694 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	ff68b0b433	v0.248.0: i18n slice 1 release A — apps and settings in English, Hungarian byte-identical (R-556) ... Ten pages converted against fixtures captured from unconverted templates (6be55a0); marker coverage test; English page mask narrowed; English retrieval-promise stems; common keys; title keys and infraMeta from the bundle; old wording tests read the Hungarian expansion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-17 17:36:08 +02:00
admin	6be55a0eb3	i18n slice 1 release A: parity cases + fixtures captured from UNCONVERTED templates (25 states, 10 pages) ... dashboard, stacks, logs, monitoring, app_import, app_export, deploy, settings_system, settings_security, settings_notifications. Captured before any of these templates carries a marker; case completeness was checked with the coverage probe on a trial conversion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-17 17:19:51 +02:00
admin	1af89a54af	i18n slice 1 (A.2-A.4, A.6): narrowed English mask, marker coverage test, English retrieval stems, parse timing ... Five v0.247.0 fixtures re-captured from UNCONVERTED v0.246.0 (89dd3e94) because their one-word Hungarian data values had to become multi-word; two new cases (backups_tier_due, app_info_installable) captured the same way — the coverage test found both gaps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-17 17:15:23 +02:00
admin	612c417024	v0.247.0: i18n spike — the dashboard can speak English, Hungarian byte-identical ... Message bundles (internal/i18n) expanded into templates before parsing, one template set per language. Launcher, /backups, /apps/<slug> and the layout converted; household language setting, POST /settings/language, ?lang= override, report field. Parity test against fixtures captured from unconverted templates; copy gates read templates expanded; new i18n_missing_gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-17 14:50:57 +02:00
admin	0fe315b759	v0.246.0: an interrupted restore is told; the recovery-code reminder waits until the box can take it ... MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). Requires hub v0.117.0 for restore_interrupted. R-550 (operator ruling: fix). A design reversed and recorded: the restore op-status was in memory by choice. Now restore-status.json in DataDir, written atomically at both ends of an op. At startup a record still marked running becomes a failed, interrupted result kept per app until that app's next restore, shown on /backups/restore and the off-site wizard, and raised once as restore_interrupted. Cooldowns stay in memory. R-546. The R-543 reminder bar consults the agent's own preflight ok (every blocking item, not a copy of pbs_storage_id), cached 60 s, probed only while paused. /backup/escrow shows a waiting card that polls and reloads instead of red crosses and English diagnostics. POST /api/escrow/start refuses 409 before staging or starting - the direct path chaos night used. Unknown readiness keeps the bar. Red-proofs (each seen failing): restore record across restart; main() calls both startup functions; startup helper with loading skipped; restore page card; bar held back; waiting card; start refusal. go build/vet/test ./... green, 28 packages; controller_gates --fast all OK. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-17 10:45:29 +02:00
admin	ad398b60d9	v0.245.0 — R-543: the household is asked for the recovery code, the page says "szunetel" until then ... Off-site backup is ON by default and does not RUN until the household creates its recovery code. The pause is the zero-knowledge escrow design and is untouched here; what was missing is that nothing ASKED, while the app-backup page promised the very copy that had never run. - a reminder bar on every authenticated page while the off-site tier is configured and its escrow is not complete, linking /backup/escrow. It is the R-241 bar, second instance: same session-cookie dismissal, back next visit, gone for good when escrowed. No second banner system. It hangs off executeTemplate, the single render choke point, so it cannot reach only the pages someone remembered. - the tier-1 file sentence renders by tier3State's own vocabulary instead of the app's shape: active -> "vedi", escrow_pending -> "vedene ... szunetel" + the route, no copy at all -> says so and names both ways out. - both fixes red-proofed: the bar test fails on BOTH pages with the hook removed; the sentence test quotes the exact v0.244.0 promise when the state is ignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-16 21:02:51 +02:00
admin	2f8ff2414c	v0.244.0: the backup page stops promising what it does not hold (R-537/R-538/R-536) ... R-537 — the contents label is now PER TIER. One string computed from the app's shape was rendered on all three tier rows; a Tier-1 unit has no file-copy step, so for the four class-A apps it was claiming „Adatok" for files it does not hold. R-538 — a unit restore REFUSES before anything is touched when the unit cannot return the app's drive-side files, and names the route that can. It runs before the stack is stopped because the measured harm included the app's own wastebasket going unreachable, which still held every byte. R-536 — „Alkalmazás telepítve" moved from the deploy's acceptance to its completion, with app_deploy_started and app_deploy_failed as the honest pair. Each fix red-proofed: seen failing with its own sentence, passing when restored. Requires hub v0.116.0 for the two new event types. MinAgent unchanged (0.131.0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-16 16:55:55 +02:00
admin	d3eacbb7cc	backup tile: unknown size shows a dash, not 0 B (R-517 follow-up, measured on 9201) ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-15 10:53:20 +02:00
admin	843b319f35	v0.243.0: FileBrowser generated admin password (R-513); per-tier whole-guest backup truth (R-517); skip absent-storage tiers (R-518); OOM-killed worker visible (R-514) ... MinAgent: 0.131.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-15 10:12:08 +02:00
admin	406755fa8f	docs: v0.242.0 report, context; R-489 measured limit recorded (row kept open) ... A volume recreated by a unit restore carries no compose label, so the before/after difference misses it; proven on the scratch guest. Docs only, no release. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-13 23:04:48 +02:00
admin	d698ce343b	controller v0.242.0: a removed app is listed with its kept backup; five small ones (R-487 R-491 R-490 R-489 R-476 R-456) ... R-487: the local backup lists are keyed on the drives, not on what is deployed — a removed app whose unit was kept is listed with the restore that reinstalls it, the picker answers for it, and the restore opens the unit where it sits. R-491: a removal clears the app's update hold. R-490: /api/system/info reaches the API router and reads the default storage path. R-489: volumes_removed is the real before/after difference, [] when none. R-476: a Tier-2 copy is dated by its data, not its manifest. R-456: the boot-orphan rule is pinned. Every fix red-proofed.	2026-09-13 22:50:18 +02:00
admin	3e813307cc	controller v0.241.0: a bind-data app leans on off-site before its own unit; the hold names what the copy holds (R-479) ... Operator ruling 2026-09-13. An app with classified binds walks second drive -> off-site -> own unit (its unit holds no files); volume apps keep 2 -> 1 -> 3. RestoreHold.CopyHolds records what the chosen copy holds and the sentence ends with it; older holds keep their tier-only sentence. Tests on both halves; red-proof: a layout-blind order fails the bind case.	2026-09-13 21:47:33 +02:00
admin	bdcbd50b42	controller v0.240.0: seven defects from the any-tier proof and the first nightly rotation ... R-486 (P1): removing an app with its backups KEPT keeps its Tier-2 record, so the second-drive restore is no longer refused over an intact mirror. R-484: postgis/pgvector/timescaledb images are Postgres (logical dumps). R-485: the backup card sizes the recovery unit and the mirror(s). R-480: a held update's sentence leaves the card once the hold is lifted. R-477: the update's off-site lookup is one snapshots call, no stats. R-478: a copy older than this install's deploy does not count. R-474: "delete backups" deletes the unit, the mirror(s) and the prefs. Tests and red-proofs per row; evidence in felhom.eu documentation/audits/v0240-2026-09-13/ and nightly-2026-09-13-adventurelog/.	2026-09-13 19:26:50 +02:00
admin	b93c1543da	controller v0.239.0: any backup tier lets an app update (R-475) ... Operator ruling 2026-09-13. The update precondition walks Tier 2, Tier 1 (own recovery unit, "helyi") and Tier 3 (off-site, 15 s bound; unreachable counts as absent with a WARN) and leans on the first FRESH copy; the backup_max_age rule applies to whichever tier is chosen. No copy anywhere: back up first. Refused only when nothing exists and no backup can be taken. RunAppBackupNow tolerates a Tier-2 failure (WARN) and marks the captured unit proven current. The hold names the tier (második meghajtó / saját meghajtó / távoli mentés) and the date; pre-v0.239.0 holds keep their text. A successful off-site restore now lifts an update hold. The backups page still uses Tier2UnitRestorePoint unchanged. Scenarios G-M tested; red-proofs M, L, the tail and the off-site clear in felhom.eu documentation/audits/rulings-r472-r475-2026-09-13/.	2026-09-13 17:16:24 +02:00
admin	f946b0d0ca	gates: the newest release header must state its MinAgent; backfill v0.233.0-v0.236.0 (R-470, R-472) ... From hub v0.112.0 a floor above the golden is served only with a declared MinAgent, read from this CHANGELOG's newest `## vX.Y.Z` header. New fast, blocking gate minagent_header_gate.py: that block must contain a line starting `**MinAgent: X.Y.Z**`; prose, a code span or a non-bold mention does not count (decoy test; red-proof F: relaxing the match to a body mention fails test_decoy_body_mention_is_not_the_line). Backfill: v0.233.0, v0.234.0, v0.235.0 and v0.236.0 carried no MinAgent line. Each now reads `**MinAgent: 0.129.0** (unchanged)`, the value of the nearest earlier header (v0.232.0). Proof it did not move: zero commits under controller/internal/agentapi since 2026-09-01 (last: bb50e12, 2026-08-14), and the highest featureMinAgent entry is 0.129.0.	2026-09-13 17:09:33 +02:00
admin	cbcca03061	v0.238.1: the nightly backup leaves an app alone WHILE it is being updated, not only once it is held (slice 4 follow-up) ... Found live in v0.238.0 Scenario F on demo-hp: during an update's 5-minute health wait the app is not yet held, and the periodic recovery-unit capture at 10:17:09 wrote the never-started definition (alpine:3.20) into its PRIMARY unit, 53 s before the hold landed. The Tier-2 mirror the hold names survived only because Tier 2 runs daily; a nightly Tier 2 inside a verify window would have mirrored the broken definition over the copy the customer is told to restore from. backup.Manager.isHeld — consulted by the capture sweep, the Tier-2 run and the volume dump — is now also true while a guarded update is moving the app, via SetUpdatingCheck wired in main.go to stacks.Manager.IsUpdating. Test with positive control + red-proof; wiring pinned. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-13 12:25:09 +02:00
admin	129201abab	v0.238.0: the page follows the update, and a held app offers no way to start it (update arc slice 4 Part 4) ... No behaviour change on the box — the surface only. - Frissítés follows the job: the button shows the phase label (polling GET /api/stacks/{name} every 3 s) and the page reloads when updating goes false. - An updating card offers no lifecycle button; a held card (failed update OR failed restore) shows the hold sentence with a Mentések link and nothing that would start it; a failed update that held nothing shows its sentence above the buttons. app_info shows the same three notices. - The updating/held checks run BEFORE isOperational, which counts `restarting` as operational — how the 2026-09-01 spike saw a green Frissítés beside a crash loop. Pinned with StateRestarting fixtures; red-proofed by moving the checks after it (both tests fail). - No new CSS, no version number. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-13 12:07:35 +02:00
admin	0d402f711d	v0.237.0: the Update button takes a backup first, and tells the truth (update arc slice 4 — R-448, R-443, R-439) ... POST /api/stacks/{name}/update is now a guarded job answering 202: cheap refusals (hold — R-439, busy, migration, deploying, memory via the deploy's own memoryVerdict, a fixed 2 GB disk floor, and no restorable Tier-2 copy) → backup-first when the proven copy is older than update.backup_max_age (24h) → safety dump BEFORE the pin moves → pin → pull (failure puts the pin back) → up → health (.felhom.yml check or 60 s settle, update.health_timeout 5m). Not healthy → the app is stopped and HELD (RestoreHold reason update_failed, same store and gate as R-379) and the page names the backup to restore from; the pin stays. Success is only ever update_phase=done after health (R-443). UpdateStack is deleted. The restorable-unit predicate is EXTRACTED to backup.Tier2UnitRestorePoint and shared with the backups page (row pinned unchanged). The copy is aged by the last successful Tier-2 copy, not the manifest created_at — measured on demo-hp that created_at moves only on definition changes. Crash safety: update-journal.json before each phase; RecoverUpdates before the boot sweep, ResumeInterruptedUpdates after the guards are wired. Three unattended start paths ignored a hold and now honour it: the drive-return gate (restart + boot recreate) and the nightly volume dump. The nightly capture and Tier-2 run skip held apps so the restore point survives. No automatic rollback — measured per-app; route back = restore. Tests A–H across stacks/backup/api/web/cmd; six red-proofs seen to fail. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-13 11:41:31 +02:00
admin	42a73e667a	v0.236.0: "delete my data too" deletes the data, or says that it could not (R-442) ... Removal resolves the drive from the app's own app.yaml HDD_PATH (the 07 ~L437 rule), never the global cfg.Paths.HDDPath which no box sets. A data removal that cannot be resolved, or whose drive is absent, is refused with a typed RemoveRefusedError -> 409 + exact Hungarian sentence, before compose down, and the app is kept. SSD app -> hdd_paths_removed: [] never null; missing folders stated; backup-path refusals reach the response. 15 tests, two red-proofs run (pre-fix fallback -> C fails with err=nil and the handler 200s; "no drive refuses" -> D fails). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-09-13 08:52:25 +02:00
admin	2a56f557d0	v0.235.0: a delivered fix must also refresh the stored definition ... Found by the LIVE validation on demo-hp, not by review. Scenario A passed - a non-image catalog change reached the pinned app on the real 15-minute cycle - and that is exactly what exposed the gap: the stored applied-compose.yml is written when the PIN is written, so the fix landed in the live compose file and not in the store. The first time the catalog then moved a version, the freeze would have rendered the pre-fix definition and reverted every fix delivered since - silently undoing the half of the operator's ruling that says fixes keep flowing. The equal-images branch now refreshes the store as it delivers. The images cannot move in that branch by construction, so no version moves and no intent is rewritten. RenderPlan gains StackDir so the syncer can write it. TestFixRefreshesTheStoredDefinition asserts both halves: the fix reaches the store, and it survives the freeze that follows.	2026-09-06 10:04:21 +02:00
admin	8a0e0a59ad	v0.235.0: freeze the version, keep the fixes flowing (operator ruling 2026-09-06) ... Slice 3. R-447 was BLOCKED because R-438 established that RestartStack's use of up -d to pick up template changes was CHOSEN and written down in its own comment. The operator ruled Option 1, and this implements it. The rule: while the catalog offers the same version you run, its fixes flow to you; the moment it moves to a newer version you are frozen until you update. NOTHING was added to any of the thirteen compose up -d call sites. Most of them are repairs - the boot reconciler, the drive-return gate, the app-stop guard - and a repair path that refuses to repair leaves a customer's app down, which is worse than the problem. They are made safe by removing the reason. app.yaml gains pinned_images: what the app is SUPPOSED to run. It is NOT installed_images, which is an observation; letting a reading become a deployment is the R-166 category error one field over. Four writers, each also storing the exact definition as applied-compose.yml. UpdateStack advances the pin and re-renders BEFORE the pull, because pull and up -d act on the file on disk, and a pin set afterwards would pull the frozen version and report success. The syncer renders instead of copying, through one nil-safe seam. Catalog images equal the pin -> verbatim, so fixes and self-healing both survive; they differ -> the WHOLE stored definition, never a substitution of refs into a newer template (wger 2.6 needs a DB config the older template cannot supply). This is deliberately not 'skip deployed apps', which was option B and was rejected. AdoptPins runs once at boot after the backfill, files only, and skips loudly rather than inventing a pin. syncer.Start() moved to after it: the initial sync would otherwise run while every app was unpinned and overwrite a deployed app's version once per boot. THE BADGE HAD TO CHANGE OR SLICE 2 WOULD HAVE INVERTED SILENTLY. TemplateImages reads the LIVE compose file, which is now the frozen one, so the comparison would have answered Naprakesz on exactly the apps that are behind - with every test green, because the new field has the same type. It now reads CatalogImages. +16 tests (1729 -> 1745), 28 packages green. Three red-proofs run and reverted. A test also caught the syncer writing an empty compose file over a live app.	2026-09-06 09:45:34 +02:00
admin	38d28b5b62	v0.234.0: seed installed_images at startup, so the label appears on an app nobody touched ... The operator looked at demo-felhom the morning after v0.233.0 and found OpenGist - up 15 hours, running exactly the catalog pin - showing no badge at all. v0.233.0 wrote the record only from the four bring-up paths, so an app nobody restarts carried no record indefinitely. On a quiet box that is every app, which is the box we most want to see. The known limitation WAS the feature not working. BackfillInstalledImages runs once at startup, beside BackfillDesiredState and before the boot reconciler. It READS containers: starts nothing, restarts nothing, writes no compose file. It never overwrites an existing record. And it REFUSES to seed a partial observation, which is why this is not a three-line loop: the badge reads a service-count mismatch as BEHIND, so seeding a degraded app from what is visible would render 'Frissites elerheto' over an app that is perfectly current. The bring-up paths may write a partial because they follow a successful up -d where a gap is real news; a backfill meets any state. Same data, two writers, two admission rules - deliberately. Also fixes a calendar bomb of mine: the render test hardcoded catalog_since and the string '46 napja', but the render path reads time.Now(), so it was green on the day it was written and red the next morning. Now derived. Filed as R-457 with six other candidate files named as unchecked, not accused. +5 tests (1724 -> 1729), 28 packages green. Red-proof of the partial guard run and reverted; the wiring and its ORDER pinned by an AST walk.	2026-09-03 11:56:43 +02:00
admin	8025304acc	v0.233.0: record what each compose service actually installed, and badge whether it is current ... Update arc slices 1 and 2. NEITHER CHANGES ANY BEHAVIOUR — no new endpoint, no auto-update, the three lifecycle buttons byte-identical. Slice 1 — app.yaml gains installed_images, keyed by compose SERVICE name, each entry carrying ref + repo digest + first-seen timestamp. Written by Manager.recordInstalledImages after a successful compose up from StartStack, RestartStack, UpdateStack and runComposeDeploy. Read from the CONTAINER, never from docker-compose.yml: the syncer overwrites a deployed app's compose on a 15-minute cycle and the two disagreed for 25 minutes in the spike's own measurement. A failed write NEVER refuses the action - the deliberate opposite of SetDesiredState, because this is an observation and that is an intent. Not called from StartStackServices (the R-47 DB-only window). Its own docker seam with a context and a 30s timeout, which neither existing exec helper has. Slice 2 — .felhom.yml gains optional catalog_since; web.updateBadge compares the recorded ref per service against what the current template pins and returns a *MetaBadge through the EXISTING meta_badge partial. No new markup, no new CSS. NO RECORD RENDERS NOTHING: absent means unknown and never means current. No version number reaches the customer and no registry is queried. Known limitation, filed not hidden: 23 catalog pins float, so those apps can read Naprakesz when the image behind the tag has moved. +17 tests (1707 -> 1724), 28 packages green. Wiring proven through a real RestartStack plus an AST walk of the four call sites. Three companion red-proofs run and reverted.	2026-09-02 20:18:01 +02:00
admin	681cc663ef	decoy sweep: eight holes in this repo's gates, all measured, all fixed (R-421) ... Every gate was DECOYED - the label constructed without the fact, the gate run, the verdict recorded. No verdict here was reached by reading, because reading is exactly how the five prior instances hid. SCOPE IS A FACT TOO, and it was the big one. Six gates decided what to look at with os.listdir - one directory level. Every one was green AND CORRECT, because no template subdirectory exists today; every one would have gone blind the moment anyone added templates/partials/, which is an ordinary act. A single planted file carrying an emoji, a native confirm(), hand-rolled row markup, a dangling JS id reference, a templated secret and an unregistered retrieval promise passed all six. THE CONTROL IS WHAT MAKES THAT A MEASUREMENT: mojibake and docker-v already used os.walk, saw the identical planted file, and convicted. So the cause was the listing, not the decoy. COMMENTS ARE NOT CODE, AND COMMENTS ARE NOT CONTROLS. debug-routes matched `case subpath == "x"` in raw text, so a case left in a commented-out block counted as a live handler - which is R-400's original defect (seven dead controls on the page an operator opens when something is already wrong) reached through the one door its own gate could not see. app-row-dedup's MUST_USE check had the same shape: a commented-out {{template "app_list_row"}} satisfied it. Stripping is deliberately crude in debug_route_gate, and that is correct there: its own docstring insists on ten lines that cannot rot. A // inside a string literal truncates that line, which can only ever HIDE a reference, never invent one - it fails in the safe direction. NOT FIXED, and left open with its decoy rather than quietly patched: R-425, offbox-rename scans a fixed three-entry FILES list, so banned NAS branding in a NEW offbox template passes. The scope was correct when written and silently narrows every time the feature grows a file. test_gate_decoys.py holds 10 decoys and declares COVERS, which felhom.eu's new decoy-coverage gate AST-parses - a substring search for coverage would be the very shape this sweep exists to find. No Go code. No version bump. No image. No golden owed. Survey: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-gate-decoys-2026-09-01.md	2026-09-01 12:39:17 +02:00
admin	a4444088ad	R-404: the golden NOTICE, in the repo where the debt is created - NOT A RELEASE ... No version heading on purpose. No Go code, no image, no version bump; giving this one would create the exact golden debt the change is about. Until today this repo - where a release actually happens - had NO golden-currency check at all, while felhom.eu ran one on every push including documents-only ones that can neither create the debt nor clear it. The person who could act heard nothing; the person who could not act was blocked, thirteen --no-verify uses' worth. golden_notice.py is ADVISORY IN EVERY CASE, and that is the only correct behaviour rather than timidity: at the moment a release is committed the golden legitimately does not exist yet, so blocking there would refuse the commit that STARTS the process - and blocking later is the mistake being undone. NO SECOND IMPLEMENTATION: it IMPORTS felhom.eu/scripts/golden_currency_gate.py and calls that gate's own released_versions()/newest_baked(), so it is the same comparison read in the other direction. Cross-repo shape copied from instructions_gate.py; never a copy of the script, because a copy recreates the drift these gates exist to detect. An absent sibling clone is INCONCLUSIVE and silent about currency - it never guesses. controller_gates.py GAINED A FIFTH `blocking` FIELD. It could not express a reporting-only gate at all before: every registered gate's non-zero exit failed the run, so the only way to add a notice was to give it the power to refuse a push. The capability was added rather than the notice compromised (R-420). False for exactly one gate, and test_golden_notice.py asserts it stays one. Tests N1-N4 with a positive control that every other gate is still blocking. RED-PROOF RUN: making the debt branch return 1 fails N1 - in production that would refuse the commit that starts a release.	2026-09-01 12:01:26 +02:00
admin	62c6a8a98a	docs(v0.232.0): CHANGELOG, three CONTEXT rulings, README (R-411/408/407, R-414, R-412a)	2026-09-01 10:36:52 +02:00
admin	8b55de734c	R-414: the fallback scratch must also be DELETABLE - caught by live validation ... The system-data fallback resolved a scratch fine and removeProofScratch then refused to delete it: its accepted-roots list is built from REGISTERED drives, and a driveless box has none. Observed on demo-felhom: 'refusing to remove ... it is not inside a proof root', with the copy still on disk. Every nightly proof would have left one behind, growing forever, on exactly the boxes the fallback exists for. My defect, introduced with the fallback in the same session. The unit tests missed it because every one of them registers a drive; the new pair deliberately does not, and the second asserts the guard still REFUSES a path outside every proof root, so the fix is not a widening into uselessness.	2026-09-01 10:29:08 +02:00
admin	fcef8e069c	one writer at a time, and a check that can run (R-411, R-408, R-407, R-414, R-412a) ... THE WALK FOUND THREE MORE ENTRY POINTS THAN THE REPORT DID. R-411 named one missing acquireRunning. Fixing it and then pinning the invariant with an AST walk surfaced FOUR in total, all of which issued restic commands with no flag: RestoreOffboxScratch - the reported one OffboxRestorePrepareFull - the SECOND request in the customer's own two-step full-restore flow, and the one that actually shells `restic stats`. The UI reaches it FIRST, so flagging only the restore would have left the collision reachable by the ordinary path. RestoreSharesScratch - R-411's exact shape on the shares tier: unlockStale + resticStep, a live web caller, and its sibling PlaceSharesRestore has always taken the flag. RestoreOffbox - no production caller today, but the same dangerous pattern. Flagged rather than left for a future caller to inherit. OffsiteInventoryList is REGISTERED EXEMPT with its reason: it issues only `restic snapshots --json`, measured on demo-hp 2026-08-31 not to take a lock, and flagging it would make browsing a page refuse during a backup for no safety gain. THE REAL DELIVERABLE IS THE WALK, not the acquire. offbox_integrity.go:28 asserted "Every off-site operation takes acquireRunning" since v0.227.0, nothing checked it, and it was false for months - the ninth instance of this project's most-repeated class. The walk is an AST pass, not strings.Contains, because a commented-out call still contains the string. Red-proofed twice: removing the acquire fails it naming RestoreOffboxScratch; an unregistered fake entry point fails it naming the fake. R-407: "It NEVER writes to the repository" corrected in place, not deleted (R-360's rule). `check` takes a lock - and so does `restic stats`, which is the fact nobody had and the one that made R-411 possible. Both recorded where the next reader will meet them. R-414: the proof could not run at all on a box with no registered drive. Part 2.1's determination came out as neither "missed" nor "deliberate": R-356's own test comments say the scratch resolver "still resolves ... only the DESTINATION moves", so it was OUT OF SCOPE, and it was never ruled out on state-only grounds - the one comment about a systemDataPath fallback belonged to PlaceOffsiteRestore, concerned bulk USERDATA, and R-356 overruled even that. So 07 section 6.3's rule applies and now has a fourth consumer. The fallback is SCOPED, because the two callers ask different questions and one predicate answering both is the R-356 defect itself: a UNIT-ONLY restore may fall back to the system data path (07 section 7 records as FACT that a driveless app's unit already lives there indefinitely, and that the same-device placement is intended); a FULL restore keeps today's refusal, because it pulls bulk userdata onto a state-only tier. And the silence ends either way: a proof that cannot start now records ProofResultCannotRun rather than an Err, so last_proof_result is never ABSENT - absent already means "controller too old", and a second meaning on the same field is the StatsKnown trap one level up. It is recorded WITHOUT advancing per-snapshot due-ness, so the app stays retryable once a drive is registered. R-412 leg 1: a per-app push whose unit carried no dump and no tar now says so, at WARN. Wording only - no guard, and the capture is untouched (08 section 8.2). Leg 2 stays OPEN. 16 new tests, 1689 -> 1705. Full suite 28 packages rc=0, all 13 controller gates OK. Red-proofs run and reverted byte-identical for A3/B1 (twice), C1 and D1.	2026-09-01 10:19:36 +02:00
admin	303129e3af	v0.231.0: the off-site proof gets a by-hand trigger, like its integrity sibling (R-87) ... Without it the only way to see the job work is to wait for 05:30, which makes live validation and any future diagnosis a next-day exercise. Same function as the scheduled job - no second code path. ONE deliberate difference from the integrity button: due-ness is NOT bypassed. There, forcing means "check the store again", which is always answerable. Here due-ness IS the target selection - an app is due when its newest snapshot has not been proved - so ignoring it would mean inventing a second way to choose an app, exactly what having one function prevents. When nothing is due the button says so, honestly. Every other guard intact, including the single-writer flag: a hand-run during a backup SKIPS exactly as the scheduled one would. POST /api/debug/backup/offsite-proof, button beside "Restic integritas" on the debug page. debug_route_gate pairs the two, so a button with no dispatch (R-400's shape) cannot ship.	2026-08-31 21:09:09 +02:00
admin	e43b5ec07d	v0.231.0 - the box proves its own off-site copy still holds something (R-87) ... R-87 re-scoped by its own spike and built as Option C. MinAgent 0.129.0 unchanged. THE QUESTION NOTHING ASKED. The weekly check proves the stored bytes are the bytes we stored; it cannot tell us we stored the WRONG thing. A hollow recovery unit backs up cleanly, checks cleanly at 100 percent depth, restores cleanly and gives the customer nothing back - measured on demo-hp 2026-08-31, 120082104 B to 7036 B in one nightly run recorded as a success (R-403). No tier and no cadence asked it. Now offsite-proof does, nightly, on one app. IT DOES NOT prove a restore puts data back into a running app. That stays drill work and 07 section 8 matrix row 4 is NOT moved. THE ACCEPTANCE RULE HAS TWO PARTS AND THE OBVIOUS ONE IS A TRAP. "Check the unit against its own packing list" PASSES a hollow unit, because a hollow unit declares nothing. So: (1) everything declared is present, AND (2) the manifest declares what the app is supposed to have. Part 2 is the whole value. RED-PROOFED: the naive rule makes the hollow-unit test read verdict "pass". THE EXPECTATION COMES FROM INSIDE THE UNIT, never the live box - the snapshot may predate the app's shape, and GetDockerVolumes describes the running app. Database half is DBServiceNames, the same discriminator RestoreFromRecoveryUnit uses. Volume half is ParseComposeNamedVolumes as an EXISTENCE check, not a name match: tars are <project>_<volume>.tar and ResolveDockerVolumeNames derives the project from the compose file's parent dir, which inside a unit is the literal string "compose". Measured on all eight real units on demo-hp the counts match exactly and the naming held every time - but "held on eight" is not "derivable" (R-355). Half a rule that is true beats a whole rule that is invented. THREE OUTCOMES: pass, fail (readable and empty), cannot judge. An app that legitimately has neither a database nor volumes PASSES. RED-PROOFED: alarming on any empty unit makes that test read verdict "fail". IT NEVER WRITES TO THE REPOSITORY and that is asserted on the ARGV as a non-effect: --no-lock, no unlockStale, and m.runner() rather than resticStep so the unlock --remove-all escalation is unreachable. RED-PROOFED: routing it the customer path's way makes the test fail on "unlock" appearing in the argv. IT TAKES acquireRunning ITSELF and skips rather than waits, because RestoreOffboxScratch does not take it (R-408) while offbox_integrity.go states that invariant as universal. DUE-NESS IS PER SNAPSHOT (R-86's model), never per clock. RED-PROOFED: recording a timestamp fails the stored-value test AND breaks the rotation - night 2 re-picks night 1's app. ITS SCRATCH IS A SEPARATE ROOT (backups/offsite-proof) and that is a safety decision, not tidiness: the job deletes its copy on every path, and sharing backups/offsite-restore/<app> would mean a nightly background job deleting the verification copy a CUSTOMER is looking at. It is also invisible to placement, so a proof copy can never be pushed into a live app. SHARED RATHER THAN FORKED: offboxScratchDirIn parameterises the scratch resolver on its ROOT builder, and unitOnlyHeadroom extracts the free-space gate, so the customer path and the proof refuse at the same floor with the same Hungarian sentence. RestoreOffboxScratch's behaviour is unchanged. NEW EVENT offsite_proof_empty, severity error, operator-only - deliberately NOT backup_integrity_failed, whose hub template says the store is DAMAGED. Here the store is sound and the content is absent: different cause, different action. The hub half shipped FIRST, in felhom.eu 1aeaa30 (hub v0.110.0, live and verified), because an unallowlisted type is 400'd and vanishes. 33 new tests, all groups green; full suite 1689 tests, 28 packages, rc=0. All 13 controller gates OK. Five red-proofs run and recorded in REPORT.md. A golden carrying 0.231.0 is OWED - the fleet is on 0.230.0. Viktor's call (R-242).	2026-08-31 20:55:34 +02:00
admin	1cfdde968f	docs(v0.230.0): R-403 — CHANGELOG, CONTEXT rulings, README, REPORT ... CHANGELOG v0.230.0, leading with the measurement rather than the fix: 120 082 104 B -> 7 036 B on the shipped v0.229.0, reproduced before anything was built. CONTEXT records three rulings: hollowness is a MANIFEST question and never a size question; the guard fences one shape and NOT shrinking, because the derived-copy rebuild is a design decision; and the rehydrate happens inside the restore because a follow-up job races the 5-minute capture. Plus the shape the live run taught: a warning that fires on everything costs the same as the comforting lie it replaces. README documents the refusal, what each surface says, and why the capture job is deliberately not guarded. REPORT leads with Part 1's result, carries the six red-proofs, the per-row Scenario D table with its seven-app control, and eight observations including R-404 filed-not-acted-on and three mistakes of mine recorded rather than tidied away.	2026-08-31 14:39:13 +02:00
admin	b48a7fa326	R-403: the restore OUTCOME names the package's date, not the run's ... Live on demo-hp the confirm said 11:43 (the preserved package) and the outcome said 14:23 (the copy's newest run) for the same restore. A customer reading both cannot tell which one they had, and one of the two is the flattering sentence. Part 2.3's rule is 'not a plain green success ANYWHERE', and the outcome is an anywhere. tier2UnitSourceMsg now asks UnitRestoreDate, the same resolver the confirm uses, so the two cannot disagree. TestR403_OutcomeNamesThePackageDateNotTheRunDate pins it, with a negative control for the ordinary case.	2026-08-31 14:32:29 +02:00
admin	5429d651ee	R-403 fix, caught by the live run: the stale flag fired for every healthy app ... UnitRestoreDate also compared the package's date against the run's and flagged 'older'. A recovery unit is ALWAYS captured shortly before the run that mirrors it, so that comparison is true for every healthy app. Measured on demo-hp: bookstack, kimai, opengist and privatebin all had src and dest manifests at 12:03:49Z against a run at 12:14:24Z - perfectly healthy, and all four would have been told their package was stale. A warning that fires on everything is a warning nobody reads, which costs the same as the comforting lie it was meant to replace. The second return is now UnitLegPreserved and nothing else. TestR403_AHealthyAppIsNeverCalledStale pins it; red-proof: reinstate the comparison -> it fails.	2026-08-31 14:22:32 +02:00
admin	2358e561b7	R-403: a poorer copy must never delete a richer one ... MEASURED FIRST, then fixed. On the shipped v0.229.0, on demo-hp, an app's Tier-2 copy went from 120 082 104 B (4 database dumps + 3 named-volume tars) to 7 036 B (none of either) in ONE nightly run, and the run recorded itself a success: 'Tier 2 copied docmost -> ... (14.9 KB, 0 leg(s), 0s)'. Evidence: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/DRILL-r403-tier2-delete-2026-08-31/. The mechanism was three individually-correct lines: RunTier2 guards the unit leg with os.Stat only (does the folder exist), rsyncMirror is rsync -a --delete, and nothing between them compared source to destination. An EMPTY unit is a folder that exists. THE GUARD. One predicate, unitCarriesData/unitIsHollow (r403_hollow.go), asking the MANIFEST and never the byte size - a big compose tree with no dumps is dangerous, a tiny unit for a tiny app is fine. Fail closed on an absent or unparseable manifest. RunTier2 skips the unit leg when the source is hollow AND the destination is not; the other legs still run, the run is not failed, and the skip is recorded for the SURFACE (CrossDriveBackup.UnitLegSkipped + UnitPackageDate) as well as logged. --delete STAYS and shrinking stays legal. 07 section 8 row 5's derived-copy rule is unchanged; the fence is exactly one shape. TestR403_DataLegShrinkIsUnaffected is the guard on the guard. THE HONESTY. A preserved package is older than the run that preserved it, so the card carries a notice and the unit-restore confirm names the PACKAGE's date - read from the mirrored manifest's own created_at, not from the status record - plus a clause saying why it is older. THE CAUSE. RestoreTier2Unit now refills a hollow or absent primary unit from the mirror it just restored from, INSIDE the call before returning. The hollow manifest was written two seconds after a restore by the 5-minute capture job; any follow-up job races it. The capture itself is NOT guarded: a capture describing an empty drive as empty is correct, and with the primary refilled there is no hollow state left to describe. Never over a complete primary, never after a failed restore. recordTier2Success and tier2UnitConfirmMsg keep their old signatures as thin callers, so no existing test needed editing. New seam unitRehydrate, separate from tier2Mirror on purpose. 22 new Go tests. Red-proofs run and reverted: A6 (predicate -> size threshold), B1 (guard removed -> the copy's 3 files are DELETED and the seam is called), B6 (a general never-shrink rule -> the shrink case fails), C2 (only-when-hollow dropped -> the complete primary is overwritten).	2026-08-31 14:02:13 +02:00
admin	8aa95b5831	docs(v0.229.0): R-102 + R-103 — CHANGELOG, CONTEXT rulings, README, REUSE, REPORT ... CHANGELOG v0.229.0. CONTEXT records three rulings: the source moves and the destination does not; two predicates and not one wider one (R-356's cost restated); and a destructive operation reached from a non-destructive surface carries the difference in the CONFIRM, not the label. README documents the new action and route and corrects the coverage note to the measured count. REUSE maps the four unit-directory-relative primitives and the new manager methods, with the traps. REPORT covers the live drill on demo-hp (docmost, class B, primary unit moved aside — 3 volumes of 3 and 1 database of 1 in 28.65 s, accented filename byte-identical verified as hex, the app reading its own row over TCP; Scenario D with the guest app.yaml also aside, secrets recovered=2/2), the settled count (A=7 B=45 C=1, and why the earlier 9/43/1 was wrong), the five named red-proofs, and seven observations including R-403 and a process error of mine that changed the box and is now in memory.	2026-08-31 12:21:28 +02:00
admin	4c8f0d2919	R-103: the Tier-2 refusal becomes an action ... An app whose Tier-2 copy holds no file legs but a full recovery-unit mirror - 45 of the 53 catalog templates - was told to press a button on a DIFFERENT page. Since R-102 the data it is asking for is restorable from the copy it is looking at. New POST /backup/tier2/unit-restore and backupTier2UnitRestoreHandler: same guards, same restoreOpBlocked() refusal (R-351b), same async shape as the file restore beside it, plus a fail-closed pre-flight so the app is never stopped for a mirror that could not be opened. The outcome reuses unitRestoreOutcomeMsg and adds which copy overwrote the live data. The row offers the action where the refusal was, in a danger style, as a SEPARATE button. The two are not merged: one adds what is missing, the other overwrites. The confirm carries that difference in words and names the copy's date - and says so differently when that date is only an ATTEMPT (R-101). It is built from named Go constants rather than assembled inside an HTML attribute, so a test can assert it verbatim; fmtTimeStr now delegates to a package-level fmtRFC3339Local so the confirm and the outcome cannot render the same date two ways. tier2NoCoverageMsg is NARROWED to the case that remains - no legs and no openable unit - and still names the route that works. tier2UnitNotCoveredMsg is NOT deleted: it is appended where the FILE restore ran and is still exactly true of it. Tests C1-C2 and D1-D6 plus four more. Red-proofs: C1 (widen CanRestore to include HasUnit -> the unit-only cases fail), D6 (drop EndRestoreOp from the handler goroutine -> 'the restore never published a result').	2026-08-31 11:42:03 +02:00
admin	0f9b796615	R-102: the recovery unit on the second drive becomes a way back ... Tier-2 mirrors each app's whole recovery unit to <dest>/backups/secondary/<app>/recovery-unit/ on every run and has done for months. Nothing read it. In the one failure Tier-2 exists for - the primary drive is lost, and the primary unit with it - the surviving copy could not be opened by any action in the product (07-backup-architecture 6.3, 7.2). Part 1.2: RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt(stack, unitDir) holds the whole body; RestoreFromRecoveryUnit is the thin caller naming the primary unit. ONE implementation, two callers. The SOURCE moves; the DESTINATION does not - live Docker volumes, the live database container, the guest's definition, all unchanged. The R-47 mutation order, the secret reconciliation with unit-over-guest precedence, the fail-closed data-key gate and the no-unit fallback with CountsUnknown are untouched. reimportDBDumpsAtCtx is the bounded-context twin of reimportDBDumpsFrom; the 35-minute bound is now named once so the two paths cannot drift. The R-354 volume-replay seam is reused rather than a second one invented, which is what lets the acceptance test assert the volume leg's source directory. Part 1.3: RestoreTier2Unit resolves the recorded copy, refuses fail-closed unless the mirror carries a parseable manifest - a directory is not a package - and delegates. The single-writer flag is taken inside RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt, not beside it. Part 2.1: Tier2Coverage gains UnitRestorable and the copy's dates. CanRestore() is NOT widened; it still answers only 'can the file restore run?'. One predicate answering two questions is R-356, which refused 40 running apps for months. Tests: A2-A6 and B1-B5, plus two non-regression guards. The Tier-2 fixtures build their mirror with the production RunTier2, so the claim is 'the copy Tier-2 writes is the copy this restore reads'. Red-proofs: A5 (swap volumes/recreate -> fails on the order), B2 (point the reader back at the primary -> fails with the mirror never reaching the redeploy, and with permission denied once the primary tree is unreadable).	2026-08-31 11:30:34 +02:00
admin	c732006d26	R-102 phase 1.1: split the recovery-unit path helpers, zero behaviour change ... Every unit path helper took (nsRoot, stackName) and joined backups/primary/<stack>/... . That hard-coded 'primary' is the mechanism of R-102: Tier-2 mirrors the whole unit directory to <dest>/backups/secondary/<stack>/recovery-unit/ every night, and because no reader could NAME a unit outside backups/primary/, that mirror has been captured for months and read by nothing. Adds four unit-directory-relative primitives - UnitComposeDir, UnitManifestFile, UnitDBDumpDir, UnitVolumeDumpDir - each taking the recovery-unit DIRECTORY itself. The four existing (nsRoot, stackName) helpers become thin wrappers over them and keep their exact signatures and their exact return values; every current caller compiles untouched. ONE implementation, two callers - the rule restoreDockerVolumesFrom already follows in this repo. TestR102_PathWrappersAreByteIdenticalToToday pins the wrappers against hand-written literals (not re-derived from the helpers under test). Red-proof: UnitComposeDir join changed to 'compose2' -> the test fails on all three fixtures.	2026-08-31 11:16:02 +02:00
admin	3c49dc8ea4	v0.228.0 — the off-site check reads the data; the debug page stops lying (R-399 + R-400) ... R-399: monitoring.integrity.read_data_subset defaults to 100%. A pack damaged without changing its size made plain `restic check` report "no errors were found" on demo-hp 2026-08-30; every read-data form caught it. Cost on that 134 MB store: 35.0s structure vs 39.2s at 100%. "off" (any case) is the off token; empty means not-configured, therefore the default; a malformed value falls back to the DEFAULT, never to structure. A completed check over 5 minutes logs a WARN naming the duration, the depth and R-401 — operator log only, no hub event, no depth change. The depth is now recorded with the verdict (LastIntegrityDepth; empty = NOT RECORDED, never "structure"). R-400: 24 debug-page references, 17 dispatched, 7 dead — three of which fetched on page LOAD, so those panels were permanently blank. backup/crossdrive implemented; backup/infra, hub/infra-push, dr/infra-status, storage/watchdog-status and both storage/simulate-* deleted with their panels and JavaScript. scripts/debug_route_gate.py fails in both directions and is registered after the seven were resolved. 18 referenced, 18 dispatched, none orphaned. Corrections: the dead-field warning in report/types.go said the controller runs no integrity check and the notifiers are called from nowhere — both false since v0.227.0. controller.yaml.example gains its missing integrity: block. integrityCheckTimeout's "ships OFF" comment rewritten.	2026-08-31 10:24:29 +02:00
admin	45770f2282	v0.227.1: the damage classifier matched restic's ordinary progress output ... A patch and not a rebuilt 0.227.0: that tag was already running on demo-hp, and re-pushing changed bytes under a live tag is the :latest hazard with extra steps. looksLikeRepositoryDamage matched bare "pack ", "tree ", "snapshot ", "blob ". A HEALTHY restic check prints "check all packs" and "check snapshots, trees and blobs" -- so any check that failed for a NON-damage reason, a connection dropped mid-run for instance, would have been classified as a corrupted repository and told the customer their backups may be damaged. That is the false alarm that teaches an operator to ignore the true one. Caught by the NEGATIVE control, built from the real bytes of a real passing check on demo-hp. The spec made the negative control mandatory and this is what it was for: a control that has only ever seen the failing case proves nothing. Signatures are now phrases from restic's own error wording. Also in this commit: CONTEXT.md records the three rulings (take the flag and skip, due-ness not a weekday, publish on OffboxReportStatus not the R-331 dead fields) plus the measurement a future session would otherwise assume wrongly -- THE STRUCTURE CHECK DOES NOT CATCH SILENT CORRUPTION. README documents the job, the route and the config, and corrects a line that listed four debug backup routes when only two exist. REUSE gains three rows, including one that records R-398 was my own mistake so nobody re-files it.	2026-08-30 21:22:23 +02:00
admin	0d52a42c17	R-359 + R-397: the off-site store gets checked, and the advertised check becomes real ... Nothing ever verified that the off-site copies are still readable. The whole-guest tier has verify jobs; the tier holding the customer's documents and photos had none -- the complete set of restic verbs this controller used contained no `check`. We would have found out at restore time, with a customer waiting. On 2026-08-21 a deliberately damaged pack was caught at once by plain `restic check`; we had never run it. R-397: NotifyIntegrityOK/NotifyIntegrityFailed existed with no caller, the hub allowlists both event types and carries the Hungarian text for both, the settings checkbox exists, and the debug button posts to /api/debug/backup/ integrity. Everything was built except the part that runs. SIXTH instance of that shape in this project. THE HAZARD SHAPES THE WHOLE DESIGN. resticStep self-heals a crash lock by running `unlock --remove-all` and retrying, and its own comment records why that is safe: every caller holds the in-process single-flight mutex, so any lock it meets is stale. A check that did not take that flag could meet a LIVE prune's lock from this same box, remove it, and retry over the top of it. So the check TAKES THE FLAG and SKIPS rather than waits -- waiting would pin the nightly backup behind it, and a skip costs nothing because due-ness makes tomorrow try again. TestR359_SkipsWhenRunningFlagHeld asserts the NON-EFFECTS: restic never invoked, `unlock` never in any argv. Its red-proof prints the real thing -- restic running `check` while the flag was held. DUE-NESS, NOT A WEEKDAY. Daily job, weekly behaviour: "is the last successful check older than 7 days?" not "is it Sunday?". R-341 is exactly the other shape, a dated check quietly missed and never caught up. No Weekly primitive added. THREE OUTCOMES, NOT TWO. Skipped, Unreachable and failed are different facts. "I could not look" is not "I looked and it is broken" -- R-339 already owns reachability, and a second alarm for the same fact trains the operator to discount the one alarm that means the backups are damaged. A timeout is unreachable, never damage. A failure advances due-ness (a broken store must not be re-checked nightly); a skip and an unreachable store do not. Success is severity `info`, which severityNotifies DROPS -- it mails NOBODY, by design. A weekly success e-mail is how people stop reading their alerts. The customer gets a SENTENCE; restic's words go to the log, truncated (R-379: 615 bytes of raw database text reached a customer once). read-data-subset ships OFF and a malformed value is refused at read time rather than handed to restic, where one typo would fail the whole check. Published on OffboxReportStatus, NOT on report.BackupReport's IntegrityOK -- those were retired by R-331 YESTERDAY and TestBackupReport_DeadFieldsStayZero still passes unmodified. Also: the monitoring page stopped promising a Sunday job that never existed, and the debug button got its dispatch case. PART 0 WAS NOT BUILT, AND R-398 WAS MY OWN MISTAKE. The seam it asked for already exists: offboxRunner/SetOffboxRunner/m.runner() has been injectable since the off-site tier shipped, and other tests drive restic-backed paths through it. A resticStepFn seam would have been WORSE here -- it would replace the `unlock --remove-all` escalation and hide it from the assertions that must see it. R-358's AST ordering test is converted to a real execution test instead, which immediately surfaced something the AST walk could not: unlockStale legitimately runs before the restore. Four red-proofs, each printing the pre-fix behaviour. Green gate: 28 packages, rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.	2026-08-30 21:03:29 +02:00
admin	c0c8fe67bf	An unknown drawn as a zero: the defect v0.226.0's own fix introduced ... Writing the REPORT's observation "the no-unit fallback already reports a zero result, which is honest" exposed that the sentence was FALSE. A zero UnitRestoreResult is Scenario B's shape. So RestoreFromRecoveryUnit's fallback to RestoreApp -- which returns only an error, and whose signature is deliberately out of scope -- would have printed "ez a mentes csak a beallitasokat tartalmazta, adatot nem" over a restore that may have replayed the app's entire dataset. That is an unknown drawn as a zero: the exact R-88 failure direction this whole change exists to remove, re-introduced by the change. UnitRestoreResult now carries CountsUnknown, the fallback sets it, and there is a fourth sentence claiming only what is known -- the restore ran, the app is back, and we cannot say what came back. RestoreApp's signature is untouched. Pinned by TestUnitRestoreOutcome_NoUnitFallbackSaysUnknownNotEmpty. The A5 seam test was corrected too: its fixture has no recovery unit, so it exercises exactly this path and had been asserting the wrong sentence -- it now asserts the unknown, which is what pins the fallback to it. IT WAS THE observations GATE REFUSING THE PUSH THAT FORCED THE RE-READ. A gate written to stop findings dying in an overwritten REPORT.md caught a live defect instead. Also files R-397 (NotifyIntegrityOK/Failed are dead code AND the monitoring page advertises a weekly integrity check that does not exist) and R-398 (resticStep is not a seam, which is why R-358's ordering needed an AST test) rather than leaving them in a file that is overwritten every session. REPORT.md is the full run record: baselines re-confirmed, per-test results, the five red-proofs with their observed output, the live validation with verbatim Hungarian messages, what was NOT validated and why, teardown across three layers, and the register 165 -> 167 -> 161. Green gate clean: 28 packages, rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.	2026-08-30 19:51:16 +02:00
admin	b8af72764d	R-353/R-357/R-358/R-360: the restore tells the truth (v0.226.0) ... Four defects on the restore surface, all proven on demo-hp during the 2026-08-21 backup-truth drill, all still in shipped code. They share one acceptance idea: a restore surface must state what it actually did, and must refuse what it cannot do. VERSION NOTE. The task specifying this targeted v0.224.0 against baseline f8c9390. Both were consumed earlier the same day by R-330 (0.224.0) and R-331 (0.225.0). Drift re-confirmed against live Gitea before the first edit, operator authorised proceeding, every symbol the spec named re-verified present at the real baseline e5eee50. R-353 -- a restore that gave back nothing still said it worked. RestoreFromRecoveryUnit returned only error, so the surface printed "<app> visszaallitva (<snapshot>)." -- equally true of a run that returned an entire dataset and one that returned nothing. The count already existed and was discarded one line deep: restoreDockerVolumesFrom always returned it, the wrapper threw it away. Now (UnitRestoreResult, error), carrying replayed counts AND what the manifest LISTED, because zero-replayed has two causes that are opposite news. Three cases, three sentences, and EVERY one is a claim about the BACKUP, never about the app -- this path has no SafetyDump discriminator, and 07-backup-architecture 6.3 records that an absent dump says nothing about the app (R-361 destroyed canonical .sql files for four months). R-357 -- the destructive restore had no free-space gate. offbox_reconstitute.go contained ZERO references to offboxFree; all three existing gates guard non-destructive paths. The gate now sits before mapOffsiteRestorePaths, writeSafetyDump and StopStack, so a refusal costs nothing. Position IS the fix, which is why the test asserts StopStack was never called. No headroom multiplier (matches PlaceOffsiteRestore; the x1.1 elsewhere predicts a download). Fail closed on either probe <= 0 -- otherwise `free < need` with need==0 is FALSE and an unmeasurable scratch sails through: a gate present and inert. R-358 -- a failed download was offered as a good one. The gate answered "the directory exists and is non-empty", which is exactly what a part-way restic run leaves. Now a completion marker written 0600 atomically AFTER restic returns nil, with any stale one cleared BEFORE it starts; both orders pinned by an AST test because resticStep is not a seam. Both handlers refuse server-side: the wizard flags control a button, and a hidden button is not a guard. SCENARIO F ANSWERED, and worse than the question assumed: a unit-only scratch IS reachable through the real flow, by the most ordinary route. "Ellenorzo visszaallitas" (mode=unit, advertised non-destructive) writes the SAME directory -- offboxRestoreScratchDir ignores `full` and --include limits what restic extracts, never where -- so a customer who ran the SAFE restore was then offered the destructive one over a unit-only copy. Filed R-396; the marker closes it. R-360 -- the delete refused only while a BACKUP ran. IsRunning() is FALSE for the whole of a verification restore; the five sibling handlers all use restoreOpBlocked(). Its doc comment claimed it already did this, which is why nobody looked -- corrected in place. Red-proofs, each printing the pre-fix behaviour, in CHANGELOG and REPORT. The first R-357 red-proof exposed a hollow test OF MY OWN and it is recorded rather than quietly fixed: the fixture refused earlier at the placement stat pre-pass, so `stops == 0` passed against the pre-fix code. Fixture corrected, assertions reordered so a removed gate reports the outage rather than "no error returned". Green gate clean: 28 packages, rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.	2026-08-30 19:31:31 +02:00
admin	e5eee501b5	R-331 (controller half): forward stats_known so the hub can tell empty from unmeasured (v0.225.0) ... The hub's operator Backup card read `Snapshots 0 / Repo Size 0 MB / Integrity Unknown` for EVERY customer, because it rendered the report's `backup` object -- whose snapshot/size/integrity fields have had NO producer since disk-tier restic moved to the host agent (slice 8C). buildBackupReport leaves them zero deliberately and says so. Measured on demo-hp 2026-08-30 while that night's log said `[offbox] backup OK: 8 app(s) backed up, 67 snapshot(s), 2m14s`. The live numbers were always in the report's `offsite` object, which the hub already reads for its Offsite page and its fill/staleness alarms. The hub fix is to render that -- and that made exactly ONE field mandatory that was not being forwarded. snapshot_count:0 means two opposite things: "holds nothing" and "never measured". R-225 measured that confusion inside this repo (a rebuilt box rendered 0 pillanatkep over a store really holding snapshot f3d9cd67), and settings.OffboxTarget.StatsKnown fixed it for the controller's own UI. It was never put on the wire, so the hub was free to make the identical mistake one layer up -- and did. OffboxReportStatus.StatsKnown now carries it, omitempty, so an older controller sends no key and a reader degrades to UNKNOWN, never to EMPTY. Absence is ignorance, not emptiness. The four dead BackupReport fields stay on the wire (historical reports in the hub store must keep parsing) but now carry a warning naming R-331 and pointing at Offsite. TestBackupReport_DeadFieldsStayZero fails the moment a producer appears for one -- the prompt to update the hub card in the SAME change rather than ship a field nothing renders. RED-PROOF: drop `StatsKnown: t.StatsKnown` -> "a MEASURED empty repository reported stats_known=<nil>". Tests assert the JSON the hub sees, not the Go struct: measured-empty and never-measured must differ ON THE WIRE, which is the entire point of the field. Green gate clean: 28 packages, rc 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM	2026-08-30 18:38:10 +02:00
admin	92cebb8c95	R-330: stop the backup alarming about the apps it is holding down (v0.224.0) ... Measured live on demo-hp 2026-08-30 (controller 0.223.0): the nightly db-dump and offbox-backup legs stop each stack ~13s to tar its volumes while the deadapp-check job scans every 30s, so the scan caught whichever stack was mid-cycle and pushed app_start_failed to the customer. 61 e-mails about apps that were never broken. The defect is not a missing mechanism. quiesce/suppress.go solved exactly this in v0.179.0 and works -- but classifyRunStates read only the quiesce loop's set, and that loop covers the WHOLE-GUEST backup. The per-app legs stop stacks through Manager.DumpAppVolumesSafe, which registered with nothing. Two mechanisms stop apps on purpose; only one told the alarm. Fifth instance of the "seam built but never wired" class, and the first where the unwired half was a consumer. The suppression now rides AppStopGuard, which already brackets every deliberate stop in the product (Begin before the stop, End after a successful restart) at all three call sites, and which main.go hands as ONE object to the backup manager and the exporter. scanDeployedAppRunStates takes the union of both sets. All three per-app stop paths are covered, not only the reported nightly one. It cannot latch -- End() runs only on a restart that SUCCEEDED, so unlike the quiesce loop an open-ended hold is a real hazard here: 1. ReleaseFailed drops the entry IMMEDIATELY on a restart that broke, wired at every failure path, so the app alarms on the next scan; 2. Begin REPLACES the set (one marker file = one operation); 3. appStopMaxHold (6h) caps a hold nothing released, logged at WARN. Grace is 180s, deliberately quiesce's own constant and derivation. Suppression is NOT persisted: after a crash the guard holds nothing and a down app must alarm. ReleaseFailed keeps the durable crash marker; a test pins that. Three companion red-proofs, each printing the pre-fix value (REPORT.md section 5): - drop markStopped from Begin -> "suppressed at stop = map[]" - drop ReleaseFailed from the dump -> "map[bookstack:true] after a restart that FAILED" - pass nil instead of appStopGuard -> the AST wiring test fails The third is load-bearing: the component was never the broken part, so a suite that only injected it would have been green against the shipped defect. Green gate clean: go build + go vet + go test ./... -- 28 packages, rc 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM	2026-08-30 17:58:15 +02:00
admin	f8c9390946	gate 11: register the observations gate, and mark up this repo's observations ... The shared gate lives in felhom.eu/scripts/observations_gate.py and is invoked across the workspace, exactly as reuse_refs_check.py and instructions_gate.py already are. It is never copied. REPORT.md's observations now carry their markers. Item 1 was the finding that had no register row - only the first broken app per hour reaches the operator - and it is now R-389. Item 4, the golden-bake runbook's missing `pveam update`, is R-390. Items 3 and 5 are declared NOT-A-FINDING with their reasons. The observations' text itself is unchanged; only the markers were added.	2026-08-23 13:53:18 +02:00
admin	1da2c9c6c6	docs(v0.223.0): REPORT, CONTEXT rulings, README severity contract ... REPORT overwritten: the 1.1 sweep in full (one bad severity, nine legitimate "warn" strings that are healthcheck statuses), the hub manifest's real location since the task's premise was wrong, all five red-proofs with the layer each guard sits at, the live walk in six steps with the hub's own records quoted, and the absent-intent count (0 of 8). Three things are reported that a tidier account would omit: red-proof 5 passed first time because the mutation was INERT; Scenario G was silently refused twice behind an HTTP 200; and the live Scenario A does NOT prove the customer gate, because demo-hp has no prefs row at all. CONTEXT records the severity vocabulary as a ruling with its mechanism, the intent ruling with its three-way handling of unknown, both fences, and two traps worth more than the fixes: a 200 can be a refusal, and a passing red-proof can mean an inert mutation. README: the event table said `app_start_failed | warn` - the defect, written down as if correct. Now `warning`, with the vocabulary contract and who receives what. `disk_critical` also corrected from `error` to `critical`, which is what fillwatch has always sent.	2026-08-23 12:06:45 +02:00
admin	9832760027	v0.223.0: the app-down alarm reached nobody (R-329), and the stop nobody heard (R-386) ... R-329. NotifyAppStartFailures emitted severity "warn". The hub accepts exactly {info, warning, error, critical} and silently coerces anything else to "info", which severityNotifies then drops BEFORE both legs. Banner shown, event stored, POST 200, no mail sent. One word. This is the second time: DiskAlertKind.Severity emitted "warn" until v0.215.0 and its own comment records that every warning-level disk alert went to nobody. A comment recorded the lesson and nothing enforced it. The guard is now an AST walk over the whole controller - grep cannot work here, since "warn" appears legitimately nine times as a healthcheck status vocabulary. The sweep found exactly one bad severity. Its limits are stated: the walk cannot follow a variable, so all six dynamic call sites are registered by name with the values each can take, and a new one fails the test. Two of the six were found by the guard, not by the hand sweep before it. Also pinned: fillwatch.Band.Severity() returns "" for BandOK, which would vanish the same way. It is unreachable because Check() notifies only on escalation - but that safety lives in a different function from the one that looks unsafe, so the test asserts the consequence rather than the mapping. app_start_failed gains a customer toggle, DEFAULT OFF, per operator ruling. The operator is mailed either way: processOperator never consults customer prefs. It is deliberately NOT in operatorOnlyEvents, which would make the toggle a lie. R-386. classifyRunStates decided "the customer stopped this" from the STATE, so every stopped stack was assumed deliberate. Measured on demo-hp: privatebin stopped out of band, nine scans, zero events, zero banner - while the comment beside it claimed an out-of-band stop still alerts. DesiredState already records the answer and has exactly one writer. Stopped -> no alarm; Running -> alarm; absent -> UNKNOWN, keep today's behaviour AND say so. Absent stays silent deliberately: reading it as "nobody asked" would email about every app anyone ever stopped, fleet-wide, on the first cycle after upgrade. The gap is bounded not silent - IntentUnknown is set and the names are logged at INFO on the heartbeat cadence. failedRestart still lifts a Stopped intent, or F-CRIT-1 re-opens. No new DesiredState writer. Two settings toggles each governed two alarms. "Lemez figyelmeztetes (90%+)" also wrote disk_critical, the drive-is-FAILING alarm. Now four honest toggles; 12 became 15. A no-op save stores the existing slice verbatim, so byte identity is by construction - without that guard the defaults case reorders, which the red-proof caught. Test count 1504 -> 1522. Five red-proofs, five seen failing; one passed first time and is reported - that mutation was inert, not the test weak.	2026-08-23 11:21:06 +02:00
admin	14137efac5	docs(v0.222.0): REPORT, CONTEXT decisions, README state table + the ordering ... REPORT.md overwritten with the full run: baselines and the hub's four numbers, the four red-proofs with the mutation and observed text for each, the five IsDownState consumers walked and named, the live walk in full with the old and new heartbeat lines quoted side by side, and the halt. CONTEXT records the decision - a dead supervised member is asked about before a failing healthcheck, because they are different questions and the second was answering the first - plus the fence that IsDownState did not move, the trap that three existing subtests pinned the defect, and R-386. README gains the `degraded` row, which the state table never had, and a note that the ORDER is load-bearing. Points at the new alarm-ladder architecture doc.	2026-08-23 07:58:09 +02:00
admin	5da11c4480	v0.222.0: ask whether a supervised member is DEAD before whether one is UNHEALTHY (R-384), and stop promising an undo copy nobody looked for (R-383) ... R-384. aggregateState returned StateUnhealthy the moment unhealthy > 0, and the R-51 mixed-case block that asks "is a supervised member dead?" sat below it. A two-container app whose database exits goes unhealthy BECAUSE it cannot reach that database - so the symptom the dead database causes was what suppressed the alarm for it. unhealthy is not a down state, so classifyRunStates never marked the app down and app_start_failed never fired. Measured live on demo-hp 2026-08-22: bookstack-db stopped at 21:27:01 and the F-OBS heartbeat printed "0 currently down" throughout. R-51's 18-hour immich failure, back through a different door. Two things moved, and either alone leaves the defect standing: the supervised test is hoisted above the unhealthy/starting/restarting returns, and "some members are up" now counts ANY member not in the down bucket. The old guard was running > 0, which made the R-51 block unreachable in exactly the case it was written for. IsDownState is byte-identical - unhealthy stays excluded, because an unhealthy container is running and folding it in reintroduces the flapping that exclusion exists to stop. No new state was minted. Only the ORDER changed. The priority comment was rewritten because it asserted an ordering the code no longer has. Three subtests in TestAggregateState_UnchangedBranches were AMENDED: they asserted an unhealthy/starting/restarting member beat an exited peer on unless-stopped, which pinned the defect as settled behaviour. They keep their intent with the down member given a benign policy. R-383. The double-failure message said the previous state's backup EXISTS, built from the returned path without asking the filesystem - and a missing file is one of the two ways that rollback fails. undoCopyPhrase now describes the copy from disk: present, partial, missing (still naming where it should be), or never written. Zero-length counts as missing. Test count 1494 -> 1504. Four red-proofs planted, four seen failing; the two halves of R-384 convict independently.	2026-08-23 07:25:00 +02:00