Files
felhom-controller/controller/internal/report/escrow_confirm_test.go
T
admin 2487681396 style: gofmt normalization — no logic changes
gofmt -w across the controller tree (46 files) so gofmt -l is empty — disarms the
formatting landmine where a targeted edit + accidental gofmt -w swept ~46 unrelated
files. Pure formatting: whitespace + gofmt's optional-semicolon removal in reflowed
inline closures. One doc comment reworded ('' -> 'the empty string') to avoid gofmt's
Go-1.19 doc-comment typographic substitition ('' -> curly quote) muddying its meaning.
No build/vet/test behavior change.
2026-07-25 07:37:02 +02:00

122 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package report
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log"
"strings"
"testing"
)
const (
hubHash = "dbfc02f987e1ac0c91911d5761267089b1144628745a3343e4d96194e43c08e4"
otherHash = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"
)
type confirmerHarness struct {
c *EscrowAutoConfirmer
pending bool
local string
localOK bool
flips int
wipes int
logbuf *bytes.Buffer
}
func newConfirmer(t *testing.T) *confirmerHarness {
t.Helper()
h := &confirmerHarness{pending: true, local: hubHash, localOK: true, logbuf: &bytes.Buffer{}}
h.c = &EscrowAutoConfirmer{
Pending: func() bool { return h.pending },
LocalHash: func() (string, bool) { return h.local, h.localOK },
Flip: func() error { h.flips++; h.pending = false; return nil },
Wipe: func(context.Context) error { h.wipes++; return nil },
Logger: log.New(h.logbuf, "", 0),
}
return h
}
func matchStatus(hash string) *EscrowStatus {
return &EscrowStatus{IdentityBlobPresent: true, ResticPwSHA256: hash, CreatedAt: "2026-07-09T20:00:00Z"}
}
// Scenario A — hash match → flip to escrowed + wipe the staged secret; and a repeat ACK is a no-op
// (state is no longer pending).
func TestEscrowConfirm_AutoConfirmsOnMatch(t *testing.T) {
h := newConfirmer(t)
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash))
if h.flips != 1 || h.wipes != 1 {
t.Fatalf("match must flip once + wipe once, got flips=%d wipes=%d", h.flips, h.wipes)
}
if !strings.Contains(h.logbuf.String(), "auto-confirmed") {
t.Fatal("the flip must log the hub-verified auto-confirm")
}
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash)) // now escrowed → no-op
if h.flips != 1 {
t.Fatal("an already-escrowed target must never be re-flipped")
}
}
// Scenario B — blob present but the hash does NOT cover the current password → stay pending + a LOUD
// warn naming the ceremony; deduped per distinct hash (not per 15-min cycle).
func TestEscrowConfirm_StaleBlobStaysPending(t *testing.T) {
h := newConfirmer(t)
h.local = otherHash // local password differs from what the blob covers
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash))
if h.flips != 0 || h.wipes != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a mismatched hash must NEVER flip (false custody claim): flips=%d", h.flips)
}
if !strings.Contains(h.logbuf.String(), "does not cover the CURRENT repo password") ||
!strings.Contains(h.logbuf.String(), "escrow ceremony") {
t.Fatalf("mismatch must warn loudly naming the fix, got: %s", h.logbuf.String())
}
// dedupe: the same hash again → no second warn
before := strings.Count(h.logbuf.String(), "does not cover")
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash))
if strings.Count(h.logbuf.String(), "does not cover") != before {
t.Fatal("repeated ACKs with the same mismatched hash must warn ONCE (dedupe)")
}
// a NEW distinct hash → warns again
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222"))
if strings.Count(h.logbuf.String(), "does not cover") != before+1 {
t.Fatal("a new distinct mismatched hash must warn again")
}
}
// Scenario C — no status / hash-less blob / no local password file → stay pending SILENTLY.
func TestEscrowConfirm_SilentPendingCases(t *testing.T) {
h := newConfirmer(t)
h.c.Reconcile(nil) // no escrow row on the hub
h.c.Reconcile(&EscrowStatus{IdentityBlobPresent: true}) // hash NULL (legacy blob)
h.c.Reconcile(&EscrowStatus{IdentityBlobPresent: false, ResticPwSHA256: hubHash}) // hash without identity blob — fail-closed
h.localOK = false
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash)) // no local password file
if h.flips != 0 || h.logbuf.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("all no-verify cases must stay pending SILENTLY: flips=%d log=%q", h.flips, h.logbuf.String())
}
}
// Scenario E — not pending (already escrowed / offbox unconfigured) → no-op; NEVER un-confirms.
func TestEscrowConfirm_NeverActsOutsidePending(t *testing.T) {
h := newConfirmer(t)
h.pending = false // already escrowed (the demo's live state)
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash))
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(otherHash)) // even a MISMATCH on an escrowed target must not warn/touch
if h.flips != 0 || h.wipes != 0 || h.logbuf.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("non-pending must be a total no-op: flips=%d wipes=%d log=%q", h.flips, h.wipes, h.logbuf.String())
}
}
// A wipe failure after the flip is loud but does not undo the confirm (the flip is primary).
func TestEscrowConfirm_WipeFailureKeepsConfirm(t *testing.T) {
h := newConfirmer(t)
h.c.Wipe = func(context.Context) error { return context.DeadlineExceeded }
h.c.Reconcile(matchStatus(hubHash))
if h.flips != 1 {
t.Fatal("the flip must land even when the wipe fails")
}
if !strings.Contains(h.logbuf.String(), "NOT wiped") {
t.Fatal("a failed wipe must log the loud NOT-wiped signal")
}
}