1053 lines
44 KiB
Go
1053 lines
44 KiB
Go
// Package agentapi is the in-guest controller's client for the host agent's per-guest local
|
||
// API (doc 03 §6, slice 8A). It reaches the agent over the bridge, pinning the agent's
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||
// self-signed leaf by SHA-256 (the same pin convention the agent uses for the Proxmox/PBS host
|
||
// certs), and authenticates with the per-guest bearer token. In 8A it exercises GET /storage
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||
// (connectivity + the controller learning its mounts); the full surface (the /backup/due
|
||
// quiesce loop) lands in 8B.
|
||
package agentapi
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||
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||
import (
|
||
"bytes"
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||
"context"
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||
"crypto/sha256"
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||
"crypto/tls"
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||
"crypto/x509"
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||
"encoding/hex"
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||
"encoding/json"
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||
"fmt"
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||
"io"
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||
"log"
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||
"net/http"
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||
"regexp"
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||
"strings"
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||
"sync"
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||
"time"
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||
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||
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/logx"
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||
)
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||
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// Client talks to one agent local-API endpoint with a pinned leaf + bearer token.
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||
type Client struct {
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||
baseURL string
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||
token string
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||
hc *http.Client
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||
// features caches capability-probe verdicts for Supports (features.go).
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||
features SupportCache
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||
// verMu guards lastAgentVersion — the most recent STRICTLY-VALIDATED X-Felhom-Agent-Version
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||
// seen on any agent response (v0.82.0 version channel). "" = never seen (pre-0.82 agent) →
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||
// Supports falls back to the route probe.
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||
verMu sync.Mutex
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||
lastAgentVersion string
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||
// logger is the optional per-call DEBUG trace sink (v0.116.0 observability — the
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||
// capture ring holds these even at logging.level=info). nil = silent (unchanged).
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||
logger *log.Logger
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||
}
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||
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||
// SetLogger wires the optional per-call DEBUG trace logger (method, path, status,
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||
// duration + agent-version changes — never bodies or tokens).
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||
func (c *Client) SetLogger(l *log.Logger) { c.logger = l }
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||
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||
// reAgentVersion is the bare-semver shape the publish pipeline enforces (publish-agent.sh) — the
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||
// ONLY header values trusted for capability comparison. Anything else (garbage, "dev", suffixes)
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||
// is ignored and the probe fallback stays in charge.
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||
var reAgentVersion = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$`)
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||
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||
// noteAgentVersion records a response's version header (passive capture — called on EVERY response
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||
// path). Invalid/absent headers never overwrite a previously-seen valid version.
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func (c *Client) noteAgentVersion(resp *http.Response) {
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v := strings.TrimSpace(resp.Header.Get("X-Felhom-Agent-Version"))
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||
if v == "" || !reAgentVersion.MatchString(v) {
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||
return
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||
}
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||
c.verMu.Lock()
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||
prev := c.lastAgentVersion
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||
c.lastAgentVersion = v
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||
c.verMu.Unlock()
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||
if prev != v {
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logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] agent version seen: %s (was %q)", v, prev)
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||
}
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||
}
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||
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||
// AgentVersion returns the last strictly-validated agent version seen on this client's traffic
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||
// ("" = unknown — header-less agent or no traffic yet). This is the Supports comparison source.
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||
func (c *Client) AgentVersion() string {
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||
c.verMu.Lock()
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||
defer c.verMu.Unlock()
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||
return c.lastAgentVersion
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||
}
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||
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// MountInfo mirrors the agent's GET /storage mount entry (doc 03 §6).
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||
type MountInfo struct {
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||
Key string `json:"key"`
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||
Storage string `json:"storage"`
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||
MountPoint string `json:"mount_point"`
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||
Class string `json:"class"` // fast | slow | ""
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||
Backup bool `json:"backup"`
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||
}
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||
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||
// StorageResponse mirrors the agent's GET /storage data payload.
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type StorageResponse struct {
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||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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||
Mounts []MountInfo `json:"mounts"`
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||
}
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||
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||
// apiResponse is the agent's {ok,data,error} envelope.
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||
type apiResponse struct {
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||
OK bool `json:"ok"`
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||
Data json.RawMessage `json:"data"`
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||
Error string `json:"error"`
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||
}
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||
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||
// New builds a pinned client for endpoint ("host:port") with the given per-guest token and the
|
||
// agent leaf-cert SHA-256 fingerprint (hex, ':'-separators tolerated). The pin is the trust
|
||
// anchor — the agent serves a self-signed cert, so chain verification is replaced by an exact
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||
// leaf-DER SHA-256 match (fails closed on any mismatch).
|
||
func New(endpoint, token, fingerprintHex string) (*Client, error) {
|
||
endpoint = strings.TrimSpace(endpoint)
|
||
if endpoint == "" {
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||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: endpoint required")
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||
}
|
||
if token == "" {
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||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: token required")
|
||
}
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||
want, err := normalizeFingerprint(fingerprintHex)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
|
||
InsecureSkipVerify: true, // self-signed leaf — the pin below is the real check
|
||
VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
|
||
if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: TLS pin: peer presented no certificate")
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||
}
|
||
got := sha256.Sum256(rawCerts[0]) // leaf DER
|
||
if hex.EncodeToString(got[:]) != want {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: TLS pin mismatch: agent leaf SHA-256 does not match the bootstrap fingerprint")
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
},
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||
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
|
||
}
|
||
return &Client{
|
||
baseURL: "https://" + endpoint,
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||
token: token,
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||
hc: &http.Client{
|
||
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
|
||
// Bound + expire the idle-conn pool. With the controller reusing one Client (so the pool
|
||
// stays ~2), IdleConnTimeout also lets idle conns to a RESTARTED agent drain instead of
|
||
// lingering as stale ESTABLISHED entries, and caps any future per-call misuse. (The earlier
|
||
// bare Transport had IdleConnTimeout:0 = idle keep-alives never expire → the leak.)
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||
Transport: &http.Transport{
|
||
TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg,
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||
MaxIdleConns: 4,
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||
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 2,
|
||
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
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||
},
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||
},
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||
}, nil
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||
}
|
||
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||
// Close releases the client's idle keep-alive connections. Optional hygiene for any caller that builds
|
||
// a short-lived client; the controller reuses one long-lived client, so it relies on the bounded,
|
||
// expiring idle pool (above) rather than calling this.
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||
func (c *Client) Close() { c.hc.CloseIdleConnections() }
|
||
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||
// Storage calls GET /storage and returns this guest's mounts (connectivity + placement view).
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||
func (c *Client) Storage(ctx context.Context) (StorageResponse, error) {
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||
var out StorageResponse
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||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/storage")
|
||
if err != nil {
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||
return out, err
|
||
}
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||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
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||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /storage: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
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||
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||
// ---- slice 8B: app-consistent backup (quiesce loop) -------------------------------------
|
||
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||
// DueResponse mirrors the agent's GET /backup/due payload. AgeSecs is the age of the newest
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||
// successful backup (nil when none has run yet).
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||
type DueResponse struct {
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||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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||
Due bool `json:"due"`
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||
Reason string `json:"reason"`
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||
AgeSecs *int64 `json:"age_seconds"`
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||
}
|
||
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||
// BackupResponse mirrors the agent's POST /backup payload.
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||
type BackupResponse struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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||
JobID string `json:"job_id"`
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||
Phase string `json:"phase"`
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||
}
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||
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||
// StatusResponse mirrors the agent's GET /backup/status payload. Backup is the latest RECORDED
|
||
// whole-guest backup (nil until one has run), surfaced to the controller's backup page for visibility.
|
||
type StatusResponse struct {
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||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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||
Phase string `json:"phase"` // idle | running | snapshotted | done | failed
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||
JobID string `json:"job_id"`
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||
Error string `json:"error"`
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||
Backup *BackupRecord `json:"backup,omitempty"`
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||
}
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||
|
||
// BackupRecord mirrors the agent's hub.Backup — one whole-guest vzdump/PBS backup result. The
|
||
// controller renders it read-only (it does NOT own whole-guest backup; the agent does).
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||
type BackupRecord struct {
|
||
TargetID string `json:"target_id"` // backup storage name (e.g. "local", "felhom-pbs")
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||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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||
Archive string `json:"archive"` // produced vzdump volid (e.g. "local:backup/vzdump-lxc-…")
|
||
Mode string `json:"mode"` // snapshot | stop
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||
CrashConsistent bool `json:"crash_consistent"`
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||
SizeBytes int64 `json:"size_bytes"`
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||
Success bool `json:"success"`
|
||
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
|
||
StartedAt string `json:"started_at"` // RFC3339
|
||
DurationSeconds float64 `json:"duration_seconds"`
|
||
}
|
||
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||
// RestoreTestRecord mirrors the agent's hub.RestoreTest — the latest self-restore-test (the "backup
|
||
// verified restorable" trust signal). Nil when none has run yet.
|
||
type RestoreTestRecord struct {
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||
SourceArchive string `json:"source_archive"`
|
||
SourceTier string `json:"source_tier"` // "local" (pbs = Phase B)
|
||
Pass bool `json:"pass"`
|
||
Verified string `json:"verified"` // "boot+running" this slice
|
||
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
|
||
TestedAt string `json:"tested_at"` // RFC3339
|
||
DurationSeconds float64 `json:"duration_seconds"`
|
||
Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Backup status phases (mirror the agent's vocabulary).
|
||
const (
|
||
PhaseIdle = "idle"
|
||
PhaseRunning = "running"
|
||
PhaseDone = "done"
|
||
PhaseFailed = "failed"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// BackupDue reports whether a policy-scheduled backup is due for this guest (the quiesce trigger).
|
||
func (c *Client) BackupDue(ctx context.Context) (DueResponse, error) {
|
||
var out DueResponse
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||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/backup/due")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /backup/due: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// StartBackup enqueues a backup of this guest (the agent vzdump) and returns the job to poll.
|
||
func (c *Client) StartBackup(ctx context.Context) (BackupResponse, error) {
|
||
var out BackupResponse
|
||
body, err := c.post(ctx, "/backup", struct{}{})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode POST /backup: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// BackupStatus reports the current/last backup job phase for this guest.
|
||
func (c *Client) BackupStatus(ctx context.Context) (StatusResponse, error) {
|
||
var out StatusResponse
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/backup/status")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /backup/status: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RestoreTestStatus calls GET /restore-test/status and returns the latest self-restore-test result
|
||
// (nil when none has run yet — the agent payload is {"restore_test": {...}|null}).
|
||
func (c *Client) RestoreTestStatus(ctx context.Context) (*RestoreTestRecord, error) {
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/restore-test/status")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
var out struct {
|
||
RestoreTest *RestoreTestRecord `json:"restore_test"`
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /restore-test/status: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out.RestoreTest, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ---- slice 8C: disk management (execution is the agent's) --------------------------------
|
||
|
||
// DiskInfo mirrors the agent's GET /disks entry.
|
||
type DiskInfo struct {
|
||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||
Type string `json:"type"`
|
||
State string `json:"state"`
|
||
BackingDevice string `json:"backing_device"`
|
||
MountPath string `json:"mount_path"`
|
||
Class string `json:"class"`
|
||
// Role is the agent's AUTHORITATIVE protection tier: "system" | "backup" | "user-data". The UI
|
||
// is driven from it — system/backup get a lock badge and NO destructive controls; user-data is
|
||
// customer-manageable (eject/wipe with type-to-confirm).
|
||
Role string `json:"role"`
|
||
DataBearing bool `json:"data_bearing"`
|
||
DataReason string `json:"data_reason"`
|
||
TotalBytes int64 `json:"total_bytes"`
|
||
UsedBytes int64 `json:"used_bytes"`
|
||
UsedFraction float64 `json:"used_fraction"`
|
||
// DurableID is the target's stable identity (e.g. "uuid:<fs-uuid>" for usb/local-dir). The
|
||
// fs UUID (strip the "uuid:" prefix) is the key the controller passes to AssignDisk — it's the
|
||
// only way the de-privileged controller learns a mount key it cannot read off the device itself.
|
||
DurableID string `json:"durable_id"`
|
||
// WipeDurableID is the device's wipe-binding id in the gate's scheme (byid:<wwn>/byuuid:<uuid>) —
|
||
// the id a customer-confirmed data-bearing wipe must carry (F20-BUG2). DISTINCT from DurableID
|
||
// (uuid:, used for assign): confirming a wipe with DurableID was rejected (binding_mismatch).
|
||
WipeDurableID string `json:"wipe_durable_id,omitempty"`
|
||
// GuestAttached reports whether the drive is actually bound into THIS guest (usable in-guest), as
|
||
// opposed to merely present on the host (F9) — the signal whose absence let the HDD look available
|
||
// when it wasn't attached. LEGACY (per-drive mp model); the intermediary model uses BoundUnderParent.
|
||
GuestAttached bool `json:"guest_attached"`
|
||
// GuestPath is the drive's STABLE in-guest path in the intermediary-mount model
|
||
// (/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>) — what the controller registers + repoints HDD_PATH to. Distinct from
|
||
// MountPath (the raw /mnt/<name> host PVE mount the agent ops on). "" for non-user-data drives.
|
||
GuestPath string `json:"guest_path,omitempty"`
|
||
// BoundUnderParent reports whether the drive's felhom-data is currently bound under the shared parent
|
||
// (live + usable in the guest). The controller's drive-absent gate keys on this + State.
|
||
BoundUnderParent bool `json:"bound_under_parent"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FSUUID returns the raw filesystem UUID from a "uuid:<…>" DurableID, or "" if this disk's identity
|
||
// is not a filesystem UUID (network/lvm targets — not assignable as a host mount).
|
||
func (d DiskInfo) FSUUID() string {
|
||
if rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(d.DurableID, "uuid:"); ok {
|
||
return rest
|
||
}
|
||
return ""
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// DisksResponse mirrors GET /disks.
|
||
type DisksResponse struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Disks []DiskInfo `json:"disks"`
|
||
// GuestBootID changes on every guest boot (host or guest reboot) but is stable across a
|
||
// controller-only restart — the deterministic signal the controller recreates drive-backed apps on.
|
||
GuestBootID string `json:"guest_boot_id,omitempty"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FormatResult mirrors POST /disks/format (the success/refusal payload).
|
||
type FormatResult struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||
Formatted bool `json:"formatted"`
|
||
DataBearing bool `json:"data_bearing"`
|
||
Reason string `json:"reason"`
|
||
// Role is the agent's tier for this device (system | backup | user-data).
|
||
Role string `json:"role,omitempty"`
|
||
// NeedsConfirmation is set on a USER-DATA data-bearing refusal: re-submit with confirmed=true +
|
||
// DurableID after the type-to-confirm UI (NOT an operator signature).
|
||
NeedsConfirmation bool `json:"needs_confirmation,omitempty"`
|
||
DurableID string `json:"durable_id,omitempty"`
|
||
// PendingOp is set on a SYSTEM/BACKUP data-bearing refusal — the operator-signature op.
|
||
PendingOp *PendingOp `json:"pending_op,omitempty"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// PendingOp mirrors the agent's bound destructive intent on a data-bearing refusal. The controller
|
||
// surfaces the exact `felhom-opsign` command from it — it CANNOT complete a destructive format itself.
|
||
type PendingOp struct {
|
||
Op string `json:"op"` // e.g. "storage_wipe"
|
||
HostScope string `json:"host_scope"` // the agent's host id (anti-retarget)
|
||
DurableID string `json:"durable_id"` // byid:…|byuuid:… — the device's stable identity
|
||
FSType string `json:"fstype"` // the filesystem to mkfs after the wipe
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// OpsignCommand returns the literal command the operator must run offline to authorize the wipe.
|
||
func (p PendingOp) OpsignCommand() string {
|
||
return fmt.Sprintf("felhom-opsign -op %s -host %s -durable-id %s", p.Op, p.HostScope, p.DurableID)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ErrFormatRefused is returned by FormatDisk when the agent refuses a data-bearing format on a
|
||
// SYSTEM/BACKUP device (operator signature required). The UI surfaces the pending opsign command.
|
||
var ErrFormatRefused = fmt.Errorf("agentapi: format refused — system/backup device (operator authorization required)")
|
||
|
||
// ErrNeedsConfirmation is returned by FormatDisk when the agent refuses a data-bearing format on a
|
||
// USER-DATA device pending the CUSTOMER's informed-confirmation (bound to FormatResult.DurableID).
|
||
// The UI surfaces the type-to-confirm flow, then re-submits with confirmed=true + that durable id.
|
||
var ErrNeedsConfirmation = fmt.Errorf("agentapi: format needs customer confirmation — user-data device")
|
||
|
||
// Disks lists the host drives the agent manages, with a data-bearing flag per drive.
|
||
func (c *Client) Disks(ctx context.Context) (DisksResponse, error) {
|
||
var out DisksResponse
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/disks")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /disks: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// DiskCandidate mirrors one entry from the agent's GET /disks/candidates (Impl-2a candidates.go) —
|
||
// a host disk the agent's unclaimed-disk filter proved is FREE for Felhom to enroll.
|
||
type DiskCandidate struct {
|
||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||
SizeBytes int64 `json:"size_bytes"`
|
||
Model string `json:"model,omitempty"`
|
||
FSType string `json:"fstype,omitempty"`
|
||
DataBearing bool `json:"data_bearing"`
|
||
Mountable bool `json:"mountable"`
|
||
MountSource string `json:"mount_source,omitempty"`
|
||
DurableID string `json:"durable_id,omitempty"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CandidatesResult mirrors GET /disks/candidates: disks free to enroll, split into initialize (all
|
||
// unclaimed) and attach (the mountable-FS subset).
|
||
type CandidatesResult struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Initialize []DiskCandidate `json:"initialize"`
|
||
Attach []DiskCandidate `json:"attach"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ListCandidates fetches the host disks free for Felhom to enroll (Impl-2b wizard source).
|
||
func (c *Client) ListCandidates(ctx context.Context) (CandidatesResult, error) {
|
||
var out CandidatesResult
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/disks/candidates")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /disks/candidates: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// AssignDisk attaches a drive (by fs-UUID) as a host mount (benign, self-serve).
|
||
func (c *Client) AssignDisk(ctx context.Context, uuid, where, fstype, options string) error {
|
||
_, err := c.post(ctx, "/disks/assign", map[string]string{
|
||
"uuid": uuid, "where": where, "fstype": fstype, "options": options,
|
||
})
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// GuestAttach binds an enrolled drive's felhom-data namespace into THIS guest (slice 10 P2, Model A).
|
||
// The drive must already be host-mounted at `where` (the enroll flow's assign did that). Idempotent on
|
||
// the agent side (returns the existing slot if already bound). Returns nil on success.
|
||
func (c *Client) GuestAttach(ctx context.Context, where string) error {
|
||
_, err := c.post(ctx, "/disks/guest-attach", map[string]string{"where": where})
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// GuestReboot reboots THIS guest to activate persisted-but-inactive drive binds (slice 10 P2
|
||
// activation — the host-side live inject is blocked on an unprivileged guest, so a drive enrolled into
|
||
// a running guest activates only at the next boot). The agent runs the reboot detached + returns 202;
|
||
// this guest (and the controller) restarts shortly after. User-triggered ("Újraindítás most").
|
||
func (c *Client) GuestReboot(ctx context.Context) error {
|
||
_, err := c.post(ctx, "/guest/reboot", struct{}{})
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SwapResult mirrors the agent's 202 from POST /controller/swap (agentic controller update, Phase 1).
|
||
type SwapResult struct {
|
||
Status string `json:"status"` // "swapping"
|
||
PreviousImage string `json:"previous_image"` // image before the swap (for the UI/log)
|
||
TargetImage string `json:"target_image"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SwapController asks the agent to swap the in-guest controller to `image` (which the controller has
|
||
// already pulled into the guest's docker storage). The agent responds 202 and performs the swap+verify
|
||
// +rollback asynchronously, EXTERNALLY to this controller container (so it survives this process being
|
||
// killed by the swap). Latest-only is enforced by the caller (queryRegistry); the agent re-validates
|
||
// the ref shape.
|
||
func (c *Client) SwapController(ctx context.Context, image string) (SwapResult, error) {
|
||
var out SwapResult
|
||
body, err := c.post(ctx, "/controller/swap", map[string]string{"image": image})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /controller/swap: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SwapStatus mirrors the agent's GET /controller/swap/status (observability for the post-restart UI).
|
||
type SwapStatus struct {
|
||
State string `json:"state"` // none | swapping | done | failed
|
||
InFlight bool `json:"in_flight"`
|
||
Current string `json:"current"`
|
||
Previous string `json:"previous"`
|
||
Target string `json:"target"`
|
||
Error string `json:"error"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SwapStatus reads the last/in-flight swap outcome for this guest.
|
||
func (c *Client) SwapStatus(ctx context.Context) (SwapStatus, error) {
|
||
var out SwapStatus
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/controller/swap/status")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /controller/swap/status: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// EjectResult mirrors POST /disks/eject (the dependent-guest warning).
|
||
type EjectResult struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Ejected string `json:"ejected"`
|
||
DependentGuests []int `json:"dependent_guests"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// EjectDisk safe-unmounts a host mount (data preserved) and returns the dependent guests.
|
||
// Status-aware POST (campaign F2 evidence gap): the agent's refusal body carries the reason
|
||
// (e.g. "…eject refused (role: system)") — surface it instead of a bare "HTTP 403".
|
||
// StageEscrowSecret pushes the offsite restic repo password to the agent (fork-4), which stages it
|
||
// transiently for the escrow-create ceremony to wrap under the customer recovery code R. The value is
|
||
// sent over the authenticated pinned local-API channel; the CALLER must never log it.
|
||
func (c *Client) StageEscrowSecret(ctx context.Context, resticRepoPassword string) error {
|
||
env, status, err := c.postWithStatus(ctx, "/escrow/stage-secret", map[string]string{"restic_repo_password": resticRepoPassword})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
return refusalError("/escrow/stage-secret", status, env)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// WipeStagedEscrowSecret removes the agent-staged offsite repo password (fork-4 hygiene) — called whenever
|
||
// EscrowState flips to escrowed, so the transient 0600 staging file doesn't outlive its purpose. Idempotent
|
||
// on the agent side (an absent file is a clean 200). Requires agent >= v0.78.0 (older agents 404 — the
|
||
// caller logs loudly and moves on).
|
||
func (c *Client) WipeStagedEscrowSecret(ctx context.Context) error {
|
||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodDelete, c.baseURL+"/escrow/stage-secret", nil)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
|
||
resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: DELETE /escrow/stage-secret: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
||
c.noteAgentVersion(resp) // v0.82.0 version channel: passive capture on EVERY response
|
||
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
|
||
var env apiResponse
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: DELETE /escrow/stage-secret: HTTP %d, bad envelope: %w", resp.StatusCode, err)
|
||
}
|
||
return refusalError("/escrow/stage-secret", resp.StatusCode, env)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (c *Client) EjectDisk(ctx context.Context, where string) (EjectResult, error) {
|
||
var out EjectResult
|
||
env, status, err := c.postWithStatus(ctx, "/disks/eject", map[string]string{"where": where})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := refusalError("/disks/eject", status, env); err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /disks/eject: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// DecommissionResult mirrors POST /disks/decommission.
|
||
type DecommissionResult struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Decommissioned string `json:"decommissioned"`
|
||
DependentGuests []int `json:"dependent_guests"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Decommission permanently removes a user-data drive (self-serve, non-destructive — the agent records
|
||
// IntentDecommissioned, prunes the bind record, and unmounts; it NEVER formats). Data stays on the
|
||
// drive. The agent role-gates to user-data and refuses a system/backup mount regardless.
|
||
// Status-aware POST (campaign F2 evidence gap): the agent's refusal body carries the reason
|
||
// (e.g. "…decommission refused (role: system)") — surface it instead of a bare "HTTP 403".
|
||
func (c *Client) Decommission(ctx context.Context, where string) (DecommissionResult, error) {
|
||
var out DecommissionResult
|
||
env, status, err := c.postWithStatus(ctx, "/disks/decommission", map[string]string{"where": where})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := refusalError("/disks/decommission", status, env); err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /disks/decommission: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// refusalError converts a non-2xx status or an ok:false envelope into an error that CARRIES the
|
||
// agent's reason (truncated; never request bodies or secrets). nil on an accepted 200/202+ok=true.
|
||
func refusalError(path string, status int, env apiResponse) error {
|
||
accepted := status == http.StatusOK || status == http.StatusAccepted
|
||
if accepted && env.OK {
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
reason := truncateErr(env.Error, 300)
|
||
if reason == "" {
|
||
reason = "(no reason in agent response)"
|
||
}
|
||
if accepted { // 2xx but ok:false — business refusal without an HTTP error code
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: %s", path, reason)
|
||
}
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: HTTP %d: %s", path, status, reason)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// truncateErr mirrors stacks.truncateStr for agent refusal reasons.
|
||
func truncateErr(s string, maxLen int) string {
|
||
if len(s) <= maxLen {
|
||
return s
|
||
}
|
||
return s[:maxLen] + "..."
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FormatDisk asks the agent to format a device. The AGENT inspects the device and tiers it by ROLE
|
||
// (its own classification, never the controller's claim):
|
||
// - blank device → formatted.
|
||
// - user-data, data-bearing, NOT confirmed → ErrNeedsConfirmation (out.DurableID = the id to confirm).
|
||
// - user-data, data-bearing, confirmed + matching durable id → formatted.
|
||
// - system/backup, data-bearing → ErrFormatRefused (out.PendingOp = the operator opsign command).
|
||
//
|
||
// confirmed + durableID authorize a user-data wipe (the durable id the agent gave on the prior
|
||
// ErrNeedsConfirmation); they are inert for system/backup.
|
||
func (c *Client) FormatDisk(ctx context.Context, device, fstype string, confirmed bool, durableID string) (FormatResult, error) {
|
||
var out FormatResult
|
||
// Status-aware POST: the agent returns the FULL FormatResponse (incl. pending_op / durable_id)
|
||
// even on the 403 refusal, so we must read the body on non-2xx rather than discarding it.
|
||
env, status, err := c.postWithStatus(ctx, "/disks/format", map[string]any{
|
||
"device": device, "fstype": fstype, "confirmed": confirmed, "durable_id": durableID,
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
// env.Data is the envelope's {data:…} payload (present on both success and the 403 refusal).
|
||
if len(env.Data) > 0 {
|
||
_ = json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &out) // best-effort; fields default on a missing/partial body
|
||
}
|
||
if out.Formatted {
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
if out.NeedsConfirmation {
|
||
out.DataBearing = true
|
||
return out, ErrNeedsConfirmation // user-data: surface the type-to-confirm flow
|
||
}
|
||
if status == http.StatusForbidden || (out.DataBearing && !out.Formatted) {
|
||
out.DataBearing = true
|
||
return out, ErrFormatRefused // system/backup: surface the opsign command
|
||
}
|
||
// F20-BUG1: a non-2xx response (or ok:false) that is NOT one of the recognized refusals above is a
|
||
// real failure (e.g. the agent's 502 on a mkfs error: "device is mounted"). Returning the zero-value
|
||
// result with a nil error here made a failed destructive format read as a silent SUCCESS in the web
|
||
// layer. Surface it as an error so the caller (and the dashboard) report the failure.
|
||
if status < 200 || status >= 300 || !env.OK {
|
||
msg := strings.TrimSpace(env.Error)
|
||
if msg == "" {
|
||
msg = "format failed"
|
||
}
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: format: HTTP %d: %s", status, msg)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FormatStatusResult mirrors GET /disks/format/status (F20-BUG3): the most-recent / in-flight format
|
||
// job on the host. Phase ∈ idle | running | done | failed. The drive-init flow polls this to follow a
|
||
// mkfs that outran the 15 s client timeout — the agent runs the mkfs DETACHED and keeps the record, so
|
||
// the client can learn the real outcome instead of assuming failure (F6).
|
||
type FormatStatusResult struct {
|
||
Phase string `json:"phase"`
|
||
Device string `json:"device"`
|
||
FSType string `json:"fstype"`
|
||
Error string `json:"error"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FormatStatus fetches the agent's most-recent format-job record.
|
||
func (c *Client) FormatStatus(ctx context.Context) (FormatStatusResult, error) {
|
||
var out FormatStatusResult
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/disks/format/status")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /disks/format/status: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ---- NAS network storage (Part A2 → agent A1 /netstorage/*) ------------------------------
|
||
//
|
||
// A NAS share is a DISTINCT storage class from a drive: the controller proxies add/list/remove to the
|
||
// agent (which owns the host-side automount), holds NO mount authority, and persists NO SMB password
|
||
// (it passes the credentials straight through to the agent's add request — the agent writes the 0600
|
||
// creds file). There is NO eject/decommission/migrate/wipe/SMART here — those are drive-only.
|
||
|
||
// NetworkMountStatus mirrors the agent's GET /netstorage entry (A1). health ∈ {ok, idle, unreachable}:
|
||
// `idle` (reachable + automount idle-unmounted) is BENIGN, not a fault; only `unreachable` is degraded.
|
||
type NetworkMountStatus struct {
|
||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||
Protocol string `json:"protocol"`
|
||
Server string `json:"server"`
|
||
Export string `json:"export"`
|
||
Where string `json:"where"`
|
||
Configured bool `json:"configured"`
|
||
Mounted bool `json:"mounted"`
|
||
Reachable bool `json:"reachable"`
|
||
Health string `json:"health"` // ok | idle | unreachable
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Unreachable reports the degraded state (NAS not reachable). `idle` is explicitly NOT unreachable — an
|
||
// idle-unmounted automount is the normal steady state, never a warning.
|
||
func (n NetworkMountStatus) Unreachable() bool { return n.Health == "unreachable" }
|
||
|
||
// AddNetStorageRequest is the controller→agent POST /netstorage/add body (A1). Username/Password are SMB
|
||
// only and flow STRAIGHT THROUGH to the agent (which writes the 0600 creds file) — the controller never
|
||
// stores the password at rest.
|
||
type AddNetStorageRequest struct {
|
||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||
Protocol string `json:"protocol"` // nfs | smb
|
||
Server string `json:"server"`
|
||
Export string `json:"export"`
|
||
MappedUID int `json:"mapped_uid"`
|
||
MappedGID int `json:"mapped_gid"`
|
||
IdleTimeoutSec int `json:"idle_timeout_sec,omitempty"`
|
||
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"` // SMB secret — pass-through, never persisted
|
||
Password string `json:"password,omitempty"` // SMB secret — pass-through, never persisted
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NetStorageAddResult mirrors the agent's add response (the in-guest path the media app's data dir
|
||
// points at). Since agent v0.81.0 (verify-before-commit) a successful add means "units installed,
|
||
// verify STARTED" — Verify/JobID carry the detached verify job the caller polls via NetVerifyStatus.
|
||
type NetStorageAddResult struct {
|
||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||
Protocol string `json:"protocol"`
|
||
Where string `json:"where"`
|
||
GuestPath string `json:"guest_path"`
|
||
HostUID int `json:"host_uid"`
|
||
HostGID int `json:"host_gid"`
|
||
Verify string `json:"verify"` // "started" on a verify-before-commit agent (v0.81.0+)
|
||
JobID string `json:"job_id"`
|
||
Code string `json:"code"` // set on a categorized SYNC refusal (e.g. "unreachable", "busy")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NetAddRefusedError is the agent's CATEGORIZED sync refusal of a netstorage add (the 2 s TCP
|
||
// pre-probe "unreachable", or "busy" single-flight). Code is the verify-category vocabulary the UI
|
||
// maps to Hungarian; nothing was installed agent-side.
|
||
type NetAddRefusedError struct {
|
||
Code string
|
||
Msg string
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (e *NetAddRefusedError) Error() string {
|
||
return "agentapi: netstorage add refused (" + e.Code + "): " + e.Msg
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NetVerifyStatus mirrors the agent's GET /netstorage/verify-status: the single verify slot.
|
||
// Phase "none" is a REAL signal — after an agent restart the in-memory job is gone; the caller
|
||
// treats none-after-install as verify-lost and rolls the add back (Scenario F).
|
||
type NetVerifyStatus struct {
|
||
Phase string `json:"phase"` // none | running | done | failed
|
||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||
Where string `json:"where"`
|
||
Protocol string `json:"protocol"`
|
||
Code string `json:"code"` // failure category (the agent's classifier vocabulary)
|
||
Detail string `json:"detail"` // operator hint + raw journal fragment
|
||
JobID string `json:"job_id"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// AddNetStorage installs a NAS share host-side and starts the agent's detached verify job (agent
|
||
// v0.81.0 verify-before-commit). A categorized sync refusal returns *NetAddRefusedError carrying
|
||
// the category code (the result body also carries it); other failures are plain errors.
|
||
func (c *Client) AddNetStorage(ctx context.Context, req AddNetStorageRequest) (NetStorageAddResult, error) {
|
||
var out NetStorageAddResult
|
||
env, status, err := c.postWithStatus(ctx, "/netstorage/add", req)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if len(env.Data) > 0 {
|
||
_ = json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &out) // best-effort; the refusal body carries {code}
|
||
}
|
||
if rerr := refusalError("/netstorage/add", status, env); rerr != nil {
|
||
if out.Code != "" {
|
||
return out, &NetAddRefusedError{Code: out.Code, Msg: truncateErr(env.Error, 300)}
|
||
}
|
||
return out, rerr
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NetVerifyStatus polls the agent's verify slot (short GET — fits the client's global 15 s timeout;
|
||
// the LONG wait lives in the caller's poll loop, never in one HTTP call).
|
||
func (c *Client) NetVerifyStatus(ctx context.Context) (NetVerifyStatus, error) {
|
||
var out NetVerifyStatus
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/netstorage/verify-status")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /netstorage/verify-status: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ListNetStorage returns the configured NAS shares + per-share liveness.
|
||
func (c *Client) ListNetStorage(ctx context.Context) ([]NetworkMountStatus, error) {
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/netstorage")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
var wrap struct {
|
||
NetworkMounts []NetworkMountStatus `json:"network_mounts"`
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &wrap); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /netstorage: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return wrap.NetworkMounts, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RemoveNetStorage unmounts + removes a NAS share (the agent drops the mount + creds file). This is NOT a
|
||
// drive decommission/migrate — a NAS has no device lifecycle.
|
||
func (c *Client) RemoveNetStorage(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
|
||
_, err := c.post(ctx, "/netstorage/remove", map[string]string{"name": name})
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// postWithStatus issues an authenticated JSON POST and returns the envelope's data payload + the HTTP
|
||
// status, even on a non-2xx (so callers like FormatDisk can read a 403 refusal body). A transport or
|
||
// envelope-parse failure is still an error; an `ok:false` business refusal is NOT (the data carries it).
|
||
func (c *Client) postWithStatus(ctx context.Context, path string, body any) (apiResponse, int, error) {
|
||
var env apiResponse
|
||
buf, err := json.Marshal(body)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return env, 0, err
|
||
}
|
||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(buf))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return env, 0, err
|
||
}
|
||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
|
||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||
start := time.Now()
|
||
resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] POST %s failed after %dms: %v", path, time.Since(start).Milliseconds(), err)
|
||
return env, 0, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: %w", path, err)
|
||
}
|
||
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
||
c.noteAgentVersion(resp) // v0.82.0 version channel: passive capture on EVERY response
|
||
logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] POST %s -> %d (%dms)", path, resp.StatusCode, time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
|
||
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
|
||
return env, resp.StatusCode, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: HTTP %d, bad envelope: %w", path, resp.StatusCode, err)
|
||
}
|
||
return env, resp.StatusCode, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ---- v0.116.0: agent debug-log ring (the Debug page agent tab) ----------------------------
|
||
|
||
// AgentLogEntry mirrors the agent's GET /debug/logs entry (agent ≥ 0.83.0).
|
||
type AgentLogEntry struct {
|
||
Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
|
||
Level string `json:"level"`
|
||
Message string `json:"message"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// AgentLogsResponse mirrors the agent's GET /debug/logs data payload.
|
||
type AgentLogsResponse struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Entries []AgentLogEntry `json:"entries"`
|
||
Total int `json:"total"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// DebugLogs fetches the agent's always-DEBUG capture ring. Against a pre-0.83
|
||
// agent the route is absent → a typed *StatusError with Code 404 (the caller
|
||
// renders the "available after the agent's next update" notice — S6).
|
||
func (c *Client) DebugLogs(ctx context.Context) (AgentLogsResponse, error) {
|
||
var out AgentLogsResponse
|
||
data, err := c.get(ctx, "/debug/logs")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: parsing debug logs: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ---- slice 9: host metrics (the customer host-health view) -------------------------------
|
||
|
||
// HostMetrics mirrors the agent's GET /host/metrics `host` block (shared HostMetrics wire shape).
|
||
// CPUTempC is a pointer so a host with no temp sensor is null ("n/a"), distinct from a real 0.
|
||
type HostMetrics struct {
|
||
Node string `json:"node"`
|
||
CPUPercent float64 `json:"cpu_percent"` // 0–100
|
||
MemoryTotalBytes int64 `json:"memory_total_bytes"`
|
||
MemoryUsedBytes int64 `json:"memory_used_bytes"`
|
||
MemoryPercent float64 `json:"memory_percent"`
|
||
DiskTotalBytes int64 `json:"disk_total_bytes"` // host root fs
|
||
DiskUsedBytes int64 `json:"disk_used_bytes"`
|
||
DiskPercent float64 `json:"disk_percent"`
|
||
LoadAvg []string `json:"loadavg"`
|
||
UptimeSeconds int64 `json:"uptime_seconds"`
|
||
CPUTempC *int `json:"cpu_temp_c"` // °C or null ("n/a")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ThinPoolFill mirrors the agent's lvmthin pool fill (a full thin-pool corrupts every guest on it).
|
||
type ThinPoolFill struct {
|
||
DataUsedFraction float64 `json:"data_used_fraction"`
|
||
MetadataUsedFraction *float64 `json:"metadata_used_fraction"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SmartSummary mirrors the agent's per-disk SMART health (only the fields the UI renders). Pointers
|
||
// are null when the device type does not expose that attribute.
|
||
type SmartSummary struct {
|
||
Health string `json:"health"` // PASSED | FAILING | UNKNOWN
|
||
TemperatureC *int `json:"temperature_c"`
|
||
PercentageUsed *int `json:"percentage_used"` // NVMe wear (%); null for SATA/USB
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// StorageTarget mirrors the agent's GET /host/metrics storage_targets entry (the per-storage
|
||
// capacity + health the monitoring view renders). It is a SUBSET of the agent's wire shape — only
|
||
// the fields the UI reads; unknown JSON keys are ignored.
|
||
type StorageTarget struct {
|
||
Name string `json:"name"`
|
||
Type string `json:"type"`
|
||
State string `json:"state"`
|
||
Reachable bool `json:"reachable"`
|
||
TotalBytes int64 `json:"total_bytes"`
|
||
UsedBytes int64 `json:"used_bytes"`
|
||
AvailBytes int64 `json:"avail_bytes"`
|
||
UsedFraction float64 `json:"used_fraction"`
|
||
Content string `json:"content"`
|
||
MountPath string `json:"mount_path"`
|
||
ClassHint string `json:"class_hint"`
|
||
ThinPool *ThinPoolFill `json:"thin_pool,omitempty"`
|
||
Smart SmartSummary `json:"smart"`
|
||
// Label and Purpose are controller-side display enrichment (NOT from the agent): a friendly
|
||
// Hungarian name + one-line purpose so the customer understands what each storage holds. The
|
||
// raw PVE storage id stays in Name (display-only labels — we never rename the actual storage).
|
||
Label string `json:"label,omitempty"`
|
||
Purpose string `json:"purpose,omitempty"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// HostMetricsResponse mirrors the agent's GET /host/metrics payload (host-wide health + per-storage
|
||
// capacity). Host-wide and token-authed (one-customer-per-host); a fresh collect, not a snapshot.
|
||
type HostMetricsResponse struct {
|
||
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
|
||
Host HostMetrics `json:"host"`
|
||
StorageTargets []StorageTarget `json:"storage_targets"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// HostMetrics calls GET /host/metrics and returns the host's live health + per-storage capacity.
|
||
func (c *Client) HostMetrics(ctx context.Context) (HostMetricsResponse, error) {
|
||
var out HostMetricsResponse
|
||
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/host/metrics")
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return out, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
|
||
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /host/metrics: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// StatusError is a non-2xx agent HTTP status surfaced as a TYPED error (same text the old
|
||
// fmt.Errorf produced). errors.As-able — the capability probe (features.go) keys on Code 404 to
|
||
// distinguish "this agent predates the route" from every other failure. Never match the string.
|
||
type StatusError struct {
|
||
Path string
|
||
Code int
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (e *StatusError) Error() string {
|
||
return fmt.Sprintf("agentapi: GET %s: HTTP %d", e.Path, e.Code)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// get issues an authenticated GET and unwraps the {ok,data,error} envelope.
|
||
func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, path string) (json.RawMessage, error) {
|
||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.baseURL+path, nil)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
|
||
start := time.Now()
|
||
resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] GET %s failed after %dms: %v", path, time.Since(start).Milliseconds(), err)
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: %w", path, err)
|
||
}
|
||
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
||
c.noteAgentVersion(resp) // v0.82.0 version channel: passive capture on EVERY response
|
||
logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] GET %s -> %d (%dms)", path, resp.StatusCode, time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
|
||
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
|
||
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
||
return nil, &StatusError{Path: path, Code: resp.StatusCode}
|
||
}
|
||
var env apiResponse
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: bad envelope: %w", path, err)
|
||
}
|
||
if !env.OK {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: %s", path, env.Error)
|
||
}
|
||
return env.Data, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// post issues an authenticated JSON POST and unwraps the {ok,data,error} envelope. The agent
|
||
// returns 200 or 202 for accepted requests.
|
||
func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, path string, body any) (json.RawMessage, error) {
|
||
buf, err := json.Marshal(body)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(buf))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
|
||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||
start := time.Now()
|
||
resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] POST %s failed after %dms: %v", path, time.Since(start).Milliseconds(), err)
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: %w", path, err)
|
||
}
|
||
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
||
c.noteAgentVersion(resp) // v0.82.0 version channel: passive capture on EVERY response
|
||
logx.Debugf(c.logger, "[agentapi] POST %s -> %d (%dms)", path, resp.StatusCode, time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
|
||
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
|
||
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: HTTP %d", path, resp.StatusCode)
|
||
}
|
||
var env apiResponse
|
||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: bad envelope: %w", path, err)
|
||
}
|
||
if !env.OK {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: POST %s: %s", path, env.Error)
|
||
}
|
||
return env.Data, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// normalizeFingerprint lowercases and strips ':'/' ' separators, requiring a 64-hex SHA-256.
|
||
func normalizeFingerprint(fp string) (string, error) {
|
||
s := strings.ToLower(strings.NewReplacer(":", "", " ", "", "\t", "").Replace(strings.TrimSpace(fp)))
|
||
if len(s) != 64 {
|
||
return "", fmt.Errorf("agentapi: fingerprint must be a SHA-256 (64 hex chars), got %d", len(s))
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := hex.DecodeString(s); err != nil {
|
||
return "", fmt.Errorf("agentapi: fingerprint is not valid hex: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return s, nil
|
||
}
|