The failure branch was a two-way choice — superseded? M4 : M1 — and BOTH are
statements about the customer's code. rerr was never inspected, so a hub that
refused, an agent that was stopped and a genuinely mistyped code all produced
the same accusation. Measured live 2026-08-05 with a CORRECT current code: hub
firewalled off 0.0556s, agent stopped 0.0299s, against ~1.0s for a real unseal.
Five classes, from the VALUE and never the text:
hub-unreachable 502/503 from the agent — the code was NOT used
agent-unreachable no agent verdict at all (transport) — NOT used
no-bundle 404
bundle-too-old 409
asked-and-refused 400 — the ONLY class that may mention typing
unknown everything else -> NEUTRAL, the safe default
agentapi.RecoveryRefusal carries the status as a value (refusalError flattened
it into a sentence, and a sentence is not something a caller can branch on).
THE OLD-AGENT CASE IS WHY THIS NEEDS A COUPLING. Agent < 0.126.0 answers 400
for both a fetch failure and a wrong code, so a 400 from one cannot be read as
a refusal. FeatureRecoveryFailureClass (MinAgent 0.126.0) withholds that
reading and the 400 degrades to neutral. The gate BLOCKS NOTHING — it only
decides whether the customer may be told to check their typing.
R-226: the superseded message now names BOTH possibilities and restores the
ten-words prompt. The two are indistinguishable at the engine; the honest
message says so. It still does not promise the earlier package can be opened.
Elapsed time is logged (it is what diagnosed this) and is NEVER a classifier.
Tests: scenarios A-E at the HANDLER + the classifier table asserting the same
sentence under two statuses classifies two ways. Red-proofs, each demonstrated
failing then restored: delete the 502 case (A), remove the mistype clause (C),
default to the accusation (D), route an instant transport failure to the typing
message (E).
Two existing tests encoded the defect and were corrected, not deleted: the web
fake returned a BARE error for 'wrong code' (which is the shape of a failure we
cannot classify), and R-222's test forbade any mention of typing on a
superseded box — half of which R-226 deliberately reverses.
28 packages ok, vet clean, all controller gates OK.
R-216: the offsite key recovery is a coupled feature and now says so. featureProbes +
featureMinAgent 0.125.0 + a Supports gate at the unlock entry point, FAILING CLOSED — an
agent that cannot answer is named as such instead of the customer's code being blamed.
Measured live: a 404 from agent 0.120.0 came back as "we did not accept your recovery
code, check that all ten words", in 0.134 s, against a perfect code.
R-218: delete the repo-password short-circuit in needsOffsiteCredential. The declaration
stops when the TIER WORKS, not when a key exists — installing a key is the recovery
screen's whole job, so succeeding at recovery was switching off the mechanism that would
have delivered the coordinates to use it.
R-219: the unlock finishes the job — place the key, bring the tier up, then list. Without
it the promised listing could never render on the shape the screen exists for.
R-217: an unreadable store no longer claims to have opened with unattributable content
(the OffsiteInventory{} zero value). Opened / empty / unreadable are three states.
R-222: a code that is right about a RETAINED earlier package is named, not blamed. States
what the hub knows and promises nothing — no read path exists.
R-215: GET /recovery is gated on the same predicate as the interception.
Five red-proofs, each demonstrated failing and restored.
--recover-offsite-check is a docker exec diagnostic in the shape of --print-reset-code: it
reads the customer's recovery code from STDIN, asks the agent to fetch this host's sealed
bundle and open it, and reports whether the recovered key matches the one on disk BY SHA256.
Two hashes and a verdict; never a password, never R, never a blob.
R comes from stdin and not a flag because a flag value is visible in ps, in shell history, in
a container's command line and in any transcript of the session that ran it.
IT COMPARES; IT DOES NOT INSTALL. The recovered password is never written to
offbox/repo_password -- installing changes a live box on a path nobody has walked, and that
link is next session's, with the drill around it. A test asserts the data dir is byte-unchanged
after a check; its red-proof (adding the install call) fails it.
Exit codes: 0 match, 2 clean MISMATCH, 1 a step failed -- "it failed" and "it worked and
disagreed" must never share a status. A box with no local password reports distinctly: that is
the rebuilt-box shape, where the next step is to install rather than compare.
Nothing customer-reachable ships here: no card, no form, no preview.
The half that makes the rest work: a degraded backup target recorded only in
config is the silent-degradation pattern this arc has spent a week removing.
Part 3 -- POST /api/backup-target/assign moves the target via the agent's
POST /backup/target. It is the ONLY writer of the role: registration does not set
it, the drive-gate does not, no scheduler does. Declining is not calling it. The
agent returns restart_required rather than restarting itself, because restarting
with a backup in flight records a spurious tier failure for a backup that
actually succeeded (E-1 did exactly that).
Part 4 -- GET /api/backup-target returns the state and, when degraded, Hungarian
copy in FACT -> CONSEQUENCE -> REMEDY order, pinned by a test: a customer told
only the fact cannot act on it.
Healthy renders NOTHING -- no badge, no reassurance, no tonal change.
degradedMessageFor is the single decision point, so exactly one place could start
decorating a working box. Red-proofed: reassuring on the healthy branch fails
Scenario E.
UNKNOWN is not degraded: an unreachable or pre-R-82 agent means we could not ask,
which is not evidence of degradation (R-88 Part 2's class).
A HOLLOW TEST caught by its own red-proof: TestUnknownStateRendersNothing used
{Known:false} with Degraded left false, so it passed even with the !Known guard
deleted -- the second condition covered for it. Now {Known:false, Degraded:true},
which fails properly. Without the red-proof the test would have been decoration.
State is derived from the AGENT, never from our intent flag: on the two boxes
migrated by hand in E-1 the intent was never recorded while the drive really is
the target.
MinAgent: 0.113.0
Green gate: build + vet + test rc=0 (27 packages), run separately from this commit.
NotifyStorageDisconnected and NotifyStorageReconnected were defined and called
from NOWHERE. Registered in allowedEventTypes, in DefaultEnabledEvents, and given
a Hungarian message on the hub -- and never invoked. A drive going absent produced
apps stopped, a WARN log and a UI badge, then silence on every channel. Verified
against the gitignored-cmd/ trap with a positive control. Fifth instance of this
class, found by E-2 Phase 0 rather than by a failure.
A drive that is ONLY a backup target has no apps to stop, so it was silent twice.
ReconcileDriveGates now calls both halves. When the absent drive is the whole-guest
backup target it raises the more specific backup_target_absent (error) instead --
never both, since two mails for one event trains people to ignore the channel --
and recovers as backup_target_restored (info, the existing pairing-gated pattern;
severityNotifies NOT widened). The recovery mirrors the alarm's choice or the
operator cannot match them.
Which drive is the target comes from the AGENT (/disks backup_target, >= 0.112.0),
not from our StoragePath.BackupTarget: that is customer INTENT, and on the two
boxes migrated by hand in E-1 the intent was never recorded while the drive really
is the target. An older agent omits the field -> false -> generic alarm, never a
wrong one.
Before this an absent backup target had NO prompt signal: the tier stays DUE
(targetStoragePresent checks name presence, never reachability), so the only
evidence was its own failure at the next due cycle, up to ~24h away. The R-100
shape.
Tests observe the WIRE, not a mock, because the failure class is "nothing
arrives": a real Notifier posts to an httptest hub and the test asserts the event
type and severity that actually went out.
MinAgent: 0.112.0
Green gate: build + vet + test rc=0 (27 packages), run separately from this commit.
F-CRIT-1 — an app that failed to restart after a quiesce never alarmed, for two
independent reasons, either of which alone kept it dead:
1. restartAll returned nothing, so the failure was logged and dropped and no
caller could learn a customer's app had not come back. It now returns the
stacks that failed; both call sites record the outcome.
2. classifyRunStates whitelists StateStopped on invariant I1 ('StateStopped
means the user stopped it'). The quiesce loop stops stacks by the same
compose-down path, so a failed restart is also StateStopped and was
whitelisted into silence. Loop.FailedRestarts() is now the only thing that
lifts the whitelist, so genuine user stops stay silent (v0.164.0 pinned).
F-A1 — HTTP 409 is the agent's single-flight gate refusing while a restore-test
holds it, not a failure. agentapi now returns a typed *StatusError on POST, the
adapter maps 409 -> quiesce.ErrTierBusy, and the loop defers: no breaker, no
event, no operator email, tier stays DUE.
Two traps avoided. Silence: contention outliving contentionAlarmAfter (3h, set
by the agent's own 120m PBS restore-test ceiling) raises its own BLOCKED signal.
App thrash: removing the failure treatment also removes the breaker's deferral,
so a contended tier is dropped BEFORE anything stops (contentionRetryAfter 15m,
against a 12m01s longest observed restore-test).
Three comments corrected; the invariant rule added to both CLAUDE.md copies.
Six red-proofs, all observed failing.
A witness in a _test.go file fires on go test and go vet but NOT on go build
alone — and a build-only step is exactly how the R-88 Part 2 near-miss would have
shipped. Moved beside the type it pins, and added one for AgentVersionReporter.
No defect found: quiesceBackend and *Client both satisfy their interfaces today.
No version bump, no deploy — compile-time only.
MinAgent: 0.105.0. scheduledRunAllowed fired on any nil age; it now requires a
licence from valveLicensed, which grants it for AgeStateAbsent and for a LEGACY
agent, and refuses it for AgeStateUnknown. An unreadable storage no longer
masquerades as a first-ever backup and no longer quiesces apps outside the window.
A missing wire field means legacy, not unknown — deliberately. Treating it as
unknown would stop the valve firing on un-upgraded boxes and starve genuinely new
ones. Degrade logged once; unrecognised future values also map to legacy.
Caught in passing: TieredBackend is satisfied by a RUNTIME assertion, so the
signature change compiled and vetted clean while quiesceBackend silently stopped
satisfying it — which would have degraded every box to the single-tier path with
no error. Added a compile-time witness.
Also corrects the notifier comment that claimed operator-only came from a missing
customerMessages entry; enforcement is hub-side operatorOnlyEvents (hub 0.79.0).
MinAgent UNCHANGED — degrades gracefully against ANY older agent.
The agent gained per-target tiers in v0.97.0. The controller owns quiescing,
so the multi-tier schedule is reconciled here: every due tier is collected up
front and run inside ONE quiesce window (one stop, N sequential backups, one
resume). Two cycles on the weekly night would mean two app outages for one
night's work.
Dedup rule: local-only -> one quiesce; PBS-only -> one quiesce; BOTH due ->
ONE window with both backups inside; neither -> no quiesce.
- quiesce.TieredBackend + BackupTier + ErrTiersUnsupported (optional extension)
- agentapi: BackupTiers/BackupDueFor/StartBackupFor/BackupStatusFor;
targetQuery("") yields an EMPTY suffix so untargeted hits the pre-R-82 route
byte-for-byte
- Loop.resolveDueTiers = the dedup rule in one place, agent order preserved
- quiesceAndPollTiers + pollTier: app stays quiesced until the LAST tier
snapshots (resuming earlier loses app-consistency on the DR tier). Consequence
stated in the docs: both-due-night downtime = first tier's full backup + last
tier's snapshot, which is why tiers run fast-first.
- Manual 'Mentes most' covers EVERY tier, due-ness ignored.
- Window-gate safety valve now uses the OLDEST due tier, so a stale DR tier
cannot be starved by a fresher local one.
Capability detection: /backup/tiers 404 = pre-R-82 agent (the documented
route-probe mechanism). Not a featureProbes row on purpose — the loop needs the
tier LIST, not a yes/no. Degrade logged exactly once per process.
Tests +11, full suite green. Red-proofs #2 and #3 observed and restored.
agentapi.SmartSummary.ModelName mirrors the agent's model_name; the card row label
prefers the device model over the raw name/UUID, falling back to Name(+hint) on an
old agent. Additive. Test + red-proof (drop fallback -> A4 fails).
gofmt -w across the controller tree (46 files) so gofmt -l is empty — disarms the
formatting landmine where a targeted edit + accidental gofmt -w swept ~46 unrelated
files. Pure formatting: whitespace + gofmt's optional-semicolon removal in reflowed
inline closures. One doc comment reworded ('' -> 'the empty string') to avoid gofmt's
Go-1.19 doc-comment typographic substitition ('' -> curly quote) muddying its meaning.
No build/vet/test behavior change.
Consumes the agent v0.94.0 smart payload (MinAgent floor unchanged; feature-detect
by presence). One pure verdict fn agentapi.DiskVerdictFor shared by the dashboard
card and the 6h check. Card via a 60s /disks TTL cache (anti-smartctl-storm);
unreachable agent -> Nincs adat, page never blocks. disk-health-check (6h) emits
disk_health_degraded on a degradation only vs an in-memory baseline (first run
silent, recovery/UNKNOWN never notify, multi-attr -> one event). No global banner
(deliberate). Pairs with the hub allowlist bump.
Tests: verdict table (>=90 red-proof), notifier emit, check first-run-silent
(red-proof), degradation-once, recovery-silent, UNKNOWN-excluded, FAILING-critical,
nil-smart card, TTL cache.
The customer sees the guest's current memory + allowed range on the Rendszer settings
page and resizes it. The controller proxies + maps the agent's machine code to Hungarian;
the agent (felhom-agent v0.90.0) enforces every bound and applies live (no reboot).
agentapi: GuestMemory + ResizeMemory; ruled 412 -> *MemoryRefusedError (code+bounds);
pre-0.90 agent 404 -> typed *StatusError. Capability: FeatureGuestMemoryResize +
featureMinAgent 0.90.0 + a featureProbes row (type-asserts GuestMemory so the shared
SupportProber/netAgent are untouched).
UI (internal/web/system_memory_handlers.go, settings_system.html): "Szerver memoria (RAM)"
card + number input; POST /api/system/memory/resize -> capability gate -> agent -> flash.
JS confirm only on shrink. Code->Hungarian map; agent-outdated hides the control;
agent-unreachable falls back to the guest's /proc/meminfo. Agent English never shown raw.
Tests: agentapi (decode, 404, refusal-code, capability table) + web handler (success/
below_usage_floor/agent_outdated). Gates + go build/vet/test all pass.
Key-auth-first: a KeyAuthProber seam lets the bridge skip consume+install
when the already-installed key still authenticates (pinned to the freshly
verified host key) — descriptor changes on provisioned guests no longer
loop on consume-404. Fingerprint verify still precedes everything.
Wipe-on-escrowed: confirm-escrow now calls the agent's new
DELETE /escrow/stage-secret (v0.78.0) best-effort, closing the hygiene gap
where a ceremony-less confirm left the staged password file behind.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Pairs with agent v0.77.0. StageEscrowSecret pushes the repo password to the
agent (POST /escrow/stage-secret) at offsite-enable → EscrowState="pending".
Atomicity gate: RunOffboxBackup (scheduler + handler) refuses until
EscrowState="escrowed" (operator POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow after the
escrow ceremony) — no un-recoverable offsite ciphertext can exist. DR:
POST /backup/offbox/inject-password pre-places a recovered 64-hex password 0600
(honored by WriteOffboxSecrets' IsNotExist guard; refuses clobber without
force). DR recipe gains non-secret offsite_restic coords (DRResticCoord); SFTP
key regenerated at DR, not escrowed. New settings.OffboxTarget.EscrowState.
Tests + atomicity & inject companion red-proofs green; UI gates pass. NOT yet
live-validated (supervised ceremony).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
EjectDisk/Decommission switched from c.post (drops non-2xx body) to
postWithStatus + shared refusalError, so the agent's informative 403 body
("…decommission refused (role: X)") reaches the operator instead of a bare
"HTTP 403" (campaign F2 evidence gap). Generic post + other callers untouched.
Tests T-D1/T-D2/T-D3 + ok:false case; T-D1 red-proof shows the pre-fix bare
"HTTP 403". Bundles the v0.101.0 CHANGELOG entry (this + the F3 sync deadline).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Both wizards now source candidates from the agent's Impl-2a raw-device scan
(GET /disks/candidates, proxied) instead of the Observe-based /api/disks — so a
brand-new non-PVE-storage drive is finally discoverable + enrollable end-to-end.
agentapi.ListCandidates + a passthrough proxy (no controller-side filtering; the
agent's unclaimed filter is authoritative). storage_init renders `initialize`,
storage_attach renders `attach`; the enroll flow + Impl-1 guarded mkfs unchanged.
Tests + go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Controller-side of NAS network storage, proxying to agent A1 /netstorage/*. Distinct
'network' storage kind (no drive lifecycle); add/list/remove + per-share health UI;
unreachable NAS is a recoverable warning, never the drive missing/stop cascade; SMB
creds pass through to the agent, never persisted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs
agentClient() built a new agentapi.Client (new bare http.Transport, IdleConnTimeout:0)
per call and discarded it without closing idle conns -> one leaked idle ESTABLISHED
socket per call to the agent :8443, exhausting the ephemeral port range after ~5 days
(EADDRNOTAVAIL). Memoize one shared client via sync.Once; harden Transport
(MaxIdleConns/PerHost + IdleConnTimeout 90s). Agent/firewall untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drives are visible in-guest only at the STABLE /mnt/felhom-drives/<name>; the
registered path + HDD_PATH + FileBrowser source repoint there while agent calls
map back to raw /mnt/<name> (agentWhere). Enroll binds-under-parent before
register. Drive-absent GATE (planDriveGates + 30s driveGateLoop) stops/blocks
apps when a drive vanishes and auto-restarts on return; start-gate refuses start
when the drive is absent. H1 endpoints (disconnect/reconnect/restart-apps) routed
onto host-side ops. Non-hollow tests + companions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
agentapi.Decommission + handleStorageDecommission (migrate-all-or-none, Change 2):
migrate-then-decommission via the migration done-hook, or decommission-anyway (stop
apps, keep HDD_PATH). 'Hiányzó tárhely' badge on dashboard/stacks/app card when an
app's drive is decommissioned/disconnected/absent. Change 4: registerStoragePath
clears the decommissioned marker on re-enroll (ClearDecommissioned had no callers).
Non-hollow tests incl. mutation-proven Change-4 companion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent (v0.31.0) now returns these on /disks, but the controller dropped them when
re-marshalling into its agentapi.DiskInfo mirror. Added both fields (additive) so they reach
/api/disks + the dashboard: wipe_durable_id (gate scheme, for the wipe-confirm) and guest_attached
(drive bound into THIS guest vs merely host-present). Controller behaviour otherwise unchanged.
A failed agent format (e.g. 502 'device is mounted', ok:false, data:null) fell
through FormatDisk's trailing 'return out, nil', so the web layer reported a
zero-value FormatResult as ok:true — a failed DESTRUCTIVE format read as success.
postWithStatus now returns the full envelope; FormatDisk returns a non-nil error
on any non-2xx/ok:false that is not a recognized refusal (403/needs-confirmation).
Test TestFormat_MountedFailureSurfacesError (502 → non-nil err) fails on old code.
Part A of the UI-fixes/storage-spike spec.
A1: enrichHostStorageTargets sorts /api/host-metrics storage_targets
server-side and attaches friendly Hungarian labels + purpose, fixing the
#host-storage-bars reorder-on-poll bug. Display labels only — PVE storage
ids are never renamed.
A2: new GET/POST /stacks/{name}/backup Tier-2 config panel; the "2. mentés"
Beállítás button is repointed there from the dead-end deploy page. Customer
can pin a target drive or disable Tier 2; preference is preserved across the
runner's status writes. Always visible (single-SSD + non-HDD apps included).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
pendingActivationDrives() flags registered drives the agent shows attached but not
live-mounted in the container; settings banner + "Újraindítás most" button →
/api/storage/activate → agentapi.GuestReboot. Batches all pending into one restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
agentapi GuestAttach(where) → POST /disks/guest-attach; runStorageInit/Attach +
handleStorageRegister call attachIntoGuest after register (best-effort, P3 heals).
Closes Branch A: enrolled drives become usable in the guest, banner clears.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Part 2 of the USB/backup spec. agentapi: StatusResponse.Backup record, DueResponse
age_seconds, RestoreTestStatus(). New "Rendszermentés (teljes mentés)" section
(read-only: last backup/target PBS-vs-local/next-due/restore-test) + "Mentés most"
manual trigger that goes through the quiesce loop (controller owns quiescing):
quiesce.Loop gains mutex + TriggerNow() (single-flight, async). New
/api/guest-backup/{trigger,status} (distinct from apiRouter's /api/backup/*).
App-data rows relabeled under an "Alkalmazás-mentések" divider. Config → slice 10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add agentapi HostMetrics() + a thin /api/host-metrics proxy to the agent's
new GET /host/metrics, and a 'Szerver allapota (gazdagep)' card on the
monitoring page rendering host CPU%/load/mem/CPU-temp(n/a)/uptime + per-
storage capacity bars (thin-pool fill, disk temp/wear). Polls every 8s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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