# LIVE-DRIVE-FINDINGS — felhom-controller end-to-end live drive - **Date:** 2026-06-14 - **Branch:** `audit/2026-06-14-live-drive` - **Versions under test:** controller **v0.60.0**, agent **v0.30.0**, hub v0.11.0 (per runbook) - **Target:** demo guest **9201** (`demo-felhom`) on Proxmox host `felhom-pve` (192.168.0.162) - **Mode:** unattended discovery drive — find bugs, do NOT fix. Destructive ops authorized (demo disposable). ## Control-plane access method used The demo dashboard has **no password set**, so the controller's `RequireAuth` and `CsrfProtect` middleware both skip (auth.go / csrf.go). The full REST API + web forms are therefore **open over the public URL** `https://felhom.demo-felhom.eu`. I drive the controller as a user would via that URL (NOT the container IP, which 404s on a network/mux nuance). Host SSH (`root@felhom-pve`) + `pct exec`/`docker exec` are used **only** for baseline setup and ground-truth verification — never to perform the operation under test. - Verified: `GET /api/health` → `{"ok":true}`; `GET /settings` and `GET /` → 200 without auth. --- ## Progress log (timestamped, Europe/Budapest) - **~start** — Baseline captured. Controller `:0.60.0 Up (healthy)`, agent `0.30.0 active`. 55 stacks in catalog; deployed/running: **actualbudget** (only customer app) + protected infra **traefik, cloudflared, filebrowser**. RomM is currently **not_deployed** (memory/CONTEXT said it was the live HDD app — state has since changed). Headroom: rootfs 32G (29G free), docker-data 252G (238G free). **Disks:** felhom-usb (user-data, data_bearing, /dev/sdb1, uuid:277a2179…), local + local-lvm (system), felhom-pbs (backup, 192.168.0.180:felhom-spike). Hub-side online status TBD. --- ## BASELINE | Item | Value | |---|---| | Controller image/status | `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.60.0` Up (healthy) | | Agent | `felhom-agent 0.30.0`, systemd active | | Guest rootfs | 32G total, 29G avail (4% used) | | Guest docker-data (/var/lib/docker) | 252G total, 238G avail (1% used) | | Guest RAM (LXC cgroup) | **2048 MB** (config `memory: 2048`, swap 512) | | Deployed customer apps | actualbudget | | Protected infra running | traefik, cloudflared, filebrowser, felhom-controller | | Disks | felhom-usb (HDD, user-data), local/local-lvm (system), felhom-pbs (offsite backup) | --- ## FINDINGS ### F1 — Memory metric reports HOST RAM (16GB), not the guest's 2GB cap — HIGH - **Area:** §11 monitoring accuracy / deploy headroom guard - **Action:** `GET /api/system/info`; cross-checked with `free` inside the LXC and the LXC config. - **Expected:** memory total ≈ the guest's 2048 MB cgroup limit. - **Actual:** `/api/system/info` → `total_mem_mb: 15771`, `avail_mem_mb: 13577`. The LXC is capped at **2048 MB** (`/etc/pve/lxc/9201.conf: memory: 2048`); `free -m` inside the LXC correctly shows 2048. The controller **Docker container** reads the host `/proc/meminfo` (`MemTotal: 16150380 kB` ≈ 15772 MB) because lxcfs is not bind-mounted into the container and its cgroup `memory.max = max` (no Docker memory limit). - **Evidence:** - LXC `free -m`: `Mem: 2048 ... available 1829` - controller container `head -1 /proc/meminfo`: `MemTotal: 16150380 kB`; `cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max` → `max` - `/etc/pve/lxc/9201.conf`: `memory: 2048`, `swap: 512` - **Impact:** The monitoring memory bar and (critically) the **deploy memory-headroom guard** believe the guest has ~13.5 GB free when only ~1.8 GB is usable. An operator deploying apps by that figure will OOM-kill the 2 GB guest. The 3-app bound in the runbook exists precisely because the real ceiling is 2 GB, which the UI hides. - **Verdict:** broken (misleading metric + unsafe headroom basis). **Severity: HIGH.** ### F2 — `hdd_configured: false` despite an attached user-data HDD — LOW (verify) - `/api/system/info` reports `hdd_configured: false` even though felhom-usb (HDD, role user-data, data_bearing) is attached and mounted at /mnt/felhom-usb. To confirm whether this gates any HDD-app deploy UI. Severity TBD. ### F3 — Hungarian catalog text double-UTF-8-encoded in API JSON — LOW (verify) - `GET /api/stacks` returns descriptions like `SzemĂ©lyes pĂ©nzĂĽgyek` (mojibake for "Személyes pénzügyek"). Looks like double-encoding. Need to confirm whether the rendered HTML UI is affected or only the JSON API. Severity TBD. ### F5 — uptime-kuma: broken catalog healthcheck → permanently unhealthy → **total 404 outage via Traefik** — HIGH - **Area:** §2 deploy / §2b health detection / §3 routing — a cascade. - **Action:** deployed uptime-kuma (`POST /api/stacks/uptime-kuma/deploy`), observed state, then traced the 404. - **Expected:** deploy → healthy → status.demo-felhom.eu serves the app (200). - **Actual / evidence — the cascade:** 1. **Catalog bug:** `/opt/docker/stacks/uptime-kuma/docker-compose.yml` defines `healthcheck.test: ["CMD","node","/app/extra/healthcheck.mjs"]`, but in the `louislam/uptime-kuma:2` image that file does not exist → `docker inspect` health log: `Error: Cannot find module '/app/extra/healthcheck.mjs'`, `Health=unhealthy FailingStreak=5`. 2. The **app process is actually fine** — `curl http://uptime-kuma:3001/` from a peer container → **302** (serving). 3. **Traefik gates route registration on Docker health.** On the websecure (443) entrypoint, `status.demo-felhom.eu → 404`, while every healthy app (tasks/recipes/share/paste) → 200. The HTTP→HTTPS redirect on :80 returns 301 for *all* hosts (global catch-all), which masks the missing 443 router. So the unhealthy container's TLS router is never published. 4. **Net result:** uptime-kuma is **completely unreachable at its URL (404)** for the customer, despite the app running — purely because of a wrong healthcheck path in the catalog. - **Verdict:** broken. **Severity: HIGH.** Two issues to file: (a) catalog healthcheck wrong for uptime-kuma:2; (b) **design risk** — *any* app with a broken/too-slow healthcheck doesn't just show "unhealthy", it becomes a hard 404 outage. The controller's deploy returns success and the dashboard shows "deployed (unhealthy)", giving no hint that the URL is dead. Consider surfacing "route not published because unhealthy" to the operator. - **Good part:** the controller **did correctly detect and surface `unhealthy`** (`GET /api/stacks/uptime-kuma` → `state=unhealthy`) — health detection itself works. ### F6 — Deploy POST returns `"deployed"` optimistically, before compose completes / before health is known — MEDIUM (API contract) - **Action:** timed `POST /api/stacks//deploy` vs controller logs. - **Evidence:** vikunja POST returned ~0s but log shows compose took 3.4s; uptime-kuma POST returned ~0s but compose pull took **31.7s** and the app ended **unhealthy**. The response `{"ok":true,"message":"Stack deployed"}` is sent before the container is up and regardless of eventual health. - **Impact:** This is the documented in-memory `Deployed=true`-before-`compose up` pattern (avoids the card flipping back mid-pull), and the UI compensates by polling `GET /api/stacks/`. But the **API message "deployed" is misleading** — an API consumer (or a script) that trusts the POST result will think a broken/unhealthy app succeeded (see F5). Verdict: clunky/misleading message; not a data-integrity bug. **Severity: MEDIUM.** ### F7 — API `state` lags Docker health by ~10s after deploy — LOW - mealie's container reported `(healthy)` in `docker ps` ~12s before `GET /api/stacks/mealie` flipped from `starting` to `running`. Cosmetic polling lag; transient. **Severity: LOW.** ### F8 — cloudflared `TUNNEL_TOKEN` stored in plaintext in docker-compose.yml — LOW/INFO - The cloudflared infra stack's compose holds `TUNNEL_TOKEN=` in plaintext on disk (not `enc:`-wrapped like app.yaml secrets). May be acceptable for an infra/base-bringup stack, but worth confirming against the "secrets must be encrypted at rest" posture. Token redacted here. **Severity: LOW/INFO.** ### F4 — `/api/stacks/rescan` returns "stack not found: rescan" — LOW - The runbook's documented rescan endpoint `GET /api/stacks/rescan` is routed as a stack name lookup → `{"ok":false,"error":"stack not found: rescan"}`. Either the route was removed/renamed or the runbook is stale. (Sync/rescan is reachable via `POST /api/sync`.) Cosmetic but documents a stale/missing endpoint.