# REPORT — TASK C2: one-click class-C file restore from the Tier-2 copy (closes F2) **Date:** 2026-07-05 · **Class:** implementation (code + tests + deploy + live validation) **Baseline:** `main` @ `0313ecd` (v0.99.0, matched the task's confirmed baseline exactly; not behind origin) **Shipped:** **v0.100.0**, live on guest 9201 (`gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.100.0`, healthy) **Outcome:** drill finding **F2 CLOSED** — the whole C-series (F1/F2/F3/O4 from `DRILL-appdata-restore-2026-07-04.md`) is now resolved. ## Commits (all on `main`) | Hash | What | |---|---| | `30b1110` | Part 1 — `RestoreTier2Files` engine + `rsyncRestoreMissing` + copier seam + tests | | `27aeb41` | Parts 2+3 — `POST /backup/tier2/restore` + "Fájlok visszaállítása" button + handler-guard test | | `85a5727` | Part 4 — CHANGELOG v0.100.0, CONTEXT (F2 closed), REUSE, controller/README | | felhom.eu `7e42ca6` | backup-architecture.md — class-C in-place path, additive-only semantics, reindex caveat | **Files (code):** `internal/backup/{tier2_restore.go(new), backup.go(seam)}`, `internal/web/{server.go, handlers.go, templates/backups.html}`. Tests (new): `internal/backup/tier2_restore_test.go`, `internal/web/tier2_restore_handler_test.go`. Template gates (id + emoji) green. ## What shipped - **Engine** `Manager.RestoreTier2Files(stack) (int, error)`: in-place, **additive-only** restore of missing user files from the **recorded** Tier-2 copy (`CrossDriveBackup.DestinationPath` + the `backups/secondary//appdata` literals from `RunTier2` — never a fresh `selectTier2Target`). Single-flight with backup/restore; **all refusals before any stop**, each with a customer-readable Hungarian reason (no copy / never ran / copy dir gone / Tier-2 drive disconnected / live drive disconnected or decommissioned); stop → copy → start → 90s health-wait; copy and restart errors surface (F17), health timeout only warns. - **Copier** `rsyncRestoreMissing`: `rsyncMirror`'s exec shape (mkdir, 60m ctx, trailing-slash contents copy, rsync's own exit code) with the opposite-direction flags — **`-a --ignore-existing --itemize-changes`**. Existing live files never overwritten; nothing ever deleted (the `--delete` trap). Count = `>f` itemize lines (pure `countRestoredFiles`); file names logged at DEBUG only, never INFO. - **Endpoint + UI**: `POST /backup/tier2/restore` (backupRestoreHandler-shaped guards) + the button on the **healthy Tier-2 row only** (Tier2Configured branch already excludes disconnected/inactive; extra `Tier2LastRun` gate), with the confirm dialog naming the additive-only contract + last-copy timestamp. Flash strings exactly per spec; n==0 is a success. - **Out of scope honoured:** no overwrite/point-in-time mode, no per-file selection, `recovery-unit/` untouched, offbox untouched, C1-report Obs 1/2/3 untouched. ## Tests & the §10 companion `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` green after every commit. **Top-level test functions: 286 → 293 (+7).** - Orchestration (seam): stop→copy→start order recorded; copier src = the recorded Tier-2 layout, dst = live `AppDataDir`; count passthrough. - Refusals C1–C5: each asserts the **non-effect** — `StopStack` never called, copier never invoked (C5 via a held running flag). C6 at the handler (`httptest`; nil backupMgr would panic if reached — it isn't). - Scenario D: `(0, nil)` success; copy-error surfacing (app still restarted). - FS-level semantics against **real rsync** (LookPath-skipped on Windows; **PASS on the build server**): deleted file restored byte-identical + counted; differing live file keeps live bytes; live-only file survives. - **Companion red-proof (run on the build server, where rsync exists):** flags swapped to `rsyncMirror`'s (`-a --delete`, no `--ignore-existing`) → the test failed **on both harms**: `live-edited b.txt was CLOBBERED: "BACKUP-VERSION"` **and** `live/c.txt: no such file or directory` (plus count 2≠1). Mutation reverted (`git status` clean on the build server), test green again. ## Deploy + live validation (§13, felhom-pve / guest 9201 only — Peti's box untouched) Build `./build.sh 0.100.0 --push` on 180; bootstrap deploy; verify `:0.100.0 Up (healthy)`, no fatal/panic. **Method note:** the claude-in-chrome bridge disconnected mid-session, so the first pass verified the **rendered UI HTML** (button + confirm + hidden `stack_name`, exactly once on nextcloud's Tier-2 row) and exercised the restore as the **exact form POST the button submits**. After Chrome was reopened, the **real click was also validated end-to-end** (step 8 below) — the UI path is now fully click-proven, no proxy caveat remains. 1. **Fixtures:** sentinel `d982fa3b….bin` (sha `1e5f82d7…`) + `modify_me.txt` (sha `c5ca964b…`) planted in live `appdata/nextcloud/drill` → `POST /api/backup/tier2` → both in the Tier-2 copy on felhom-flash, shas identical. 2. **Three fates staged after the copy:** `.bin` deleted live; `modify_me.txt` edited live (new sha `bd24729a…`); `live_only.txt` created live (sha `3c3474d5…`). 3. **Restore:** `302 → flash "nextcloud: 1 fájl visszaállítva a másodlagos másolatból."` Log: `Tier-2 file restore for nextcloud: …/felhom-flash/…/appdata → …/felhom-usb/appdata/nextcloud (additive-only)` … `1 file(s) restored (15s)`. 4. **All three fate assertions PASSED:** `.bin` back **byte-identical** (`1e5f82d7…`); `modify_me.txt` kept its **LIVE** sha (`bd24729a…`, NOT the backup's `c5ca964b…`); `live_only.txt` **survived** (`3c3474d5…`). Nextcloud healthy after restart. 5. **Idempotency (Scenario D):** immediate rerun → `flash "Nincs hiányzó fájl — minden fájl megvan a helyén."` (success, 0 files). 6. **Refusal non-effect:** sparkyfitness (no Tier-2 record) — the button is **absent** from its row (rendered-HTML count = 1, nextcloud only); direct POST → `flash_error "Fájl-visszaállítás sikertelen: nincs másodlagos fájlmásolat ehhez az alkalmazáshoz"`; container IDs + uptimes **unchanged** (never stopped). 7. **Cleanup:** drill dir removed live; fresh Tier-2 run purged the copy side (mirror semantics); zero residue both sides; final `docker ps` all healthy. 8. **Real-click UI validation (Chrome reopened):** fresh sentinel (`click.txt`, sha `6ce3342e…`) → Tier-2 run → deleted live → **the actual "Fájlok visszaállítása" button clicked in the dashboard** (Nextcloud row expanded; the native confirm dialog fired with the exact spec text incl. the live last-copy timestamp `2026-07-05T11:35:49Z`, auto-accepted via a test-only `window.confirm` override to avoid the extension-blocking dialog) → flash banner **"nextcloud: 1 fájl visszaállítva a másodlagos másolatból."** rendered on the page (screenshot) → file back **byte-identical** (`6ce3342e…`), nextcloud healthy. Cleanup repeated: zero residue, all healthy. ## Observations (not acted on) 1. **Reindex caveat is real but untested in-app** — the restored file returns at filesystem level; whether Nextcloud's own UI lists it may require `occ files:scan` (documented in backup-architecture.md; not exercised — the drill fixture lives outside Nextcloud's indexed user dirs). 2. **Carried from C1 (still open, unchanged):** O4-residual/F3 interaction, compose stderr truncation, compose volume-label warnings, demo-box unauth/empty-CSRF exposure.