legs have not run), and the two Part-5 riders.

10. Operator actions outstanding

  1. STOP-1 (controller legs) — needs 0.156.0 live; see the ordering question in felhom.eu/REPORT.md §5.
  2. STOP-3 floor → 0.156.0, which is also what deploys it.
  3. P1's answer falls out of STOP-1's reboot leg for free — worth recording either way.