R-650: internal/dockerexec — every docker exec routed through it; under
go test a real docker is refused (opt-in FELHOM_TEST_REAL_DOCKER=1; a stub
under the temp dir is allowed). api/stacks/web tests run under a silent
stub (TestMain). TestR650_NoBareDockerExec pins it repo-wide.
R-640: a dump without its engine's completion marker is refused before
the first mutation (unit + off-site restore) and again before any load.
R-499: the Tier-2 page's system-disk sentence has four true branches.
R-518: the backup button states the measured ~8 min stop.
R-626: measured on 9202, not reproduced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Four defects on the restore surface, all proven on demo-hp during the 2026-08-21
backup-truth drill, all still in shipped code. They share one acceptance idea: a
restore surface must state what it actually did, and must refuse what it cannot
do.
VERSION NOTE. The task specifying this targeted v0.224.0 against baseline
f8c9390. Both were consumed earlier the same day by R-330 (0.224.0) and R-331
(0.225.0). Drift re-confirmed against live Gitea before the first edit, operator
authorised proceeding, every symbol the spec named re-verified present at the
real baseline e5eee50.
R-353 -- a restore that gave back nothing still said it worked.
RestoreFromRecoveryUnit returned only error, so the surface printed
"<app> visszaallitva (<snapshot>)." -- equally true of a run that returned an
entire dataset and one that returned nothing. The count already existed and was
discarded one line deep: restoreDockerVolumesFrom always returned it, the
wrapper threw it away. Now (UnitRestoreResult, error), carrying replayed counts
AND what the manifest LISTED, because zero-replayed has two causes that are
opposite news. Three cases, three sentences, and EVERY one is a claim about the
BACKUP, never about the app -- this path has no SafetyDump discriminator, and
07-backup-architecture 6.3 records that an absent dump says nothing about the
app (R-361 destroyed canonical .sql files for four months).
R-357 -- the destructive restore had no free-space gate. offbox_reconstitute.go
contained ZERO references to offboxFree; all three existing gates guard
non-destructive paths. The gate now sits before mapOffsiteRestorePaths,
writeSafetyDump and StopStack, so a refusal costs nothing. Position IS the fix,
which is why the test asserts StopStack was never called. No headroom multiplier
(matches PlaceOffsiteRestore; the x1.1 elsewhere predicts a download). Fail
closed on either probe <= 0 -- otherwise `free < need` with need==0 is FALSE and
an unmeasurable scratch sails through: a gate present and inert.
R-358 -- a failed download was offered as a good one. The gate answered "the
directory exists and is non-empty", which is exactly what a part-way restic run
leaves. Now a completion marker written 0600 atomically AFTER restic returns
nil, with any stale one cleared BEFORE it starts; both orders pinned by an AST
test because resticStep is not a seam. Both handlers refuse server-side: the
wizard flags control a button, and a hidden button is not a guard.
SCENARIO F ANSWERED, and worse than the question assumed: a unit-only scratch IS
reachable through the real flow, by the most ordinary route. "Ellenorzo
visszaallitas" (mode=unit, advertised non-destructive) writes the SAME directory
-- offboxRestoreScratchDir ignores `full` and --include limits what restic
extracts, never where -- so a customer who ran the SAFE restore was then offered
the destructive one over a unit-only copy. Filed R-396; the marker closes it.
R-360 -- the delete refused only while a BACKUP ran. IsRunning() is FALSE for the
whole of a verification restore; the five sibling handlers all use
restoreOpBlocked(). Its doc comment claimed it already did this, which is why
nobody looked -- corrected in place.
Red-proofs, each printing the pre-fix behaviour, in CHANGELOG and REPORT. The
first R-357 red-proof exposed a hollow test OF MY OWN and it is recorded rather
than quietly fixed: the fixture refused earlier at the placement stat pre-pass,
so `stops == 0` passed against the pre-fix code. Fixture corrected, assertions
reordered so a removed gate reports the outage rather than "no error returned".
Green gate clean: 28 packages, rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.
R-355 (first, because it is the only one where data can be lost for good). paperless-ngx's
PostgreSQL was dumped into backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps/ — a directory for a stack that
does not exist, on the system drive — while the app's own unit recorded db_dumps: null. The
same misattribution reached writeSafetyDump, so a destructive restore of that app took NO undo
copy and the fail-closed refusal was never reached. Fixed by reading the compose project label,
which is the stack name by construction (compose runs with cmd.Dir set to the stack dir and no
-p). The old derivation stays as the fallback and an unresolvable attribution is now loud.
Catalogue sweep, proven able to convict: one affected app of 53. The fix is in the controller,
not the catalogue.
R-354. ReconstituteFromOffsite skipped every unit placement and the volume archives live inside
the unit, so the off-site restore had no volume leg at all — proven live with planted files:
calibre-web's 1,422,848-byte config archive was in the unit, the snapshot and the checking
folder, and the restore reported success without it. For the 40 of 53 apps that declare no data
drive that archive is the whole dataset. restoreDockerVolumesFrom is the local path's own replay
with an explicit directory: ONE implementation, two callers. Volumes replay before the database
and inside the stopped window. VolumesReplayed reaches the message.
The comment beside the skip was half false and is corrected; the half that still holds — the
live unit is the local path's source — is named, and scenario D fingerprints the whole live unit
across the operation.
Seven red-proofs, each asserted applied and reverted. Two found defects in the tests, not the
code: scenario D passed with the unit guard removed because the fingerprint had been narrowed
and was blind to the unit root.
The restore paths (RestoreFromRecoveryUnit + the RestoreApp fallback) repopulated
Docker volume tars but NEVER replayed the captured <stack>-<dbtype>.sql dump, so
DB-resident data (e.g. rows in a DB whose data dir is a bind mount) did not come
back — the romm marker round-trip in the audit lost the row.
New appbackup.ImportDump (read-side counterpart to DumpOne) replays a .sql/.sql.gz
into the running DB using the live container's OWN discovered credentials (no env
threading; reuses DiscoveredDB + getMariaDBPassword). backup.reimportDBDumps
orchestrates it AFTER volume restore + stack bring-up, so the logical dump WINS
over any volume-tar copy of the DB (operator-chosen precedence). pg_dump
--clean --if-exists and mariadb-dump (default --add-drop-table) make replay
idempotent; psql ON_ERROR_STOP=1 surfaces real import errors.
Also: volume-restore per-volume failures and DB-import failures now SURFACE (the
restore returns an error) instead of a swallowed WARN, so a failed data restore
cannot read as success.
Tests (restore_db_test.go, injectable discover/import seams): imports when dump+DB
present, failure surfaces, no-dump skips discovery, dump-but-no-matching-DB is a
non-fatal skip. Live DB round-trip to be validated post-deploy.
- Backups page: whole-guest backup shown as real DR — target label "Biztonsági szerver –
külön hardver (PBS)"; app-data "Távoli mentés" card now reflects the PBS offsite tier
(guestBackupView.Offsite) instead of "nincs beállítva".
- Model-A double-nest fix: appbackup path helpers take a felhom-data NAMESPACE ROOT (no
internal felhom-data join); backup.Manager.namespaceRoot/AppNamespaceRoot resolve
HDD-vs-systemDataPath provenance so a drive-resident app's backups land single-nested
(<drive>/backups/... on the guest = <drive>/felhom-data/backups/... on the host) instead
of .../felhom-data/felhom-data/.... Writes, deletion (GetStackBackupData/RemoveStack/
ProtectedHDDPaths), wipe-warning scan, and export updated coherently; legacy double-nest
dirs kept protected. New appbackup test asserts no doubled segment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add Docker named volume backup to Tier 1 (dump to tar, include in restic)
and Tier 2 (copy tars to rsync mirror _volumes/ dir)
- Fix volume name resolution: use project-prefixed names (mealie_mealie_data)
- Fix double Tier 1 in restore dropdown: filter snapshots by app's home drive
- Add Tier 2 restore: RestoreAppFromTier2() restores from rsync mirror
- Show Tier 2 entry in restore dropdown when cross-drive backup succeeded
- Add .fab import link in restore section
- Volume-aware restore type banners and backup content labels
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add structured operational logging at INFO, WARN, and ERROR levels to
every controller module. Standardize custom prefixes ([GEO], [SCHED],
[SYNC]) to use [INFO/WARN/ERROR] [module] format. Fix misleveled logs
(WARN->ERROR for data loss scenarios, WARN->INFO for routine operations).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Major refactor of backup and storage paths:
- Per-drive restic repos at <drive>/backups/primary/restic/
- Per-app DB dumps at <drive>/backups/primary/<app>/db-dumps/
- Remove global BackupDir, DBDumpDir, ResticRepo config fields
- Add SystemDataPath config (fallback for apps without HDD)
- New backup/paths.go with pure path computation helpers
- Add GetStackHDDPath to StackDataProvider interface
- Restic methods now accept repoPath as parameter
- Cross-drive backup uses new secondary path structure
- Rename storage/ to appdata/ in scripts and compose templates
- Update protected HDD paths (storage → appdata + backups)
- Simplify backup UI (remove global path displays)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix 1: HDD data backup is now mandatory for all deployed apps.
resolveAppBackupPaths() iterates ListDeployedStacks() directly — no
longer reads GetAppBackupMap() or checks the Enabled flag. DiscoverAppData()
drops backupPrefs parameter; BackupEnabled is set from HasHDDData.
Five dead settings methods removed: IsAppBackupEnabled, SetAppBackup,
GetAppBackupMap, SetAppBackupBulk, GetAppBackupPrefs.
Fix 2: Cross-drive backup now triggers a fresh DB dump (DumpStackDB)
before running. DBDumper interface added to crossdrive.go; Manager
implements it; SetDBDumper wired in main.go. Non-fatal — proceeds with
user data backup even if DB dump fails.
Fix 3: Restore dropdown shows ALL deployed apps (not just HDD+enabled).
restore.go rewritten: always restores config+DB, adds user data if hasHDD.
UI shows restore type banner (full / config+DB / config only) with
color-coded styling. Snapshot API clarified for non-HDD apps.
Fix 4: "Docker kötetek" → "Konfiguráció" — named volumes are not in
the restic backup paths; compose files + app.yaml are what's backed up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- StackDataProvider interface extended with StopStack/StartStack
- backup.Manager.GetStackHDDMounts() delegates to stackProvider
- RestoreApp() auto-stops app before restic restore, restarts after (even on failure)
- stackAdapter in main.go wires StopStack/StartStack through to stacks.Manager
- GET /api/backup/snapshots?stack={name} filters snapshots by app HDD paths via filterSnapshotsByPaths()
- Restore section simplified: no path list, per-app filtered snapshots, human-friendly timestamp format, single calm warning, empty-result inline message
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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