f037be7a6a
gates / gates (push) Successful in 48s
R-970: /api/config, /api/config/hash, /api/config/apply removed (they read and replaced controller.yaml with every secret, reachable with the box's own hub API key, unsigned; nothing called them). The hub-key Bearer door on /api/selfupdate/ and /api/geo/ and the matching CSRF exemption are gone; the dashboard keeps using those with a session. The route table is buildMux, so a test drives the real one. Data tab: the export password field is autocomplete=new-password with a non-login name; the 2nd copy's status rows that repeated the form are gone (the no-target reason moves into the form). R-1103: app_fields.html loses its installed-only branches (no page serves them since R-1095); the tests that rendered that dead path are retired, their rules asserted on the settings tab (R-694 moved there). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
112 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
112 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package web
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import (
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"crypto/subtle"
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"fmt"
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"html/template"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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const csrfFormField = "_csrf"
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const csrfHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
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// CsrfProtect validates CSRF tokens on unsafe HTTP methods (POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH).
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// Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) pass through unchanged.
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//
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// Exempt cases:
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// - Auth is disabled (no password configured)
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func (s *Server) CsrfProtect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Safe methods: no CSRF check needed
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Skip CSRF if auth is disabled (no password set = open access)
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if !s.authEnabled() {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Claim/reset POSTs carry their OWN pre-auth HMAC CSRF (validated in the handler) — the
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// customer resetting a claimed box has no session yet, so the session-CSRF path can't apply.
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// The guest launcher share password POST (/s/<token>, v0.165.0) is the same shape: no admin
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// session, own pre-auth HMAC CSRF (validShareCSRF). The admin share-management POSTs live
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// under /launcher/share/* and are NOT exempted — they ride the normal session CSRF below.
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if r.URL.Path == "/claim" || r.URL.Path == "/claim/request-new-code" || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/s/") {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// The anonymous language switch (v0.254.0, R-557). Exempt for a narrow and checkable reason:
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// the ONLY thing it can achieve is to change the language of the page the victim's own browser
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// shows them. It writes one display-only cookie, reads nothing, touches no setting, and its
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// redirect cannot leave this box (safeBackPath). A CSRF token here would also be unobtainable:
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// the visitor has no session to mint one from. **If this handler ever gains a second effect,
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// it needs CSRF that day** — the exemption is for what it does, not for where it lives.
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if r.URL.Path == langCookiePath {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// v0.322.0 (R-970): no Bearer exemption. It existed for the routes that accepted the box's hub API key
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// (/api/config/, /api/selfupdate/, /api/geo/); none does now, so a request carrying that key is a dashboard
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// request like any other and needs the session's CSRF token. Pinned by TestR970_HubKeyIsNoCSRFExemption.
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// Get the session's CSRF token
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cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
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if err != nil {
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s.csrfReject(w, r, "no session cookie")
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return
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}
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expected := s.csrfTokenForSession(cookie.Value)
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if expected == "" {
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s.csrfReject(w, r, "invalid or expired session")
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return
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}
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// Check form field first, then header (for fetch/AJAX calls)
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submitted := r.FormValue(csrfFormField)
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if submitted == "" {
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submitted = r.Header.Get(csrfHeaderName)
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}
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if submitted == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(submitted), []byte(expected)) != 1 {
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s.csrfReject(w, r, "token mismatch")
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// csrfReject sends a 403 response. Returns JSON for /api/ paths, plain text otherwise.
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func (s *Server) csrfReject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, reason string) {
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s.logger.Printf("[WARN] CSRF rejected: %s %s from %s (%s)", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.RemoteAddr, reason)
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if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
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fmt.Fprint(w, `{"ok":false,"error":"CSRF token missing or invalid"}`)
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return
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}
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http.Error(w, "CSRF token missing or invalid. Please reload the page and try again.", http.StatusForbidden)
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}
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// csrfToken returns the CSRF token for the current request's session.
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func (s *Server) csrfToken(r *http.Request) string {
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cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
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if err != nil {
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return ""
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}
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return s.csrfTokenForSession(cookie.Value)
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}
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// csrfField returns an HTML hidden input for embedding in forms.
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func (s *Server) csrfField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
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token := s.csrfToken(r)
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return template.HTML(`<input type="hidden" name="` + csrfFormField + `" value="` + template.HTMLEscapeString(token) + `">`)
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}
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