12 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	7c05b59708	v0.253.0 — errors carry the key of the sentence they are (R-557 slice 2 release B) ... 179 Hungarian sentences were built deep inside a package with fmt.Errorf and printed by whoever caught them: too late to translate where they are shown, too early where they are made. Every one now carries its key across that gap. ZERO Hungarian error literals remain. util.MsgError does three things at once, each earned: - Error() is the Hungarian, byte for byte, so every un-converted printer is unchanged; - errors.Is answers for the kind AND for a wrapped cause (KindErrorf dropped the cause); - an error ARGUMENT renders recursively, so "formázás sikertelen: %w" translates whole. A foreign error — restic, docker, ssh, the stdlib — prints verbatim. It is not ours. 76 display sites go through errText, and TestNoErrErrorInPageOutput convicts any that do not. memoryVerdict returns an error rather than a sentence, so the deploy's 409 and the household's language come from one value; UpdateRefusal gained a Cause to carry it. Plurals, one rule, stated once: a key with .one/.other takes its COUNT first. Not a per-call-site flag — the producer somebody forgot would read "3 app is not running". The guard caught a real key collision (alert.deadapp.one) the day the rule landed. TWO DEFECTS FOUND IN MY OWN TOOLING, recorded rather than quietly fixed. The bulk converter silently dropped multi-line concatenations, damaging 7 producers — and the parity gate could not see it, because every surviving fragment WAS a real base literal while the CALL had lost text; two behaviour tests caught it. And the counting script was case-sensitive, so it said "0 left" while five remained. MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-18 11:44:30 +02:00
admin	2f8ff2414c	v0.244.0: the backup page stops promising what it does not hold (R-537/R-538/R-536) ... R-537 — the contents label is now PER TIER. One string computed from the app's shape was rendered on all three tier rows; a Tier-1 unit has no file-copy step, so for the four class-A apps it was claiming „Adatok" for files it does not hold. R-538 — a unit restore REFUSES before anything is touched when the unit cannot return the app's drive-side files, and names the route that can. It runs before the stack is stopped because the measured harm included the app's own wastebasket going unreachable, which still held every byte. R-536 — „Alkalmazás telepítve" moved from the deploy's acceptance to its completion, with app_deploy_started and app_deploy_failed as the honest pair. Each fix red-proofed: seen failing with its own sentence, passing when restored. Requires hub v0.116.0 for the two new event types. MinAgent unchanged (0.131.0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-16 16:55:55 +02:00
admin	d698ce343b	controller v0.242.0: a removed app is listed with its kept backup; five small ones (R-487 R-491 R-490 R-489 R-476 R-456) ... R-487: the local backup lists are keyed on the drives, not on what is deployed — a removed app whose unit was kept is listed with the restore that reinstalls it, the picker answers for it, and the restore opens the unit where it sits. R-491: a removal clears the app's update hold. R-490: /api/system/info reaches the API router and reads the default storage path. R-489: volumes_removed is the real before/after difference, [] when none. R-476: a Tier-2 copy is dated by its data, not its manifest. R-456: the boot-orphan rule is pinned. Every fix red-proofed.	2026-09-13 22:50:18 +02:00
admin	0d402f711d	v0.237.0: the Update button takes a backup first, and tells the truth (update arc slice 4 — R-448, R-443, R-439) ... POST /api/stacks/{name}/update is now a guarded job answering 202: cheap refusals (hold — R-439, busy, migration, deploying, memory via the deploy's own memoryVerdict, a fixed 2 GB disk floor, and no restorable Tier-2 copy) → backup-first when the proven copy is older than update.backup_max_age (24h) → safety dump BEFORE the pin moves → pin → pull (failure puts the pin back) → up → health (.felhom.yml check or 60 s settle, update.health_timeout 5m). Not healthy → the app is stopped and HELD (RestoreHold reason update_failed, same store and gate as R-379) and the page names the backup to restore from; the pin stays. Success is only ever update_phase=done after health (R-443). UpdateStack is deleted. The restorable-unit predicate is EXTRACTED to backup.Tier2UnitRestorePoint and shared with the backups page (row pinned unchanged). The copy is aged by the last successful Tier-2 copy, not the manifest created_at — measured on demo-hp that created_at moves only on definition changes. Crash safety: update-journal.json before each phase; RecoverUpdates before the boot sweep, ResumeInterruptedUpdates after the guards are wired. Three unattended start paths ignored a hold and now honour it: the drive-return gate (restart + boot recreate) and the nightly volume dump. The nightly capture and Tier-2 run skip held apps so the restore point survives. No automatic rollback — measured per-app; route back = restore. Tests A–H across stacks/backup/api/web/cmd; six red-proofs seen to fail. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-13 11:41:31 +02:00
admin	0f9b796615	R-102: the recovery unit on the second drive becomes a way back ... Tier-2 mirrors each app's whole recovery unit to <dest>/backups/secondary/<app>/recovery-unit/ on every run and has done for months. Nothing read it. In the one failure Tier-2 exists for - the primary drive is lost, and the primary unit with it - the surviving copy could not be opened by any action in the product (07-backup-architecture 6.3, 7.2). Part 1.2: RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt(stack, unitDir) holds the whole body; RestoreFromRecoveryUnit is the thin caller naming the primary unit. ONE implementation, two callers. The SOURCE moves; the DESTINATION does not - live Docker volumes, the live database container, the guest's definition, all unchanged. The R-47 mutation order, the secret reconciliation with unit-over-guest precedence, the fail-closed data-key gate and the no-unit fallback with CountsUnknown are untouched. reimportDBDumpsAtCtx is the bounded-context twin of reimportDBDumpsFrom; the 35-minute bound is now named once so the two paths cannot drift. The R-354 volume-replay seam is reused rather than a second one invented, which is what lets the acceptance test assert the volume leg's source directory. Part 1.3: RestoreTier2Unit resolves the recorded copy, refuses fail-closed unless the mirror carries a parseable manifest - a directory is not a package - and delegates. The single-writer flag is taken inside RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt, not beside it. Part 2.1: Tier2Coverage gains UnitRestorable and the copy's dates. CanRestore() is NOT widened; it still answers only 'can the file restore run?'. One predicate answering two questions is R-356, which refused 40 running apps for months. Tests: A2-A6 and B1-B5, plus two non-regression guards. The Tier-2 fixtures build their mirror with the production RunTier2, so the claim is 'the copy Tier-2 writes is the copy this restore reads'. Red-proofs: A5 (swap volumes/recreate -> fails on the order), B2 (point the reader back at the primary -> fails with the mirror never reaching the redeploy, and with permission denied once the primary tree is unreadable).	2026-08-31 11:30:34 +02:00
admin	c0c8fe67bf	An unknown drawn as a zero: the defect v0.226.0's own fix introduced ... Writing the REPORT's observation "the no-unit fallback already reports a zero result, which is honest" exposed that the sentence was FALSE. A zero UnitRestoreResult is Scenario B's shape. So RestoreFromRecoveryUnit's fallback to RestoreApp -- which returns only an error, and whose signature is deliberately out of scope -- would have printed "ez a mentes csak a beallitasokat tartalmazta, adatot nem" over a restore that may have replayed the app's entire dataset. That is an unknown drawn as a zero: the exact R-88 failure direction this whole change exists to remove, re-introduced by the change. UnitRestoreResult now carries CountsUnknown, the fallback sets it, and there is a fourth sentence claiming only what is known -- the restore ran, the app is back, and we cannot say what came back. RestoreApp's signature is untouched. Pinned by TestUnitRestoreOutcome_NoUnitFallbackSaysUnknownNotEmpty. The A5 seam test was corrected too: its fixture has no recovery unit, so it exercises exactly this path and had been asserting the wrong sentence -- it now asserts the unknown, which is what pins the fallback to it. IT WAS THE observations GATE REFUSING THE PUSH THAT FORCED THE RE-READ. A gate written to stop findings dying in an overwritten REPORT.md caught a live defect instead. Also files R-397 (NotifyIntegrityOK/Failed are dead code AND the monitoring page advertises a weekly integrity check that does not exist) and R-398 (resticStep is not a seam, which is why R-358's ordering needed an AST test) rather than leaving them in a file that is overwritten every session. REPORT.md is the full run record: baselines re-confirmed, per-test results, the five red-proofs with their observed output, the live validation with verbatim Hungarian messages, what was NOT validated and why, teardown across three layers, and the register 165 -> 167 -> 161. Green gate clean: 28 packages, rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.	2026-08-30 19:51:16 +02:00
admin	b8af72764d	R-353/R-357/R-358/R-360: the restore tells the truth (v0.226.0) ... Four defects on the restore surface, all proven on demo-hp during the 2026-08-21 backup-truth drill, all still in shipped code. They share one acceptance idea: a restore surface must state what it actually did, and must refuse what it cannot do. VERSION NOTE. The task specifying this targeted v0.224.0 against baseline f8c9390. Both were consumed earlier the same day by R-330 (0.224.0) and R-331 (0.225.0). Drift re-confirmed against live Gitea before the first edit, operator authorised proceeding, every symbol the spec named re-verified present at the real baseline e5eee50. R-353 -- a restore that gave back nothing still said it worked. RestoreFromRecoveryUnit returned only error, so the surface printed "<app> visszaallitva (<snapshot>)." -- equally true of a run that returned an entire dataset and one that returned nothing. The count already existed and was discarded one line deep: restoreDockerVolumesFrom always returned it, the wrapper threw it away. Now (UnitRestoreResult, error), carrying replayed counts AND what the manifest LISTED, because zero-replayed has two causes that are opposite news. Three cases, three sentences, and EVERY one is a claim about the BACKUP, never about the app -- this path has no SafetyDump discriminator, and 07-backup-architecture 6.3 records that an absent dump says nothing about the app (R-361 destroyed canonical .sql files for four months). R-357 -- the destructive restore had no free-space gate. offbox_reconstitute.go contained ZERO references to offboxFree; all three existing gates guard non-destructive paths. The gate now sits before mapOffsiteRestorePaths, writeSafetyDump and StopStack, so a refusal costs nothing. Position IS the fix, which is why the test asserts StopStack was never called. No headroom multiplier (matches PlaceOffsiteRestore; the x1.1 elsewhere predicts a download). Fail closed on either probe <= 0 -- otherwise `free < need` with need==0 is FALSE and an unmeasurable scratch sails through: a gate present and inert. R-358 -- a failed download was offered as a good one. The gate answered "the directory exists and is non-empty", which is exactly what a part-way restic run leaves. Now a completion marker written 0600 atomically AFTER restic returns nil, with any stale one cleared BEFORE it starts; both orders pinned by an AST test because resticStep is not a seam. Both handlers refuse server-side: the wizard flags control a button, and a hidden button is not a guard. SCENARIO F ANSWERED, and worse than the question assumed: a unit-only scratch IS reachable through the real flow, by the most ordinary route. "Ellenorzo visszaallitas" (mode=unit, advertised non-destructive) writes the SAME directory -- offboxRestoreScratchDir ignores `full` and --include limits what restic extracts, never where -- so a customer who ran the SAFE restore was then offered the destructive one over a unit-only copy. Filed R-396; the marker closes it. R-360 -- the delete refused only while a BACKUP ran. IsRunning() is FALSE for the whole of a verification restore; the five sibling handlers all use restoreOpBlocked(). Its doc comment claimed it already did this, which is why nobody looked -- corrected in place. Red-proofs, each printing the pre-fix behaviour, in CHANGELOG and REPORT. The first R-357 red-proof exposed a hollow test OF MY OWN and it is recorded rather than quietly fixed: the fixture refused earlier at the placement stat pre-pass, so `stops == 0` passed against the pre-fix code. Fixture corrected, assertions reordered so a removed gate reports the outage rather than "no error returned". Green gate clean: 28 packages, rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.	2026-08-30 19:31:31 +02:00
admin	4ed938cce4	D5: an app restore works from the drive alone (v0.188.0) ... The recovery unit on the customer's drive now carries the PORTABLE secret class, so Tier-1/Tier-2 restore no longer depends on the whole-guest tier. A customer needs the drive and nothing else. Part 0's rulings overturned the brief's recommendation, on evidence: - the data_key flag is untrustworthy (4+ encryption keys the catalog itself labels as such are unflagged) -> R-127 - a DB password is not resettable in practice: POSTGRES_PASSWORD is ignored once PGDATA is non-empty, so a regenerated value leaves the app unable to authenticate against its own restored rows while the dump replay still reports success (proven on a throwaway postgres:16-alpine) Ruling (operator): type:secret travels, type:password never does, minus the nonPortableSecrets code register. Plaintext -- withholding the internet- reachable class is what licenses that, and the two are coupled. Precedence: the UNIT WINS over the guest -- the unit's secrets were captured in the same run as the dumps beside them, so they match the data being restored. The fail-closed data-key gate is unchanged. Secret values are never logged; the manifest records NAMES only.	2026-07-30 16:33:06 +02:00
admin	78ff991f1c	v0.153.0 — R-47: the DB replay no longer races the app, on BOTH restore paths ... Closes R-47. No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0. The replay needs a running DB container, so both restore paths started the WHOLE stack first, giving the application a window to rebuild the very schema objects the dump was about to create. Measured live on 2026-07-19 (H4, DIAG-immich-restore-round2): immich-server rebuilt clip_index two seconds before the dump's CREATE INDEX, the replay aborted "already exists" under ON_ERROR_STOP=1, and immich reported schema drift. The data survived only because pg_dump emits COPY before CREATE INDEX. Both paths now open a DB-ONLY window: only the stack's database service(s) come up, the dump is replayed with the app still down, and the full start runs only after the replay exits 0. Fail-closed: a dump with no identifiable DB service refuses BEFORE the first mutation. Every exit from the window still does a best-effort full start, so a failed restore never leaves a box with a database and no application. New: appbackup.DBServiceNames (yaml.v3 services-map parse — never a line scan; immich's top-level volume keys are the decoy) sharing dbTypeForImage with DiscoverDatabases; stacks.Manager.StartStackServices (refuses an empty list — argument-less `up -d` is a full start); RedeployFromEnv split into PersistUnitRedeployConfig + its unchanged tail. StackDataProvider's RecreateStackFromUnit becomes RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit — the hidden `up -d` inside the old name is what carried the defect on the local path. 19 new tests (ordering plus state-at-replay-time, zero-mutation fail-closed effects, replay-failure bring-up, parser decoys, empty-list refusal); three companion red-proofs run and reverted. 23/23 packages green. Not yet live-validated: STOP-1 supervised reconstitute, golden 0.153.0.	2026-07-20 17:01:52 +02:00
admin	a52851e79e	fix(backup): O4 — generate a replacement for unrecoverable resettable secrets on restore ... The proceed-path for a missing RESETTABLE secret redeployed the app with the secret blank (compose "Defaulting to a blank string" → exit 1, live-hit in the 2026-07-04 drill Phase 5). Now the restore generates a fresh credential instead: - stacks.Manager.GenerateSecretForField: replacement value from the field's catalog generate spec via the deploy flow's generateValue (no logic copied); refuses data-keys (defense-in-depth), spec-less and non-secret fields. - backup.Manager.SetSecretGenerator seam (wired in main.go), consulted in RestoreFromRecoveryUnit AFTER the untouched fail-closed gate, for missing names NOT in DataKeyEnvVars. The generated value rides fullEnv into RecreateStackFromUnit → RedeployFromEnv → SaveAppConfig, so it persists encrypted in the guest app.yaml and round-trips on the next backup/restore (no second write path). reconcileRestoreSecrets stays pure and untouched. - WARNs now discriminate: "generated replacement for X (credential was reset)" vs "X unrecoverable and has no generator — app may fail to start". Values are never logged (asserted in test). - Residual case (documented, not pretended away): if a restored volume tar carries the OLD internal credential hash, the app may still fail auth until a manual in-DB reset — generation fully fixes only the fresh-init case. Companion red-proof: pre-fix behaviour (generation skipped) fails TestRestoreGeneratesMissingResettableSecret on the non-empty DB_PASSWORD assertion (verified, reverted). Data-key gate proven unreachable by generation in TestRestoreGenerationNeverReachesDataKeys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6	2026-07-05 11:52:04 +02:00
admin	0b9450e356	F17: per-app restore now replays the captured .sql DB dump (.sql wins) ... The restore paths (RestoreFromRecoveryUnit + the RestoreApp fallback) repopulated Docker volume tars but NEVER replayed the captured <stack>-<dbtype>.sql dump, so DB-resident data (e.g. rows in a DB whose data dir is a bind mount) did not come back — the romm marker round-trip in the audit lost the row. New appbackup.ImportDump (read-side counterpart to DumpOne) replays a .sql/.sql.gz into the running DB using the live container's OWN discovered credentials (no env threading; reuses DiscoveredDB + getMariaDBPassword). backup.reimportDBDumps orchestrates it AFTER volume restore + stack bring-up, so the logical dump WINS over any volume-tar copy of the DB (operator-chosen precedence). pg_dump --clean --if-exists and mariadb-dump (default --add-drop-table) make replay idempotent; psql ON_ERROR_STOP=1 surfaces real import errors. Also: volume-restore per-volume failures and DB-import failures now SURFACE (the restore returns an error) instead of a swallowed WARN, so a failed data restore cannot read as success. Tests (restore_db_test.go, injectable discover/import seams): imports when dump+DB present, failure surfaces, no-dump skips discovery, dump-but-no-matching-DB is a non-fatal skip. Live DB round-trip to be validated post-deploy.	2026-06-14 10:02:58 +02:00
admin	7863e62f29	v0.54.0: Phase 2b — restore-from-recovery-unit + fail-closed data-key gate ... Restore recreates an app from its on-drive unit + the guest's own secrets, regenerating nothing. reconcileRestoreSecrets (pure, unit-tested) merges the unit's non-secret env with secrets recovered from the live app.yaml and FAILS CLOSED if a data-encrypting key is unrecoverable (refuse — a PBS whole-guest restore is needed — rather than regenerate and corrupt). Resettable secrets missing → warn + proceed. - backup: RestoreFromRecoveryUnit (manifest -> recover secrets -> gate -> restore volumes -> recreate definition + redeploy w/ re-pull); falls back to volume-only. - seams: RecoverStackSecrets/RecreateStackFromUnit (adapter +encKey), stacks.RedeployFromEnv. Wired into /backup/restore. - tests: gate (refuse/proceed/verbatim) + data_key parsing. Gate + reconcile + data_key parsing unit-tested; capture live-validated (v0.53.1). Full readable-data e2e vs AdventureLog needs the auth-gated dashboard restore — pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-13 11:12:43 +02:00