Files
felhom-controller/controller/internal/web/csrf.go
T
admin 48f3336956
gates / gates (push) Successful in 23s
v0.254.0 — the saved notes follow the language, and the switch becomes a globe (R-557 slice 2 release C; SLICE 2 CLOSED)
The notes a background run SAVES — last night's backup line, the last error, the proof
result, the restore outcome — are written in the BOX's language at the moment they are
written. A household that switches sees the previous run's note in the old language until
the next run rewrites it: the operator's §16 option 1, stated rather than hidden.
EndRestoreOp no longer receives a Hungarian literal from anywhere.

The language switch is a globe. Two text links wrapped in the sidebar footer and asked the
reader to recognise "Magyar"/"English" as links; a globe is the one symbol every web user
already reads as "language", so nobody has to read Hungarian to escape Hungarian. It is
<details>/<summary> — a menu with no script, drawn inline because the icon sprite lives
only in layout.html and the visitor pages have their own shell.

Those visitor pages get the same globe, and a visitor's choice stays theirs: a display-only
felhom_lang cookie that langFor reads ONLY when there is no session. A signed-in household
can never inherit a language a previous visitor picked in the same browser. POST /lang is
CSRF-exempt for a narrow reason written at the exemption — its only achievable effect is the
language of the page the victim's own browser shows them — and safeBackPath refuses
//evil.example as well as https://, because "starts with /" alone is not the test. §16 taken:
a successful claim carries the cookie into the household's setting.

TWO PARITY EXCEPTIONS, MEASURED: 106 fixtures compared with a real diff — exactly two change
shapes (the dashboard footer, the globe in the shells) and 5 byte-identical, which are the
three pages that must not change.

I INTRODUCED A DEADLOCK AND THE SUITE CAUGHT IT BY HANGING. UpdateOffboxStatus holds the
settings write lock while running its callback; boxLang() wants the read lock; sync.RWMutex
is not reentrant. On a real box an off-site run would have hung forever HOLDING the settings
lock. Fixed by resolving the language before the callback, and guarded by a test that names
the file and line in a second instead of hanging for 25 minutes.

MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
2026-09-18 14:19:31 +02:00

121 lines
4.3 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
const csrfFormField = "_csrf"
const csrfHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
// CsrfProtect validates CSRF tokens on unsafe HTTP methods (POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH).
// Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) pass through unchanged.
//
// Exempt cases:
// - Auth is disabled (no password configured)
// - Request has a valid Authorization: Bearer header (API key / hub auth)
func (s *Server) CsrfProtect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Safe methods: no CSRF check needed
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Skip CSRF if auth is disabled (no password set = open access)
if !s.authEnabled() {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Claim/reset POSTs carry their OWN pre-auth HMAC CSRF (validated in the handler) — the
// customer resetting a claimed box has no session yet, so the session-CSRF path can't apply.
// The guest launcher share password POST (/s/<token>, v0.165.0) is the same shape: no admin
// session, own pre-auth HMAC CSRF (validShareCSRF). The admin share-management POSTs live
// under /launcher/share/* and are NOT exempted — they ride the normal session CSRF below.
if r.URL.Path == "/claim" || r.URL.Path == "/claim/request-new-code" || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/s/") {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// The anonymous language switch (v0.254.0, R-557). Exempt for a narrow and checkable reason:
// the ONLY thing it can achieve is to change the language of the page the victim's own browser
// shows them. It writes one display-only cookie, reads nothing, touches no setting, and its
// redirect cannot leave this box (safeBackPath). A CSRF token here would also be unobtainable:
// the visitor has no session to mint one from. **If this handler ever gains a second effect,
// it needs CSRF that day** — the exemption is for what it does, not for where it lives.
if r.URL.Path == langCookiePath {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Skip CSRF for Bearer-token authenticated requests.
// Validate the token against the configured API key before skipping.
if auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
apiKey := s.cfg.Hub.APIKey
if apiKey != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(apiKey)) == 1 {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Invalid Bearer token — fall through to CSRF validation
}
// Get the session's CSRF token
cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil {
s.csrfReject(w, r, "no session cookie")
return
}
expected := s.csrfTokenForSession(cookie.Value)
if expected == "" {
s.csrfReject(w, r, "invalid or expired session")
return
}
// Check form field first, then header (for fetch/AJAX calls)
submitted := r.FormValue(csrfFormField)
if submitted == "" {
submitted = r.Header.Get(csrfHeaderName)
}
if submitted == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(submitted), []byte(expected)) != 1 {
s.csrfReject(w, r, "token mismatch")
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// csrfReject sends a 403 response. Returns JSON for /api/ paths, plain text otherwise.
func (s *Server) csrfReject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, reason string) {
s.logger.Printf("[WARN] CSRF rejected: %s %s from %s (%s)", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.RemoteAddr, reason)
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"ok":false,"error":"CSRF token missing or invalid"}`)
return
}
http.Error(w, "CSRF token missing or invalid. Please reload the page and try again.", http.StatusForbidden)
}
// csrfToken returns the CSRF token for the current request's session.
func (s *Server) csrfToken(r *http.Request) string {
cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return s.csrfTokenForSession(cookie.Value)
}
// csrfField returns an HTML hidden input for embedding in forms.
func (s *Server) csrfField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
token := s.csrfToken(r)
return template.HTML(`<input type="hidden" name="` + csrfFormField + `" value="` + template.HTMLEscapeString(token) + `">`)
}