Closes the two findings from DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19. Viktor deleted 11
immich photos to test offsite restore; both runs flashed success and the photos
stayed gone. Two independent defects.
R-43 — no offsite path could restore a database. All three buttons were
file-only: the two "visszaállítás" actions staged to a scratch folder and never
touched postgres, and place-to-live merged only MISSING files. For a DB-indexed
app the bytes returned and the app still could not see them. The dump was
carried INTO every snapshot and could never be replayed OUT of one.
New ReconstituteFromOffsite (/backup/offbox/reconstitute): safety dump → stop →
files overwritten to the snapshot version → start → the snapshot's own dump
replayed → health wait. Two invariants:
- nothing is ever deleted (-a, no --ignore-existing, no --delete): a file
created after the snapshot survives as an extra;
- the undo exists before the act — the pre-restore- dump is verified ON DISK
before anything is stopped, overwritten or replayed; if it cannot be taken
the operation refuses with zero changes.
The replay reads the SCRATCH unit: the live unit is never overwritten, so
replaying from it would replay the current DB over itself and restore nothing.
R-44 — a manual push shipped an unrefreshed dump (up to ~24h old). That day's
predated the customer's account by four hours and probed to asset:0/user:0/
album:0 inside 52MB whose bulk was immich's shipped geodata. Every run, manual
AND nightly, now refreshes dumps + units BEFORE capturing. Order is the
mechanism: the gap can only ADD files the DB does not reference yet, never
remove one it does. Manifests carry offsite_run_id + dumps_at, so coherence is
verifiable at restore time rather than assumed; the periodic refresh carries a
prior stamp forward and never invents one.
Honesty surfaces, all warn-level and none a gate: unstamped (pre-v0.148) pairs
report their skew, ValidateDump gained an EXACT-match accounts-table sniff for
customer-empty dumps, the completion flash states an outcome instead of a
mechanism, and the missing-only button now says what it does NOT do.
11 tests; 5 red-proofs run and reverted. Two of those found real test weaknesses
rather than confirming strength — the first undo mutation was caught by a second
guard, and the first table-matching test did not discriminate between the two
matchers at all. Both tests were rewritten to the cases that separate them.
NOT in scope: R-41's catalog invariant check, nightly cadence, retention, quota
math, tier-2, and v0.147.x progress semantics beyond one added phase line.
Live acceptance (§9) has NOT run: no capability-map flip, customer-restore row
stays MISSING, R-3 stays DRAFT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P9Nn14TWGzKoqAJAiVwC2s
README gains the async-job feedback section, the TOC entries it was missing
(SMB was also absent), and the three new endpoints. CONTEXT records the slice
and, more usefully, that three of its four versions exist because the cards were
watched against real runs — the failure modes were all invisible to unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nn3VgQk9iwEGgyx6QJ2NvE
The samba_classify.go SCOPE NOTE and the README KNOWN GAP both described a gap that
R-7b closes; both now describe the sibling-shares-source execution instead.
Viktor confirmed on the demo box: Network -> FELHOM -> both shares open; an
INTERACTIVE Explorer save into dokumentumok succeeded and landed owned 1000:1000
(force user holds for a real Explorer write, not just a scripted one); a write
into the read-only filmek was refused by Windows with the folder left empty on
disk. Capability-map row flipped to PROVEN-LIVE in felhom.eu.
Records the R-7 slice 1 ship, the four red-proof outcomes, live-validation
evidence, the two bugs live validation caught, and the Part-4 Step-1 enumeration
finding + the reported design fork (share data classified but not yet in a live
backup run — needs a Viktor ruling, suggested R-7b).
After a completed escrow ceremony the Távoli mentés page showed the yellow
"Helyreállítási kód szükséges" card for ~15 min until the next hub-report ACK
flipped pending→escrowed. Phase-0 diagnosis (read-only) = verdict A (report-cycle
lag), already resolved on the demo box (escrow_state:"escrowed"); hub Hypothesis B
verified false (SaveHostEscrow ON CONFLICT already clears stale_at on upload) → no
hub change.
- settings.OffboxTarget.CeremonyCompletedAt: stamped on the recovery-code claim,
zeroed on the auto-confirmer Flip + the deprecated manual confirm; persisted.
- web/handlers.go: offboxCeremonyWaitState + escrowCeremonyGraceWindow (35m).
- backups_remote.html: info "megerősítésre vár, legfeljebb 15 perc" card → warn
"a megerősítés nem érkezett meg" past the window. Existing branches untouched.
- backups_escrow.html: "Mi történik ezután?" note on the wizard's final step.
- Test web/escrow_wait_state_test.go (truth table + red-proof recorded in REPORT).
No scheduler/agent/hub/endpoint changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
SQ6 over-capture FIXED for classified apps: the userdata root tar is exclude-scoped (keeps only
ancestors/descendants of a SELECTED bind relpath — R1-C, the tier2Reconcile keep-rule); no selected
userdata bind → no root tar (radarr state-only). New appbackup.ComputeFabBuckets (shared
resolveGuardCollapse pipeline; class buckets; guards over ALL classes; no cross-bucket containment).
appexport/fabplan.go: computeFabPlan + tarDirectoryExcluding + fabEstimateSplit. ExportRequest gains
DeselectOptional/OptInExcluded (both start handlers — two-call-site); mandatory is a server-side
floor. Manifest v1 + import UNTOUCHED; legacy apps byte-identical to v0.130.0. Estimate additive
class split; export UI: locked-mandatory/optional-checkboxes/excluded-opt-in + two-number warning.
All 6 §10 red-proofs verified. 6D Accept #1 now runs against this shape.
tier2_capture.go: classified apps get TierSecondary per-bind legs (paperless copy shrinks — export
drops); legacy apps keep the byte-identical resolver set. v2 relpath-mirroring layout
(backups/secondary/<stack>/{marker LAST, recovery-unit/, hdd/<rel>/, userdata/<rel>/}); N>1 native
(errTier2MultiDir/tier2AppDataName deleted). Migration=delete-and-rebuild + reconcile; all RemoveAll
via tier2SafeRemove (refuses outside backups/secondary/). SSD=state-only tier. selectTier2Target
never picks network storage (pinned+auto, F-6C-1). Restore reads v2 behind a marker gate.
Part 0: offbox_enlarge_blocked is a persisted one-time Load seed (opt-out sticks), not a getter
append. Part 0.5: offsite restore scratch prefers a local (non-network) path.
Full v2 test suite + all 10 §10 red-proofs verified. Destructive writes bounded to backups/secondary/.
PlaceOffsiteRestore: live target via raw GetStackHDDPath not AppNamespaceRoot (F-3a-1a: no SSD
merge; undeployed refused), placement headroom gate (F-3a-1b), stat pre-pass over all placements
before any copy (F-3a-4: no partial writes), scratch removed on success/kept on failure (F-3a-2).
mapOffsiteRestorePaths refuses the namespace root itself (F-3a-3).
Delivery chain: DefaultEnabledEvents + GetNotificationPrefs append-if-absent migration + settings
checkbox + handler slice; paired with hub v0.55.0 allowlist (no customerMessages entry — raw
dynamic message survives). +8 tests; all 6 controller §10 red-proofs verified.
Task 2 of the backup-classification-redesign arc. Ships the referential-
coupling classification as DATA + PARSER + PURE CLASSIFIER, deliberately
inert — no backup tier changes behavior. Task 3 (tier policy engine) and
Task 4 (manual .fab UI) consume it.
- appbackup/classify.go: BackupSpec/BindSpec/ComposeBind/ClassifiedBind;
ClassifyBinds (SQ5 two-level default — explicit beats :ro; unlisted
writable→mandatory, unlisted :ro→excluded; nil spec→legacy/false);
ValidateBackupSpec (whole-block-reject on any defect, first defect named).
- stacks/classify_binds.go: ParseComposeClassifiableBinds — ${VAR}-relative
binds + :ro flag (NOT ParseComposeHDDMounts/ExportDataMounts, the traps).
- Metadata.Backup + LoadMetadata as the single validation choke point (bad
catalog block → nil + one ERROR → legacy, within one sync cycle).
- Manager.ClassifiedBinds + StackDataProvider.GetStackClassifiedBinds seam
(delegated by stackAdapter, nil-stubbed in every fake) — wired + tested
now so Task 3 consumes a tested seam.
INERT: full pre-existing suite green with zero test-logic edits. +14 tests;
red-proofs RP-1..RP-4 confirmed. The 13 catalog backup: blocks ship in the
same app-catalog change (this controller deploys first).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A45Qop8YY8tS94bz63LFne
The controller assumed an app's HDD appdata dir is always appdata/<stackName>.
paperless-ngx writes appdata/paperless (stack paperless-ngx), so every consumer
keying by stack name silently missed it via a stat-and-skip. One canonical
resolver appbackup.AppDataDirNames derives the real dir name(s) from the app's
compose ${HDD_PATH} binds; all consumers use it.
- F-S2 (tier-2): RunTier2 mirrors the resolved appdata/<name> (paperless docs
got NO tier-2 copy before). Tier2Info size + RestoreTier2Files live dir use it.
WARN when a declared appdata dir is absent. New tier2Mirror seam.
- F-S3 (migrate, NEW): all six per-app appdata legs (collision/size/copy/verify/
cleanup/skip-set) now loop resolved names. scope="app" migration of paperless
previously copied nothing and left an empty media dir (scope="all" was saved by
the merge walk). WARN on missing declared dir in the copy leg.
- Multi-dir (N>1) refusal: tier-2 backup/info/restore refuse loudly (Hungarian);
migrate supports N. No catalog app hits it today; lifted by Task 3.
- Display: storage page sums resolved dirs.
- Truth repair: the v0.130.0 "tier-2 copies the namespace wholesale" claim is
false; corrected in CHANGELOG + main.go export-adapter comment.
+9 tests; red-proofs RP-1..RP-5 all confirmed. Controller-only, no agent/hub
coupling. Task 1 of the backup-classification-redesign arc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A45Qop8YY8tS94bz63LFne
F8: share row fuses the shipped v0.117 classifier (fuseNetHealth) so it agrees with
the stacks stub badge (one classification, two surfaces). F4: mapped_uid range check
1..65533 at the door. §3 fork = option B (controller-only). Live-validated on 9201.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017CDMFpFx84pfviCTVuGGhf
On startup reconcile the hub-served offsite: descriptor into a key-only offbox
target. internal/offsiteapply.Bridge: verify-pin box host key vs host_fingerprint
(NO blind TOFU) → consume the one-time password (single-use, never logged) →
sshpass ssh-copy-id -s -f install + verify → configure offbox → EscrowState=pending
(fork-4 via Manager.ApplyOffsiteTarget) → persist a descriptor-hash marker LAST.
Idempotent + fail-safe. Seams faked in tests; both red-proofs run+reverted.
Dockerfile + sshpass. NOT yet live-applied (supervised end-to-end next runbook).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Pairs with agent v0.77.0. StageEscrowSecret pushes the repo password to the
agent (POST /escrow/stage-secret) at offsite-enable → EscrowState="pending".
Atomicity gate: RunOffboxBackup (scheduler + handler) refuses until
EscrowState="escrowed" (operator POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow after the
escrow ceremony) — no un-recoverable offsite ciphertext can exist. DR:
POST /backup/offbox/inject-password pre-places a recovered 64-hex password 0600
(honored by WriteOffboxSecrets' IsNotExist guard; refuses clobber without
force). DR recipe gains non-secret offsite_restic coords (DRResticCoord); SFTP
key regenerated at DR, not escrowed. New settings.OffboxTarget.EscrowState.
Tests + atomicity & inject companion red-proofs green; UI gates pass. NOT yet
live-validated (supervised ceremony).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
offbox located each toggled app's recovery unit via AppNamespaceRoot→GetAppDrivePath,
which reads the app's LIVE app.yaml HDD_PATH and silently falls back to systemDataPath
when the app isn't deployed → looked on the wrong drive, backed up nothing, reported
ok/0 (DIAG root cause). Now:
- discoverOffboxUnit/offboxCandidateNSRoots scan the durable storage registry
(schedulable non-decommissioned paths ∪ systemDataPath) for backups/primary/<app>,
independent of deploy state; newest-by-manifest-CreatedAt wins on drive churn.
- RunOffboxBackup: runOffboxInternal returns (backedUp, missing, err); 0-of-N toggled →
hard error + operator alert; partial → ok + new OffboxTarget.LastWarning (shown on
/backups, preserved across config edit).
- AppNamespaceRoot + primary WRITE paths unchanged.
- 6 non-hollow tests (A-E + edge) + both companion red-proofs run (reverted).
- NOT yet live-validated against the Storage Box (spike creds torn down).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Points to the DRILL audit in felhom.eu. Flags F1 (HIGH): the keep-side
restore UI is dead because /api/backup/snapshots has no handler, so the
"Visszaállítás indítása" button never enables (server-side POST /backup/restore
works). Validation-only run; no code changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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