felhom-controller/LIVE-DRIVE-FINDINGS-2026-06-14.md

LIVE-DRIVE-FINDINGS — felhom-controller end-to-end live drive

• Date: 2026-06-14
• Branch: audit/2026-06-14-live-drive
• Versions under test: controller v0.60.0, agent v0.30.0, hub v0.11.0 (per runbook)
• Target: demo guest 9201 (demo-felhom) on Proxmox host felhom-pve (192.168.0.162)
• Mode: unattended discovery drive — find bugs, do NOT fix. Destructive ops authorized (demo disposable).

Control-plane access method used

The demo dashboard has no password set, so the controller's RequireAuth and CsrfProtect middleware both skip (auth.go / csrf.go). The full REST API + web forms are therefore open over the public URL https://felhom.demo-felhom.eu. I drive the controller as a user would via that URL (NOT the container IP, which 404s on a network/mux nuance). Host SSH (root@felhom-pve) + pct exec/docker exec are used only for baseline setup and ground-truth verification — never to perform the operation under test.

• Verified: GET /api/health → {"ok":true}; GET /settings and GET / → 200 without auth.

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Progress log (timestamped, Europe/Budapest)

• ~start — Baseline captured. Controller :0.60.0 Up (healthy), agent 0.30.0 active. 55 stacks in catalog; deployed/running: actualbudget (only customer app) + protected infra traefik, cloudflared, filebrowser. RomM is currently not_deployed (memory/CONTEXT said it was the live HDD app — state has since changed). Headroom: rootfs 32G (29G free), docker-data 252G (238G free). Disks: felhom-usb (user-data, data_bearing, /dev/sdb1, uuid:277a2179…), local + local-lvm (system), felhom-pbs (backup, 192.168.0.180:felhom-spike). Hub-side online status TBD.

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BASELINE

Item	Value
Controller image/status	gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.60.0 Up (healthy)
Agent	felhom-agent 0.30.0, systemd active
Guest rootfs	32G total, 29G avail (4% used)
Guest docker-data (/var/lib/docker)	252G total, 238G avail (1% used)
Guest RAM (LXC cgroup)	2048 MB (config memory: 2048, swap 512)
Deployed customer apps	actualbudget
Protected infra running	traefik, cloudflared, filebrowser, felhom-controller
Disks	felhom-usb (HDD, user-data), local/local-lvm (system), felhom-pbs (offsite backup)

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FINDINGS

F1 — Memory metric reports HOST RAM (16GB), not the guest's 2GB cap — HIGH

• Area: §11 monitoring accuracy / deploy headroom guard
• Action: GET /api/system/info; cross-checked with free inside the LXC and the LXC config.
• Expected: memory total ≈ the guest's 2048 MB cgroup limit.
• Actual: /api/system/info → total_mem_mb: 15771, avail_mem_mb: 13577. The LXC is capped at 2048 MB (/etc/pve/lxc/9201.conf: memory: 2048); free -m inside the LXC correctly shows 2048. The controller Docker container reads the host /proc/meminfo (MemTotal: 16150380 kB ≈ 15772 MB) because lxcfs is not bind-mounted into the container and its cgroup memory.max = max (no Docker memory limit).
• Evidence:
  • LXC free -m: Mem: 2048 ... available 1829
  • controller container head -1 /proc/meminfo: MemTotal: 16150380 kB; cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max → max
  • /etc/pve/lxc/9201.conf: memory: 2048, swap: 512
• Impact: The monitoring memory bar and (critically) the deploy memory-headroom guard believe the guest has ~13.5 GB free when only ~1.8 GB is usable. An operator deploying apps by that figure will OOM-kill the 2 GB guest. The 3-app bound in the runbook exists precisely because the real ceiling is 2 GB, which the UI hides.
• Verdict: broken (misleading metric + unsafe headroom basis). Severity: HIGH.

F2 — hdd_configured: false despite an attached user-data HDD — LOW (verify)

• /api/system/info reports hdd_configured: false even though felhom-usb (HDD, role user-data, data_bearing) is attached and mounted at /mnt/felhom-usb. To confirm whether this gates any HDD-app deploy UI. Severity TBD.

F3 — Hungarian catalog text double-UTF-8-encoded in API JSON — LOW (verify)

• GET /api/stacks returns descriptions like Személyes pénzügyek (mojibake for "Személyes pénzügyek"). Looks like double-encoding. Need to confirm whether the rendered HTML UI is affected or only the JSON API. Severity TBD.

F5 — uptime-kuma: broken catalog healthcheck → permanently unhealthy → total 404 outage via Traefik — HIGH

• Area: §2 deploy / §2b health detection / §3 routing — a cascade.
• Action: deployed uptime-kuma (POST /api/stacks/uptime-kuma/deploy), observed state, then traced the 404.
• Expected: deploy → healthy → status.demo-felhom.eu serves the app (200).
• Actual / evidence — the cascade:
  1. Catalog bug: /opt/docker/stacks/uptime-kuma/docker-compose.yml defines healthcheck.test: ["CMD","node","/app/extra/healthcheck.mjs"], but in the louislam/uptime-kuma:2 image that file does not exist → docker inspect health log: Error: Cannot find module '/app/extra/healthcheck.mjs', Health=unhealthy FailingStreak=5.
  2. The app process is actually fine — curl http://uptime-kuma:3001/ from a peer container → 302 (serving).
  3. Traefik gates route registration on Docker health. On the websecure (443) entrypoint, status.demo-felhom.eu → 404, while every healthy app (tasks/recipes/share/paste) → 200. The HTTP→HTTPS redirect on :80 returns 301 for all hosts (global catch-all), which masks the missing 443 router. So the unhealthy container's TLS router is never published.
  4. Net result: uptime-kuma is completely unreachable at its URL (404) for the customer, despite the app running — purely because of a wrong healthcheck path in the catalog.
• Verdict: broken. Severity: HIGH. Two issues to file: (a) catalog healthcheck wrong for uptime-kuma:2; (b) design risk — any app with a broken/too-slow healthcheck doesn't just show "unhealthy", it becomes a hard 404 outage. The controller's deploy returns success and the dashboard shows "deployed (unhealthy)", giving no hint that the URL is dead. Consider surfacing "route not published because unhealthy" to the operator.
• Good part: the controller did correctly detect and surface unhealthy (GET /api/stacks/uptime-kuma → state=unhealthy) — health detection itself works.

F6 — Deploy POST returns "deployed" optimistically, before compose completes / before health is known — MEDIUM (API contract)

• Action: timed POST /api/stacks/<app>/deploy vs controller logs.
• Evidence: vikunja POST returned ~0s but log shows compose took 3.4s; uptime-kuma POST returned ~0s but compose pull took 31.7s and the app ended unhealthy. The response {"ok":true,"message":"Stack <app> deployed"} is sent before the container is up and regardless of eventual health.
• Impact: This is the documented in-memory Deployed=true-before-compose up pattern (avoids the card flipping back mid-pull), and the UI compensates by polling GET /api/stacks/<app>. But the API message "deployed" is misleading — an API consumer (or a script) that trusts the POST result will think a broken/unhealthy app succeeded (see F5). Verdict: clunky/misleading message; not a data-integrity bug. Severity: MEDIUM.

F7 — API state lags Docker health by ~10s after deploy — LOW

• mealie's container reported (healthy) in docker ps ~12s before GET /api/stacks/mealie flipped from starting to running. Cosmetic polling lag; transient. Severity: LOW.

F8 — cloudflared TUNNEL_TOKEN stored in plaintext in docker-compose.yml — LOW/INFO

• The cloudflared infra stack's compose holds TUNNEL_TOKEN=<redacted> in plaintext on disk (not enc:-wrapped like app.yaml secrets). May be acceptable for an infra/base-bringup stack, but worth confirming against the "secrets must be encrypted at rest" posture. Token redacted here. Severity: LOW/INFO.

F9 — felhom-usb HDD is NOT passed through to guest 9201 → HDD apps undeployable; disk APIs misrepresent it as available — CRITICAL

• Area: §2 HDD deploy / §7b data migration / §11 storage.
• Action: POST /api/stacks/romm/deploy with HDD_PATH=/mnt/felhom-usb (the path /api/disks reports). Then traced the guest/container mount topology.
• Expected: an HDD-requiring app (romm) deploys onto the user-data HDD.
• Actual:
  • Deploy rejected at field validation: {"ok":false,"error":"path \"/mnt/felhom-usb\" does not exist for field \"Adattárolási útvonal\""}.
  • The HDD is not in the guest. /etc/pve/lxc/9201.conf has only mp0 (docker-data → /var/lib/docker) and mp9 (bootstrap, ro). No mountpoint for felhom-usb. findmnt in the guest shows /mnt is just pve-vm-9201-disk-0[/mnt] — a subdir of the 32G rootfs.
  • The controller's only "drive" is /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data, which df inside the controller confirms is on /dev/mapper/pve-vm--9201--disk--0 (the 32G OS rootfs), not a data drive.
  • The HDD does exist on the Proxmox host: findmnt /mnt/felhom-usb → /dev/sdb1 ext4 915.8G, containing real data (felhom-data, images, storage, Dokumentumok, …). It is host-mounted but never bind-mounted into the LXC.
• Source-of-truth disconnect: /api/disks reports felhom-usb state:attached, role:user-data, data_bearing:true, mount_path:/mnt/felhom-usb; /api/host-metrics reports the same drive as content: "backup". Both are the agent's host-side view and say "attached/reachable", but the guest/controller genuinely cannot see it. Meanwhile /api/system/info correctly reports hdd_configured:false (the controller's local view). Three endpoints, two contradictory stories about whether the customer has usable external storage.
• Impact: All HDD-requiring apps (romm, nextcloud, immich, jellyfin, paperless-ngx, plex, navidrome, audiobookshelf, komga, calibre-web, emby, sonarr, radarr — 13 of 55) are undeployable. A user who reads /api/disks and enters /mnt/felhom-usb gets a confusing rejection. If they instead pick the offered sys_drive, their "external storage" app data silently lands on the 32G OS disk — the exact failure the OS/data-split slice was meant to prevent.
• Root context: the 2026-06-13 re-provision of 9201 left "RomM/USB re-enroll" as a documented pending step (CONTEXT.md); this drive confirms it was never completed and that the agent's disk APIs do not reflect the gap — they advertise the HDD as usable. The honest customer-facing status should be "external drive present on host but not attached to your server".
• Verdict: broken. Severity: CRITICAL (blocks a quarter of the catalog + risks silent data-on-OS-disk placement; API misrepresents storage availability). This is the data-migration verdict: cannot be exercised — there is no second/HDD drive attached to the guest to migrate to or from.

F10 — Crash-loop detection works (controller reports restarting, not false "running") — PASS (with a brief initial window) — INFO

• Area: §2b — the crash-loop-exit-0 trap.
• Method: created a fixture stack brokentest (alpine, command: sh -c 'echo booting; sleep 3; echo crashing; exit 1', restart: always) in the stacks dir, picked up on a controller restart, then deployed it via POST /api/stacks/brokentest/deploy and watched the state.
• Result: docker compose up -d returned exit 0 and the deploy POST returned {"ok":true,"message":"Stack brokentest deployed"} (F6 again). For the first ~10s the API reported state=running (the container was genuinely "Up" during its initial 3s sleep). Once it began crash-looping, the controller correctly transitioned to state=restarting and held there (docker oscillating Up↔Restarting (1)). It never falsely reported a stable "running"/healthy for a crashing container.
• Verdict: works. Caveat: there's a brief post-deploy window where a stack that will crash shows "running"; an operator watching the 3-step panel could see a momentary green before it flips to restarting. Severity: INFO (the lesson-#6 trap is handled).
• Note (deploy-page scan): a hand-created stack dir is only picked up by ScanStacks at controller startup — POST /api/sync (git catalog sync) does not rescan the local stacks dir, and there is no exposed manual-rescan endpoint (see F4). Minor operational gap.

F11 — "HDD-requiring" app deploys silently onto the 32G OS rootfs when no HDD is attached — MEDIUM

• Area: §2 / storage placement (related to F9).
• Action: with felhom-usb unavailable to the guest (F9), deployed romm with HDD_PATH=/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data.
• Actual: accepted; romm + romm-db (MariaDB) + romm-redis came up healthy, route arcade.demo-felhom.eu → 200. Appdata landed at /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/appdata/romm, which df confirms is the 32G OS rootfs (disk-0). No warning that an HDD-class app is being placed on the OS disk.
• Impact: for a real customer with a media app (jellyfin/immich/plex), bulk media would fill the 32G rootfs and the OS-headroom guard becomes the only backstop. The deploy UI offered no "this is your OS disk, not external storage" caution. Severity: MEDIUM.
• Positive: the multi-container DB app (MariaDB + redis + app) deployed and reached healthy cleanly — the deploy orchestration itself is solid.

F12 — Lifecycle ops (start/stop/restart/update/logs/optional-config) — PASS — INFO

• stop (vikunja): state→stopped; container removed from docker ps -a (i.e. "stop" performs a compose down, not a stop that leaves an Exited container — semantic note, functionally fine).
• start / restart: container back Up; tasks.demo-felhom.eu → 200 after restart (route survived).
• update (gokapi): completed in ~1s; container not recreated (Up 18 minutes preserved) because the image was unchanged — correct no-op behavior (compose pull + up with no new image).
• logs (GET /api/stacks/vikunja/logs?raw=1): returns real container logs (migrations, http started), timestamps current.
• optional-config (romm IGDB_CLIENT_ID): POST /api/stacks/romm/optional-config → persisted to app.yaml (plaintext, correct for a non-secret text field), romm restarted, and the env var was verified inside the running container (IGDB_CLIENT_ID=testclientid12345). Full round-trip works.
• remove guard: POST /api/stacks/brokentest/remove while running → correctly refused ("still running — stop it first"). After stop, remove succeeded; the stack directory is intentionally left on disk (so a catalog app can be redeployed) — by design.
• Verdict: all lifecycle operations work and stay consistent with ground truth. Severity: INFO (PASS).

F13 — Backup tiers: tier-1 + PBS offsite WORK; tier-2 honest no-target; but "primary" lives on the same OS disk as the data — MIXED (3-2-1 weakened by F9)

• Area: §5 backup.
• Tier-1 (primary recovery units + DB dumps): POST /api/backup/run → success. Recovery units (compose/ + manifest.json) created for all 7 deployed apps; romm's MariaDB dumped to backups/primary/romm/db-dumps/romm-mariadb.sql (44K). db_dump count=1 is correct — mealie runs embedded SQLite (single container, no postgres sidecar), so it has no SQL dump (captured as a volume in its unit). Verdict: works.
• Tier-2 (off-drive secondary): POST /api/backup/tier2 → ran, processed 1 HDD app (romm), and honestly refused: log Tier 2 for romm: no off-drive target — nincs másik fizikai meghajtó — a 2. mentéshez 2. meghajtó szükséges; backup-data shows secondary/romm/rsync exists:false. No silent failure, no rootfs-fill. Verdict: works (correct no-target handling).
• Tier-3 (PBS offsite, whole-guest): POST /api/guest-backup/trigger → created a new PBS snapshot. GET /api/guest-backup/status → phase done, started 2026-06-13T22:28:55Z, success, size 5.99GB, mode snapshot, crash_consistent. Verified in PBS itself (read-only pvesm list felhom-pbs --vmid 9201): new snapshot felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-06-13T22:28:56Z listed (3 snapshots total). Verdict: works end-to-end.
• The 3-2-1 weakness (HIGH-ish, consequence of F9): the "primary" tier (recovery units + DB dumps) is stored under /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups, which is the same 32G OS rootfs (disk-0) that holds the app data itself. So tier-1 gives zero protection against disk-0 loss — source and backup share a disk. With no second drive attached (F9), the only genuine off-host copy is PBS. Effective reality is "2 copies on the same disk + 1 PBS", not 3-2-1. The UI/dashboard 3-2-1 framing would overstate resilience here.
• Minor: /api/backup/status reports only db_dump + running/enabled — it does not surface recovery-unit or tier-2 status, so "is my backup complete?" requires multiple endpoints. The earlier guest-backup status briefly showed a stale prior run (20:27Z) before my new run appeared — momentary staleness, not a clock bug.

F14 — CTRL-T2-1 crash-window: crash mid-image-pull leaves stack NOT-deployed and redeployable — PASS — INFO

• Area: CTRL-T2-1 regression.
• Method: deployed code-server (uncached ~1GB image) with a password, confirmed the docker compose up -d pull subprocess was running, then docker kill felhom-controller mid-pull.
• On-disk state during the crash (read directly from the guest fs while controller down): app.yaml had deployed: false (only deployed_at was stamped at start; the deployed:true flag is written only on success).
• After restart: GET /api/stacks/code-server → state=not_deployed, deployed=False; no orphaned code-server container.
• Redeploy: allowed (no "already deployed; use update" refusal) → returned deployed → polled to running/healthy, code.demo-felhom.eu → 302, deployed: true persisted on success.
• Verdict: the fix works — no ghost-stuck stack. Severity: INFO (PASS).
• First-attempt note: an initial attempt without the (required) PASSWORD was rejected at validation before any pull — so a missing required field is caught pre-pull (good), and I had to supply the password to actually exercise the pull window.

F15 — docker kill/stop does NOT auto-restart the controller; bootstrap service is oneshot/Restart=no — MEDIUM (operational expectation)

• Area: §3 crash recovery / operational.
• Finding: the runbook states the bootstrap service "restarts it within seconds." In reality: felhom-controller-bootstrap.service is Type=oneshot, Restart=no (it ran once and exited). The container has --restart unless-stopped, but Docker treats an explicit docker kill/docker stop as a manual stop, so unless-stopped does not restart it (observed: RestartCount=0, stayed Exited (137) indefinitely; I had to docker start it manually).
• Impact: unless-stopped will restart the controller after a genuine unexpected death (panic/OOM/host reboot) — so real crash-recovery is covered. But there is no watchdog that recovers from a manual stop or a clean exit, and the bootstrap service does not re-run. An operator who docker stops the controller (or a tool that does) will find it stays down. The "auto-restarts within seconds" expectation is only partially true. Severity: MEDIUM (recovery assumption is narrower than documented).

F16 — Import/export round-trip + CTRL-001 path-traversal — PASS — INFO

• Export (vikunja → /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/exports/vikunja_*.fab): estimate → start → status all clean; .fab is a gzip tar (manifest.json, config/{.felhom.yml,app.yaml,docker-compose.yml}, data/volumes); manifest readable via POST /api/export/manifest (app_name, volume_names, config_files, encrypted flag). Works.
• Import round-trip: POST /api/export/import of the same .fab (over the live vikunja) succeeded; vikunja ended running, tasks.demo-felhom.eu → 200. Works.
• CTRL-001 — app_name traversal: crafted .fab with manifest.app_name = "../../../tmp/evil_appname" → import rejected at manifest parse: Manifest hiba: appexport: app_name "../../../tmp/evil_appname" must not contain a path separator; verified nothing written to /tmp, /opt, /opt/docker. PASS.
• CTRL-001 — tar-member traversal (tar-slip): crafted .fab with a valid app_name but a tar entry ../../../../tmp/evil_member → the member was not written to /tmp/evil_member (extraction sanitized the traversal). PASS. Minor: that bundle left an empty /opt/docker/stacks/eviltar dir (import got partway then failed "stack not found") — cleanup debt, not a security issue (I removed it).
• Verdict: export/import works; CTRL-001 is robustly enforced on both vectors with a clear error message. Severity: INFO (PASS).

F17 — Per-app restore does NOT restore data (DB dump never imported, volume tars not captured) — CRITICAL

• Area: §7 restore — the core disaster-recovery path.
• Method (real data-marker round-trip on romm/MariaDB):
  1. Inserted a marker row into romm's DB: felhom_restore_marker (1, 'MARKER-BEFORE-BACKUP-9921').
  2. POST /api/backup/run → confirmed the marker is in the captured dump (grep MARKER… romm-mariadb.sql → 1 hit).
  3. Dropped the table (simulated data loss) — confirmed gone.
  4. POST /backup/restore (stack_name=romm).
  5. Result: the marker table did NOT return — ERROR 1146: Table 'romm.felhom_restore_marker' doesn't exist after restore.
• What the restore actually did (from logs): stopped romm (compose down, volumes kept), secrets recovered=3/3, "Redeploying romm from recovery unit", compose up -d, "Restore-from-unit completed". The DB dump was never imported; the app simply came back on its surviving (post-drop) volume.
• Code confirmation: backup/restore_unit.go: RestoreFromRecoveryUnit → stackProvider.RecreateStackFromUnit(...) → (main.go:953) copies only docker-compose.yml + .felhom.yml from the unit and calls RedeployFromEnv. There is no DB-import (pg_restore/mysql </.sql replay) anywhere in internal/backup/*, and recovery units do not capture volume tars (F13). So the per-app restore is config + secrets only.
• Impact: the headline disaster-recovery feature does not recover data. A customer who loses DB content (corruption, bad migration, accidental delete) and clicks "restore" gets the app back with whatever was already in the volume — if the volume is intact, their loss is unchanged; if the volume is gone, the DB comes up empty. The carefully-captured DB dumps and recovery-unit manifests are effectively decorative for restore purposes. The only path that actually restores data is the PBS whole-guest snapshot (the agent's), which restores the entire LXC incl. the docker-data volume.
• What does work: secret recovery (3/3 from the guest's own app.yaml), the fail-closed data-key gate (Phase 2b, proven previously), and the app coming back healthy. The orchestration is fine; the data-replay step is simply missing.
• Verdict: broken. Severity: CRITICAL (restore advertised as data recovery does not restore data). Also: /backup/restore reads snapshot_id but ignores it (RestoreFromRecoveryUnit takes only the stack name) — there is no point-in-time selection; "restore" always means "re-create from the single latest unit."

F4 — /api/stacks/rescan returns "stack not found: rescan" — LOW

• The runbook's documented rescan endpoint GET /api/stacks/rescan is routed as a stack name lookup → {"ok":false,"error":"stack not found: rescan"}. Either the route was removed/renamed or the runbook is stale. (Sync/rescan is reachable via POST /api/sync.) Cosmetic but documents a stale/missing endpoint.