179 Hungarian sentences were built deep inside a package with fmt.Errorf and printed by
whoever caught them: too late to translate where they are shown, too early where they are
made. Every one now carries its key across that gap. ZERO Hungarian error literals remain.
util.MsgError does three things at once, each earned:
- Error() is the Hungarian, byte for byte, so every un-converted printer is unchanged;
- errors.Is answers for the kind AND for a wrapped cause (KindErrorf dropped the cause);
- an error ARGUMENT renders recursively, so "formázás sikertelen: %w" translates whole.
A foreign error — restic, docker, ssh, the stdlib — prints verbatim. It is not ours.
76 display sites go through errText, and TestNoErrErrorInPageOutput convicts any that do
not. memoryVerdict returns an error rather than a sentence, so the deploy's 409 and the
household's language come from one value; UpdateRefusal gained a Cause to carry it.
Plurals, one rule, stated once: a key with .one/.other takes its COUNT first. Not a
per-call-site flag — the producer somebody forgot would read "3 app is not running". The
guard caught a real key collision (alert.deadapp.one) the day the rule landed.
TWO DEFECTS FOUND IN MY OWN TOOLING, recorded rather than quietly fixed. The bulk converter
silently dropped multi-line concatenations, damaging 7 producers — and the parity gate could
not see it, because every surviving fragment WAS a real base literal while the CALL had lost
text; two behaviour tests caught it. And the counting script was case-sensitive, so it said
"0 left" while five remained.
MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Slice 1 translated the dashboard's markup. The sentences the program BUILDS were still
Hungarian literals in Go, so an English household clicked an English button and was
answered in Hungarian. 226 of them move into the bundle here.
A flash was the hard part: it travels inside the redirect URL and is rendered by a
DIFFERENT request, so it now carries a bundle key plus its parameters. A link minted by
an older controller carries prose and is shown verbatim — never a raw key, never dropped.
Also converted: page data and view-model text, the internal/api JSON answers, the alert
banners (Alert.MessageKey, rendered on the way out of GetAlerts), 237 country names at
display, and the four page titles built around an app name (R-566 closed).
Hungarian is byte-identical, and that is measured rather than read:
scripts/i18n_go_parity.py freezes every Go literal at the base commit (7 467) and refuses
a key whose Hungarian is not that text, byte for byte. Three decoys, each seen to convict.
Its own first version filtered the capture through an ASCII-Hungarian word list and missed
seven real literals — the R-565 class. The filter is gone.
Nothing on the wire moved, and wire goldens now hold it there: the report's health
warnings and every notify event message stay Hungarian, because the hub MAILS the
controller's sentence when it has no entry of its own. Slice 3 (R-558) owns those.
MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
R-537 — the contents label is now PER TIER. One string computed from the app's
shape was rendered on all three tier rows; a Tier-1 unit has no file-copy step, so
for the four class-A apps it was claiming „Adatok" for files it does not hold.
R-538 — a unit restore REFUSES before anything is touched when the unit cannot
return the app's drive-side files, and names the route that can. It runs before the
stack is stopped because the measured harm included the app's own wastebasket going
unreachable, which still held every byte.
R-536 — „Alkalmazás telepítve" moved from the deploy's acceptance to its completion,
with app_deploy_started and app_deploy_failed as the honest pair.
Each fix red-proofed: seen failing with its own sentence, passing when restored.
Requires hub v0.116.0 for the two new event types. MinAgent unchanged (0.131.0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
R-87 re-scoped by its own spike and built as Option C. MinAgent 0.129.0 unchanged.
THE QUESTION NOTHING ASKED. The weekly check proves the stored bytes are the bytes we
stored; it cannot tell us we stored the WRONG thing. A hollow recovery unit backs up
cleanly, checks cleanly at 100 percent depth, restores cleanly and gives the customer
nothing back - measured on demo-hp 2026-08-31, 120082104 B to 7036 B in one nightly run
recorded as a success (R-403). No tier and no cadence asked it. Now offsite-proof does,
nightly, on one app.
IT DOES NOT prove a restore puts data back into a running app. That stays drill work and
07 section 8 matrix row 4 is NOT moved.
THE ACCEPTANCE RULE HAS TWO PARTS AND THE OBVIOUS ONE IS A TRAP. "Check the unit against
its own packing list" PASSES a hollow unit, because a hollow unit declares nothing. So:
(1) everything declared is present, AND (2) the manifest declares what the app is supposed
to have. Part 2 is the whole value. RED-PROOFED: the naive rule makes the hollow-unit test
read verdict "pass".
THE EXPECTATION COMES FROM INSIDE THE UNIT, never the live box - the snapshot may predate
the app's shape, and GetDockerVolumes describes the running app. Database half is
DBServiceNames, the same discriminator RestoreFromRecoveryUnit uses. Volume half is
ParseComposeNamedVolumes as an EXISTENCE check, not a name match: tars are
<project>_<volume>.tar and ResolveDockerVolumeNames derives the project from the compose
file's parent dir, which inside a unit is the literal string "compose". Measured on all
eight real units on demo-hp the counts match exactly and the naming held every time - but
"held on eight" is not "derivable" (R-355). Half a rule that is true beats a whole rule
that is invented.
THREE OUTCOMES: pass, fail (readable and empty), cannot judge. An app that legitimately
has neither a database nor volumes PASSES. RED-PROOFED: alarming on any empty unit makes
that test read verdict "fail".
IT NEVER WRITES TO THE REPOSITORY and that is asserted on the ARGV as a non-effect:
--no-lock, no unlockStale, and m.runner() rather than resticStep so the unlock --remove-all
escalation is unreachable. RED-PROOFED: routing it the customer path's way makes the test
fail on "unlock" appearing in the argv.
IT TAKES acquireRunning ITSELF and skips rather than waits, because RestoreOffboxScratch
does not take it (R-408) while offbox_integrity.go states that invariant as universal.
DUE-NESS IS PER SNAPSHOT (R-86's model), never per clock. RED-PROOFED: recording a
timestamp fails the stored-value test AND breaks the rotation - night 2 re-picks night 1's
app.
ITS SCRATCH IS A SEPARATE ROOT (backups/offsite-proof) and that is a safety decision, not
tidiness: the job deletes its copy on every path, and sharing backups/offsite-restore/<app>
would mean a nightly background job deleting the verification copy a CUSTOMER is looking
at. It is also invisible to placement, so a proof copy can never be pushed into a live app.
SHARED RATHER THAN FORKED: offboxScratchDirIn parameterises the scratch resolver on its
ROOT builder, and unitOnlyHeadroom extracts the free-space gate, so the customer path and
the proof refuse at the same floor with the same Hungarian sentence. RestoreOffboxScratch's
behaviour is unchanged.
NEW EVENT offsite_proof_empty, severity error, operator-only - deliberately NOT
backup_integrity_failed, whose hub template says the store is DAMAGED. Here the store is
sound and the content is absent: different cause, different action. The hub half shipped
FIRST, in felhom.eu 1aeaa30 (hub v0.110.0, live and verified), because an unallowlisted
type is 400'd and vanishes.
33 new tests, all groups green; full suite 1689 tests, 28 packages, rc=0. All 13 controller
gates OK. Five red-proofs run and recorded in REPORT.md.
A golden carrying 0.231.0 is OWED - the fleet is on 0.230.0. Viktor's call (R-242).
R-329. NotifyAppStartFailures emitted severity "warn". The hub accepts exactly
{info, warning, error, critical} and silently coerces anything else to "info",
which severityNotifies then drops BEFORE both legs. Banner shown, event stored,
POST 200, no mail sent. One word.
This is the second time: DiskAlertKind.Severity emitted "warn" until v0.215.0
and its own comment records that every warning-level disk alert went to nobody.
A comment recorded the lesson and nothing enforced it. The guard is now an AST
walk over the whole controller - grep cannot work here, since "warn" appears
legitimately nine times as a healthcheck status vocabulary.
The sweep found exactly one bad severity. Its limits are stated: the walk cannot
follow a variable, so all six dynamic call sites are registered by name with the
values each can take, and a new one fails the test. Two of the six were found by
the guard, not by the hand sweep before it.
Also pinned: fillwatch.Band.Severity() returns "" for BandOK, which would vanish
the same way. It is unreachable because Check() notifies only on escalation -
but that safety lives in a different function from the one that looks unsafe, so
the test asserts the consequence rather than the mapping.
app_start_failed gains a customer toggle, DEFAULT OFF, per operator ruling. The
operator is mailed either way: processOperator never consults customer prefs.
It is deliberately NOT in operatorOnlyEvents, which would make the toggle a lie.
R-386. classifyRunStates decided "the customer stopped this" from the STATE, so
every stopped stack was assumed deliberate. Measured on demo-hp: privatebin
stopped out of band, nine scans, zero events, zero banner - while the comment
beside it claimed an out-of-band stop still alerts.
DesiredState already records the answer and has exactly one writer. Stopped ->
no alarm; Running -> alarm; absent -> UNKNOWN, keep today's behaviour AND say
so. Absent stays silent deliberately: reading it as "nobody asked" would email
about every app anyone ever stopped, fleet-wide, on the first cycle after
upgrade. The gap is bounded not silent - IntentUnknown is set and the names are
logged at INFO on the heartbeat cadence. failedRestart still lifts a Stopped
intent, or F-CRIT-1 re-opens. No new DesiredState writer.
Two settings toggles each governed two alarms. "Lemez figyelmeztetes (90%+)"
also wrote disk_critical, the drive-is-FAILING alarm. Now four honest toggles;
12 became 15. A no-op save stores the existing slice verbatim, so byte identity
is by construction - without that guard the defaults case reorders, which the
red-proof caught.
Test count 1504 -> 1522. Five red-proofs, five seen failing; one passed first
time and is reported - that mutation was inert, not the test weak.
Three defects made the disk-health feature silent in exactly the case it
exists for. Evidence: felhom.eu documentation/audits/DIAG-smart-passed-trap-2026-08-14.md
1. SEVERITY (the one that changes whether anything arrives at all).
NotifyDiskHealthDegraded emitted severity "warn", which is NOT in the
hub's accepted set {info,warning,error,critical}. The hub coerced it to
"info" (hub/internal/api/handler.go) and severityNotifies dropped it
(hub/internal/notify/dispatcher.go), so every Figyelmeztetes-level disk
alert was filed as an informational notice and emailed to NOBODY, on the
customer and the operator leg alike. Now "warning". DiskAlertKind.Severity()
is exported so the contract is checkable from any package.
2. NO LEVEL ABOVE "worth an eye". smart_status.passed CANNOT fail on
unreadable sectors (attrs 187/197/198 all carry thresh 0 and a normalized
value floors at 1), so Hiba was unreachable for this whole fault class.
DiskVerdictFor now takes a DiskPrior and implements a 14-row top-down
ladder: sustained unreadable sectors, a count too large to be a blip (64),
unreadable+remapping together, overheating, NVMe critical flag or spent
endurance all reach Hiba. No fourth label — predicted failure is "Hiba".
3. IT SPOKE ONCE, AND FORGOT ON RESTART. The baseline was in-memory, so a box
that rebooted while a disk was failing never alerted again; and between 8
and 352 sectors nothing was emitted at all. State is now persisted
(disk-health-state.json, atomic tmp+rename), the decision compares against
the last ALERTED verdict (collapsing flaps to one alert while letting a
genuine escalation fire immediately), and a disk already at Hiba re-alerts
once it has BOTH doubled its count and waited out a 24h cooldown.
The card replays the same prior the check used (diskRecord.PriorSawUncorrectable)
so the chip and the email cannot disagree — the property the shared verdict
function exists to guarantee, now pinned rather than asserted.
Tests: 12 scenario groups A-L. Group L builds the Server through web.NewServer,
the same call main.go makes, over a real file.
MEASURED, not supposed. On 2026-08-03 nine per-app recovery_unit_capture_failed
events reached the hub and TWO operator emails went out. The hub's operator
cooldown key is customerID:eventType(+tier) and that event carries `app` but no
`tier`, so the key held no app identifier: the first refused app took the hour's
slot and every other app's failure was discarded BEFORE anything was written
down, leaving no row on any channel.
The obvious fix — put `app` in the key — was ruled against: on a full disk it
produces one email per app, the volume problem wearing the correctness problem's
clothes.
internal/backup/runsummary.go: a per-run collector with exactly admissionSet's
lifetime, fed by all three write legs, emitting backup_run_failures ONCE at the
end and only when something failed. A clean run emits nothing.
The per-app event stays and becomes the RECORD — the hub routes it record-only,
stored and logged every time, never competing for an email slot. The record and
the notification are now different things.
Deliberate skips (disconnected, decommissioned) are excluded: they have their
own alert, and a nightly email about an unplugged drive is one the operator
learns to ignore.
A manual run always reports: the digest carries a unique run_id the cooldown
cannot collapse. Someone pressing the button is actively trying to get a backup.
THE PERIODIC SWEEP GETS A DIGEST TOO. With the per-app event now record-only, a
capture failure found between runs would be recorded and never notified — a new
silence introduced while closing one. That path emits a digest with NO run_id,
so the ordinary 1-hour cooldown caps it exactly as before while the mail now
lists every failing app instead of whichever was first.
A refusal is recorded ONCE, where the verdict is taken, not at the three legs
that consult it — R-181's contract is one verdict per app per run. Noting it per
leg listed one refused app three times and produced "2 of 1 apps failed". Found
by the digest's own test, not in review.
Silence is safe because the hub's deadline check raises expected_backup_missed
from report freshness, independently of any mail this box sends
(monitor/deadline.go:396,417). Confirmed, not assumed.
7 new tests, 4 red-proofs. The main.go seam walk did NOT fail on its first
attempt — the AST test walked the backup package and not main.go; the test was
fixed and the mutation re-run rather than the pass recorded.
R-167: new internal/fillwatch warns the CUSTOMER before a filesystem fills.
It emits the PRE-EXISTING disk_warning/disk_critical pair, which was
allowlisted, copy'd, default-enabled and checkbox'd with no producer in any
repo — the sixth "built but never wired" instance here. Two threshold terms
(85% or 5 GiB free; critical 95%/2 GiB) because a percentage alone lies at
both ends of this fleet's size range. Edge-triggered on escalation only,
state persisted, hysteresis dead zone at 75%/7 GiB pinned by a test. A nil
usage read is never a warning and never clears one. Per filesystem, never
per app. Daily 03:30, before the nightly app-data legs.
R-158: new unitNotify seam fires per app when a Tier-1 recovery-unit capture
fails, loop continuing, carrying the target filesystem's used/free bytes.
Operator-tier (recovery_unit_capture_failed) — deliberately NOT backup_failed,
which is customer-enabled and would email the customer about a failure they
cannot act on. D-c overrides R-158's own proposal here.
R-174: the app-stop guard no longer starts apps onto MISSING drives — a
regression in v0.189.0 code, found by review and closed the same session.
SetStarter got the raw stack manager, whose StartStack has no drive gate,
and Recover runs at startup. R-171 one path over. bootDriveGate could not be
reused whole (its holder #2 is the guard's own marker, and holders #1/#2 read
vars assigned after Recover runs), so holder #3 is extracted into a shared
driveStartGate with a test pinning the delegation. ErrStartRefused splits a
refusal from a failure: both keep the marker, only Failed alarms, because
routing a deliberate hold into NotifyBackupFailed is the same false alarm.
Tests 1157 -> 1184. All red-proofs demonstrated failing and restored.
NotifyStorageDisconnected and NotifyStorageReconnected were defined and called
from NOWHERE. Registered in allowedEventTypes, in DefaultEnabledEvents, and given
a Hungarian message on the hub -- and never invoked. A drive going absent produced
apps stopped, a WARN log and a UI badge, then silence on every channel. Verified
against the gitignored-cmd/ trap with a positive control. Fifth instance of this
class, found by E-2 Phase 0 rather than by a failure.
A drive that is ONLY a backup target has no apps to stop, so it was silent twice.
ReconcileDriveGates now calls both halves. When the absent drive is the whole-guest
backup target it raises the more specific backup_target_absent (error) instead --
never both, since two mails for one event trains people to ignore the channel --
and recovers as backup_target_restored (info, the existing pairing-gated pattern;
severityNotifies NOT widened). The recovery mirrors the alarm's choice or the
operator cannot match them.
Which drive is the target comes from the AGENT (/disks backup_target, >= 0.112.0),
not from our StoragePath.BackupTarget: that is customer INTENT, and on the two
boxes migrated by hand in E-1 the intent was never recorded while the drive really
is the target. An older agent omits the field -> false -> generic alarm, never a
wrong one.
Before this an absent backup target had NO prompt signal: the tier stays DUE
(targetStoragePresent checks name presence, never reachability), so the only
evidence was its own failure at the next due cycle, up to ~24h away. The R-100
shape.
Tests observe the WIRE, not a mock, because the failure class is "nothing
arrives": a real Notifier posts to an httptest hub and the test asserts the event
type and severity that actually went out.
MinAgent: 0.112.0
Green gate: build + vet + test rc=0 (27 packages), run separately from this commit.
MinAgent: 0.105.0. scheduledRunAllowed fired on any nil age; it now requires a
licence from valveLicensed, which grants it for AgeStateAbsent and for a LEGACY
agent, and refuses it for AgeStateUnknown. An unreadable storage no longer
masquerades as a first-ever backup and no longer quiesces apps outside the window.
A missing wire field means legacy, not unknown — deliberately. Treating it as
unknown would stop the valve firing on un-upgraded boxes and starve genuinely new
ones. Degrade logged once; unrecognised future values also map to legacy.
Caught in passing: TieredBackend is satisfied by a RUNTIME assertion, so the
signature change compiled and vetted clean while quiesceBackend silently stopped
satisfying it — which would have degraded every box to the single-tier path with
no error. Added a compile-time witness.
Also corrects the notifier comment that claimed operator-only came from a missing
customerMessages entry; enforcement is hub-side operatorOnlyEvents (hub 0.79.0).
R-97a: internal/quiesce had no route to the hub at all — three failed whole-guest
backups on 2026-07-27 produced zero events. TierNotifier is a seam (not an import),
wired by an init-only setter because main.go builds the notifier after the loop.
Edge-triggered: the failure fires when the R-88 breaker ARMS, not per retry, and
recovery rides recordSuccess's existing bool. Uses NEW operator-only event types;
reusing backup_failed would have emailed the customer in Hungarian about a backup
they cannot act on, since it has a customerMessages entry and is in live
enabled_events. Requires hub >= v0.78.0.
R-97b: v0.164.0's state filter cannot see an app caught MID-RESTART, which is how
BookStack alarmed. The fix is a suppression window keyed to the quiesce CYCLE,
consumed at the same single derivation point. 180s grace, derived from the deploy
flow's 120s health timeout and Mealie's 60s start_period; it expires, so an app
that genuinely fails to come back still alarms.
Source: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/DIAG-agent-channel-2026-07-26.md
bootstrap.DetectEndpointDrift names a controller.yaml vs bootstrap.json
local_api.endpoint divergence -- one ERROR carrying BOTH values and BOTH paths,
its own event type local_api_endpoint_drift, and its own Hungarian banner shown
ABOVE the channel banner because drift is the cause and "agent unreachable" the
symptom. It writes NOTHING: reconciling from bootstrap.json would clobber a
correct controller.yaml on any half-provisioned or hand-repaired guest, so the
authority ruling is deferred to R-78. Fail-safe silent on absent/unparseable/
incomplete bootstrap and on an empty endpoint (ensureLocalAPI's fill-if-missing
path is untouched). Fingerprint compared as a BOOLEAN only; token never
compared, logged or exposed.
EffectiveProtected now gates samba on Enabled && UserSet, mirroring BOTH of
reconcileSambaAt's early returns, and the doc comment is corrected in the same
change -- it claimed "detection and deployment agree in both directions" while
citing only !smb.Enabled, an assertion that went false when !smb.UserSet was
added. Not over-suppressed: sharing on WITH a password and a dead container
still alarms.
Channel log: the debounce placeholder is stateUnconfirmed (rendered "unseeded")
instead of "up", so a born-down channel no longer logs "up->down" and orUnseeded
stops being dead code. Logging only -- the placeholder is still matched in the
re-arm condition, so F2 born-down alerting is byte-for-byte unchanged and all
nine pre-existing channelhealth tests pass.
Tests 951 -> 959, all green. Red-proofs A (both directions), E and F.
MinAgent unchanged; felhom-agent untouched.
Consumes the agent v0.94.0 smart payload (MinAgent floor unchanged; feature-detect
by presence). One pure verdict fn agentapi.DiskVerdictFor shared by the dashboard
card and the 6h check. Card via a 60s /disks TTL cache (anti-smartctl-storm);
unreachable agent -> Nincs adat, page never blocks. disk-health-check (6h) emits
disk_health_degraded on a degradation only vs an in-memory baseline (first run
silent, recovery/UNKNOWN never notify, multi-attr -> one event). No global banner
(deliberate). Pairs with the hub allowlist bump.
Tests: verdict table (>=90 red-proof), notifier emit, check first-run-silent
(red-proof), degradation-once, recovery-silent, UNKNOWN-excluded, FAILING-critical,
nil-smart card, TTL cache.
New internal/channelhealth Checker: ~60s probe via the PRODUCTION memoized client
(Server.ProbeAgentChannel, GET /storage), classifies failures (spike Q1 map), debounces transient
reasons (N>=2; construction error latches distinctly), seeds first obs, alerts operator+dashboard on
transition. Notifier.NotifyAgentChannelDown/Recovered (English, operator-only), AlertManager dashboard
banner (Hungarian). No agent/hub change. Spike-proven.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
Controller half of Phase-1 Infra Backup retirement (hub v0.12.0;
SPIKE-infra-backup-2026-06-15). Pure dead-code removal, no behaviour change.
- Remove Pusher.PushInfraBackup (caller-less; hub endpoint gone).
- Remove Notifier.NotifyBackupCompleted / backup_completed event (caller-less
since slice 8C; hub deadline check now reads agent host-report PBS snapshots).
- Remove report.BackupReport.ResticPassword — builder never sets it post-8C
(confirmed in source + live), but it historically leaked the restic password
into the hub's plaintext reports store.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Debug-mode-only dashboard (/debug) with 8 collapsible sections:
system diagnostics, notification testing, backup triggers, storage
simulation, hub & connectivity, self-update dry-run, DR/setup wizard,
and in-memory log viewer. Migrates debug dump from API router to web
server. Adds ring buffer log capture, storage disconnect simulation,
event history tracking, and cross-drive/self-update test methods.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After successful config apply, immediately push infra backup to Hub
so the config sync status updates right away. Also fix startup event
message that showed "vv0.21.2" instead of "v0.21.3".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- SyncPreferences() method on Notifier: POST to hub /api/v1/preferences
- IsEnabled() getter for hub connectivity check
- settingsNotificationsHandler: sync to hub after local save (3 flash message variants)
- Startup sync: non-blocking goroutine pushes prefs to hub on boot (DB rebuild recovery)
- Updated CONTEXT.md, README.md with v0.7.2 changes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Monitoring page: "Távoli monitoring" section showing healthcheck ping UUID
configuration status (configured/not configured) for each of the 5 pings
- Alert manager: persistent dashboard banners on all pages generated from
health check results, missing pings, and backup status
- Notification system: controller-side notifier sends events to hub relay,
with cooldown tracking and event-type filtering
- Notification preferences UI: email, event checkboxes, cooldown settings
on the settings page with test email functionality
- Settings refactored: shared settingsData() helper, NotificationPrefs
struct with getter/setter and defaults
New files:
- controller/internal/web/alerts.go (AlertManager)
- controller/internal/notify/notifier.go (hub notification client)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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