felhom-controller/controller/internal/backup/offsite_diag_test.go

package backup

import (
	"fmt"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/settings"
)

// the real demo-hp target shape — the values the sanitiser must remove literally
func diagTarget() *settings.OffboxTarget {
	return &settings.OffboxTarget{
		Host: "u629488-sub3.your-storagebox.de", User: "u629488-sub3",
		RepoPath: "/home/felhom-repo", Port: 23,
	}
}

// F-DIAG — four causes collapsed into one string, and that string was a RAW error passthrough.
//
// Two separate defects in one line of code:
//   - an operator could not tell a full quota from a dead network without reading logs;
//   - `err.Error()` from restic/ssh carries the repo reference `sftp:<user>@<host>:<path>`, so the
//     notification carried a customer-identifying location (and potentially a credential) off the box,
//     breaking the keys-not-values rule at the one place the text leaves the machine.

func TestClassifyOffsiteFailure_EachCauseIsDistinct(t *testing.T) {
	cases := []struct {
		name string
		err  error
		want OffsiteFailureClass
	}{
		{"quota gate", fmt.Errorf("A távoli mentés túllépte a tárhelykeretet (51/50 GB) — törölj régi mentéseket vagy kérj nagyobb keretet."), OffsiteFailQuota},
		{"orphaned repo", fmt.Errorf("probe: %w", ErrOffboxOrphaned), OffsiteFailOrphaned},
		{"no repo", fmt.Errorf("restic: unable to open config file: Stat: file does not exist\nIs there a repository at the following location?"), OffsiteFailNoRepo},
		{"no units", fmt.Errorf("off-box backup produced no snapshots: 3 app(s) toggled but no recovery unit was found on any connected drive (missing: a, b, c)"), OffsiteFailNoUnits},
		{"transport refused", fmt.Errorf("dial tcp 1.2.3.4:23: connect: connection refused"), OffsiteFailTransport},
		{"transport timeout", fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: i/o timeout"), OffsiteFailTransport},
		{"transport auth", fmt.Errorf("ssh: permission denied (publickey)"), OffsiteFailTransport},
		{"unclassified", fmt.Errorf("restic: some future error nobody has seen"), OffsiteFailUnknown},
	}
	seen := map[OffsiteFailureClass]bool{}
	for _, c := range cases {
		got := ClassifyOffsiteFailure(c.err)
		if got != c.want {
			t.Errorf("%s: class = %q, want %q", c.name, got, c.want)
		}
		seen[got] = true
	}
	// The whole point of F-DIAG: the causes must not collapse.
	if len(seen) < 5 {
		t.Errorf("only %d distinct classes across %d causes — the causes are still collapsing", len(seen), len(cases))
	}
}

// An unclassifiable error must say so rather than being folded into a neighbour. Inventing a precision
// the code does not have is how a confident-but-wrong diagnosis ships.
func TestClassifyOffsiteFailure_UnknownIsHonest(t *testing.T) {
	if got := ClassifyOffsiteFailure(fmt.Errorf("something entirely new")); got != OffsiteFailUnknown {
		t.Errorf("an unclassifiable error was folded into %q instead of being reported as unknown", got)
	}
	msg := offsiteFailureMessage(diagTarget(), fmt.Errorf("something entirely new"), time.Minute)
	if !strings.Contains(msg, "ismeretlen okból") {
		t.Errorf("the unknown case does not admit it is unknown: %q", msg)
	}
}

// THE SECRETS TEST. The repo reference must never survive into a message.
//
// RED-PROOF: make sanitiseOffsiteError return err.Error() unchanged → this fails with
// "the repo reference reached the message".
func TestOffsiteFailureMessage_NeverCarriesTheRepoReference(t *testing.T) {
	leaky := []error{
		fmt.Errorf(`Fatal: unable to open repository at sftp:u629488-sub3@u629488-sub3.your-storagebox.de:/home/felhom-repo: connection refused`),
		fmt.Errorf(`ssh: connect to host u629488-sub3.your-storagebox.de port 23: Connection refused`),
		fmt.Errorf(`restic: repo "sftp:u629488-sub3@u629488-sub3.your-storagebox.de:/home/felhom-repo" locked`),
	}
	for _, e := range leaky {
		msg := offsiteFailureMessage(diagTarget(), e, 42*time.Second)
		for _, forbidden := range []string{
			"sftp:",
			"your-storagebox.de",
			"u629488-sub3",
			"/home/felhom-repo",
		} {
			if strings.Contains(msg, forbidden) {
				t.Errorf("the repo reference reached the message (%q leaked):\n  %s", forbidden, msg)
			}
		}
		if !strings.Contains(msg, "<repo>") {
			t.Errorf("the redaction placeholder is absent — the detail may have been dropped silently instead of sanitised:\n  %s", msg)
		}
	}
}

// The message must still be ACTIONABLE. Sanitising must not reduce it to a shrug — an operator needs
// the cause line plus enough residual detail to act.
func TestOffsiteFailureMessage_StaysActionable(t *testing.T) {
	msg := offsiteFailureMessage(diagTarget(), fmt.Errorf("dial tcp: connect: connection refused"), 90*time.Second)
	if !strings.Contains(msg, "nem érhető el") {
		t.Errorf("the transport cause is not named: %q", msg)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(msg, "connection refused") {
		t.Errorf("all actionable detail was stripped along with the secret: %q", msg)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(msg, "1m30s") {
		t.Errorf("the duration was lost: %q", msg)
	}
}

// A very long error must be bounded — an unbounded restic dump in an email is its own problem.
func TestSanitiseOffsiteError_IsBounded(t *testing.T) {
	long := fmt.Errorf("%s", strings.Repeat("x", 5000))
	if got := sanitiseOffsiteErrorFor(diagTarget(), long); len(got) > 320 {
		t.Errorf("sanitised error is %d chars — unbounded", len(got))
	}
	if sanitiseOffsiteErrorFor(diagTarget(), nil) != "" {
		t.Error("a nil error produced text")
	}
}