Files
felhom-controller/controller/internal/bootrecon/bootrecon.go
T
admin 582135f861
gates / gates (push) Successful in 8s
v0.190.0 — the boot settle window, both gates on intent, and R-171
R-171 (a regression v0.189.0 introduced, CONFIRMED on hardware before any fix
was written). Replacing isBootOrphan's container-count term with recorded intent
made a drive-gate-stopped app read as a boot orphan: the gate stops apps with
`compose down` (zero containers) and never touches desired_state, because it is
not the customer. Observed on 9201 with the drive held unmounted — the sweep
found and started it, burned both attempts, and handed it to the dead-app alarm.
The write hazard did not materialise (the unbound mountpoint is host-root-owned
and the guest is unprivileged) but that protection is accidental and untested.
New consumer-side seam bootrecon.StartGate, fail-safe (cannot determine ⇒ do not
start), wired in main.go. The rule is not new: the API's startGatedByMissingDrive
already refuses this; the sweep bypassed it.

R-157 mechanism A. The sweep looked once at T+5s, deriving candidates from a
fleet docker was still restoring — three of six hard resets. Now a settle-then-
sweep window: sample every 5s, settled after 3 identical samples, sweep ONCE at
the end; ends on settled or a 50s budget, and the log says which. The budget is
50s because settle+budget+one retry must stay under the 90s dead-app grace — a
test rejected 60s at 95s. A window that overruns emits a LATE RECOVERY warn
rather than the grace being widened to hide it.

Widening the window made two more holders reachable, so the one gate covers all
three: an absent drive, a quiesce, and an in-flight app-data operation — reusing
quiesce.SuppressedStacks() and a new read-only AppStopGuard.HeldStacks().

R-170. shouldRecreateOnBoot now reads desired_state with the identical three-way
table; absent keeps the old hasContainers behaviour exactly. Its comment argued
for the container count and was rewritten. presentStable is untouched. The two
gates' agreement is pinned from both sides against one fixture table.

27/27 packages green; 6 red-proofs observed FAIL then restored.
2026-08-02 19:56:20 +02:00

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// Package bootrecon implements R-52: the bounded, start-ONCE recovery of apps that were left
// behind by an interrupted boot.
//
// The live failure it closes (AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20, finding F5): a pre-transport
// shutdown left `immich-server` and `calibre-web` Exited; ten sibling containers came back and
// those two did not, and they were still down ~18 hours later. The controller REPORTED them (the
// 30 s deadapp-check) but never started them — deployed-but-stopped was an alarm with no recovery.
//
// Two deliberate boundaries, both load-bearing:
//
// - **Bounded, never a loop.** At most `attempts` tries, `retryDelay` apart, then it stops and the
// alarm owns the problem. A restart loop would paper over a genuinely broken app forever and
// hammer docker while doing it.
// - **A user's Stop survives a reboot.** This is still the whole safety argument; only the way it
// is established changed. Until v0.189.0 it was inferred — the UI's Stop is `docker compose
// down`, which REMOVES containers, so "zero containers" was read as "the customer stopped it"
// and left alone. Since v0.189.0 (R-166) the customer's intent is RECORDED in app.yaml and read
// directly, because the inference could not distinguish a deliberate Stop from a power cut or an
// interrupted backup, and silently stranded both. An app.yaml with no recorded intent — every
// app on every box predating the field — keeps the old inference exactly. See isBootOrphan,
// TestReconcile_UserStoppedAppIsNeverStarted and
// TestReconcile_LegacyNoDesiredState_BehavesExactlyAsBefore.
//
// It runs inside the notifier's boot grace (cmd/controller/main.go `deadAppBootGrace`), so a
// successful recovery never fires an alert and a failed one alerts honestly once the grace expires.
package bootrecon
import (
"context"
"log"
"time"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/stacks"
)
// StackProvider is the slice of *stacks.Manager this package needs. Declared consumer-side so the
// tests can count StartStack calls without a docker anywhere near them.
type StackProvider interface {
GetStacks() []stacks.Stack
StartStack(name string) error
RefreshStatus() error
}
// StartGate answers the one question this package must ask before starting anything: **may this app
// be started right now?** Declared consumer-side, in the style of StackProvider, so `bootrecon`
// still imports `stacks` alone and knows nothing about settings, the agent, quiesce or the web layer.
//
// It is ONE seam rather than three because the three reasons a boot orphan must NOT be started share
// a shape — something else is deliberately holding this app — and differ only in the reason string:
//
// the drive-absent gate stopped it → its drive is not live (R-171, below)
// a quiesce is holding it for a backup → the quiesce loop restarts its own stacks
// an app-data operation stopped it → the app-stop guard's own Recover owns it
//
// A widened boot window (R-157 mechanism A) is what makes the last two reachable at all: the old
// T+5 s single sweep never overlapped them.
//
// R-171 — WHY THIS EXISTS, and it is a regression this package caused. Until v0.189.0 the sweep
// required a stack to still HAVE containers, and an app the drive-absent gate had stopped has zero,
// so such apps were skipped by accident. v0.189.0 replaced that term with the customer's recorded
// intent — correctly — and the drive gate does NOT change `desired_state` (it is not the customer),
// so a gate-stopped app now reads as `running` + zero containers, i.e. a boot orphan. Observed live
// on 2026-08-02: the sweep found and started an app whose drive was unmounted, burned both attempts,
// and handed it to the dead-app alarm — a false alarm about an app the drive gate is deliberately
// holding (audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md).
//
// The rule itself is not new and is not invented here: the API's own start path already refuses this
// (`startGatedByMissingDrive`, internal/api/router.go) with a Hungarian message to the customer. The
// sweep simply bypassed it by calling Manager.StartStack directly. This seam gives the sweep the
// same question to ask.
//
// CONTRACT — the answer is fail-safe by design (§8.4): an implementation that CANNOT DETERMINE
// whether the drive is live must return false, not true. Not starting is recoverable — the drive
// gate's `Return` branch restarts the app when the drive comes back, and the dead-app alarm reports
// it meanwhile. Starting on an absent drive is not recoverable by anything automatic: compose
// creates the bind sources wherever the mountpoint currently points, which is the guest rootfs.
type StartGate interface {
// MayStart reports whether the named stack may be started. The reason is for the log line and is
// only read when may is false.
MayStart(stackName string) (may bool, reason string)
}
const (
// DefaultAttempts is the total number of start attempts per boot (not per app per retry-forever).
DefaultAttempts = 2
// DefaultRetryDelay spaces the attempts. 2 × 30 s fits comfortably inside the 90 s boot grace,
// so a recovery that works is silent and one that does not is honest.
DefaultRetryDelay = 30 * time.Second
)
// Reconciler performs the start-once sweep. Zero value is not usable — use New.
type Reconciler struct {
stacks StackProvider
logger *log.Logger
attempts int
retryDelay time.Duration
// sleep is the inter-attempt wait; injectable so tests never spend 30 real seconds.
sleep func(context.Context, time.Duration)
// startGate (R-171) refuses to start an app something else is deliberately holding. nil = NOT
// WIRED, which means "this caller has no such concept" and is permissive — the test fixtures'
// case. It is NOT the same as "cannot determine", which the gate itself answers with false (see
// StartGate's contract). Production MUST wire it; TestMainWiresBootDriveGate walks main.go's AST
// for the call, because an unwired seam here is silently the pre-v0.190.0 behaviour.
startGate StartGate
}
// Result is the outcome, returned for logging/testing (the hub learns about failures only through
// the existing app_start_failed alarm — this package deliberately pushes no events of its own).
type Result struct {
Candidates []string // boot-orphaned apps found
Recovered []string // running again by the end
StillDown []string // still down after the last attempt — the alarm's problem now
Attempts int // attempts actually made (0 when there was nothing to do)
// HeldByDrive (R-171) are apps that ARE boot orphans by intent but which something else is
// deliberately holding (an absent drive, a quiesce, an app-data operation), so they were not
// started. Reported separately from StillDown because they are not a fault this sweep failed to
// fix — the holder owns their recovery. Collapsing the two would put a deliberately-held app in
// the same bucket as a broken one, which is the false alarm R-171 removes.
HeldByDrive []string
}
// SetDriveGate wires the R-171 start refusal. INIT-ONLY — call once, before Run.
func (r *Reconciler) SetDriveGate(g StartGate) { r.startGate = g }
// mayStart asks the gate, or allows when none is wired (see the startGate field comment).
func (r *Reconciler) mayStart(stackName string) (bool, string) {
if r.startGate == nil {
return true, ""
}
return r.startGate.MayStart(stackName)
}
// New builds a Reconciler with the shipped defaults.
func New(p StackProvider, logger *log.Logger) *Reconciler {
return &Reconciler{
stacks: p,
logger: logger,
attempts: DefaultAttempts,
retryDelay: DefaultRetryDelay,
sleep: sleepCtx,
}
}
func sleepCtx(ctx context.Context, d time.Duration) {
t := time.NewTimer(d)
defer t.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case <-t.C:
}
}
// isBootOrphan reports whether a stack is an app the boot left behind.
//
// The gate, term by term:
// - Deployed — an app that is installed. NOTE: `Deployed` means INSTALLED, not "wanted running";
// the two were conflated until v0.189.0 and that conflation is what the desired-state term below
// repairs.
// - not Protected — traefik/cloudflared/felhom-controller have their own supervision; this must
// never race the base-stack self-heal.
// - not Deploying — mid-deploy is not a fault.
// - desired state — see below. REPLACES the old container-count term.
// - IsDownState — stopped/exited/degraded (R-51 included: a boot that half-started a stack is the
// same interrupted-boot shape).
//
// ── WHY INTENT REPLACED THE CONTAINER COUNT (R-166, closing R-157 mechanism B) ────────────────────
//
// This gate used to end in `len(s.Containers) > 0`, and its comment called that "the D-case guard":
// a UI Stop is `compose down`, which REMOVES containers, so zero containers was read as "the
// customer stopped this" and left alone. The safety goal was right and still holds. The SIGNAL was
// wrong, because zero containers has at least three causes and the count cannot tell them apart:
//
// a deliberate Stop → must stay down
// a power cut mid-compose, or an interrupted deploy → must come back
// a backup that stopped the app and died before restarting it → must come back
//
// Two of those three were silently unrecoverable: the app simply stayed gone until a human noticed.
// The count was never capable of separating them, so the fix is not a better inference — it is to
// stop inferring and read what the customer actually asked for, which app.yaml now records.
//
// ── WHAT ABSENT STILL MEANS, AND WHY THE OLD BEHAVIOUR IS KEPT ────────────────────────────────────
//
// DesiredStateUnknown falls back to the ORIGINAL container-count rule, byte-for-byte. This is the
// single most important line in the change. Every app.yaml on every existing box predates the field,
// so absent is what the whole fleet reads on upgrade; treating absent as "running" would start, on
// the first boot after the upgrade, every app its owner had deliberately stopped. The fallback is
// what makes this feature inert for an app nobody has pressed a button on since — see
// TestReconcile_LegacyNoDesiredState_BehavesExactlyAsBefore and its red-proof.
//
// The full decision table (§8.1):
//
// desired containers state → result
// stopped any any → never an orphan (the customer said so)
// running 0 — → ORPHAN ← the R-157 case, invisible before v0.189.0
// running >0 IsDownState → ORPHAN (unchanged)
// running >0 up → not an orphan
// absent 0 — → not an orphan (exactly the pre-v0.189.0 behaviour)
// absent >0 IsDownState → ORPHAN (exactly the pre-v0.189.0 behaviour)
func isBootOrphan(s stacks.Stack) bool {
if !s.Deployed || s.Protected || s.Deploying {
return false
}
switch stacks.DesiredStateOf(s) {
case stacks.DesiredStateStopped:
// The customer pressed Stop. No observation may overturn that — not a missing container, not
// a down state, not a reboot. Nothing else in this package starts an app.
return false
case stacks.DesiredStateRunning:
// Wanted running. ANY way of not being up is a fault to repair, including having no
// containers at all — which is the case the old count term structurally could not see.
return len(s.Containers) == 0 || stacks.IsDownState(s.State)
default:
// DesiredStateUnknown — legacy. Keep the pre-R-166 rule exactly.
return len(s.Containers) > 0 && stacks.IsDownState(s.State)
}
}
// Run performs the sweep once and returns what happened. It is safe to call with no boot orphans
// (the quiet path logs one DEBUG-free INFO-free line — see below) and it never returns an error:
// a failure to start is an app-level fact the alarm reports, not a controller startup failure.
func (r *Reconciler) Run(ctx context.Context) Result {
var res Result
pending := map[string]bool{}
for _, s := range r.stacks.GetStacks() {
if !isBootOrphan(s) {
continue
}
// R-171: intent says this app should be running and it is not — but if something else is
// deliberately holding it (absent drive, quiesce, an app-data operation), starting it is the
// wrong repair. Refuse, loudly, and let the holder own it.
if live, reason := r.mayStart(s.Name); !live {
res.HeldByDrive = append(res.HeldByDrive, s.Name)
r.logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] %q is a boot orphan by intent but is HELD (%s) — NOT starting it; whatever is holding it owns its recovery",
s.Name, reason)
continue
}
pending[s.Name] = true
res.Candidates = append(res.Candidates, s.Name)
}
sortStrings(res.Candidates)
sortStrings(res.HeldByDrive)
if len(pending) == 0 {
// The healthy path must be observable — "no alarms" and "never ran" have to be
// distinguishable in a log (the v0.91.2 lesson). "Nothing to start" and "everything I found
// is held by an absent drive" must be distinguishable too, or the held case reads as healthy.
if len(res.HeldByDrive) > 0 {
r.logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: nothing to start — %d app(s) held (absent drive / quiesce / app-data operation): %v",
len(res.HeldByDrive), res.HeldByDrive)
return res
}
r.logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: no boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start)")
return res
}
r.logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: %d boot-orphaned app(s) found: %v — up to %d attempt(s)",
len(res.Candidates), res.Candidates, r.attempts)
for attempt := 1; attempt <= r.attempts && len(pending) > 0; attempt++ {
res.Attempts = attempt
for _, name := range sortedKeys(pending) {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
break
}
start := time.Now()
if err := r.stacks.StartStack(name); err != nil {
r.logger.Printf("[WARN] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation attempt %d/%d: start %q failed after %.1fs: %v",
attempt, r.attempts, name, time.Since(start).Seconds(), err)
continue
}
r.logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation attempt %d/%d: started %q (took %.1fs)",
attempt, r.attempts, name, time.Since(start).Seconds())
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
break
}
// Re-read reality rather than trusting a nil error: `compose up -d` exits 0 on a crash-loop
// (a session-critical invariant of this repo), so only a fresh docker ps can say whether the
// app is actually up.
if err := r.stacks.RefreshStatus(); err != nil {
r.logger.Printf("[WARN] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: status refresh failed: %v", err)
}
for _, s := range r.stacks.GetStacks() {
if pending[s.Name] && !stacks.IsDownState(s.State) {
delete(pending, s.Name)
res.Recovered = append(res.Recovered, s.Name)
}
}
if len(pending) > 0 && attempt < r.attempts {
r.sleep(ctx, r.retryDelay)
}
}
res.StillDown = sortedKeys(pending)
sortStrings(res.Recovered)
if len(res.StillDown) == 0 {
r.logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation complete: %d app(s) recovered in %d attempt(s): %v",
len(res.Recovered), res.Attempts, res.Recovered)
} else {
// Deliberately no hub event here: the app_start_failed alarm fires on its own once the boot
// grace expires, and two events for one dead app is how an operator inbox becomes noise.
r.logger.Printf("[WARN] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation gave up after %d attempt(s): recovered=%v still down=%v (the dead-app alarm now owns these)",
res.Attempts, res.Recovered, res.StillDown)
}
return res
}
// --- tiny local helpers (no dependency on sort ordering semantics elsewhere) ---
func sortedKeys(m map[string]bool) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for k := range m {
out = append(out, k)
}
sortStrings(out)
return out
}
func sortStrings(s []string) {
for i := 1; i < len(s); i++ {
for j := i; j > 0 && s[j] < s[j-1]; j-- {
s[j], s[j-1] = s[j-1], s[j]
}
}
}