package main

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"flag"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"log"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"os/exec"
	"os/signal"
	"path/filepath"
	"sort"
	"syscall"
	"time"

	"crypto/subtle"
	"strings"

	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/agentapi"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/api"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/appbackup"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/appexport"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/assets"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/backup"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/backupwindow"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/bootrecon"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/bootstrap"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/channelhealth"
	cf "gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/cloudflare"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/config"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/crypto"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/fillwatch"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/infra"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/integrations"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/mailrelay"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/metrics"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/monitor"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/notify"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/offsiteapply"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/quiesce"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/recovery"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/report"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/scheduler"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/selftest"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/selfupdate"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/settings"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/setup"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/stacks"
	catalogsync "gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/sync"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/system"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/web"
)

var (
	// Set at build time via ldflags
	Version   = "dev"
	BuildTime = "unknown"
	GitCommit = "unknown"
)

func main() {
	// Hidden re-exec mode (NAS verify-before-commit): the web server re-execs THIS binary as
	// `felhom-controller --netprobe <dir>` with uid/gid-1000 credentials to prove a media app can
	// write through a freshly-verified network share (SPIKE-nas-verify Q2). Handled before flag
	// parsing; the exit code is the probe verdict (see web/netprobe.go).
	if len(os.Args) == 3 && os.Args[1] == "--netprobe" {
		os.Exit(web.NetProbeChild(os.Args[2]))
	}

	configPath := flag.String("config", "/opt/docker/felhom-controller/controller.yaml", "Path to configuration file")
	showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "Show version and exit")
	printResetCode := flag.Bool("print-reset-code", false, "Customer-claim escape hatch (v0.122.0, F-4): print a fresh one-time local claim/reset code to stdout, then exit. Root-gated by reachability (docker exec). Same gate consumes it.")
	printInfraImages := flag.Bool("print-infra-images", false, "Print every controller-managed infra image (one per line) and exit. Read by the golden bake (felhom-agent configs/build-golden.sh) so the appliance image pre-pulls exactly what THIS controller version will request.")
	recoverOffsiteCheck := flag.Bool("recover-offsite-check", false, "R-200 diagnostic: read the customer recovery code from STDIN, recover the offsite repository password from the hub-held sealed escrow via the agent, and report whether it matches the one on disk — BY HASH. Compares, never installs; writes nothing. Exit 0 = match, 2 = clean mismatch, 1 = a step failed.")
	recoverOffsiteInstall := flag.Bool("recover-offsite-install", false, "R-200: read the customer recovery code from STDIN, recover the offsite repository password, print both hashes, and — with --confirm-install — PLACE it so the existing repository reopens. Without --confirm-install it is a dry run that writes nothing.")
	confirmInstall := flag.Bool("confirm-install", false, "Required alongside --recover-offsite-install to actually write the recovered repository password. Deliberately a second invocation so the hashes are seen before any write is possible.")
	// §7.5 (R-241): the operator levers for a running abandonment countdown. The automatic 30-day
	// ending is deliberately NOT built (R-245) — what is built is the path that actually happens,
	// which is the customer getting in touch and support needing something to press.
	abandonStatus := flag.Bool("abandon-status", false, "R-241: print the state of this box's off-site abandonment countdown (set-aside path, due date, days left) and exit. Read-only.")
	abandonExtend := flag.Int("abandon-extend", 0, "R-241 (operator): extend a running abandonment countdown by N days from now, then exit. Refuses when no countdown is running.")
	abandonStop := flag.Bool("abandon-stop", false, "R-241 (operator): stop a running abandonment countdown, then exit. The set-aside history is kept and nothing is deleted. Refuses when no countdown is running.")
	listRestoreHolds := flag.Bool("restore-holds", false, "R-379 (operator): list apps this controller is deliberately holding stopped after a failed database restore whose rollback also failed, then exit. Read-only.")
	clearRestoreHold := flag.String("clear-restore-hold", "", "R-379 (operator): clear the restore hold on APP so it can start again, then exit. Clearing does NOT repair the database — check the app's data first; the undo copies are in its unit's db-dumps dir.")
	flag.Parse()

	if *showVersion {
		fmt.Printf("felhom-controller %s (built %s, commit %s)\n", Version, BuildTime, GitCommit)
		os.Exit(0)
	}

	// Config-free by design: the golden bake runs this against a bare `docker run` of the controller
	// image, where no controller.yaml, data dir or settings exist yet. It must never touch either.
	if *printInfraImages {
		for _, img := range infra.Images() {
			fmt.Println(img)
		}
		os.Exit(0)
	}

	// R-200 (v0.196.0) — the INSTALL sibling. Same fetch/unseal path, same stdin discipline for R;
	// the difference is that it places the recovered password so a rebuilt box reopens the off-site
	// history it inherited. Two invocations by design: without --confirm-install it prints the hashes
	// and writes nothing.
	if *recoverOffsiteInstall {
		cfg, err := config.LoadPermissive(*configPath)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "recover-offsite-install: loading config: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		sett, err := settings.Load(cfg.Paths.DataDir+"/settings.json", log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0))
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "recover-offsite-install: loading settings: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		ac, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "recover-offsite-install: agent channel: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		os.Exit(backup.RecoverAndInstall(backup.RecoveryCheckDeps{
			Manager:   backup.NewManager(cfg, sett, log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0)),
			Recoverer: ac,
			In:        os.Stdin,
			Out:       os.Stdout,
			Err:       os.Stderr,
		}, *confirmInstall))
	}

	// R-200 (v0.195.0) — the offsite-key recovery check. A `docker exec` escape hatch in the shape of
	// --print-reset-code above, and deliberately NOT a page or a browser-reachable API: the
	// customer-facing flow is designed on top of a chain that has been walked, and this is the walk.
	// R arrives on STDIN so it never appears in argv, `ps`, shell history or a session transcript.
	if *recoverOffsiteCheck {
		cfg, err := config.LoadPermissive(*configPath)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "recover-offsite-check: loading config: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		sett, err := settings.Load(cfg.Paths.DataDir+"/settings.json", log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0))
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "recover-offsite-check: loading settings: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		ac, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "recover-offsite-check: agent channel: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		os.Exit(backup.RunRecoveryCheck(backup.RecoveryCheckDeps{
			Manager:   backup.NewManager(cfg, sett, log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0)),
			Recoverer: ac,
			In:        os.Stdin,
			Out:       os.Stdout,
			Err:       os.Stderr,
		}))
	}

	// §7.5 (R-241) — the operator's abandonment levers. Grouped in one block, before the server
	// starts, exactly like the other CLI subcommands: each loads config + settings, acts, and exits.
	// R-379 (operator): the way OUT of a hold. A CLI subcommand rather than an API route, matching
	// --abandon-stop above: the controller's HTTP surface is authenticated as the CUSTOMER, and
	// clearing a hold is a decision that should follow an operator looking at the database. Reaching
	// this needs `docker exec` into the guest, which is the operator gate this project already uses.
	if *listRestoreHolds || *clearRestoreHold != "" {
		cfg, err := config.LoadPermissive(*configPath)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "restore-hold: loading config: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		lg := log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0)
		sett, err := settings.Load(cfg.Paths.DataDir+"/settings.json", lg)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "restore-hold: loading settings: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		if *listRestoreHolds {
			holds := sett.ListRestoreHolds()
			if len(holds) == 0 {
				fmt.Println("no restore holds in force")
				os.Exit(0)
			}
			for _, h := range holds {
				fmt.Printf("%s\theld since %s\n  replay error : %s\n  rollback err : %s\n", h.Stack, h.At, h.ReplayError, h.RollbackErr)
			}
			os.Exit(0)
		}
		cleared, err := sett.ClearRestoreHold(*clearRestoreHold)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "restore-hold: clearing %s: %v\n", *clearRestoreHold, err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		if !cleared {
			// "there was nothing to clear" is not success — a silent 0 here would let an operator
			// believe they had unblocked an app whose name they mistyped.
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "no restore hold in force for %q — nothing was changed\n", *clearRestoreHold)
			os.Exit(2)
		}
		// THE RESTART IS NOT OPTIONAL, and saying so is the difference between a route that works
		// and one an operator believes worked. This runs as a SECOND process: it clears the hold in
		// settings.json, but the RUNNING controller holds its own in-memory Settings and keeps
		// refusing until it reloads. Measured on demo-hp 2026-08-22 — the clear succeeded, the file
		// was correct, and the customer's start button still refused until the controller restarted.
		//
		// There is also a lost-update window while both processes hold the file: if the running
		// controller saves settings.json from its own copy before the restart, the clear is undone.
		// Restarting promptly closes it. A route that clears through the running controller would
		// remove both problems and is the right shape later; it needs an operator tier the
		// controller's HTTP surface does not have today (it authenticates as the CUSTOMER, and a
		// customer clearing their own hold is precisely what the hold exists to prevent).
		fmt.Printf("restore hold cleared for %s in settings.json.\n", *clearRestoreHold)
		fmt.Printf("  NOW RESTART THE CONTROLLER, or it will keep refusing to start the app:\n")
		fmt.Printf("    systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap.service\n")
		fmt.Printf("  Check the app's data first — the undo copies are in its unit's db-dumps dir.\n")
		os.Exit(0)
	}

	if *abandonStatus || *abandonExtend > 0 || *abandonStop {
		cfg, err := config.LoadPermissive(*configPath)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "abandon: loading config: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		lg := log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0)
		sett, err := settings.Load(cfg.Paths.DataDir+"/settings.json", lg)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "abandon: loading settings: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		mgr := backup.NewManager(cfg, sett, lg)
		st := mgr.AbandonStatus()
		switch {
		case *abandonStop:
			if serr := mgr.StopAbandon(); serr != nil {
				fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "abandon-stop: %v\n", serr)
				os.Exit(2)
			}
			fmt.Printf("abandonment STOPPED — the set-aside history at %s is kept; nothing was deleted\n", st.RepoPath)
		case *abandonExtend > 0:
			due, eerr := mgr.ExtendAbandon(*abandonExtend)
			if eerr != nil {
				fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "abandon-extend: %v\n", eerr)
				os.Exit(2)
			}
			fmt.Printf("abandonment EXTENDED by %d day(s) — the set-aside history at %s is now deleted on %s\n",
				*abandonExtend, st.RepoPath, due.Format("2006-01-02"))
		default:
			if !st.Active && !st.PurgeRequested {
				fmt.Println("no abandonment countdown is running on this box")
				os.Exit(0)
			}
			if st.PurgeRequested {
				fmt.Printf("set-aside history DELETED at %s; awaiting the hub to drop the sealed package\n", st.RepoPath)
				os.Exit(0)
			}
			fmt.Printf("abandonment countdown RUNNING\n  set-aside history : %s\n  chosen on         : %s\n  deleted on        : %s\n  days left         : %d\n",
				st.RepoPath, st.StartedAt.Format("2006-01-02"), st.DueAt.Format("2006-01-02"), st.DaysLeft)
		}
		os.Exit(0)
	}

	if *printResetCode {
		cfg, err := config.LoadPermissive(*configPath)
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "print-reset-code: loading config: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		sett, err := settings.Load(cfg.Paths.DataDir+"/settings.json", log.New(os.Stderr, "", 0))
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "print-reset-code: loading settings: %v\n", err)
			os.Exit(1)
		}
		os.Exit(web.PrintLocalResetCode(sett, cfg))
	}

	startTime := time.Now()

	// --- Load configuration ---
	// Use LoadPermissive to tolerate minimal configs (e.g. only domain set by docker-setup.sh).
	// If even that fails (file missing/unreadable), fall back to defaults.
	cfg, err := config.LoadPermissive(*configPath)
	if err != nil {
		cfg = config.Default()
		log.Printf("[WARN] Config load failed (%s), using defaults: %v", *configPath, err)
	}

	logger, logBuffer := setupLogger(cfg)
	// fix-6 (CAMPAIGN-3): load the pre-restart debug-ring window back immediately, so a controller
	// restart / container recreation no longer wipes the exact evidence an operator needs. The spill
	// lives on the SSD state dir (DataDir — holds settings.json, survives recreation), NEVER a NAS path.
	ringSpillPath := filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "debug-ring.log")
	logBuffer.LoadFrom(ringSpillPath)
	// v0.116.0: the debug ring is the controller_log_tail source (report self-tail channel).
	report.SetControllerLogSource(logBuffer.Lines)

	// --- Bootstrap ingestion (slice 8A → v0.40.0 onboarding, doc 03 §6) ---
	// On first run, if this controller is not yet configured AND the host agent's provisioning
	// back-half attached a bootstrap.json config mount, PULL the full controller.yaml from the hub
	// (using the bootstrap's retrieval passphrase), merge in the per-guest local_api block, and come
	// up CONFIGURED — skipping setup mode. Idempotent (never clobbers an existing controller.yaml)
	// and fail-safe (a malformed/absent bootstrap, or a hub outage at first boot, leaves us in setup
	// mode). The adapter marks a transient hub-unreachable error as retryable (the rest are permanent).
	pull := func(hubURL, customerID, retrievalPassword string) (string, error) {
		y, perr := report.PullConfig(hubURL, customerID, retrievalPassword)
		if perr != nil && errors.Is(perr, report.ErrHubUnreachable) {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", bootstrap.ErrPullTransient, perr)
		}
		return y, perr
	}
	cfg = bootstrap.MaybeIngest(*configPath, cfg, logger, pull)

	// --- Wire system package debug logging ---
	if cfg.Logging.Level == "debug" {
		system.DebugLogger = logger
	}

	// --- Setup mode: if no customer ID configured, run setup wizard ---
	if setup.NeedsSetup(cfg) {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] felhom-controller %s — setup mode", Version)
		runSetupMode(cfg, logger)
		return
	}

	// --- Local API connectivity probe (slice 8A) ---
	// When seeded with a local-API endpoint, prove the controller↔agent channel at startup and
	// learn this guest's mounts (placement view). Non-fatal — the controller runs regardless; a
	// failure is logged for diagnosis. The full /backup/due quiesce loop lands in 8B.
	probeLocalAPI(cfg, logger)

	logger.Printf("[INFO] felhom-controller %s starting (customer: %s, domain: %s)",
		Version, cfg.Customer.ID, cfg.Customer.Domain)

	// --- Load settings ---
	settingsPath := cfg.Paths.DataDir + "/settings.json"
	sett, err := settings.Load(settingsPath, logger)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Fatalf("[FATAL] Failed to load settings from %s: %v", settingsPath, err)
	}
	sett.SetDebug(cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")

	// --- Auto-discover storage paths from deployed apps ---
	discoveredPaths := discoverHDDPaths(cfg.Paths.StacksDir, logger)
	sett.AutoDiscoverStoragePaths(discoveredPaths, cfg.Paths.HDDPath, logger)

	// --- Load or create encryption key ---
	encKeyPath := filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "encryption.key")
	encKey, err := crypto.LoadOrCreateKey(encKeyPath)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Fatalf("[FATAL] Failed to load encryption key: %v", err)
	}
	logger.Printf("[INFO] Encryption key loaded from %s", encKeyPath)

	// --- Initialize stack manager ---
	stackMgr, err := stacks.NewManager(cfg, logger)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Fatalf("[FATAL] Failed to initialize stack manager: %v", err)
	}
	stackMgr.SetEncryptionKey(encKey)

	// Initial stack scan
	if err := stackMgr.ScanStacks(); err != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] Initial stack scan failed: %v", err)
	}

	// Inject missing deploy fields for all deployed stacks on startup
	if names := stackMgr.DeployedStackNames(); len(names) > 0 {
		stackMgr.InjectMissingFields(names)
	}

	// Migrate existing plaintext passwords to encrypted
	stackMgr.MigrateEncryption()

	// --- First-boot base-infrastructure bring-up ---
	// We are guaranteed configured here (setup.NeedsSetup returned false above), so deploy the base
	// stack (traefik-public network → traefik → cloudflared → filebrowser) the controller needs for
	// routing + external access. Runs in a goroutine so a slow first-boot image pull never delays the
	// web server; non-fatal (idempotent + single-flight, the health loop re-attempts each tick).
	go func() {
		if err := stackMgr.EnsureBaseStack(); err != nil {
			logger.Printf("[WARN] [infra] first-boot base-stack bring-up: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	// --- Initialize catalog syncer ---
	syncer := catalogsync.New(cfg, logger, stackMgr.ScanStacks, func(updated []string) {
		stackMgr.InjectMissingFields(updated)
	})
	syncer.Start()
	defer syncer.Stop()

	// --- Graceful shutdown context ---
	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
	defer cancel()

	// --- Quiesce loop (slice 8B): app-consistent backup around the agent vzdump ---
	// Runs only when the local API is configured (a provisioned guest) and quiesce is enabled.
	// Recover FIRST (restart any stacks left stopped by a crash mid-quiesce), then start the loop.
	quiesceLoop := startQuiesceLoop(ctx, cfg, sett, stackMgr, logger)

	// --- R-166: recover apps left stopped by an interrupted app-data operation ---
	// A volume dump, an offsite reconstitution or a `.fab` export stops the app, works on its data,
	// and starts it again. A controller killed inside that window used to leave the app down with
	// NOTHING on disk explaining it — and a stopped app has zero containers, which the boot
	// reconciler below read as a deliberate customer stop and left alone, indefinitely.
	//
	// ORDERING IS LOAD-BEARING (§8.4) and this call must COMPLETE, not merely be reached, before the
	// boot-reconcile goroutine is launched: an app the marker already explains must not also be
	// reported as an unexplained boot orphan. Same position and same reason as the quiesce Recover
	// immediately above.
	// The guard is built HERE rather than taken from the backup manager because that manager is not
	// constructed until ~40 lines below — and moving its construction up to suit this would be a far
	// wider change than moving one object down. It is handed to the manager (SetAppStopGuard) and to
	// the exporter later, so all three share ONE guard over ONE file.
	//
	// R-174: the starter is GATED, never the raw manager. Recover runs here, at startup — exactly
	// when an external drive may not have come back — and `Manager.StartStack` has no drive gate of
	// its own, so the un-gated version started apps onto missing drives. The gate is the SAME
	// `driveStartGate` the boot sweep uses (holder #3 of bootDriveGate), so the two cannot disagree.
	appStopGuard := backup.NewAppStopGuard(filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "appstop-state.json"), logger)
	appStopGuard.SetStarter(gatedAppStopStarter{
		inner:  stackMgr,
		gate:   driveStartGate{mgr: stackMgr, sett: sett},
		logger: logger,
	})
	appStopRecovery := appStopGuard.Recover()

	// --- R-166: desired-state backfill (running-only) ---
	// Converge the apps whose intent is unambiguous — deployed and observed UP — so the fleet stops
	// depending on legacy inference without waiting for a button press. NEVER backfills "stopped":
	// zero containers cannot distinguish a deliberate stop from a power cut, and that inference is
	// the defect. Runs after the two recoveries so a just-restarted app is counted as running.
	stackMgr.BackfillDesiredState()

	// --- R-52: boot desired-state reconciliation ---
	// A deployed app that missed its boot start used to stay down until a human noticed (F5: immich
	// and calibre-web sat Exited for ~18 h while ten siblings came back). One bounded start-once
	// sweep, deliberately AFTER the quiesce recovery above so the two never race for the same stack,
	// and entirely inside deadAppBootGrace so a successful recovery is silent and a failed one still
	// alerts honestly. Never touches an app the customer stopped — see internal/bootrecon.
	// R-171: hand the boot sweep the settings it needs to answer "is this app's drive live?" BEFORE
	// the goroutine starts — an unwired gate is silently the pre-v0.190.0 behaviour that started apps
	// onto absent drives. TestMainWiresBootDriveGate walks this file's AST for the assignment.
	bootDriveSettings = sett
	bootQuiesceLoop = quiesceLoop
	bootAppStopGuard = appStopGuard
	go runBootReconcile(ctx, stackMgr, logger)

	// --- Start CPU collector ---
	cpuCollector := system.NewCPUCollector(5 * time.Second)
	cpuCollector.Start(ctx)
	defer cpuCollector.Stop()

	// --- Initialize metrics store + collector ---
	metricsDBPath := "/opt/docker/felhom-controller/data/metrics.db"
	metricsStore, err := metrics.NewMetricsStore(metricsDBPath, logger)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to initialize metrics store: %v — monitoring disabled", err)
	} else {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] Metrics store opened at %s", metricsDBPath)
	}

	if metricsStore != nil {
		defer metricsStore.Close()
		metricsHDDPath := cfg.Paths.HDDPath
		if p := sett.GetDefaultStoragePath(); p != "" {
			metricsHDDPath = p
		}
		metricsCollector := metrics.NewMetricsCollector(metricsStore, cpuCollector, metricsHDDPath, logger)
		metricsCollector.Start(ctx)
		defer metricsCollector.Stop()
		logger.Println("[INFO] Metrics collector started (60s interval)")
	}

	// Deprecation notice for ping UUIDs (Healthchecks pinging retired — the Hub
	// now owns monitoring; disk-tier backup moved to the host agent in slice 8C).
	uuids := cfg.Monitoring.PingUUIDs
	if uuids.Heartbeat != "" || uuids.SystemHealth != "" || uuids.DBDump != "" || uuids.Backup != "" || uuids.BackupIntegrity != "" {
		logger.Println("[INFO] Healthchecks ping UUIDs configured but no longer used — monitoring is now handled by the Hub")
	}

	// --- Initialize backup manager (app-data only: DB dumps + Docker-volume tars) ---
	var backupMgr *backup.Manager
	stackProv := &stackAdapter{
		mgr:             stackMgr,
		getStoragePaths: func() []settings.StoragePath { return sett.GetStoragePaths() },
		encKey:          encKey,
	}
	if cfg.Backup.Enabled {
		backupMgr = backup.NewManager(cfg, sett, logger)
		// R-166: use the guard that already ran Recover at startup, not a second one over the same
		// file (see SetAppStopGuard — one file, one owner).
		backupMgr.SetAppStopGuard(appStopGuard)
		backupMgr.SetStackProvider(stackProv)
		backupMgr.SetVersion(Version)
		// O4: restore-from-unit generates a replacement for an unrecoverable RESETTABLE secret
		// (data-keys stay fail-closed) so the app redeploys with a fresh credential, not a blank one.
		backupMgr.SetSecretGenerator(stackMgr.GenerateSecretForField)
		// R-7b: after a shares restore re-adds definitions to the registry, smb.conf must be
		// re-rendered or the restored shares exist on paper but are not exported. A seam rather than a
		// direct call — the backup package must not depend on the stacks package.
		backupMgr.SetSharesReconciler(stackMgr.ReconcileSamba)
	}

	// SLICE 2: the offsite apply-bridge is launched further down, AFTER the self-updater is constructed
	// (R-71a: the bridge's settle-gate reads the updater's floor/update-running state to defer the
	// consume past a managed day-0 floor-update). See "offsite apply-bridge" below.

	// --- Wire the data-migration engine (B1) + backup↔migration mutual exclusion (Change 3) ---
	stackMgr.SetMigrationDeps(sett, func() bool { return backupMgr != nil && backupMgr.IsRunning() })
	if backupMgr != nil {
		backupMgr.SetMigrationRunningCheck(stackMgr.IsMigrating)
	}
	// RecoverMigration is started AFTER the web server's done-hook is wired (below), so a resumed
	// decommission-migration still finalizes the source decommission on completion.

	// --- Initialize alert manager ---
	alertMgr := web.NewAlertManager(logger)

	// --- Initialize notifier ---
	notifier := notify.New(cfg.Hub.URL, cfg.Hub.APIKey, cfg.Customer.ID, sett, logger, cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")

	// R-97a: wire the quiesce loop's hub-event seam. It MUST happen here and not in
	// startQuiesceLoop, because the notifier is constructed after it — and it must happen at all,
	// or the seam is inert (the "built but never wired" trap, four recorded instances). Reachability
	// is covered by TestQuiesceTierNotifierIsWired in this package.
	if quiesceLoop != nil {
		quiesceLoop.SetTierNotifier(quiesceTierNotifier{n: notifier})
	}

	// R-166 §2.4: report an interrupted app-data operation to the operator, HERE, because the
	// recovery itself had to run before the boot reconciler (line ~236) and the notifier does not
	// exist until this line. An interrupted operation means the controller died mid-backup and that
	// backup did not complete — operator-grade news even when every app came back.
	//
	// It rides the EXISTING `backup_failed` event type rather than a new one: a new type needs the
	// hub's allowedEventTypes + customerMessages pair changed, which is a wire change, and this
	// release ships no hub change. A controller emitting an unlisted type gets a flat 400 from
	// POST /event. Reachability is covered by TestAppStopRecoveryIsWired.
	// R-174: `Alarming()` and not merely `!= nil`. A recovery that ONLY refused starts is the drive
	// gate working as designed, and `backup_failed` is customer-enabled by default — reporting a
	// deliberate hold through it would email the customer "A biztonsági mentés sikertelen!" about an
	// app nothing is wrong with. The refusal is already logged at WARN with its reason.
	if appStopRecovery != nil && appStopRecovery.Alarming() {
		notifier.NotifyBackupFailed(appStopRecovery.Message(), appStopRecovery.Detail())
	} else if appStopRecovery != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] [appstop] %s — not alarming: %s", appStopRecovery.Message(), appStopRecovery.Detail())
	}

	// --- Initialize the app-email SMTP shim (mailrelay) ---
	// In-process shim: apps → shim → hub → Resend (the Resend key stays hub-side). It runs only
	// when the controller has a hub (URL+key) AND the operational kill-switch is on; the runtime
	// global app-email toggle then decides whether it actually listens (Lifecycle.Apply). Listeners
	// bind to the app Docker network only — never published to the host/internet.
	var mailShim *mailrelay.Lifecycle
	if cfg.Hub.URL != "" && cfg.Hub.APIKey != "" && cfg.MailRelay.HardEnabled() {
		mailShim = mailrelay.NewLifecycle(mailrelay.Options{
			PlainAddr:      cfg.MailRelay.PlainListen,
			TLSAddr:        cfg.MailRelay.TLSListen,
			PlainNoTLSAddr: cfg.MailRelay.PlainNoTLSListen,
			ServiceName:    cfg.MailRelay.ShimHost,
			Policy:         mailrelay.NewPolicy(cfg.MailRelay.FromDomains),
			Forwarder:      mailrelay.NewHubForwarder(cfg.Hub.URL, cfg.Hub.APIKey),
			Logger:         logger,
		})
		if err := mailShim.Apply(sett.AppEmailEnabled()); err != nil {
			logger.Printf("[ERROR] [mailrelay] could not start app-email shim: %v", err)
		}
	} else {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] [mailrelay] app-email shim unavailable (no hub configured or disabled in config)")
	}

	// --- Initialize self-updater ---
	var updater *selfupdate.Updater
	if cfg.SelfUpdate.Enabled {
		// Phase 1: the host agent performs the container swap. Build a (nil-able) agent client from the
		// provisioned local-API config; when absent (un-provisioned guest) self-update is unavailable.
		var swapAgent selfupdate.AgentSwapper
		if cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint != "" && cfg.LocalAPI.Token != "" {
			if ac, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint); err != nil {
				logger.Printf("[WARN] Self-update: agent client init failed (%v) — updates unavailable", err)
			} else {
				swapAgent = ac
			}
		}
		updater = selfupdate.NewUpdater(&cfg.SelfUpdate, &cfg.Git, Version, cfg.Paths.DataDir, swapAgent, logger, cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
		updater.SetBackupRunningCheck(func() bool {
			return backupMgr != nil && backupMgr.IsRunning()
		})
		// Check for post-update state (did a previous update succeed or fail?)
		if state := updater.VerifyStartup(); state != nil {
			notifier.NotifyControllerUpdated(state.PreviousVersion, state.TargetVersion, state.Status == "success")
		}
		logger.Printf("[INFO] Self-update enabled (check every %s, auto-update: %v, auto-update time: %s)",
			cfg.SelfUpdate.CheckInterval, cfg.SelfUpdate.AutoUpdate, cfg.SelfUpdate.AutoUpdateTime)
	}

	// SLICE 2: the offsite apply-bridge — on startup (async, non-blocking) reconcile the hub-served
	// offsite descriptor into a configured key-only offbox target (fail-safe, idempotent, no blind
	// TOFU). The config_refresh self-restart re-runs this after a descriptor change (new process →
	// startup). Launched HERE (after the self-updater is built) so the R-71a settle-gate can read the
	// updater's floor/update-running state and defer the one-time-password consume past a managed
	// day-0 floor-update (the F10 race). The gate is wired ONLY when an updater exists — with no update
	// mechanism there is no floor-update to race, so the bridge reconciles immediately (Settle nil).
	// offsiteBridge is hoisted out of the block below ONLY so the recovery screen can drive one
	// reconcile between placing a recovered key and reading the repository (R-219). nil when off-site
	// is not configured for this customer, which the web seam treats as "skip".
	var offsiteBridge *offsiteapply.Bridge
	if backupMgr != nil && cfg.Offsite.Enabled && cfg.Hub.URL != "" && cfg.Hub.APIKey != "" {
		bridge := &offsiteapply.Bridge{
			Cfg:       cfg,
			Consumer:  offsiteapply.HTTPConsumer{HubURL: cfg.Hub.URL, CustomerID: cfg.Customer.ID, APIKey: cfg.Hub.APIKey},
			Scanner:   offsiteapply.KeyscanScanner{},
			KeyGen:    offsiteapply.ED25519KeyGen{},
			Installer: offsiteapply.SSHCopyIDInstaller{},
			Prober:    offsiteapply.SFTPKeyAuthProber{KeyPath: filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "offbox", "ssh_key")},
			Enabler: offsiteapply.EnablerFunc(func(ctx context.Context, host, user string, port int, repoPath, priv, kh string, quotaGB int) error {
				tgt := &settings.OffboxTarget{Enabled: true, Host: host, User: user, Port: port, RepoPath: repoPath, Schedule: "daily", QuotaGB: quotaGB}
				stage := func(ctx context.Context, pw string) error {
					ac, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint)
					if err != nil {
						return err
					}
					return ac.StageEscrowSecret(ctx, pw)
				}
				return backupMgr.ApplyOffsiteTarget(ctx, tgt, priv, kh, stage)
			}),
			MarkerPath: filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "offbox", "applied_marker"),
			Logger:     logger,
		}
		if updater != nil {
			// Thin adapter over the updater's OWN knowledge (StackDataProvider pattern) — the bridge
			// never fetches the floor a second way. floorKnown = the floor has been learned from a
			// report ACK yet (GetFloor() != "").
			u := updater
			bridge.Settle = offsiteapply.SettleFunc(func() (string, string, bool, bool) {
				floor := u.GetFloor()
				return Version, floor, u.IsUpdateRunning(), floor != ""
			})
		}
		offsiteBridge = bridge
		go func() {
			// ReconcileWhenSettled runs the settle-gate FIRST (its own bounds), then Reconcile under a
			// fresh 3-minute context — the gate's wait never eats the reconcile budget.
			if err := bridge.ReconcileWhenSettled(context.Background()); err != nil {
				logger.Printf("[WARN] [offsite-apply] reconcile: %v (retries on next config refresh/restart)", err)
			}
		}()
	}

	// --- Initialize scheduler ---
	sched := scheduler.New(logger)
	sched.SetDebug(cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")

	// Existing periodic tasks (migrated from ad-hoc goroutines)
	// F7: 30s left the dashboard list lagging Docker health by up to ~30s after a deploy/state change.
	// 10s (matching the health-probes cadence) tightens it; RefreshStatus is a cheap `docker ps`-based
	// refresh of the in-memory map, so 10s does not meaningfully load Docker. (The deploy page itself
	// already polls per-stack every 3s; this is for the dashboard/stacks list.)
	sched.Every("status-refresh", 10*time.Second, func(ctx context.Context) error {
		return stackMgr.RefreshStatus()
	})
	sched.Every("stack-scan", 2*time.Minute, func(ctx context.Context) error {
		return stackMgr.ScanStacks()
	})
	sched.Every("health-probes", 10*time.Second, func(ctx context.Context) error {
		return stackMgr.RunHealthProbes()
	})

	// System health check — refreshes dashboard alerts and notifies on changes.
	// Healthchecks.io pinging has been retired (the Hub now owns monitoring).
	healthInterval, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.Monitoring.SystemHealthInterval)
	if err != nil {
		healthInterval = 5 * time.Minute
	}
	sched.Every("system-health", healthInterval, func(ctx context.Context) error {
		healthReport := monitor.RunHealthCheck(cfg, cpuCollector, sett.GetStoragePaths(), sett.GetSMBSettings(), logger)
		// Self-heal the base stack: call unconditionally every tick. EnsureBaseStack is single-flight
		// + idempotent (skips running stacks ⇒ a cheap 3× docker-inspect no-op when healthy), so there
		// is no need to couple to the health-report issue strings. Runs in a goroutine — never blocks
		// or fails the health job.
		go func() {
			if err := stackMgr.EnsureBaseStack(); err != nil {
				logger.Printf("[WARN] [infra] self-heal base-stack bring-up: %v", err)
			}
		}()
		// Refresh dashboard alerts from health report
		updateAvailable := false
		latestVersion := ""
		if updater != nil {
			status := updater.GetStatus()
			if status.LastCheck != nil {
				updateAvailable = status.LastCheck.UpdateAvailable
				latestVersion = status.LastCheck.LatestVersion
			}
		}
		alertMgr.Refresh(healthReport, cfg, backupMgr, updateAvailable, latestVersion, sett.GetStoragePaths())
		// Notify on health status changes
		notifier.NotifyHealthChange(healthReport.Status, healthReport.Issues, healthReport.Warnings)
		return nil
	})

	// fix-3 (CAMPAIGN-3): a deployed app that is not running must be LOUD, not silent (the campaign's
	// CWA sat dead 4 h; F11 then produced 4 silently-dead NAS apps per reboot). Runs on its own short
	// cadence (faster than the 5-min health cycle) so a dead app surfaces quickly. Logs nothing on the
	// quiet path (no ring spam — fix-6 friendly); the dashboard banner is state-based (self-clears) and
	// the hub event fires once per running→down transition (notifier tracks it). A boot grace skips the
	// controller's own startup settle so apps that legitimately take 30–60 s to come up don't alert.
	//
	// F-OBS (Campaign 8): this check had NO positive observable at default `info` level. Its per-cycle
	// scheduler line is emitted through Scheduler.dbg(), which is gated on logging.level==debug and so
	// is never PRODUCED on a default box (not merely filtered — the always-DEBUG ring cannot capture
	// it either), and a 30 s interval also puts it on the scheduler's quiet path. So on every customer
	// box, "no alarms" was indistinguishable from "the detector never ran" — the precise fallacy this
	// project now has a standing rule against, and it directly undermines confidence in the F-CRIT-1
	// fix in the field.
	//
	// The observable is a PERIODIC SUMMARY, not a line per run: at 30 s a per-run line is 2880
	// lines/day of pure noise, which is what made the original author choose silence. Every
	// deadAppHeartbeatEvery-th scan emits one INFO carrying the scan count and what it found, so an
	// operator can always answer "is it running, and what does it see?" from a default box — and a
	// STALLED detector is visible as the heartbeat stopping.
	sched.Every("deadapp-check", 30*time.Second, func(ctx context.Context) error {
		if time.Since(startTime) < deadAppBootGrace {
			return nil // still inside the startup settle window
		}
		dead, states := scanDeployedAppRunStates(stackMgr, quiesceLoop, appStopGuard)
		alertMgr.SetDeadAppAlerts(dead)
		notifier.NotifyAppStartFailures(states)
		deadAppScans++
		noteDeadAppScan(logger, deadAppScans, len(states), len(dead))
		noteUnknownIntentSuppressions(logger, states)
		return nil
	})

	// fix-6 (CAMPAIGN-3): periodically spill the debug ring to the SSD state dir so a HARD crash loses
	// at most ~60 s of the window (a clean shutdown spills too). ≤30s interval → auto-quiet (no
	// per-cycle scheduler line). SpillTo is atomic (tmp+rename) so it can never corrupt the ring file.
	sched.Every("ring-spill", 30*time.Second, func(ctx context.Context) error {
		return logBuffer.SpillTo(ringSpillPath)
	})

	// --- Central hub pusher (declared early so backup closure can reference it) ---
	var hubPusher *report.Pusher
	// escrowConfirmer is hoisted so the web server (built later) can read its Scenario-F
	// stale-blob flag (SetEscrowStale below). nil when no hub is configured.
	var escrowConfirmer *report.EscrowAutoConfirmer
	if cfg.Hub.URL != "" && cfg.Hub.APIKey != "" {
		hubPusher = report.NewPusher(&cfg.Hub, logger, cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
		// SLICE 3 — hub-verified escrow auto-confirm (long-lived: the mismatch warn dedupes per hash,
		// not per 15-min cycle). Flips offbox pending→escrowed ONLY when the hub-recorded hash of the
		// escrowed password matches the local repo password's hash; never un-confirms. v0.127.0 adds
		// the escrowed-state STALE re-check (Scenario F — warn + card flag, never a state change).
		escrowConfirmer = &report.EscrowAutoConfirmer{
			Pending: func() bool {
				return backupMgr != nil && backupMgr.OffboxConfigured() &&
					sett.GetOffboxTarget() != nil && sett.GetOffboxTarget().EscrowState == "pending"
			},
			Escrowed: func() bool {
				return backupMgr != nil && backupMgr.OffboxConfigured() &&
					sett.GetOffboxTarget() != nil && sett.GetOffboxTarget().EscrowState == "escrowed"
			},
			LocalHash: func() (string, bool) {
				if backupMgr == nil {
					return "", false
				}
				return backupMgr.OffboxRepoPasswordHash()
			},
			Flip: func() error {
				return sett.UpdateOffboxStatus(func(o *settings.OffboxTarget) {
					o.EscrowState = "escrowed"
					o.CeremonyCompletedAt = "" // v0.138.0: clear the awaiting-card stamp on confirm
				})
			},
			Wipe: func(ctx context.Context) error {
				ac, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint)
				if err != nil {
					return err
				}
				return ac.WipeStagedEscrowSecret(ctx)
			},
			// v0.199.0 (R-204 item 4 / R-193): remember whether the HUB holds a sealed recovery
			// package for us — recorded on EVERY ACK, including when no off-site target exists, which
			// is precisely the case that needs it. Half of the stranded-rebuild predicate in
			// backup.needsOffsiteCredential; the other half (no repository password) is local.
			RecordPresence: sett.SetHubEscrowIdentityPresent,
			// v0.201.0 (R-222): whether the hub is ALSO keeping an EARLIER sealed package, so the
			// recovery screen can name that situation instead of blaming the customer's typing.
			// v0.206.0 (R-241): the superseded fact ALSO closes out an abandonment. When the hub stops
			// reporting a superseded package, the sealed package that protected the deleted set-aside
			// history is gone too — both halves are away and the question is finished (Scenario F).
			// Chained onto the existing recorder rather than added as a second ACK consumer, for the
			// reason RecordPresence's own comment gives.
			RecordSuperseded: func(present bool, at string) error {
				if backupMgr != nil {
					backupMgr.ClearAbandonPurgeIfConfirmed(present)
				}
				return sett.SetHubEscrowSuperseded(present, at)
			},
			// v0.206.0 (R-241): the hash the hub's package COVERS. This is the fact the recovery
			// screen's shape (c) reads, and the comparison against it was already being computed here
			// on every ACK and discarded. Wired at the same point as the two above, deliberately —
			// a second wiring site in this file is how six features got built and never reached.
			RecordEscrowKeyHash: sett.SetHubEscrowKeySHA256,
			Logger:              logger,
		}
		// Wire hub verification: update settings when hub reports customer status
		hubPusher.OnPushResponse = func(resp *report.PushResponse) {
			if resp.CustomerBlocked {
				sett.SetHubVerified(false, time.Now())
				logger.Printf("[WARN] Customer blocked on Hub — new deployments may be restricted")
			} else {
				sett.SetHubVerified(true, time.Now())
			}
			// Phase 2 managed updates: the ACK carries the operator-enforced minimum version (FLOOR).
			// Hand it to the updater and reconcile — if the box is below the floor it auto-updates to
			// the floor (reusing the Phase 1 swap). This rides the existing report cycle; no new timer.
			// latest_version stays informational (the customer's opt-in button), NOT the auto-target.
			if updater != nil {
				updater.SetFloor(resp.MinControllerVersion)
				updater.MaybeAutoUpdate()
			}
			// Config-refresh (v0.26.0): the ACK also carries the per-customer config_version. On a
			// change vs. the last-applied version, re-pull controller.yaml (re-merging local_api from
			// bootstrap.json) and self-restart so the new config loads. Pull-based — the hub never
			// connects into the box. Rides this same report cycle; no new timer, no agent. First-ever
			// ACK records the baseline without restarting; a failed pull keeps the current config and
			// retries next cycle; an unchanged version is a no-op (so no restart storm).
			cr := &report.ConfigRefresher{
				Applied: sett.GetAppliedConfigVersion,
				Record:  sett.SetAppliedConfigVersion,
				Refresh: func() error { return bootstrap.RefreshConfig(*configPath, logger, pull) },
				Restart: func() { api.GracefulSelfRestart(logger) },
				Logger:  logger,
			}
			cr.Reconcile(resp.ConfigVersion)
			// SLICE 3: run the escrow auto-confirm on the same ACK (after the config refresh decision —
			// a refresh-restart re-enters here anyway on the next cycle).
			escrowConfirmer.Reconcile(resp.Escrow)
			// v0.111.0: operator log-tail requests ride the same ACK (pull pattern — the hub
			// never reaches in). The NEXT report cycle collects + ships the tails; the hub
			// clears its pending request on receipt. An empty list clears any stale local set.
			report.SetPendingLogTails(resp.LogTailRequests)
			// v0.116.0: the controller's OWN ring, same pattern (selftail.go).
			report.SetPendingControllerLog(resp.ControllerLogRequested)
			// v0.122.0 (F-4): cache the hub-delivered claim-code state (idempotent by
			// generation). The web gate reads it on the next request — no restart needed.
			claimSync := &report.ClaimSync{Settings: sett, Logger: logger}
			claimSync.Reconcile(resp.Claim)
		}
		// Wire hub push status into alert manager for dashboard alerts
		alertMgr.SetHubPushStatus(func() web.HubPushStatusData {
			s := hubPusher.GetStatus()
			return web.HubPushStatusData{
				LastAttempt: s.LastAttempt,
				LastSuccess: s.LastSuccess,
				LastError:   s.LastError,
				Consecutive: s.Consecutive,
			}
		})
	}

	// Backup daily jobs
	if cfg.Backup.Enabled && backupMgr != nil {
		// v0.168.0: ONE customer setting (the window start W) drives all three nightly legs at fixed
		// offsets — db-dump at W, tier-2 at W+60m, off-box at W+105m — so they can never be misordered.
		// The window resolves settings > controller.yaml > "02:30"; a UI save fans out via UpdateDaily.
		win := backupwindow.EffectiveWindow(sett.GetBackupWindowStart(), cfg.Backup.DBDumpSchedule)
		dbLeg, tier2Leg, offboxLeg := backupwindow.LegTimes(win)

		// App-data backup: daily database dumps. Disk-tier (restic snapshots,
		// cross-drive, integrity check, infra backup) has moved to the host agent.
		sched.Daily("db-dump", dbLeg, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			err := backupMgr.RunDBDumps(ctx)
			if err != nil {
				notifier.NotifyDBDumpFailed("Adatbázis mentés sikertelen", err.Error())
			} else {
				notifier.NotifyDBDumpCompleted(notify.DBDumpDetails{})
			}
			return err
		})

		// ── R-218, THE CONSUME HALF (v0.203.0) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
		//
		// The declaration half shipped in v0.201.0 and works: a stranded box says
		// `offsite.state=needs_credential`, and the hub's `offsiteheal` re-stages the one-time secret
		// and logs *"the box re-consumes on its next cycle"*.
		//
		// **THERE WAS NO NEXT CYCLE.** `Reconcile` ran exactly twice in a process's life: once at
		// start-up (the goroutine above, whose own comment says "retries on next config refresh/
		// restart") and once when the recovery screen drives it (R-219). Both fire BEFORE the hub has
		// anything staged, because the hub only stages in response to the declaration those runs
		// precede.
		//
		// Measured on the R-201 re-walk, 2026-08-06: unlock reconcile 11:43:07 · hub staged 11:44:57
		// saying "next cycle" · a full report cycle ran 11:55:46 · still unconsumed at 12:06. A guest
		// command line moved it in **18 seconds**, which proves the credential, the target and the key
		// were all fine and only the trigger was missing.
		//
		// So: re-run the SAME reconcile, on a tick, for exactly as long as the box itself says it needs
		// a credential. The signal is the box's own `OffboxReportStatus().State` — the very statement
		// the hub acts on, so the two can never disagree about whether a retry is wanted.
		//
		// WHY A POLL AND NOT AN ACK FLAG: the customer-facing text promises "amint megvannak" (no
		// deadline) and the backups card promises "within a day"; a 5-minute tick is inside both by a
		// wide margin, and it needs no hub change. If either promise ever tightens to minutes, revisit.
		//
		// IT STOPS BY CONSTRUCTION: the instant a target exists `OffboxReportStatus` stops returning
		// the declared state, so a healthy box does no work and makes no noise. The settle gate is
		// deliberately kept — `ReconcileWhenSettled` waits for floor knowledge exactly as at start-up.
		sched.Every("offsite-credential-retry", 5*time.Minute, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			if offsiteBridge == nil {
				return nil // off-site not configured for this customer
			}
			attempted, err := offsiteBridge.RetryIfDeclared(ctx, func() bool {
				st := backupMgr.OffboxReportStatus()
				return st != nil && st.State == backup.OffsiteStateNeedsCredential
			})
			if !attempted {
				return nil // a target exists (or we never needed one) — no work, and no log line
			}
			if err != nil {
				// NOT a job failure: the box still declares, so the next tick tries again. Logged at
				// WARN because a credential that never arrives is exactly what this exists to surface.
				logger.Printf("[WARN] [offsite-apply] credential retry: %v (the box still declares a need; retrying)", err)
				return nil
			}
			logger.Printf("[INFO] [offsite-apply] credential retry: the staged credential was collected and the tier applied")
			return nil
		})

		// Cache refresh: every 5 minutes. Recompute the effective window each pass so the cached
		// "next DB dump" follows a runtime window change (the UI save also refreshes immediately).
		sched.Every("backup-cache", 5*time.Minute, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			curDB, _, _ := backupwindow.LegTimes(backupwindow.EffectiveWindow(sett.GetBackupWindowStart(), cfg.Backup.DBDumpSchedule))
			backupMgr.RefreshCache(scheduler.NextDailyRun(curDB))
			return nil
		})

		// Tier 2: off-drive copy of each HDD app's recovery unit + userdata (auto-enabled, auto-target).
		// Runs after the DB dump so it copies a fresh unit.
		backupMgr.SetTier2Notifier(func(stackName, destLabel string, dur time.Duration, err error) {
			// DISPLAY BOUNDARY (R-7b): this event's StackName lands in Hungarian operator/customer copy
			// ("Másodlagos mentés elkészült: <név>"), so the reserved shares key is mapped here. Caught
			// by live validation — the first demo run pushed a literal "_shares" before this line.
			display := backup.DisplayStackName(stackName)
			if err != nil {
				notifier.NotifyCrossDriveFailed(notify.CrossDriveDetails{
					StackName: display, Method: "rsync", DestPath: destLabel,
					Duration: dur.Round(time.Second).String(), Error: err.Error(),
				})
			} else {
				notifier.NotifyCrossDriveCompleted(notify.CrossDriveDetails{
					StackName: display, Method: "rsync", DestPath: destLabel,
					Duration: dur.Round(time.Second).String(),
				})
			}
		})
		sched.Daily("tier2-backup", tier2Leg, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			backupMgr.RunAllTier2()
			return nil
		})

		// Off-box (NAS) restic-SFTP backup (Part B): the off-site leg. A failure (incl. a fail-fast dead-NAS
		// error) alerts the operator via the allowlisted backup_failed event. Daily after Tier 2.
		backupMgr.SetOffboxNotify(func(dur time.Duration, snapshots int, err error) {
			if err != nil {
				// F-DIAG: a distinct message per cause, and the detail SANITISED — a raw err.Error()
				// carries the sftp:user@host:/path repo reference off the box.
				notifier.NotifyBackupFailed("Off-box (NAS) mentés sikertelen",
					backupMgr.OffsiteFailureMessage(err, dur))
			}
		})
		// R-203 (operator half): a completed off-site run could NOT capture a directory an app declares
		// MANDATORY. It is not a failed run — what was captured is real and the snapshot count records
		// it — but the app is NOT fully protected, and until v0.197.0 that reached nobody: the run said
		// ok, the card said ok, the hub said ok, and one WARN line inside the container said otherwise.
		//
		// It rides the EXISTING per-run digest (backup_run_failures) rather than a new event type: a
		// new type is a two-repo change (the hub's allowedEventTypes drops anything unlisted), and the
		// digest is already operator-only and already means "this run did not fully do its job".
		backupMgr.SetOffboxGapNotify(func(gaps map[string][]string) {
			apps := make([]string, 0, len(gaps))
			for app := range gaps {
				apps = append(apps, app)
			}
			sort.Strings(apps) // deterministic message + details
			d := notify.BackupRunFailuresDetails{RunKind: "offsite", Attempted: len(apps), Failed: len(apps)}
			var parts []string
			for _, app := range apps {
				sort.Strings(gaps[app])
				reason := "declared MANDATORY data directories not captured: " + strings.Join(gaps[app], ", ")
				d.Apps = append(d.Apps, notify.RunFailureDetail{App: app, Leg: "offsite-userdata", Reason: reason})
				parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s)", app, strings.Join(gaps[app], ", ")))
			}
			notifier.NotifyBackupRunFailures(fmt.Sprintf(
				"Offsite backup INCOMPLETE: %d app(s) had a directory they declare MANDATORY missing from the snapshot — %s. "+
					"The run itself succeeded and what it captured is real, but these apps are NOT fully protected off-site. "+
					"Check that the declared path exists on disk and that the app's data root resolves where the backup looks (R-203).",
				len(apps), strings.Join(parts, "; ")), d)
		})
		// R-158 / R-167 (D-c, operator half): a per-app Tier-1 recovery-unit capture failed. Until
		// v0.191.0 this was a `[WARN]` line and nothing else — /backups/apps is the page you open to
		// ask whether ONE app is backed up, and it was the one page that never said. Fires per app;
		// the capture loop continues, so three failing apps produce three events and one failing app
		// does not silence its siblings.
		//
		// OPERATOR-TIER, not backup_failed — a customer can take no action on a capture failure, and
		// backup_failed is customer-enabled by default. The space figures ride along because the
		// overwhelmingly likely cause is a full filesystem and they answer "why" without a login.
		// No controller-side cooldown: the hub owns it.
		backupMgr.SetUnitNotify(func(stackName string, err error, usage *backup.UnitSpace) {
			d := notify.RecoveryUnitFailureDetails{App: stackName, Error: err.Error()}
			if usage != nil {
				d.TargetPath, d.UsedGB, d.AvailGB = usage.Path, usage.UsedGB, usage.AvailGB
				d.TotalGB, d.UsedPercent, d.SpaceKnown = usage.TotalGB, usage.UsedPercent, true
			}
			notifier.NotifyRecoveryUnitCaptureFailed(fmt.Sprintf(
				"Recovery unit capture FAILED for %q — the app has no fresh local (Tier-1) backup, and Tier-2/Tier-3 have nothing to copy. %s. Error: %v",
				stackName, usage.String(), err), d)
		})
		// R-182: the ONE operator digest per backup run. The per-app events above are the RECORD
		// (the hub routes them record-only); this is the NOTIFICATION, sent once at the end of a run
		// and only when something actually failed. A clean run sends nothing — and that silence is
		// safe because the hub's own daily deadline check raises expected_backup_missed from report
		// freshness, independently of any mail this box chooses to send.
		backupMgr.SetRunSummaryNotify(func(rs backup.RunSummary) {
			d := notify.BackupRunFailuresDetails{
				RunID: rs.RunID, RunKind: rs.RunKind,
				Failed: rs.Failed, Attempted: rs.Attempted,
			}
			for _, a := range rs.Apps {
				d.Apps = append(d.Apps, notify.RunFailureDetail{App: a.App, Leg: a.Leg, Reason: a.Reason})
			}
			if rs.Usage != nil {
				d.TargetPath, d.UsedGB, d.AvailGB = rs.Usage.Path, rs.Usage.UsedGB, rs.Usage.AvailGB
				d.TotalGB, d.UsedPercent, d.SpaceKnown = rs.Usage.TotalGB, rs.Usage.UsedPercent, true
			}
			notifier.NotifyBackupRunFailures(rs.Message, d)
		})
		// R-379/R-380: an app HELD after a failed database restore whose rollback also failed.
		//
		// ROUTED THROUGH `backup_run_failures`, and the reuse is deliberate but imperfect — say so
		// rather than let a future reader assume it was the natural fit. That type is operator-only
		// (`notify.operatorOnlyEvents`), carries severity `error` (a VALID token — `warn` would
		// coerce to `info` and email nobody, which is R-329 and still live elsewhere), and its
		// payload is exactly {app, leg, reason}. What it is NOT is a restore event: it says "backup
		// run". **No operator-facing RESTORE event type exists**, and minting one is a two-repo
		// change with a hub deploy, which this task's baselines hold fixed. The leg is named
		// `restore-hold` so the record is unambiguous to whoever reads it.
		//
		// DELIBERATELY NOT `backup_failed`: customer-enabled by default, Hungarian "A biztonsági
		// mentés sikertelen!", and this is a deliberate hold rather than a backup failure. R-171 one
		// path over.
		backupMgr.SetRestoreHoldNotify(func(stack string, replayErr, rollbackErr error) {
			d := notify.BackupRunFailuresDetails{RunKind: "offsite-reconstitute", Failed: 1, Attempted: 1}
			reason := "rollback failed"
			if rollbackErr != nil {
				reason = rollbackErr.Error()
			}
			d.Apps = append(d.Apps, notify.RunFailureDetail{App: stack, Leg: "restore-hold", Reason: reason})
			msg := fmt.Sprintf("App %q is HELD STOPPED: its off-site database restore failed AND the rollback to the customer's own pre-restore copy also failed. "+
				"The app will not start from any path until the hold is cleared. Replay error: %v. Rollback error: %v", stack, replayErr, rollbackErr)
			notifier.NotifyBackupRunFailures(msg, d)
		})
		// 3a: the pre-push enlargement gate blocked an app's userdata push (config+DB still saved). Edge-
		// triggered by the engine (only NEW blocks notify), so the hub's per-event-type cooldown suffices —
		// no controller-side timer (the hub owns cooldown).
		backupMgr.SetOffboxEnlargeBlockedNotifier(func(stack string, estBytes int64, usedGB, quotaGB int) {
			notifier.NotifyOffboxEnlargeBlocked(fmt.Sprintf(
				"A(z) %s teljes távoli mentése (~%s) túllépné a tárhelykeretet (%d/%d GB). A konfiguráció és az adatbázis továbbra is mentésre kerül; nagyobb kerethez vedd fel velünk a kapcsolatot.",
				stack, appbackup.HumanizeBytes(estBytes), usedGB, quotaGB))
		})
		// v0.142.0 offsite-repo continuity: push a hub event on the orphaned/reset transitions (once per
		// transition — the Manager guards nightly re-fire). Operator-visible on the customer page.
		backupMgr.SetOffboxOrphanEvent(func(eventType, renamedTo string) {
			switch eventType {
			case "offbox_repo_orphaned":
				notifier.PushEvent("offbox_repo_orphaned", "warning",
					"A távoli mentési tároló elárvult: a benne lévő mentések egy korábbi, már nem elérhető kulccsal készültek (újratelepítés). Új mentés a tároló visszaállításáig nem készül.", nil)
			case "offbox_repo_reset":
				notifier.PushEvent("offbox_repo_reset", "info",
					"A távoli mentési tároló visszaállítva: a régi előzmény félretéve (nem törölve), és egy üres, új tároló jött létre a mostani kulccsal.", map[string]string{"renamed_to": renamedTo})
			case "offbox_abandon_completed":
				// R-241: the ONLY event in the product that reports a customer's off-site history
				// being deleted. It is fired after the deletion, not before — the operator wants to
				// know it happened, and a pre-announcement that then fails would be worse than silence.
				notifier.PushEvent("offbox_abandon_completed", "info",
					"A korábbi távoli mentések a türelmi idő lejártával törlésre kerültek, az ügyfél döntése alapján. A hozzájuk tartozó lezárt helyreállítási csomag eltávolítását is kértük.", map[string]string{"deleted_path": renamedTo})
			}
		})
		sched.Daily("offbox-backup", offboxLeg, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			t := sett.GetOffboxTarget()
			if t == nil || !t.Enabled || t.Schedule != "daily" || !backupMgr.OffboxConfigured() {
				return nil // not configured / not scheduled
			}
			return backupMgr.RunOffboxBackup(ctx)
		})
		// R-241 — the abandonment terminal step. DAILY and not on the backup leg, deliberately: it must
		// run on a box whose off-site tier is NOT configured for runs (an abandoning box may be sitting
		// with escrow pending), and tying it to the backup leg would make the deletion depend on a
		// condition that has nothing to do with it.
		//
		// It is quiet by construction: on every box with no countdown it returns immediately and logs
		// nothing, which is asserted (TestR241_Sweep_QuietWhenNothingDue).
		sched.Daily("offsite-abandon-sweep", "05:10", func(ctx context.Context) error {
			deleted, err := backupMgr.AbandonSweep(ctx)
			if err != nil {
				// NOT a job failure: the countdown stays due and tomorrow's sweep retries. A transport
				// blip must never silently abandon the abandonment.
				logger.Printf("[WARN] [offbox] abandonment sweep: %v (the countdown stays due and retries)", err)
				return nil
			}
			if deleted {
				logger.Printf("[INFO] [offbox] abandonment sweep: the set-aside history was deleted this cycle")
			}
			return nil
		})
		// R-359 — the off-site store gets checked. Nothing verified it before this: the whole-guest
		// tier has verify jobs, the tier holding the customer's documents and photos had none, and we
		// would have found out at restore time with a customer waiting.
		//
		// DAILY JOB, WEEKLY BEHAVIOUR, and that is the point. It asks "is the last successful check
		// older than the max age?" rather than "is it Sunday?", so a box that was switched off on its
		// check day is checked the next day it is on. R-341 is exactly the other shape: a dated check
		// quietly missed and never caught up. No `Weekly` primitive was added to the scheduler —
		// due-ness is smaller, catches up, and is what R-86 already chose for restore-tests.
		//
		// 06:00 CHOSEN FROM THE LIVE SCHEDULE, not from a document. Observed on demo-hp 2026-08-30:
		// db-dump 02:30, tier2-backup 03:30, fill-watch 03:30, metrics-prune 04:00, offbox-backup
		// 04:15, offsite-abandon-sweep 05:10, whole-guest gate [04:30, 08:30). 06:00 is 1h45 clear of
		// the off-site leg (which runs ~2m20s, measured) and 50 min clear of the sweep. The backup
		// WINDOW is customer-configurable, so no fixed time is collision-proof for every box — but a
		// collision costs one skipped day, not a missed check, because due-ness makes tomorrow try
		// again. What would be a real defect is a slot that collides EVERY night; this is not one.
		sched.Daily("offsite-integrity", "06:00", func(ctx context.Context) error {
			runOffsiteIntegrityCheck(ctx, backupMgr, notifier, logger, false)
			return nil
		})
	}

	// Metrics prune — daily at 04:00
	if metricsStore != nil {
		sched.Daily("metrics-prune", "04:00", func(ctx context.Context) error {
			deleted, err := metricsStore.Prune(30 * 24 * time.Hour)
			if err != nil {
				return err
			}
			logger.Printf("[INFO] Pruned %d old metric rows", deleted)
			return nil
		})
	}

	// --- R-167 (decision D-c, customer half): warn BEFORE a filesystem fills ---
	//
	// Nothing warned before v0.191.0. The first sign of a full filesystem was a backup that did not
	// happen, and the only related signal — the healthcheck's generic `health_degraded` at 90% — looked
	// at REGISTERED STORAGE PATHS ONLY, so the docker area and the system-data area (the one holding
	// every driveless app's recovery unit) were invisible, and it never reported a free-byte figure or
	// named a drive.
	//
	// CADENCE: DAILY, at 03:30. A fill is a slow-moving quantity — the thing that fills a disk is a
	// customer's photo library or a nightly backup, not a spike — so a shorter interval buys no
	// earlier warning and only costs statfs calls. 03:30 is deliberately BEFORE the nightly app-data
	// legs (db-dump / tier2 / offbox), so a customer who is about to lose a backup to lack of space
	// hears about it while there is still a night's margin, rather than after the failure.
	// The interval is NOT a cooldown: repeats are impossible because the check is edge-triggered per
	// filesystem, and the hub owns cooldown regardless.
	fillWatcher := fillwatch.New(
		filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "fillwatch-state.json"), logger,
		func() []fillwatch.Target { return fillTargets(cfg, sett) },
		func(p string) *fillwatch.Usage {
			di := system.GetDiskUsage(p)
			if di == nil {
				return nil // §8.4 — unreadable is NOT full; never fabricate a zero here
			}
			return &fillwatch.Usage{
				UsedPercent: di.UsedPercent, AvailGB: di.AvailGB,
				UsedGB: di.UsedGB, TotalGB: di.TotalGB,
			}
		})
	if notifier != nil {
		fillWatcher.SetNotify(func(e fillwatch.Event) {
			// The CUSTOMER's event — deliberately not operator-only. A customer can free space,
			// delete files or add a drive, so this alert is theirs (D-c). The dynamic Hungarian
			// message carries the label and the free space; the hub has NO customerMessages entry for
			// these two types precisely so the template cannot discard them.
			notifier.PushEvent(e.Band.EventType(), e.Band.Severity(), e.Message, map[string]any{
				"path": e.Target.Path, "label": e.Target.Label,
				"used_percent": e.Usage.UsedPercent, "avail_gb": e.Usage.AvailGB,
				"total_gb": e.Usage.TotalGB, "band": e.Band.String(),
			})
		})
	}
	sched.Daily("fill-watch", "03:30", func(ctx context.Context) error { return fillWatcher.Check() })

	// AND ONCE SHORTLY AFTER STARTUP. A box that BOOTS with a filesystem already over the line must
	// warn now, not up to 24 hours later — that is the R-100 shape, a real fault visible only after a
	// deadline elapses. The hub's own checkers handle exactly this case deliberately ("already-breached
	// keys are left UNSEEDED at init so their first Check emits" — the F2 lesson, storage_fill.go), and
	// a daily-only schedule here would have been the same gap one component over.
	//
	// It is SAFE because the check is edge-triggered against PERSISTED state: a filesystem the customer
	// has already been warned about stays silent, so this adds a warning only where one is genuinely
	// owed. The delay lets mounts settle and the drive gate tick first, so a drive that is merely slow
	// to come back reads as unreadable (§8.4, skipped) rather than as anything at all.
	go func() {
		select {
		case <-ctx.Done():
			return
		case <-time.After(fillWatchStartupDelay):
		}
		if err := fillWatcher.Check(); err != nil {
			logger.Printf("[WARN] [fillwatch] startup check failed: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	// --- Central hub reporting schedule ---
	if hubPusher != nil {
		if cfg.Hub.Enabled {
			pushInterval, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.Hub.PushInterval)
			if err != nil {
				pushInterval = 15 * time.Minute
			}
			sched.Every("hub-report", pushInterval, func(ctx context.Context) error {
				r := report.BuildReport(cfg, *configPath, stackMgr, backupMgr, cpuCollector, metricsStore, Version, sett.GetStoragePaths(), sett.GetGeoRestriction(), sett.GetSMBSettings(), logger)
				r.Claimed = sett.GetClaimed() // v0.122.0 (F-4): set-only claim flag for the hub
				if err := hubPusher.Push(r); err != nil {
					return err
				}
				// Drain pending events (e.g., DR recovery completed) after successful push
				if events := sett.DrainPendingEvents(); len(events) > 0 {
					for _, ev := range events {
						notifier.Notify(ev.EventType, ev.Severity, ev.Message, ev.Details)
					}
					logger.Printf("[INFO] Drained %d pending events to Hub", len(events))
				}
				return nil
			})
			logger.Printf("[INFO] Hub reporting enabled (every %s to %s)", pushInterval, cfg.Hub.URL)
		} else {
			logger.Printf("[INFO] Hub reporting disabled — will send disabled notification to %s", cfg.Hub.URL)
		}
	}

	// Self-update scheduler jobs
	if cfg.SelfUpdate.Enabled && updater != nil {
		// Periodic version check (populates UI, never triggers update)
		checkInterval, ciErr := time.ParseDuration(cfg.SelfUpdate.CheckInterval)
		if ciErr != nil {
			checkInterval = 6 * time.Hour
		}
		sched.Every("selfupdate-check", checkInterval, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			result := updater.CheckForUpdate()
			if result.UpdateAvailable {
				logger.Printf("[INFO] Update available: %s -> %s", result.CurrentVersion, result.LatestVersion)
			}
			return nil
		})

		// Auto-update (daily, fires after typical backup completion)
		if cfg.SelfUpdate.AutoUpdate {
			sched.Daily("selfupdate-auto", cfg.SelfUpdate.AutoUpdateTime, func(ctx context.Context) error {
				result := updater.CheckForUpdate()
				if !result.UpdateAvailable {
					return nil
				}
				if err := updater.TriggerUpdate("auto"); err != nil {
					logger.Printf("[WARN] Auto-update skipped: %v", err)
				}
				return nil
			})
		}
	}

	// Storage watchdog (disk disconnect/reconnect detection) has moved to the host
	// agent (slice 8C) — the controller no longer owns disk-level monitoring.

	// --- Asset syncer (download from Hub) ---
	var assetsSyncer *assets.Syncer
	if cfg.Hub.Enabled && cfg.Assets.SyncEnabled && cfg.Hub.URL != "" && cfg.Hub.APIKey != "" {
		assetsDir := filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "assets")
		assetsSyncer = assets.New(cfg.Hub.URL, cfg.Hub.APIKey, assetsDir, "/usr/share/felhom/assets", logger, cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
		go func() {
			time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
			if err := assetsSyncer.Sync(ctx); err != nil {
				logger.Printf("[WARN] Initial asset sync failed: %v", err)
			}
		}()
		sched.Daily("asset-sync", cfg.Assets.SyncSchedule, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			return assetsSyncer.Sync(ctx)
		})
		logger.Printf("[INFO] Asset sync enabled (daily at %s from Hub)", cfg.Assets.SyncSchedule)
	}

	// --- Startup self-test ---
	selfTestResult := selftest.Run(cfg, sett, logger)

	sched.Start(ctx)
	defer sched.Stop()

	// Generate recovery info file if retrieval password is set
	if rp := sett.GetRetrievalPassword(); rp != "" {
		go func() {
			info := recovery.Info{
				CustomerID:        cfg.Customer.ID,
				RetrievalPassword: rp,
				HubURL:            cfg.Hub.URL,
				SupportEmail:      "support@felhom.eu",
				SupportURL:        "https://felhom.eu/kapcsolat",
			}
			if err := recovery.GenerateRecoveryFile(info, Version, cfg.Paths.DataDir); err != nil {
				logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to generate recovery-info.txt: %v", err)
			}
		}()
	}

	// Fire startup pings + hub report immediately (don't wait for first scheduler tick)
	go func() {
		time.Sleep(5 * time.Second) // Let all subsystems fully initialize

		// Push controller startup event to Hub
		notifier.NotifyControllerStarted(Version, map[string]interface{}{
			"selftest_pass": selfTestResult.Pass,
			"selftest_warn": selfTestResult.Warn,
			"selftest_fail": selfTestResult.Fail,
		})

		// Hub report
		if hubPusher != nil {
			if cfg.Hub.Enabled {
				r := report.BuildReport(cfg, *configPath, stackMgr, backupMgr, cpuCollector, metricsStore, Version, sett.GetStoragePaths(), sett.GetGeoRestriction(), sett.GetSMBSettings(), logger)
				r.Claimed = sett.GetClaimed() // v0.122.0 (F-4): set-only claim flag for the hub
				var pushErr error
				for attempt := 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++ {
					pushErr = hubPusher.Push(r)
					if pushErr == nil {
						logger.Println("[INFO] Startup hub report sent")
						break
					}
					logger.Printf("[WARN] Startup hub report attempt %d/3 failed: %v", attempt, pushErr)
					if attempt < 3 {
						time.Sleep(15 * time.Second)
					}
				}
				if pushErr != nil {
					logger.Printf("[WARN] Startup hub report failed after 3 attempts — next scheduled push in %s", cfg.Hub.PushInterval)
				}
			} else {
				// Send a minimal "disabled" notification so hub knows reporting is intentionally off
				r := &report.Report{
					Version:           1,
					CustomerID:        cfg.Customer.ID,
					CustomerName:      cfg.Customer.Name,
					ControllerVersion: Version,
					Timestamp:         time.Now().UTC(),
					ReportingDisabled: true,
					Health:            report.HealthReport{Status: "disabled", Issues: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}},
					Stacks:            report.StacksReport{Deployed: []string{}, Available: []string{}},
					Containers:        report.ContainerReport{List: []report.ContainerDetailReport{}},
				}
				hubPusher.PushOnce(r)
			}
		}

		// Initial self-update check (so settings page shows version info quickly)
		if updater != nil {
			time.Sleep(25 * time.Second) // Additional delay after hub report
			result := updater.CheckForUpdate()
			if result.UpdateAvailable {
				logger.Printf("[INFO] Startup: update available %s -> %s", result.CurrentVersion, result.LatestVersion)
			} else if result.Error != "" {
				logger.Printf("[DEBUG] Startup version check: %s", result.Error)
			}
		}
	}()

	// Initial backup cache population (don't block startup)
	if cfg.Backup.Enabled && backupMgr != nil {
		go func() {
			curDB, _, _ := backupwindow.LegTimes(backupwindow.EffectiveWindow(sett.GetBackupWindowStart(), cfg.Backup.DBDumpSchedule))
			backupMgr.RefreshCache(scheduler.NextDailyRun(curDB))
		}()
	}

	// Sync notification preferences to hub on startup (handles hub DB rebuild recovery)
	if notifier.IsEnabled() {
		go func() {
			prefs := sett.GetNotificationPrefs()
			if prefs.Email != "" {
				if err := notifier.SyncPreferences(prefs.Email, prefs.EnabledEvents, prefs.CooldownHours); err != nil {
					logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to sync notification preferences on startup: %v", err)
				}
			}
		}()
	}

	// Initial alert refresh (so alerts appear immediately, not after first 5min health check)
	go func() {
		report := monitor.RunHealthCheck(cfg, cpuCollector, sett.GetStoragePaths(), sett.GetSMBSettings(), logger)
		alertMgr.Refresh(report, cfg, backupMgr, false, "")
	}()

	// --- Out-of-cycle report trigger (v0.139.0, Direction 1) ---
	// ONE canonical fire closure (full BuildReport + Claimed + Push) behind a debounced,
	// coalescing trigger — user actions with hub-side effects (geo, escrow claim, settings
	// save, offsite toggle, app deploy/remove, customer claim) round-trip in seconds instead
	// of the next ~15-min cycle. The scheduled hub-report job above stays the reconciliation
	// backbone; the trigger is best-effort on top (its failures degrade to the cycle).
	// nil when hub reporting is off → the api/web seams stay unset (strict no-op).
	var reportTrigger *report.Trigger
	if hubPusher != nil && cfg.Hub.Enabled {
		fireReport := func() error {
			rep := report.BuildReport(cfg, *configPath, stackMgr, backupMgr, cpuCollector, metricsStore, Version, sett.GetStoragePaths(), sett.GetGeoRestriction(), sett.GetSMBSettings(), logger)
			rep.Claimed = sett.GetClaimed() // v0.122.0 (F-4): set-only claim flag for the hub
			return hubPusher.Push(rep)
		}
		reportTrigger = report.NewTrigger(fireReport, logger)
		go reportTrigger.Run(ctx)

		// Direction-2 immediate-sync (v0.140.0): hold a hanging GET against the hub's wait channel
		// and fire the trigger the instant operator intent moves — so an operator save round-trips in
		// seconds instead of on the next ~15-min cycle. Reuses the SAME hub URL + key as the pusher;
		// no new config keys. Gated on the trigger existing (hub reporting enabled). The ACK from the
		// fired report delivers everything through the unchanged machinery.
		waiter := report.NewWaiter(cfg.Hub.URL, cfg.Hub.APIKey, reportTrigger.Fire, logger)
		go waiter.Run(ctx)
	}

	// --- Initialize API router ---
	apiRouter := api.NewRouter(cfg, *configPath, sett, stackMgr, syncer, cpuCollector, backupMgr, metricsStore, updater, notifier, logger)
	if reportTrigger != nil {
		// Out-of-cycle, non-blocking hub report push (geo changes + app deploy/remove) so
		// the hub reflects the new state immediately instead of after the next ~15-min cycle.
		apiRouter.SetReportPushTrigger(reportTrigger.Fire)
	}
	if assetsSyncer != nil {
		apiRouter.SetAssetsSyncer(assetsSyncer)
	}

	// --- Initialize Cloudflare geo-restriction ---
	var geoSync *cf.GeoSyncManager
	if cfg.Infrastructure.CFAPIToken != "" {
		cfClient := cf.New(cfg.Infrastructure.CFAPIToken, logger, cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
		geoStacks := &geoStackAdapter{mgr: stackMgr, domain: cfg.Customer.Domain}
		geoSync = cf.NewGeoSyncManager(cfClient, sett, cfg.Customer.Domain, geoStacks, logger)
		geoSync.SetDebug(cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
		apiRouter.SetGeoSync(geoSync)

		// Re-sync geo rules when apps are deployed/removed
		apiRouter.OnGeoRelevantChange = func() {
			geo := sett.GetGeoRestriction()
			if geo != nil && geo.Enabled {
				if err := geoSync.Sync(context.Background()); err != nil {
					logger.Printf("[WARN] Geo sync after app change failed: %v", err)
				}
			}
		}

		// Periodic verification every 6 hours
		sched.Every("geo-verify", 6*time.Hour, func(ctx context.Context) error {
			geo := sett.GetGeoRestriction()
			if geo == nil || !geo.Enabled {
				return nil
			}
			return geoSync.Sync(ctx)
		})

		// Initial sync (delayed, non-blocking)
		go func() {
			time.Sleep(15 * time.Second)
			if geo := sett.GetGeoRestriction(); geo != nil && geo.Enabled {
				if err := geoSync.Sync(context.Background()); err != nil {
					logger.Printf("[WARN] Initial geo sync failed: %v", err)
				}
			}
		}()

		logger.Printf("[INFO] Geo-restriction support enabled (CF API token configured)")
	}

	// --- Initialize integration manager ---
	integrationStacks := &integrationStackAdapter{mgr: stackMgr}
	integrationMgr := integrations.NewManager(sett, integrationStacks, cfg.Customer.Domain, cfg.Paths.StacksDir, encKey, logger)
	integrationMgr.SetDebug(cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
	apiRouter.SetIntegrationManager(integrationMgr)

	// --- Initialize app exporter ---
	exportProv := &exportAdapter{mgr: stackMgr, encKey: encKey}
	appExporter := appexport.NewExporter(exportProv, logger, Version)
	appExporter.SetDebug(cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")
	// R-166: the exporter stops apps too (export with "stop the app first"), so it shares the backup
	// manager's ONE marker file rather than opening a second one — one file, one recovery. Without
	// this the export path would be the uncovered sibling of two covered ones, which is how a reader
	// concludes the whole class is handled (§2.2).
	appExporter.SetStopGuard(exportStopGuard{g: appStopGuard})
	apiRouter.SetDebug(cfg.Logging.Level == "debug")

	// --- Initialize web server ---
	webServer := web.NewServer(cfg, stackMgr, cpuCollector, backupMgr, sched, sett, alertMgr, notifier, updater, logger, Version)
	// Migration done-hook: a decommission-initiated migration finalizes the source decommission on
	// success (soft-mark + agent). Wire it before RecoverMigration so a resumed one still finalizes.
	stackMgr.SetMigrationDoneHook(webServer.OnMigrationDone)
	stackMgr.RecoverMigration(ctx)
	webServer.SetEncryptionKey(encKey)
	webServer.SetAppExporter(appExporter)
	// Disk-health degradation check (v0.169.0; hourly + persisted state v0.215.0): compare each
	// physical disk's SMART verdict against the PERSISTED per-disk record (disk_health_state.go) and
	// emit disk_health_degraded per the v0.215.0 decision rules — escalation against the last ALERTED
	// verdict, plus a re-alert for a disk already at Hiba that keeps worsening. A disk's first verdict
	// baselines silently; recovery and UNKNOWN never notify. Only on a provisioned guest (an agent to
	// read /disks from); the check no-ops gracefully if the agent is unreachable.
	//
	// WHY HOURLY, not the original 6h: the one real failing drive's benign excursion lasted about ONE
	// HOUR (11 Aug 12:28 -> 13:28, cleared completely). A 6-hourly sampler can land either side of an
	// excursion like that and see nothing, then catch the terminal run half a day late. Measured on
	// demo-hp 2026-08-14, the real /disks fetch costs min 0.805s / median 0.821s / max 0.841s over 10
	// calls (3 physical disk rows), so an hourly poll is ~0.02% duty — far under the 5s bar that would
	// have kept this at 6h.
	if cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint != "" {
		sched.Every("disk-health-check", 1*time.Hour, webServer.RunDiskHealthCheck)
	}
	// Browser .fab upload (v0.128.0): upload state is in-memory, so a restart strands the .part —
	// GC stray part files in every registered drive's exports dir at startup.
	webServer.CleanupStaleUploadParts()
	// Escrow wizard (v0.127.0): the Scenario-F stale-blob flag feeds the Távoli mentés card.
	if escrowConfirmer != nil {
		webServer.SetEscrowStale(escrowConfirmer.StaleBlob)
		// R-193: the recovery screen may state WHEN the hub sealed the package, and nothing more,
		// before a code is entered. A timestamp, never a secret.
		webServer.SetEscrowSealedAt(escrowConfirmer.SealedAt)
	}
	// R-219 / R-218: the unlock brings the off-site tier up between placing the recovered key and
	// reading the repository. Without it the listing the screen promises can never render on the
	// pristine rebuilt box — no key ⇒ no target ⇒ no inventory — and the apply-bridge's only other
	// trigger is a config refresh or a restart, neither of which the customer can cause.
	if offsiteBridge != nil {
		webServer.SetRecoveryTierUp(offsiteBridge.Reconcile)
	}
	webServer.SetIntegrationManager(integrationMgr)
	if reportTrigger != nil {
		// Out-of-cycle report push after hub-relevant user actions (escrow claim, settings
		// save, offsite config/toggle, customer claim) — same debounced trigger as the api
		// router's; nil (hub reporting off) leaves the seam a strict no-op.
		webServer.SetReportTrigger(reportTrigger.Fire)
	}
	if quiesceLoop != nil {
		webServer.SetBackupTrigger(quiesceLoop) // "Mentés most" → app-consistent backup via the quiesce loop
	}
	if mailShim != nil {
		webServer.SetMailShim(mailShim) // settings toggle starts/stops the app-email shim at runtime
	}
	if assetsSyncer != nil {
		webServer.SetAssetsSyncer(assetsSyncer)
	}
	if hubPusher != nil {
		webServer.SetHubPushStatus(func() web.HubPushStatusData {
			s := hubPusher.GetStatus()
			return web.HubPushStatusData{
				LastAttempt: s.LastAttempt,
				LastSuccess: s.LastSuccess,
				LastError:   s.LastError,
				Consecutive: s.Consecutive,
			}
		})
	}
	if logBuffer != nil {
		webServer.SetLogBuffer(logBuffer)
	}
	webServer.SetStartTime(startTime)

	// Controller→agent channel health (self-health slice). A ~60s probe of the local-API channel via
	// the PRODUCTION memoized client (webServer.ProbeAgentChannel), classified + debounced, alerting the
	// operator + dashboard on a transition. Only on a provisioned guest (endpoint set) — mirrors
	// probeLocalAPI's guard. Registered after webServer (it owns the memoized client); sched.Every
	// launches the job immediately since the scheduler is already started.
	if cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint != "" {
		chSink := channelSink{notifier: notifier, alertMgr: alertMgr}
		chChecker := channelhealth.New(webServer.ProbeAgentChannel, chSink, logger)
		sched.Every("agent-channel-health", 60*time.Second, chChecker.Check)
	}

	// local_api endpoint drift (R-77, from the 2026-07-25 outage): controller.yaml and bootstrap.json
	// can disagree indefinitely and silently — the island migration rewrote the latter and the
	// controller kept dialling the former for 17.5 h, alerting only "agent unreachable". This NAMES
	// the fault; it deliberately does not reconcile the files (R-78 owns which one wins).
	//
	// Startup-only is sufficient and correct: both files are read at boot and neither changes under a
	// running controller, so a periodic re-check would add noise without adding signal.
	if d := bootstrap.DetectEndpointDrift(*configPath, cfg, logger); d != nil {
		alertMgr.SetEndpointDriftAlert(true, d.HungarianMessage())
		if notifier != nil {
			notifier.NotifyEndpointDrift(d.EnglishMessage(), d.FingerprintAgrees)
		}
	}

	// Wire debug callbacks (only in debug mode)
	if cfg.Logging.Level == "debug" {
		dc := &web.DebugCallbacks{}
		if hubPusher != nil {
			dc.TriggerHubReportPush = func() error {
				r := report.BuildReport(cfg, *configPath, stackMgr, backupMgr, cpuCollector, metricsStore, Version, sett.GetStoragePaths(), sett.GetGeoRestriction(), sett.GetSMBSettings(), logger)
				r.Claimed = sett.GetClaimed() // v0.122.0 (F-4): set-only claim flag for the hub
				return hubPusher.Push(r)
			}
		}
		// R-359/R-397: the debug button's caller. Same function as the scheduled job, `force=true` the
		// only difference — see runOffsiteIntegrityCheck.
		dc.RunIntegrityCheck = func(force bool) backup.IntegrityResult {
			ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 35*time.Minute)
			defer cancel()
			return runOffsiteIntegrityCheck(ctx, backupMgr, notifier, logger, force)
		}
		dc.HubConnectivityTest = func() (int, int64, error) {
			start := time.Now()
			client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
			resp, err := client.Get(cfg.Hub.URL + "/healthz")
			latency := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
			if err != nil {
				return 0, latency, err
			}
			resp.Body.Close()
			return resp.StatusCode, latency, nil
		}
		if cfg.Git.RepoURL != "" {
			dc.GiteaConnectivityTest = func() (int, int64, error) {
				start := time.Now()
				client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
				resp, err := client.Head(cfg.Git.RepoURL)
				latency := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
				if err != nil {
					return 0, latency, err
				}
				resp.Body.Close()
				return resp.StatusCode, latency, nil
			}
		}
		dc.GetTelemetryPreview = func() ([]report.AppTelemetry, error) {
			return report.BuildAppTelemetryForDebug(stackMgr, metricsStore, logger), nil
		}
		webServer.SetDebugCallbacks(dc)
	}

	// Drive migration (full-drive move) has moved to the host agent (slice 8C);
	// the controller no longer runs a DriveMigrator.

	// --- Build HTTP mux ---
	mux := http.NewServeMux()

	// API routes (no auth for health endpoint, auth for everything else)
	mux.HandleFunc("/api/health", apiRouter.HealthHandler)
	// Disk management API — thin proxy to the host agent (slice 8C). The agent owns
	// disk execution; the controller forwards list/assign/eject/format.
	mux.Handle("/api/disks", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeDiskAPI))))
	mux.Handle("/api/disks/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeDiskAPI))))
	// Guided storage provisioning (init/attach/eject orchestration over the agent disk API + registry).
	mux.Handle("/api/storage/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeStorageAPI))))
	// LAN network-sharing folder picker (R-7 slice 1). Must live here, not in the web ServeHTTP
	// switch: the /api/ subtree is routed on this mux, so a case there is shadowed and 401s.
	mux.Handle("/api/sharing/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeSharingAPI))))
	// Guest RAM resize (v0.143.0, R-24): read current allocation/bounds + apply a bounded resize.
	mux.Handle("/api/system/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeSystemAPI))))
	// Standalone full-server (guest) restart — the "Kiszolgáló újraindítása" maintenance affordance,
	// a sibling to the controller-only /api/selfrestart. Reuses the agent GuestReboot primitive.
	mux.Handle("/api/server/reboot", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.HandleServerReboot))))
	// Whole-guest (appliance) backup visibility + manual trigger. Distinct prefix from apiRouter's
	// app-data /api/backup/{run,status} (DB dumps) to avoid shadowing the /api/ catch-all subtree.
	mux.Handle("/api/guest-backup/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeBackupAPI))))
	// Host metrics API — thin proxy to the host agent (slice 9). Read-only host-wide health +
	// per-storage capacity for the monitoring view; the de-privileged controller can't read the
	// host itself. GET only, so no CSRF wrapper needed.
	mux.Handle("/api/host-metrics", webServer.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeHostMetricsAPI)))
	// App export/import API routes handled by web server
	mux.Handle("/api/export/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeExportAPI))))
	// Debug API routes handled by web server (debug-mode gating inside handler)
	mux.Handle("/api/debug/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeDebugAPI))))
	// Escrow ceremony wizard API (v0.127.0) — session auth + CSRF on POSTs; the claim response is
	// the ONLY surface the recovery code R ever crosses (no-store, never logged).
	mux.Handle("/api/escrow/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeEscrowAPI))))
	// Self-update API — accepts session auth OR hub API key (for external triggering)
	// CsrfProtect exempts Bearer-token requests automatically.
	mux.Handle("/api/selfupdate/", selfUpdateAuthMiddleware(cfg, webServer, webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(apiRouter.ServeHTTP))))
	// Config API — accepts session auth OR hub API key (for Hub config push)
	mux.Handle("/api/config/", selfUpdateAuthMiddleware(cfg, webServer, webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(apiRouter.ServeHTTP))))
	// Geo API — accepts session auth OR hub API key (for Hub geo-disable)
	mux.Handle("/api/geo/", selfUpdateAuthMiddleware(cfg, webServer, webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(apiRouter.ServeHTTP))))
	mux.Handle("/api/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(apiRouter.ServeHTTP))))

	// Web UI routes (auth required)
	mux.Handle("/", webServer.RequireAuth(webServer.CsrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(webServer.ServeHTTP))))

	// --- Start HTTP server ---
	server := &http.Server{
		Addr:         cfg.Web.Listen,
		Handler:      webServer.CatchAllMiddleware(mux),
		ReadTimeout:  30 * time.Second,
		WriteTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
		IdleTimeout:  120 * time.Second,
	}

	sigCh := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
	signal.Notify(sigCh, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)

	go func() {
		sig := <-sigCh
		logger.Printf("[INFO] Received signal %v, shutting down...", sig)
		// fix-6: spill the debug ring on a clean shutdown so a `systemctl restart` / container recreate
		// preserves the pre-restart window (the periodic spill already covers a hard crash to ≤60 s).
		if err := logBuffer.SpillTo(ringSpillPath); err != nil {
			logger.Printf("[WARN] debug-ring spill on shutdown failed: %v", err)
		}
		cancel()
		if mailShim != nil {
			mailShim.Close()
		}

		shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
		defer shutdownCancel()

		if err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
			logger.Printf("[ERROR] HTTP server shutdown error: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	logger.Printf("[INFO] Web UI listening on %s", cfg.Web.Listen)
	if err := server.ListenAndServe(); err != http.ErrServerClosed {
		logger.Fatalf("[FATAL] HTTP server error: %v", err)
	}

	logger.Println("[INFO] felhom-controller stopped")
}

// selfUpdateAuthMiddleware allows access via session auth (normal UI) OR hub API key bearer token (external).
// deadAppBootGrace is the startup settle window before fix-3 evaluates deployed-app run states — apps
// legitimately take 30–60 s to come up, so a shorter grace would false-alarm during the controller's
// own boot. After the grace, an app that still isn't running alerts (the F11 dead-at-boot case).
const deadAppBootGrace = 90 * time.Second

// deadAppHeartbeatEvery is how many 30 s scans pass between deadapp heartbeat lines (F-OBS).
// 20 scans = one line per ~10 minutes: frequent enough that a stalled detector is obvious well
// inside the 180 s alarm grace it feeds, and 144 lines/day instead of 2880.
const deadAppHeartbeatEvery = 20

// deadAppScans counts completed deadapp scans since boot. Single-goroutine (the scheduler runs
// each job serially), so it needs no lock.
var deadAppScans int

// noteDeadAppScan emits the F-OBS heartbeat every deadAppHeartbeatEvery-th scan, at [INFO] so it
// survives a default `logging.level: info` box. Extracted from the job closure so a test can assert
// the OBSERVABLE (the line, at info) rather than merely that the scan function ran — which is the
// distinction F-OBS is about.
func noteDeadAppScan(logger *log.Logger, scans, evaluated, down int) {
	if logger == nil || deadAppHeartbeatEvery <= 0 || scans%deadAppHeartbeatEvery != 0 {
		return
	}
	logger.Printf("[INFO] [deadapp] check alive: %d scans since boot, %d deployed app(s) evaluated, %d currently down",
		scans, evaluated, down)
}

// noteUnknownIntentSuppressions reports every app whose dead-app alarm was suppressed ONLY because
// no customer intent was ever recorded (R-386, §4's ruling).
//
// **A rule without a mechanism is not a rule.** §4 chose to keep today's behaviour for the unknown
// case, which is the safe choice — but a safe choice that is invisible is indistinguishable from the
// defect it replaced. This line is what makes the gap BOUNDED rather than silent: an operator can
// grep one word and answer "how many apps am I blind to, and which?".
//
// It rides the same cadence as the F-OBS heartbeat rather than firing every 30 s, for the reason
// noteDeadAppScan records: a per-scan line is 2880 lines/day of noise, and noise is what made the
// original author choose silence. The population only changes when someone starts or stops an app.
func noteUnknownIntentSuppressions(logger *log.Logger, states []notify.AppRunState) {
	if logger == nil || deadAppHeartbeatEvery <= 0 || deadAppScans%deadAppHeartbeatEvery != 0 {
		return
	}
	var names []string
	for _, s := range states {
		if s.IntentUnknown {
			names = append(names, s.Name)
		}
	}
	if len(names) == 0 {
		return
	}
	sort.Strings(names)
	logger.Printf("[INFO] [deadapp] %d stopped app(s) have NO recorded customer intent, so their "+
		"dead-app alarm is suppressed by the unknown-intent fallback (R-386): %s. This closes itself "+
		"as each app is started or stopped through the interface.", len(names), strings.Join(names, ", "))
}

// bootReconcileSettle is the delay before the FIRST observation. It lets the initial scan, the first
// status refresh and the two crash recoveries land before the R-52 sweep decides what "down" means.
var bootReconcileSettle = 5 * time.Second

// ── R-157 mechanism A: the window, and why these three numbers ───────────────────────────────────
//
// Until v0.190.0 the sweep looked exactly ONCE, at T+5 s, and returned. At T+5 s docker is still
// restoring containers after a hard reset, so an app that has not yet settled into a down state is
// not a candidate — and because the sweep never looked again, it stayed down. Measured failing on
// THREE OF SIX hard resets (CAMPAIGN-10). The predicate was never the problem; the single
// observation was.
//
// The fix is a window that SETTLES rather than a timer that runs forever (§5: an unbounded loop
// papers over a genuinely broken app and hammers docker). Three constants, each chosen against the
// 90 s dead-app boot grace:
//
//   - bootReconcileSample = 5 s. Fine enough that a container settling at T+40 s is seen within one
//     sample, coarse enough that a quiet boot costs ~12 cheap GetStacks() calls, not hundreds.
//   - bootReconcileStableFor = 3 consecutive identical samples (15 s of no change) before the fleet
//     is called settled. One sample cannot distinguish "settled" from "sampled between two docker
//     events"; three spans the gap between a container exiting and its restart policy re-creating it.
//   - bootReconcileBudget = 50 s. THE BINDING CONSTRAINT, and it is arithmetic, not taste:
//     bootReconcileSettle (5 s) + budget (50 s) + ONE DefaultRetryDelay (30 s) inside the final
//     sweep = 85 s, which must stay under deadAppBootGrace (90 s) so a recovery that works is
//     SILENT. 60 s was the first choice and TestBootWindow_CommonCaseFitsInsideTheDeadAppGrace
//     rejected it at 95 s — the test is the reason this number is 50 and not a round 60.
//     Extending the grace to make a bigger budget fit was rejected (§8.3): that hides a late
//     recovery rather than reporting it. A window that genuinely overruns is reported instead —
//     see recordLateRecovery below.
//
// The window ends on WHICHEVER COMES FIRST — settled, or budget exhausted — and the log says which,
// because "settled and found nothing" and "ran out of time still churning" are different facts about
// the box and must not read the same (the v0.91.2 lesson).
var (
	bootReconcileSample    = 5 * time.Second
	bootReconcileStableFor = 3
	bootReconcileBudget    = 50 * time.Second
)

// bootReconcileFn is the R-52 sweep, a package var purely so the wiring below is testable from
// package main (the v0.154.0 / v0.91.0 lesson: a seam proven only through injection proves the
// component and not the caller).
var bootReconcileFn = func(ctx context.Context, mgr bootrecon.StackProvider, logger *log.Logger) bootrecon.Result {
	r := bootrecon.New(mgr, logger)
	// R-171: the sweep must not start an app whose data drive is absent. Wired HERE, at the one
	// place the sweep is constructed, so there is no path that builds an ungated reconciler.
	if sm, ok := mgr.(*stacks.Manager); ok {
		r.SetDriveGate(bootDriveGate{drive: driveStartGate{mgr: sm, sett: bootDriveSettings}})
	}
	return r.Run(ctx)
}

// bootDriveSettings / bootStartHolders are what the boot start gate reads. Init-only, set in main()
// before the reconcile goroutine is launched; both are nil-safe (see MayStart).
var (
	bootDriveSettings *settings.Settings
	bootQuiesceLoop   *quiesce.Loop
	bootAppStopGuard  *backup.AppStopGuard
)

// bootDriveGate answers bootrecon.StartGate for the real controller. It enforces §8.2: an app that
// something else is deliberately holding must NOT be started by the boot sweep.
//
// THE THREE HOLDERS, in the order they are checked. The first two only became reachable when R-157
// mechanism A widened the window — the old T+5 s single sweep never overlapped a quiesce or a
// running app-data operation, and that is exactly why widening it needed these:
//
//  1. QUIESCE — the whole-guest backup loop stops app stacks and restarts exactly the ones it
//     stopped. Starting one mid-backup would put a running app inside a snapshot that is supposed to
//     be clean-shutdown-consistent, which is the entire point of quiescing. `SuppressedStacks` is
//     the set it already publishes for precisely this "an app WE stopped is not a fault" question,
//     so reusing it means the two cannot drift.
//  2. THE APP-STOP GUARD — a volume dump / offbox reconstitute / .fab export that is CURRENTLY
//     holding an app down. Its own Recover already ran to completion before this goroutine started,
//     so the marker seen here belongs to an operation running NOW, not to a crashed one.
//  3. THE DRIVE — R-171. Two questions, because they fail in opposite directions and neither alone
//     is sufficient at boot:
//     • the settings flags (`Disconnected`/`Decommissioned`) — the SAME signal the API's own
//     `startGatedByMissingDrive` uses, so the customer's path and the sweep cannot disagree about
//     whether an app may start. But they are the drive gate's bookkeeping, and inside the boot
//     window that gate may not have ticked yet, so a genuinely absent drive can still read as
//     connected.
//     • `Manager.DriveLive` — the live mountpoint check, the SAME `isMountPoint` seam the userdata
//     belt already uses. It answers immediately and needs no gate tick.
//
// Fail-safe per bootrecon.StartGate's contract: anything that cannot be determined returns false.
type bootDriveGate struct {
	drive driveStartGate
}

func (g bootDriveGate) MayStart(stackName string) (bool, string) {
	// 1. quiesce (nil-safe on an unprovisioned guest: SuppressedStacks returns nil)
	if bootQuiesceLoop.SuppressedStacks()[stackName] {
		return false, "a whole-guest backup (quiesce) is holding it — the quiesce loop restarts its own stacks"
	}
	// 2. an app-data operation in flight
	for _, held := range bootAppStopGuard.HeldStacks() {
		if held == stackName {
			return false, "an app-data operation is holding it — the app-stop guard restarts it when the operation ends"
		}
	}
	// 3. the drive — the SHARED predicate, so this gate and the app-stop guard's crash recovery
	//    (R-174) cannot disagree about whether an app's drive is available.
	return g.drive.MayStart(stackName)
}

// driveStartGate is holder #3 of bootDriveGate, EXTRACTED so it has two callers and one
// implementation (R-174).
//
// WHY IT IS SEPARATE FROM bootDriveGate RATHER THAN REUSED WHOLE. The app-stop guard's Recover needs
// exactly this question and NOT the other two holders:
//
//   - Holder #2 reads `bootAppStopGuard.HeldStacks()`, which during Recover is the guard's OWN
//     marker — the very stacks being recovered. Reusing bootDriveGate there would refuse every
//     recovery it was meant to perform, self-referentially.
//   - Holders #1 and #2 read package-level vars assigned in main() at the `bootDriveSettings` block,
//     which runs AFTER `appStopGuard.Recover()`. They are nil at recovery time, so a whole-gate
//     reuse would be correct only by accident of nil-safety — and would silently invert the moment
//     anyone moved either line. This project has shipped that class of accident before.
//
// Fail-safe per bootrecon.StartGate's contract: anything that cannot be determined returns false.
type driveStartGate struct {
	mgr  *stacks.Manager
	sett *settings.Settings
}

func (g driveStartGate) MayStart(stackName string) (bool, string) {
	// R-379/R-380 HOLDER, checked FIRST and deliberately ABOVE the `HDD_PATH == ""` early return
	// below. The apps this hold exists for are DRIVELESS — a failed database restore is the case,
	// and 40 of the 53 catalogue apps have no drive at all — so a hold placed after that return
	// would never be consulted for the exact class it was built for.
	//
	// This is holder #4, and putting it here rather than in bootDriveGate is what gives it two
	// callers with one implementation: the boot sweep reaches it through bootDriveGate, and the
	// app-stop guard's Recover reaches it directly. A hold only one path honours is not a hold.
	if g.sett != nil {
		if h, ok := g.sett.GetRestoreHold(stackName); ok {
			return false, "held after a failed restore whose rollback also failed (" + h.At + ") — clear the hold to start it"
		}
	}
	if g.mgr == nil {
		return false, "no stack manager wired — the drive cannot be determined"
	}
	cfg := g.mgr.LoadAppConfigByName(stackName)
	if cfg == nil {
		// CANNOT DETERMINE. A deployed app whose app.yaml will not load cannot have its drive
		// resolved, so the fail-safe direction applies rather than a hopeful start.
		return false, "app.yaml could not be read"
	}
	hdd := cfg.Env["HDD_PATH"]
	if hdd == "" {
		return true, "" // SSD-resident: there is no external drive to be absent (mirrors the API gate)
	}
	if g.sett != nil {
		for _, sp := range g.sett.GetStoragePaths() {
			if sp.Path != hdd {
				continue
			}
			if sp.Decommissioned {
				return false, "drive " + hdd + " is decommissioned"
			}
			if sp.Disconnected {
				return false, "drive " + hdd + " is flagged disconnected"
			}
		}
	}
	if !g.mgr.DriveLive(hdd) {
		return false, "drive " + hdd + " is not a live mountpoint"
	}
	return true, ""
}

// gatedAppStopStarter is the app-stop guard's starter, wrapped in the drive gate (R-174).
//
// THE DEFECT IT CLOSES, found by review on 2026-08-02 in code shipped 2026-08-01 (v0.189.0):
// `appStopGuard.SetStarter(stackMgr)` handed Recover the RAW stack manager, whose `StartStack` has
// no drive gate. Recover runs at startup — precisely when an external drive may not have come back —
// so a backup that stopped an app, followed by a power cut and a drive that did not remount, ended
// with the app started onto a missing drive. That is R-171 one path over, and the rule is not new:
// the API's own `startGatedByMissingDrive` already refuses this to the customer.
//
// The check stays HERE, per-caller, and is deliberately NOT pushed into `Manager.StartStack` — it has
// fourteen callers and most of them legitimately start apps outside this concern.
type gatedAppStopStarter struct {
	inner  backup.AppStopStarter
	gate   driveStartGate
	logger *log.Logger
}

func (s gatedAppStopStarter) StartStack(name string) error {
	if ok, why := s.gate.MayStart(name); !ok {
		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [appstop] refusing to restart %q after an interrupted operation: %s", name, why)
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", backup.ErrStartRefused, why)
	}
	return s.inner.StartStack(name)
}

// fillWatchStartupDelay is how long the startup fill check waits before its single run. Long enough
// for the drive gate's first reconcile and for mounts to settle — a drive still coming back must read
// as unreadable (and be skipped, §8.4), never as a filesystem worth warning about.
const fillWatchStartupDelay = 90 * time.Second

// fillTargets is §8.1's watch list: the app-data volume, the system-data volume, and every
// registered drive. Resolved at CHECK time, not at startup, so a drive added or decommissioned
// between checks is picked up without a controller restart.
//
// WHY THESE THREE AND NOT ONLY THE REGISTERED DRIVES — which is all the healthcheck ever looked at:
//
//   - the APP-DATA volume (`mp0`, `/var/lib/docker`) holds every app's live named volumes;
//   - the SYSTEM-DATA volume (`mp1`, `/mnt/sys_drive`) holds the retained recovery unit of every
//     DRIVELESS app (architecture/07-backup-architecture.md §7.5) and is the smaller of the two at
//     20 G against 50 G — the very mismatch R-165 exists to remove. It is also the filesystem whose
//     silent exhaustion R-158 measured;
//   - the registered DRIVES hold the customer's own data.
//
// De-duplicated by path: on a box where a drive is not a separate mount these collapse, and warning
// twice about one filesystem is exactly the noise the per-filesystem rule exists to prevent. A
// DECOMMISSIONED drive is dropped — it is deliberately out of service, and its fill is not news. A
// DISCONNECTED one is kept in the list but will read as unreadable and be skipped by §8.4, which is
// the correct outcome: its absence already has its own alert.
func fillTargets(cfg *config.Config, sett *settings.Settings) []fillwatch.Target {
	seen := make(map[string]bool)
	var out []fillwatch.Target
	add := func(path, label string) {
		if path == "" || seen[path] {
			return
		}
		seen[path] = true
		out = append(out, fillwatch.Target{Path: path, Label: label})
	}

	// The docker data-root as seen from inside the guest, and the system-data area.
	add(system.DockerVolumePath, "Alkalmazások területe")
	if cfg != nil {
		add(cfg.Paths.SystemDataPath, "Rendszer- és mentési terület")
	}
	if sett != nil {
		for _, sp := range sett.GetStoragePaths() {
			if sp.Decommissioned {
				continue
			}
			add(sp.Path, sp.Label)
		}
	}
	return fillwatch.SortTargets(out)
}

// bootFleetSample is a comparable snapshot of one deployed app — name, state and container count,
// per §8.1. Container count is in it deliberately: a stack can go from 3 containers to 0 without its
// aggregate state changing, and that IS the boot still moving.
type bootFleetSample struct {
	name       string
	state      string
	containers int
}

// sampleBootFleet REFRESHES, then returns the fleet snapshot, sorted, so two samples compare by
// equality.
//
// THE REFRESH IS LOAD-BEARING, and it was found by live validation, not by review. `GetStacks()`
// returns the Manager's IN-MEMORY map, which the scheduler refreshes on its own 10 s cadence
// (`status-refresh`, main.go). Sampling it every 5 s without refreshing means two consecutive samples
// can straddle one refresh and be identical because THE CACHE DID NOT UPDATE — not because the fleet
// stopped moving. The window would then declare "settled" on stale data and sweep on a picture of the
// box from up to 10 s ago, which is a quieter version of the exact defect R-157 mechanism A is.
//
// Observed on guest 9201 on 2026-08-02: a container removed ~5 s before the window closed was still
// present in the sampled fleet, so the sweep logged "no boot-orphaned apps" for an app that had none.
//
// `RefreshStatus` is a cheap `docker ps`-based refresh of the in-memory map (the same one the
// scheduler runs every 10 s), so at most ~10 extra calls per boot. A refresh error is logged and the
// sample proceeds on whatever the map holds — degraded, but never silently: a boot window that cannot
// see docker is exactly when a stale verdict is most dangerous.
func sampleBootFleet(mgr bootrecon.StackProvider) []bootFleetSample {
	_ = mgr.RefreshStatus()
	stacksNow := mgr.GetStacks()
	out := make([]bootFleetSample, 0, len(stacksNow))
	for _, s := range stacksNow {
		if !s.Deployed {
			continue
		}
		out = append(out, bootFleetSample{name: s.Name, state: string(s.State), containers: len(s.Containers)})
	}
	sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].name < out[j].name })
	return out
}

func sameBootFleet(a, b []bootFleetSample) bool {
	if len(a) != len(b) {
		return false
	}
	for i := range a {
		if a[i] != b[i] {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

// runBootReconcile waits out the settle delay, then samples the fleet until it stops changing (or
// the budget runs out) and performs the bounded sweep ONCE, at the end.
//
// Sweeping on every sample was rejected: the sweep's own StartStack changes the fleet, so a
// sweep-per-sample would never observe a settled fleet and would race docker's restore. Sampling is
// read-only; exactly one sweep runs, and it re-derives its candidate set from a settled fleet —
// which is the whole point, since the pre-v0.190.0 bug was a candidate set derived too early.
//
// Called from main() in a goroutine.
func runBootReconcile(ctx context.Context, mgr bootrecon.StackProvider, logger *log.Logger) {
	select {
	case <-ctx.Done():
		return
	case <-time.After(bootReconcileSettle):
	}

	started := time.Now()
	prev := sampleBootFleet(mgr)
	stable := 1
	settled := false

	for time.Since(started) < bootReconcileBudget {
		select {
		case <-ctx.Done():
			return
		case <-time.After(bootReconcileSample):
		}
		cur := sampleBootFleet(mgr)
		if sameBootFleet(prev, cur) {
			stable++
		} else {
			// Not settled — the boot is still moving. Log at DEBUG: at 5 s cadence an INFO line per
			// sample would bury the one line that matters, which is the verdict below.
			logger.Printf("[DEBUG] [bootrecon] boot window: fleet still changing (%d app(s)) — resampling", len(cur))
			stable = 1
		}
		prev = cur
		if stable >= bootReconcileStableFor {
			settled = true
			break
		}
	}

	if settled {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] boot window: fleet settled after %.0fs (%d identical samples %s apart) — sweeping",
			time.Since(started).Seconds(), bootReconcileStableFor, bootReconcileSample)
	} else {
		// NOT a failure — a box whose apps are still churning at the budget is exactly the box that
		// most needs the sweep. But it is a different fact from "settled", and saying so is what makes
		// a stuck boot visible instead of looking like a quiet one.
		logger.Printf("[INFO] [bootrecon] boot window: budget %s exhausted while the fleet was still changing — sweeping anyway",
			bootReconcileBudget)
	}

	res := bootReconcileFn(ctx, mgr, logger)
	recordLateRecovery(logger, started, res)
}

// recordLateRecovery keeps §8.3 honest. The window can finish AFTER deadAppBootGrace, and when it
// does the dead-app alarm has already fired for an app this sweep then recovered. Extending the
// grace to hide that was rejected; reporting it is the alternative, so the record is truthful and
// the operator is not left with a stale alarm and no counter-evidence.
//
// Measured from controller start, which is what the grace is measured from.
func recordLateRecovery(logger *log.Logger, started time.Time, res bootrecon.Result) {
	if len(res.Recovered) == 0 {
		return
	}
	elapsed := bootReconcileSettle + time.Since(started)
	if elapsed <= deadAppBootGrace {
		return
	}
	logger.Printf("[WARN] [bootrecon] LATE RECOVERY: %d app(s) recovered %.0fs after start, past the %s dead-app grace — an alert may already have fired for: %v",
		len(res.Recovered), elapsed.Seconds(), deadAppBootGrace, res.Recovered)
}

// scanDeployedAppRunStates returns the fix-3 view of the deployed apps: the DEAD ones (for the
// state-based dashboard banner) and EVERY deployed app's run state (for the notifier's one-event-per-
// transition tracking). Deploying apps are skipped (mid-deploy is not a fault). Pure over GetStacks()
// — the derivation itself lives in classifyRunStates so it is testable without a live Manager.
func scanDeployedAppRunStates(mgr *stacks.Manager, q *quiesce.Loop, g *backup.AppStopGuard) ([]web.DeadApp, []notify.AppRunState) {
	// R-97b: a stack THIS controller stopped for a backup is not a fault. q may be nil (unprovisioned
	// guest) — SuppressedStacks is nil-safe and returns nothing, i.e. suppress nothing.
	//
	// R-330: there are TWO mechanisms in this product that stop a customer's app on purpose, and until
	// v0.224.0 only one of them told the alarm. `q` covers the WHOLE-GUEST quiesce loop (vzdump/PBS);
	// `g` covers the per-app operations — the nightly volume dump, an off-site reconstitution and a
	// .fab export. Both are nil-safe, and the union is taken here rather than inside classifyRunStates
	// so that pure function keeps its single `quiesced` parameter and its existing tests.
	return classifyRunStates(mgr.GetStacks(), unionSuppressed(q.SuppressedStacks(), g.SuppressedStacks()), q.FailedRestarts(), time.Now())
}

// unionSuppressed merges the suppression sets of the two mechanisms that stop apps on purpose.
// Returns nil when both are empty so the common case allocates nothing.
func unionSuppressed(a, b map[string]bool) map[string]bool {
	if len(a) == 0 {
		return b
	}
	if len(b) == 0 {
		return a
	}
	out := make(map[string]bool, len(a)+len(b))
	for n := range a {
		out[n] = true
	}
	for n := range b {
		out[n] = true
	}
	return out
}

// classifyRunStates is the pure fix-3 derivation over a plain stack slice. It splits the deployed
// apps into the DEAD list (dashboard banner) and the per-app run states (notifier transition tracker).
//
// v0.164.0: a deliberate user stop is NOT a fault and must not alarm anywhere (banner OR email). The
// down predicate therefore excludes StateStopped — but NOT unconditionally. That exclusion rested on
// two invariants, and F-CRIT-1 (Campaign 8) showed the first of them had already become false:
//
//   - I1 (AS WRITTEN, AND WRONG): "the UI stop path Manager.StopStack runs `docker compose down` →
//     containers are removed → a deployed stack with zero containers aggregates to StateStopped, so
//     StateStopped means 'deployed, deliberately stopped by the user'."
//     **The quiesce loop stops stacks by the SAME path.** So a stack that a backup quiesce stopped and
//     then FAILED to restart is also StateStopped — byte-identical to a user stop on the Docker side —
//     and the whitelist swallowed it. Campaign 8 observed a customer app dead indefinitely with no
//     banner, no event and no email, while the dead-app scanner ran 11 times over it.
//   - I2 (still true): the P2 restart-policy census (2026-07-21, 53 templates / 78 services) found
//     every catalog service on `unless-stopped`, so a CRASHING app never comes to rest at `stopped` —
//     faults surface as StateExited / StateDegraded (and restarting/unhealthy).
//
// I1 RESTATED, TRUE AS OF v0.179.0: StateStopped means "deployed with zero containers", which is
// EITHER a deliberate user stop OR a quiesce restart that failed. No state test can tell them apart,
// because they are the same state. The distinguishing fact is not in the state at all — it is that
// the quiesce loop TRIED to restart the stack and could not, which it now reports via
// Loop.FailedRestarts(). `failedRestart` is that set, and it is the ONLY thing that lifts the
// StateStopped whitelist.
//
// (An out-of-band `docker compose stop` leaves the containers present → StateExited → still alerts,
// which is correct: out-of-band tampering IS reportable.) IsDownState is intentionally left unchanged
// — other callers rely on stopped counting as down; the suppression is a filter at this single
// derivation point only.
// `now` is injected (C9-F2) so the crash-loop threshold is a unit-testable contract rather than a
// property of the wall clock.
func classifyRunStates(sts []stacks.Stack, quiesced map[string]bool, failedRestart map[string]bool, now time.Time) ([]web.DeadApp, []notify.AppRunState) {
	var dead []web.DeadApp
	var states []notify.AppRunState
	for _, st := range sts {
		if !st.Deployed || st.Deploying {
			continue
		}
		// R-97b: a stack a quiesce cycle stopped (or restarted within the grace window) is NOT down —
		// we stopped it. This is a CYCLE-keyed suppression, not a state test, because an app caught
		// mid-restart is `starting`/`unhealthy`, not StateStopped, so v0.164.0's state filter above
		// cannot see it. The window EXPIRES (quiesceAlarmGrace): an app that genuinely fails to come
		// back still alarms on the first scan after it closes.
		// F-CRIT-1: StateStopped is whitelisted as a deliberate user stop UNLESS the quiesce loop
		// reports that it stopped this stack and could not restart it. That single term is what turns
		// an indefinitely-silent dead app back into an alarm, without re-alarming genuine user stops.
		// C9-F2: a SUSTAINED restarting is a crash loop, and a crash loop is a dead app. Deliberately
		// NOT folded into IsDownState — that would alarm on every deploy and update fleet-wide, which
		// is the over-correction F-A1 nearly cost us. The threshold (stacks.crashLoopAfter, 5 min) sits
		// above the deploy health timeout, the slowest catalog start_period AND R-97b's grace, so a
		// brief restart never reaches it and the two suppression windows compose into one bounded
		// delay. Quiesce suppression below still wins inside its own window.
		crashLooping := st.CrashLooping(now)

		// R-386: ASK THE FIELD THAT KNOWS, do not guess from the state.
		//
		// Until v0.223.0 this read `st.State == StateStopped && !failedRestart[...]` — i.e. EVERY
		// stopped stack was assumed to be a deliberate customer stop. Measured on `demo-hp`
		// 2026-08-23: `privatebin` stopped out of band, nine dead-app scans, zero events, zero
		// banner. The comment above claimed an out-of-band stop "still alerts"; it did not, because
		// `aggregateState` folds StateExited into the stopped counter and StateExited never survives
		// aggregation.
		//
		// `DesiredState` is what the customer actually asked for, it has exactly ONE writer (the
		// customer's own action — see the field's comment in internal/stacks/deploy.go), and it is
		// TRI-state. The three-way ruling, operator-approved 2026-08-23:
		//
		//   Stopped → the customer asked        → no alarm  (unchanged)
		//   Running → nobody asked              → ALARM     (the R-386 fix)
		//   absent  → UNKNOWN, never "running"  → no alarm, AND say so (see IntentUnknown)
		//
		// The absent case keeps today's behaviour deliberately. Reading unknown as "nobody asked"
		// would, on the first cycle after this ships, email about every app any owner has ever
		// deliberately stopped — fleet-wide, from a field that predates the intent it is being asked
		// about. That is the same over-correction the tri-state exists to prevent, and the backfill
		// cannot help: it seeds Running only from an observed-UP reading, so anything stopped at
		// upgrade time stays unknown — which is exactly the ambiguous population.
		//
		// The gap is BOUNDED AND NAMED, not silent: IntentUnknown is set, the caller logs it at INFO
		// with the app name, and an operator can therefore answer "how many apps am I blind to?".
		// It closes itself as apps are started and stopped through the interface.
		//
		// `failedRestart` still lifts a Stopped intent, and that ordering is load-bearing: the
		// quiesce loop stops stacks by the same path a customer does, so a stack it stopped and could
		// NOT restart must alarm whatever the intent says. Removing that term re-opens F-CRIT-1's
		// indefinitely-silent dead app.
		intentUnknown := false
		userStopped := false
		if st.State == stacks.StateStopped && !failedRestart[st.Name] {
			switch stacks.DesiredStateOf(st) {
			case stacks.DesiredStateStopped:
				userStopped = true
			case stacks.DesiredStateRunning:
				userStopped = false
			default: // DesiredStateUnknown — the §4 fallback
				userStopped = true
				intentUnknown = true
			}
		}

		down := (stacks.IsDownState(st.State) || crashLooping) && !userStopped && !quiesced[st.Name]
		states = append(states, notify.AppRunState{
			Name: st.Name, DisplayName: st.Meta.DisplayName, Down: down,
			IntentUnknown: intentUnknown && !down,
		})
		if down {
			dead = append(dead, web.DeadApp{Name: st.Name, DisplayName: st.Meta.DisplayName, State: string(st.State)})
		}
	}
	return dead, states
}

func selfUpdateAuthMiddleware(cfg *config.Config, webServer *web.Server, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		// Check bearer token first (for external API calls: hub, build scripts)
		if auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
			token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
			if token != "" && cfg.Hub.APIKey != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(cfg.Hub.APIKey)) == 1 {
				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
				return
			}
		}
		// Fall back to session auth
		webServer.RequireAuth(next).ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// setupLogger builds the v0.116.0 capture layer: the LogBuffer ring ALWAYS exists
// and captures every line (DEBUG included — remote diagnostics need the detail to
// exist without a config flip), while stdout (docker logs) keeps respecting
// logging.level via the level filter. Lshortfile stays debug-only (unchanged).
func setupLogger(cfg *config.Config) (*log.Logger, *web.LogBuffer) {
	// fix-6 (CAMPAIGN-3): 1000 wrapped in ~6.5 min under the campaign's ~2.6 entries/s load — the exact
	// post-incident window an operator needs was the first thing lost. 5000 gives ≈32 min at that raw
	// rate, and ≈50+ min now that the periodic-scheduler TRACE noise no longer enters the ring (2b).
	logBuffer := web.NewLogBuffer(5000)
	flags := log.LstdFlags
	if cfg.Logging.Level == "debug" {
		flags |= log.Lshortfile
	}
	stdout := web.NewLevelFilterWriter(os.Stdout, cfg.Logging.Level)
	return log.New(io.MultiWriter(stdout, logBuffer), "", flags), logBuffer
}

// stackAdapter implements backup.StackDataProvider using stacks.Manager.
type stackAdapter struct {
	mgr             *stacks.Manager
	getStoragePaths func() []settings.StoragePath
	encKey          []byte // for decrypting live app.yaml secrets during restore-from-unit
}

func (a *stackAdapter) GetStackComposePath(name string) (string, bool) {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return "", false
	}
	return s.ComposePath, true
}

// GetStackClassifiedBinds delegates to the stacks manager's backup-classification resolver (Task 2).
// INERT — no backup tier calls this yet; wired so Task 3 consumes a tested seam.
func (a *stackAdapter) GetStackClassifiedBinds(name string) ([]backup.ClassifiedBind, bool) {
	return a.mgr.ClassifiedBinds(name)
}

func (a *stackAdapter) ListDeployedStacks() []backup.StackSummary {
	var result []backup.StackSummary
	for _, s := range a.mgr.GetStacks() {
		if !s.Deployed {
			continue
		}
		result = append(result, backup.StackSummary{
			Name:        s.Name,
			DisplayName: s.Meta.DisplayName,
			ComposePath: s.ComposePath,
			NeedsHDD:    s.Meta.Resources.NeedsHDD,
			HasVolumes:  len(backup.ParseComposeNamedVolumes(s.ComposePath)) > 0,
		})
	}
	return result
}

func (a *stackAdapter) StopStack(name string) error {
	return a.mgr.StopStack(name)
}

func (a *stackAdapter) StartStack(name string) error {
	return a.mgr.StartStack(name)
}

func (a *stackAdapter) GetStackHDDMounts(name string) []string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}

	// Priority 1: Read the app's own HDD_PATH from its app.yaml
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfig(stackDir)
	if appCfg != nil && appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"] != "" {
		return stacks.ParseComposeHDDMounts(s.ComposePath, appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"])
	}

	// Priority 2: Try all registered storage paths (fallback)
	var allMounts []string
	seen := make(map[string]bool)
	for _, sp := range a.getStoragePaths() {
		mounts := stacks.ParseComposeHDDMounts(s.ComposePath, sp.Path)
		for _, m := range mounts {
			if !seen[m] {
				seen[m] = true
				allMounts = append(allMounts, m)
			}
		}
	}
	return allMounts
}

func (a *stackAdapter) GetDockerVolumes(name string) []string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}
	return backup.ResolveDockerVolumeNames(s.ComposePath)
}

// GetImportRoot delegates to the stack manager's canonical drop-zone root (R-75). Both the backup
// and the export provider need it: ${IMPORT_PATH} binds live on the SYSTEM drive and can NOT be
// resolved from an app's HDD_PATH.
func (a *stackAdapter) GetImportRoot() string { return a.mgr.GetImportRoot() }

func (a *stackAdapter) GetStackHDDPath(name string) string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return ""
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfig(stackDir)
	if appCfg != nil && appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"] != "" {
		return filepath.Clean(appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"])
	}
	return ""
}

// GetStackRecoveryInfo gathers the inputs for an app's recovery unit: the stack dir, pinned image
// tags, the non-secret env, the NAMES of every secret/data-key env var, and — since D5 — the decrypted
// VALUES of the PORTABLE secret class.
//
// The non-secret env still excludes every named secret (plus a defensive crypto.IsEncrypted guard), so
// the two sets are disjoint by construction and a secret can only reach the unit by being in the
// portable class. The EXCLUDED class (`type: password`, and the nonPortableSecrets register) is
// name-only here and is recovered from the guest — or regenerated (O4) — exactly as before.
func (a *stackAdapter) GetStackRecoveryInfo(name string) (backup.RecoveryInfo, bool) {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return backup.RecoveryInfo{}, false
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	meta := stacks.LoadMetadata(stackDir)

	// Secret set = all secret/password fields ∪ any data_key fields (in deterministic metadata order).
	secretSet := make(map[string]bool)
	var secretNames []string
	add := func(v string) {
		if !secretSet[v] {
			secretSet[v] = true
			secretNames = append(secretNames, v)
		}
	}
	for _, v := range stacks.SensitiveEnvVars(&meta) {
		add(v)
	}
	dataKeys := meta.DataKeyEnvVars()
	for _, v := range dataKeys {
		add(v)
	}

	// Non-secret env: raw app.yaml values that are neither named-secret nor (defensively) encrypted.
	nonSecret := make(map[string]string)
	if appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfig(stackDir); appCfg != nil {
		for k, v := range appCfg.Env {
			if secretSet[k] || crypto.IsEncrypted(v) {
				continue
			}
			nonSecret[k] = v
		}
	}

	// D5: decrypt the portable class so it can travel in the unit. Reuses the SAME decrypt path as the
	// restore side (LoadAppConfigDecrypted), so there is one way to turn app.yaml into plaintext, not
	// two. A name whose value is absent/empty is simply omitted — the restore's fail-closed data-key
	// gate is what decides whether that is survivable.
	portableNames := stacks.PortableSecretEnvVars(&meta)
	portable := make(map[string]string, len(portableNames))
	if len(portableNames) > 0 {
		if dec := stacks.LoadAppConfigDecrypted(stackDir, a.encKey); dec != nil {
			for _, n := range portableNames {
				if v, ok := dec.Env[n]; ok && v != "" {
					portable[n] = v
				}
			}
		}
	}

	return backup.RecoveryInfo{
		StackDir:              stackDir,
		DisplayName:           s.Meta.DisplayName,
		ImagePins:             backup.ParseComposeImages(s.ComposePath),
		NonSecretEnv:          nonSecret,
		SecretEnvVars:         secretNames,
		DataKeyEnvVars:        dataKeys,
		PortableSecretEnvVars: portableNames,
		PortableSecrets:       portable,
	}, true
}

// RecoverStackSecrets returns the live decrypted values for the named secret env vars present in the
// stack's app.yaml (the guest's own — live rootfs or PBS-restored). Absent/empty names are omitted;
// the caller's fail-closed gate decides. Secrets come from the guest, never from the recovery unit.
func (a *stackAdapter) RecoverStackSecrets(name string, names []string) map[string]string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}
	cfg := stacks.LoadAppConfigDecrypted(filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath), a.encKey)
	if cfg == nil {
		return nil
	}
	out := make(map[string]string)
	for _, n := range names {
		if v, ok := cfg.Env[n]; ok && v != "" {
			out[n] = v
		}
	}
	return out
}

// RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit restores the app definition from the unit's compose dir into the
// stack dir and persists app.yaml from the reconstructed full env. Secrets in fullEnv were recovered
// from the guest, never regenerated. It starts NOTHING — the restore flow brings the database service
// up alone for the dump replay and only then starts the whole stack (R-47).
func (a *stackAdapter) RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit(name, composeSrcDir string, fullEnv map[string]string) error {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return fmt.Errorf("stack %q not found", name)
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	// Recover the app definition from the unit (compose + .felhom.yml) into the stack dir.
	for _, fname := range []string{"docker-compose.yml", ".felhom.yml"} {
		data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(composeSrcDir, fname))
		if err != nil {
			continue // capture whichever existed
		}
		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(stackDir, fname), data, 0644); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("restoring %s from unit: %w", fname, err)
		}
	}
	return a.mgr.PersistUnitRedeployConfig(name, fullEnv)
}

// StartStackServices brings up only the named compose services (the DB-only replay window, R-47).
func (a *stackAdapter) StartStackServices(name string, services []string) error {
	return a.mgr.StartStackServices(name, services)
}

// RefreshAndIsRunning forces a docker ps scan before checking state.
// Called during post-restore health check (~every 5s for up to 90s).
// Full refresh is acceptable here since restores are rare operations.
func (a *stackAdapter) RefreshAndIsRunning(name string) bool {
	a.mgr.RefreshStatus()
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	return ok && s.State == stacks.StateRunning
}

// integrationStackAdapter implements integrations.StackProvider using stacks.Manager.
type integrationStackAdapter struct {
	mgr *stacks.Manager
}

func (a *integrationStackAdapter) GetStack(name string) (*stacks.Stack, bool) {
	return a.mgr.GetStack(name)
}

func (a *integrationStackAdapter) GetStacks() []stacks.Stack {
	return a.mgr.GetStacks()
}

func (a *integrationStackAdapter) RestartStack(name string) error {
	return a.mgr.RestartStack(name)
}

// geoStackAdapter implements cloudflare.StackLister for geo-restriction sync.
type geoStackAdapter struct {
	mgr    *stacks.Manager
	domain string
}

func (a *geoStackAdapter) GetDeployedHostnames() map[string]string {
	result := make(map[string]string)
	for _, stack := range a.mgr.GetStacks() {
		if !stack.Deployed {
			continue
		}
		subdomain := stack.Meta.Subdomain
		// Check for custom subdomain in app.yaml
		if appCfg := a.mgr.LoadAppConfigByName(stack.Name); appCfg != nil {
			if sd, ok := appCfg.Env["SUBDOMAIN"]; ok && sd != "" {
				subdomain = sd
			}
		}
		if subdomain != "" {
			result[stack.Name] = subdomain + "." + a.domain
		}
	}
	return result
}

// exportAdapter implements appexport.ExportStackProvider using stacks.Manager.
type exportAdapter struct {
	mgr    *stacks.Manager
	encKey []byte
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackDir(name string) (string, bool) {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return "", false
	}
	return filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath), true
}

// GetStackClassifiedBinds delegates to the stacks manager's backup-classification resolver (Task 2),
// used by the `.fab` class-scoped export plan (Task 4).
func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackClassifiedBinds(name string) ([]appbackup.ClassifiedBind, bool) {
	return a.mgr.ClassifiedBinds(name)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackComposePath(name string) (string, bool) {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return "", false
	}
	return s.ComposePath, true
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackHDDMounts(name string) []string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfig(stackDir)
	if appCfg != nil && appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"] != "" {
		// C6B-F1 (v0.130.0): union ${HDD_PATH} binds + the ${USERDATA_PATH} root. The old
		// ParseComposeHDDMounts-only call was blind to the standard userdata convention, so
		// 12/13 needs_hdd catalog apps exported hollow (config-only) bundles. The backup-side
		// stackAdapter is intentionally NOT changed here — the scheduled/tier-2 path copies the
		// recovery unit + the app's resolved appdata/<name> dir(s) only (NOT the userdata tree —
		// F-S1; NOT the namespace wholesale), and derives that dir name from the compose binds
		// (F-S2, see backup.tier2AppDataName). Spec:
		// felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-backup-classification-2026-07-14.md.
		return stacks.ExportDataMounts(s.ComposePath, appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"], a.mgr.StackNamespaceRoot(name))
	}
	return nil
}

// GetImportRoot delegates to the stack manager's canonical drop-zone root (R-75). Both the backup
// and the export provider need it: ${IMPORT_PATH} binds live on the SYSTEM drive and can NOT be
// resolved from an app's HDD_PATH.
func (a *exportAdapter) GetImportRoot() string { return a.mgr.GetImportRoot() }

// GetStackNamespaceRoot (R-203) — the felhom-data namespace root, NOT the drive path. The appbackup
// path helpers all take this; passing HDD_PATH straight in is what made the export plan and the
// off-site capture set describe different directories on the system-data fallback.
func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackNamespaceRoot(name string) string {
	return a.mgr.StackNamespaceRoot(name)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackHDDPath(name string) string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return ""
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfig(stackDir)
	if appCfg != nil && appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"] != "" {
		return filepath.Clean(appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"])
	}
	return ""
}

func (a *exportAdapter) IsStackRunning(name string) bool {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	// StateDegraded (R-51) counts as running: the export must stop the still-live members before
	// reading their volumes, exactly as it would for a fully running stack.
	return ok && (s.State == stacks.StateRunning || s.State == stacks.StateDegraded)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) StopStack(name string) error {
	return a.mgr.StopStack(name)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) StartStack(name string) error {
	return a.mgr.StartStack(name)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackDisplayName(name string) string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return name
	}
	return s.Meta.DisplayName
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStackNeedsHDD(name string) bool {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	return ok && s.Meta.Resources.NeedsHDD
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetDockerVolumes(name string) []string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}
	return backup.ResolveDockerVolumeNames(s.ComposePath)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) IsStackDeployed(name string) bool {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	return ok && s.Deployed
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetDecryptedEnv(name string) map[string]string {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)
	cfg := stacks.LoadAppConfigDecrypted(stackDir, a.encKey)
	if cfg == nil {
		return nil
	}
	return cfg.Env
}

func (a *exportAdapter) GetStacksBaseDir() string {
	return a.mgr.GetStacksBaseDir()
}

// exportStopGuard adapts *backup.AppStopGuard to the exporter's reason-free seam (R-166). The reason
// is supplied HERE rather than passed in, so backup.ReasonAppExport's value exists in exactly one
// place and the two packages cannot drift apart.
type exportStopGuard struct{ g *backup.AppStopGuard }

func (a exportStopGuard) Begin(opID string, stacks []string) error {
	return a.g.Begin(opID, backup.ReasonAppExport, stacks)
}

func (a exportStopGuard) End() { a.g.End() }

func (a exportStopGuard) ReleaseFailed(stacks ...string) { a.g.ReleaseFailed(stacks...) }

func (a *exportAdapter) SaveEncryptedAppConfig(stackDir string, env map[string]string) error {
	meta := stacks.LoadMetadata(stackDir)
	sensitiveVars := stacks.SensitiveEnvVars(&meta)
	cfg := &stacks.AppConfig{
		Deployed:   true,
		DeployedAt: time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
		Env:        env,
		// R-166 — a CUSTOMER-INTENT POINT, and the one that is not the API action switch. Importing
		// a `.fab` bundle is the customer installing that app on this box, and the import path starts
		// it (appexport/restore.go). Without this the app would come back from a restore with NO
		// recorded intent and fall to legacy boot behaviour — meaning a power cut days later would
		// strand it, which is exactly the failure this release exists to remove.
		DesiredState: stacks.DesiredStateRunning,
	}
	return stacks.SaveAppConfig(stackDir, cfg, a.encKey, sensitiveVars)
}

func (a *exportAdapter) RefreshStacks() error {
	return a.mgr.RefreshStatus()
}

func (a *exportAdapter) RemoveStackVolumes(name string) error {
	s, ok := a.mgr.GetStack(name)
	if !ok {
		return fmt.Errorf("stack %q not found", name)
	}
	stackDir := filepath.Dir(s.ComposePath)

	// Build env from decrypted app config
	cmdEnv := os.Environ()
	appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfigDecrypted(stackDir, a.encKey)
	if appCfg != nil {
		for k, v := range appCfg.Env {
			cmdEnv = append(cmdEnv, k+"="+v)
		}
	}

	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
	defer cancel()
	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "docker", "compose", "down", "--volumes")
	cmd.Dir = stackDir
	cmd.Env = cmdEnv
	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("compose down --volumes: %s — %w", strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), err)
	}
	return nil
}

// fileExists returns true if the path exists (file or directory).
func fileExists(path string) bool {
	_, err := os.Stat(path)
	return err == nil
}

// quiesceBackend adapts *agentapi.Client to quiesce.Backend (bool/string, decoupled from the
// agentapi response structs).
type quiesceBackend struct{ c *agentapi.Client }

func (b quiesceBackend) Due(ctx context.Context) (bool, *int64, error) {
	r, err := b.c.BackupDue(ctx)
	return r.Due, r.AgeSecs, err
}
func (b quiesceBackend) StartBackup(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
	r, err := b.c.StartBackup(ctx)
	return r.JobID, mapBusy(err) // F-A1: the untargeted (pre-R-82) path can 409 identically
}
func (b quiesceBackend) BackupStatus(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
	r, err := b.c.BackupStatus(ctx)
	return r.Phase, err
}

// ---- R-82: the tiered surface (quiesce.TieredBackend) ------------------------------------
//
// quiesceBackend satisfies quiesce.TieredBackend as well, so the loop schedules per tier when the
// agent supports it. Against a PRE-R-82 agent, Tiers returns quiesce.ErrTiersUnsupported and the
// loop degrades to the untargeted methods above — still taking a backup, never skipping one.

func (b quiesceBackend) Tiers(ctx context.Context) ([]quiesce.BackupTier, error) {
	r, err := b.c.BackupTiers(ctx)
	if errors.Is(err, agentapi.ErrTiersUnsupported) {
		// Translate the transport-layer probe into the loop's vocabulary; the loop keys on this.
		return nil, quiesce.ErrTiersUnsupported
	}
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	out := make([]quiesce.BackupTier, 0, len(r.Tiers))
	for _, t := range r.Tiers {
		out = append(out, quiesce.BackupTier{Target: t.Target, Primary: t.Primary})
	}
	return out, nil
}

func (b quiesceBackend) DueFor(ctx context.Context, target string) (bool, *int64, string, error) {
	r, err := b.c.BackupDueFor(ctx, target)
	// AgeState is passed through RAW; quiesce.ageStateFromWire owns the mapping, including the
	// legacy-vs-unknown distinction. An empty string here means a pre-v0.105.0 agent.
	return r.Due, r.AgeSecs, r.AgeState, err
}
func (b quiesceBackend) StartBackupFor(ctx context.Context, target string) (string, error) {
	r, err := b.c.StartBackupFor(ctx, target)
	// F-A1: translate the agent's HTTP 409 into the loop's vocabulary, exactly as Tiers translates a
	// 404 into ErrTiersUnsupported. 409 means the agent's R-85 single-flight gate refused because a
	// restore-test (or another backup) holds it — CONTENTION, not failure. `internal/quiesce` keeps
	// no dependency on `internal/agentapi`, so the mapping belongs here at the seam.
	return r.JobID, mapBusy(err)
}

// mapBusy converts a 409 from the agent into quiesce.ErrTierBusy, preserving the original error for
// diagnosis. Any other status passes through untouched — treating a real 5xx as contention would
// swallow genuine failures, which is the over-correction F-A1's fix must not make.
func mapBusy(err error) error {
	if err == nil {
		return nil
	}
	var se *agentapi.StatusError
	if errors.As(err, &se) && se.Code == http.StatusConflict {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", quiesce.ErrTierBusy, err)
	}
	return err
}
func (b quiesceBackend) BackupStatusFor(ctx context.Context, target string) (string, error) {
	r, err := b.c.BackupStatusFor(ctx, target)
	return r.Phase, err
}

// quiesceTierNotifier adapts *notify.Notifier to quiesce.TierNotifier (R-97a).
//
// The whole-guest tier had NO route to the hub at all — `internal/quiesce` did not import
// `internal/notify`, so on 2026-07-27 three failed backups and twelve app-stack stop/starts produced
// ZERO `backup_failed` events. The event type was already in the hub's allowlist and
// `NotifyBackupFailed` already existed; only this adapter and its wiring were missing.
//
// The tier is carried in the MESSAGE rather than a new event type, because the hub gates on
// `allowedEventTypes` and a per-tier type would need a hub-side change to be deliverable at all.
// See the cooldown note in REPORT.md: the hub's operator cooldown is keyed
// `customerID + ":" + eventType`, so two tiers failing within an hour share one key — both events
// are STORED, but only the first sends an operator email.
type quiesceTierNotifier struct{ n *notify.Notifier }

func (q quiesceTierNotifier) BackupFailed(tier, message, errMsg string) {
	q.n.NotifyWholeGuestBackupFailed(tier, message, errMsg)
}

func (q quiesceTierNotifier) BackupRecovered(tier, message string) {
	q.n.NotifyWholeGuestBackupRecovered(tier, message)
}

// startQuiesceLoop wires + starts the slice-8B quiesce loop when the local API is configured and
// quiesce is enabled. It Recovers (restarts stacks left stopped by a mid-quiesce crash) before
// starting the loop goroutine. Non-fatal: any misconfig disables the loop with a log line.
func startQuiesceLoop(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, sett *settings.Settings, stackMgr *stacks.Manager, logger *log.Logger) *quiesce.Loop {
	if cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint == "" || cfg.LocalAPI.Token == "" {
		return nil // not a provisioned guest — no agent to back up against
	}
	if !cfg.Quiesce.QuiesceEnabled() {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] [quiesce] disabled by config")
		return nil
	}
	client, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] [quiesce] disabled (agent client init failed): %v", err)
		return nil
	}
	poll := parseDurationOr(cfg.Quiesce.PollInterval, 5*time.Minute)
	statusPoll := parseDurationOr(cfg.Quiesce.StatusPoll, 10*time.Second)
	maxQuiesce := parseDurationOr(cfg.Quiesce.MaxQuiesce, 30*time.Minute)
	loop := quiesce.New(quiesce.Options{
		Backend:    quiesceBackend{c: client},
		Stacks:     stackMgr,
		MarkerPath: filepath.Join(cfg.Paths.DataDir, "quiesce-state.json"),
		Poll:       poll,
		StatusPoll: statusPoll,
		MaxQuiesce: maxQuiesce,
		Logger:     logger,
		// Window gate (v0.168.0): read the effective window fresh each poll so a customer change takes
		// effect without restart. Scheduled cycles run only inside [W+2h, W+6h), with the safety valve.
		WindowStartFn: func() string {
			return backupwindow.EffectiveWindow(sett.GetBackupWindowStart(), cfg.Backup.DBDumpSchedule)
		},
	})
	loop.Recover() // crash-safety: restart any stacks stranded-down by a mid-quiesce crash
	go loop.Run(ctx)
	return loop
}

// parseDurationOr parses a duration string, falling back to def on empty/invalid input.
func parseDurationOr(s string, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
	if s == "" {
		return def
	}
	d, err := time.ParseDuration(s)
	if err != nil || d <= 0 {
		return def
	}
	return d
}

// channelSink adapts the notify.Notifier + web.AlertManager to the channelhealth.Sink seam (kept in
// main.go so the channelhealth package imports neither — no cycle). SetDashboard reflects the current
// state each probe (idempotent); NotifyDown/NotifyRecovered fire only on a transition.
type channelSink struct {
	notifier *notify.Notifier
	alertMgr *web.AlertManager
}

func (s channelSink) SetDashboard(down bool, _ channelhealth.Reason, msg string) {
	s.alertMgr.SetAgentChannelAlert(down, msg)
}
func (s channelSink) NotifyDown(reason channelhealth.Reason, eventType, severity, msg string) {
	s.notifier.NotifyAgentChannelDown(string(reason), eventType, severity, msg)
}
func (s channelSink) NotifyRecovered() { s.notifier.NotifyAgentChannelRecovered() }

// probeLocalAPI proves the controller↔agent local-API channel at startup and logs this guest's
// mounts (slice 8A). Non-fatal: it only runs when a local-API endpoint is configured, and any
// error is logged for diagnosis without affecting the controller's boot. The leaf SHA-256 from
// the bootstrap is pinned by the client (fails closed on mismatch).
func probeLocalAPI(cfg *config.Config, logger *log.Logger) {
	if cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint == "" || cfg.LocalAPI.Token == "" {
		return
	}
	client, err := agentapi.New(cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, cfg.LocalAPI.Token, cfg.LocalAPI.Fingerprint)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] local-api: client init failed (%v) — channel not verified", err)
		return
	}
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
	defer cancel()
	resp, err := client.Storage(ctx)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] local-api: GET /storage failed (%v) — channel not verified", err)
		return
	}
	logger.Printf("[INFO] local-api: channel up (agent %s) — guest %d, %d mount(s) visible",
		cfg.LocalAPI.Endpoint, resp.VMID, len(resp.Mounts))
	for _, m := range resp.Mounts {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] local-api: mount %s → %s (storage=%s, class=%s, backup=%v)",
			m.Key, m.MountPoint, m.Storage, m.Class, m.Backup)
	}
}

// runSetupMode starts the setup wizard on dual listeners and blocks until signal.
func runSetupMode(cfg *config.Config, logger *log.Logger) {
	ips := setup.DetectLocalIPs()
	setup.LogSetupMode(cfg.Customer.Domain, ips, cfg.Web.SetupListen, logger)

	setupSrv := setup.NewServer(cfg, cfg.Paths.DataDir, logger, Version)
	handler := setupSrv.Handler()

	// Health endpoint wrapper (returns setup_mode: true)
	healthHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
		json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
			"ok": true, "message": "felhom-controller is healthy",
			"setup_mode": true, "version": Version,
		})
	})

	// Mux for both listeners
	mux := http.NewServeMux()
	mux.HandleFunc("/api/health", healthHandler)
	mux.Handle("/", handler)

	// Start main listener (:8080, behind Traefik for domain access)
	mainServer := &http.Server{
		Addr:         cfg.Web.Listen,
		Handler:      mux,
		ReadTimeout:  30 * time.Second,
		WriteTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
		IdleTimeout:  120 * time.Second,
	}
	go func() {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] Setup wizard (main) listening on %s", cfg.Web.Listen)
		if err := mainServer.ListenAndServe(); err != http.ErrServerClosed {
			logger.Printf("[ERROR] Main HTTP server error: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	// Start setup-only listener (:8081, direct HTTP for LAN access)
	setupServer := &http.Server{
		Addr:         cfg.Web.SetupListen,
		Handler:      mux,
		ReadTimeout:  30 * time.Second,
		WriteTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
		IdleTimeout:  120 * time.Second,
	}
	go func() {
		logger.Printf("[INFO] Setup wizard (LAN) listening on %s", cfg.Web.SetupListen)
		if err := setupServer.ListenAndServe(); err != http.ErrServerClosed {
			logger.Printf("[ERROR] Setup HTTP server error: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	// Wait for signal
	sigCh := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
	signal.Notify(sigCh, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
	sig := <-sigCh
	logger.Printf("[INFO] Received signal %v, shutting down setup wizard...", sig)

	shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
	defer shutdownCancel()
	mainServer.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
	setupServer.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
	logger.Println("[INFO] Setup wizard stopped")
}

// discoverHDDPaths scans deployed apps' app.yaml for HDD_PATH env values.
func discoverHDDPaths(stacksDir string, logger *log.Logger) []string {
	entries, err := os.ReadDir(stacksDir)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Printf("[WARN] Cannot read stacks dir for HDD path discovery: %v", err)
		return nil
	}
	seen := make(map[string]bool)
	var paths []string
	for _, e := range entries {
		if !e.IsDir() {
			continue
		}
		appCfg := stacks.LoadAppConfig(filepath.Join(stacksDir, e.Name()))
		if appCfg == nil || !appCfg.Deployed {
			continue
		}
		if hddPath, ok := appCfg.Env["HDD_PATH"]; ok && hddPath != "" {
			cleaned := filepath.Clean(hddPath)
			if !seen[cleaned] {
				seen[cleaned] = true
				paths = append(paths, cleaned)
			}
		}
	}
	return paths
}

// ── R-359 / R-397 — the integrity check's one caller, shared by the scheduler and the debug button ──
//
// ONE function for both so the hand-run cannot drift from the scheduled run. The only difference
// between them is `force`, which skips the due-ness question; every other guard — the single-writer
// flag above all — applies identically. A hand-run that bypassed the flag "because the operator asked
// for it" is precisely the hazard this whole feature is shaped around.
//
// R-397: `NotifyIntegrityOK` and `NotifyIntegrityFailed` have existed in internal/notify since the
// notifier did, the hub allowlists both event types, and the hub carries the Hungarian customer text
// for both. Everything was built except the caller. That is the SIXTH time this project has found that
// shape, and it is worth naming as a pattern rather than treating as a novelty each time.
func runOffsiteIntegrityCheck(ctx context.Context, mgr *backup.Manager, n *notify.Notifier, logger *log.Logger, force bool) backup.IntegrityResult {
	if mgr == nil {
		return backup.IntegrityResult{Skipped: true, SkipReason: "backup manager not configured"}
	}
	if !force {
		due, last := mgr.IntegrityDue(time.Now())
		if !due {
			logger.Printf("[INFO] [offbox] integrity: not due (last successful check %s ago, at %s) — nothing was run",
				time.Since(last).Round(time.Minute), last.Format("2006-01-02 15:04"))
			return backup.IntegrityResult{Skipped: true, SkipReason: "not due"}
		}
	}

	res := mgr.CheckOffboxIntegrity(ctx)

	switch {
	case res.Skipped:
		// Not a failure and not an alarm. The log already said why, inside the check.
		return res
	case res.Unreachable:
		// "I could not look" is not "I looked and it is broken". Deliberately NO notifier: R-339 owns
		// reachability, and a second alarm for the same fact would train the operator to discount the
		// one alarm that means the customer's backups are damaged.
		return res
	case res.OK:
		mgr.RecordIntegrityVerdict(res)
		// severity `info`, which severityNotifies DROPS before either leg — so this mails NOBODY, by
		// design (08 §6.1). A weekly success e-mail is how people stop reading their alerts. It is
		// still pushed, because the hub stores it and the event stream is where "was it checked?" is
		// answered.
		n.NotifyIntegrityOK(integrityOKMsg(res))
		return res
	default:
		mgr.RecordIntegrityVerdict(res)
		// A FAILING store advances due-ness too: re-checking a broken repository every night is load
		// with no new information, and the hourly operator cooldown already governs the mail.
		//
		// The customer gets a SENTENCE. restic's own words go to the log, truncated, where the operator
		// can diagnose without a rebuild. R-379 is the reason that split exists: 615 bytes of raw
		// database text reached a customer once.
		n.NotifyIntegrityFailed(integrityFailedMsg, "restic check reported repository errors")
		return res
	}
}

// R-359 customer-facing strings. Named constants because tests assert them verbatim and because a
// silent edit is how an honest message drifts into a comforting one.
const (
	// integrityFailedMsg names what to do and what NOT to do. "Ne törölj semmit" is load-bearing: a
	// customer who believes their backups are broken may try to "start fresh", which destroys the one
	// copy that might still be partly recoverable.
	integrityFailedMsg = "A távoli mentés ellenőrzése hibát talált a tárolóban. A mentések egy része sérült lehet. Ne törölj semmit, és vedd fel velünk a kapcsolatot."

	integrityOKBase = "A távoli mentés ellenőrzése rendben lezajlott."
)

// integrityOKMsg states what was actually checked, so a structure-only pass is never read as a
// full data verification. The depth is a fact the customer's sentence has to carry: "checked" means
// two different things depending on it.
func integrityOKMsg(res backup.IntegrityResult) string {
	msg := integrityOKBase + " (" + res.Duration.Round(time.Second).String()
	if res.ReadDataSubset != "" {
		msg += ", a mentett adatok " + res.ReadDataSubset + "-át újraolvasva"
	}
	return msg + ")"
}