e02292aa1a
Adds an in-process orchestration test for RestoreFromRecoveryUnit: success path calls recreate with non-secret env + recovered secrets merged; data-key-missing path is REFUSED and recreate is never called. Makes Manager.isDebug nil-safe (behavior-neutral in prod; cfg is always set) so the gate/orchestration are testable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
128 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package backup
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import (
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"io"
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"log"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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)
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// TestRestoreFromRecoveryUnitOrchestration exercises the full in-process flow: read manifest →
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// recover secrets → apply gate → recreate with the reconciled env. It proves (a) on success the
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// recreate is called with non-secret env + recovered secrets merged, and (b) on a missing data-key the
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// restore is REFUSED and recreate is never called.
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func TestRestoreFromRecoveryUnitOrchestration(t *testing.T) {
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newUnit := func(t *testing.T) (drive string) {
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tmp := t.TempDir()
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drive = filepath.Join(tmp, "drive")
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// stripped (secret-free) app.yaml in the unit
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mustWrite(t, filepath.Join(RecoveryUnitComposePath(drive, "app"), "app.yaml"),
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"deployed: true\nenv:\n SUBDOMAIN: trips\n")
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man := &RecoveryManifest{SchemaVersion: 1, AppName: "app", ControllerVer: "v",
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SecretEnvVars: []string{"DB_PASSWORD", "SECRET_KEY"}, DataKeyEnvVars: []string{"SECRET_KEY"}}
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if err := writeManifest(RecoveryUnitManifestPath(drive, "app"), man); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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return drive
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}
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t.Run("success — recreate called with merged env", func(t *testing.T) {
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drive := newUnit(t)
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fake := &fakeRecoveryProvider{
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hdd: drive,
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running: true, // so the post-restore health wait returns promptly
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secrets: map[string]string{"DB_PASSWORD": "pw", "SECRET_KEY": "deadbeef"},
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}
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m := &Manager{logger: log.New(io.Discard, "", 0), systemDataPath: filepath.Join(drive, "..", "sys"),
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stackProvider: fake}
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if err := m.RestoreFromRecoveryUnit("app"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("restore: %v", err)
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}
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if fake.gotEnv == nil {
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t.Fatal("recreate was not called")
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}
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if fake.gotEnv["SUBDOMAIN"] != "trips" || fake.gotEnv["DB_PASSWORD"] != "pw" || fake.gotEnv["SECRET_KEY"] != "deadbeef" {
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t.Errorf("recreate got wrong env: %v", fake.gotEnv)
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}
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if !fake.stopped {
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t.Errorf("app should be stopped before restore")
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}
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})
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t.Run("data-key unrecoverable — REFUSED, recreate not called", func(t *testing.T) {
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drive := newUnit(t)
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fake := &fakeRecoveryProvider{
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hdd: drive,
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secrets: map[string]string{"DB_PASSWORD": "pw"}, // SECRET_KEY (data_key) missing
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}
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m := &Manager{logger: log.New(io.Discard, "", 0), systemDataPath: filepath.Join(drive, "..", "sys"),
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stackProvider: fake}
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err := m.RestoreFromRecoveryUnit("app")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected fail-closed refusal, got nil")
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}
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if fake.gotEnv != nil {
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t.Errorf("recreate must NOT be called on refusal, got %v", fake.gotEnv)
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}
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})
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}
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// TestReconcileRestoreSecrets covers the safety-critical fail-closed gate + secret reconciliation.
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func TestReconcileRestoreSecrets(t *testing.T) {
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nonSecret := map[string]string{"SUBDOMAIN": "trips", "DOMAIN": "demo-felhom.eu"}
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t.Run("all recovered, no data_key — full env, no error", func(t *testing.T) {
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recovered := map[string]string{"DB_PASSWORD": "pw", "SECRET_KEY": "deadbeef"}
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full, missing, err := reconcileRestoreSecrets(nonSecret, recovered,
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[]string{"DB_PASSWORD", "SECRET_KEY"}, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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if len(missing) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("missing: %v", missing)
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}
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// Non-secret + both secrets present, and recovered values used VERBATIM (regenerate nothing).
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if full["SUBDOMAIN"] != "trips" || full["DB_PASSWORD"] != "pw" || full["SECRET_KEY"] != "deadbeef" {
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t.Errorf("full env wrong: %v", full)
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}
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})
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t.Run("data_key missing — FAIL CLOSED (refuse)", func(t *testing.T) {
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recovered := map[string]string{"DB_PASSWORD": "pw"} // SECRET_KEY (a data_key) is gone
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full, _, err := reconcileRestoreSecrets(nonSecret, recovered,
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[]string{"DB_PASSWORD", "SECRET_KEY"}, []string{"SECRET_KEY"})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected fail-closed error for missing data-encrypting key, got nil")
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}
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if full != nil {
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t.Errorf("full env should be nil on refusal, got %v", full)
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}
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})
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t.Run("data_key empty value — FAIL CLOSED", func(t *testing.T) {
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recovered := map[string]string{"SECRET_KEY": ""} // present but empty == unrecoverable
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_, _, err := reconcileRestoreSecrets(nonSecret, recovered, []string{"SECRET_KEY"}, []string{"SECRET_KEY"})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("empty data-key value must fail closed")
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}
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})
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t.Run("resettable secret missing — proceed with warning", func(t *testing.T) {
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recovered := map[string]string{"SECRET_KEY": "deadbeef"} // data_key ok; DB_PASSWORD missing
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full, missing, err := reconcileRestoreSecrets(nonSecret, recovered,
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[]string{"DB_PASSWORD", "SECRET_KEY"}, []string{"SECRET_KEY"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("a missing resettable secret must NOT fail closed: %v", err)
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}
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if len(missing) != 1 || missing[0] != "DB_PASSWORD" {
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t.Errorf("missing should be [DB_PASSWORD], got %v", missing)
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}
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if full["SECRET_KEY"] != "deadbeef" {
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t.Errorf("data-key should be preserved verbatim: %v", full)
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}
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if _, present := full["DB_PASSWORD"]; present {
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t.Errorf("missing resettable secret should be absent, not regenerated")
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}
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})
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}
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