R-237: /backups/restore listed apps that are CURRENTLY DEPLOYED and CURRENTLY
TOGGLED ON for future off-site backups. A rebuilt box has neither, so a household
that had just lost everything was shown nothing to restore while the repository
held their snapshots — measured live on the R-201 re-walk. To restore an app you
had to select it, to select it you had to have installed it, and to know what to
install you had to see the backup you could not see.
The store is now the source of the list (offsite_restore_list.go), built on the
existing R-193 OffsiteInventoryList. Installed-ness became a property OF a row,
never a filter on it. Every case is answered rather than hidden: a snapshot for an
app that is not installed is offered and says it will reinstall first; an installed
app with no snapshot is shown as having nothing; an unreadable store renders as
UNKNOWN (R-225's rule, one screen over) AND keeps the action, because "we could
not look" is not "there is nothing"; no-target is its own state. The felhom-offbox
and _shares marker tags are excluded from the app list.
R-238 classified as a HARNESS ARTIFACT: mode=full without confirm=1 is step 1 of a
deliberate two-step — it starts no job by design and redirects carrying
&full_prep=<app>, which deriveWizardStep requires to reveal the commit. A driver
that did not carry it forward landed back on the intent step. The operator's
browser run completed the same restore. The wizard's precedence rules were NOT
re-keyed: a stale ?full_prep= must never resurrect a commit button mid-restore.
The residue WAS real and is fixed: neither branch of that step wrote anything to
the log, so a refusal — including by the headroom gate — left no trace on the box.
Both branches now log, and so does the concurrent-op refusal.
resolveWizardApp is removed: it was dead once the gate moved, and its test pinned
the defect's behaviour (an untoggled app refused), which would have read as policy.
28 packages ok, 9/9 gates OK. Three red-proofs, each asserted to have applied.
A customer whose machine was rebuilt had everything needed to get their data
back and no way to find out: the only route was a command line. This is the
screen that closes that.
IT UNLOCKS, AND ONLY UNLOCKS (operator ruling). It explains, takes the recovery
code, opens the repository and shows what is in there — apps, dates, sizes. It
restores nothing: restore is already per-app and lives in the backups area, and
a screen that unlocks and then offers to overwrite is two decisions wearing one
button.
ONE CORE, TWO CALLERS. RecoverInstallCore is split out of RecoverAndInstall; the
CLI wrapper keeps its exit codes and printed lines byte-identical, and the
handler drives the same function. Two implementations of the one operation that
can permanently lose a customer's data would drift, and only one would be
tested. Asserted from source on both sides by AST.
THREE WAYS OUT, none a dismiss button: recover; 'most nem' (the full page stops
interrupting, the backups-area entry point stays PERMANENTLY, bound to the offer
and never to the postpone flag); and 'I do not want the old data' — confirmed
TWICE and reaching the SHIPPED move-aside, which sets aside and never deletes.
THE CODE IS HANDLED NO MORE LOOSELY THAN ON THE COMMAND LINE: POST body only,
never logged, never persisted, never echoed, cleared on every path, no-store,
autocomplete off. No lockout — the code is a ten-word phrase, and locking a
customer out of their own data for a typo is worse than anything it prevents.
TWO DEFECTS THE TESTS CAUGHT, both fixed: an UNCLAIMED (legacy-open) box would
have been shown the page, because RequireAuth passes such a box through; and the
inventory nil-dereferenced when no off-site target was configured, which is
exactly the pristine rebuilt shape.
admin