Closes R-47. No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0.
The replay needs a running DB container, so both restore paths started the
WHOLE stack first, giving the application a window to rebuild the very schema
objects the dump was about to create. Measured live on 2026-07-19 (H4,
DIAG-immich-restore-round2): immich-server rebuilt clip_index two seconds
before the dump's CREATE INDEX, the replay aborted "already exists" under
ON_ERROR_STOP=1, and immich reported schema drift. The data survived only
because pg_dump emits COPY before CREATE INDEX.
Both paths now open a DB-ONLY window: only the stack's database service(s)
come up, the dump is replayed with the app still down, and the full start
runs only after the replay exits 0. Fail-closed: a dump with no identifiable
DB service refuses BEFORE the first mutation. Every exit from the window
still does a best-effort full start, so a failed restore never leaves a box
with a database and no application.
New: appbackup.DBServiceNames (yaml.v3 services-map parse — never a line
scan; immich's top-level volume keys are the decoy) sharing dbTypeForImage
with DiscoverDatabases; stacks.Manager.StartStackServices (refuses an empty
list — argument-less `up -d` is a full start); RedeployFromEnv split into
PersistUnitRedeployConfig + its unchanged tail. StackDataProvider's
RecreateStackFromUnit becomes RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit — the hidden
`up -d` inside the old name is what carried the defect on the local path.
19 new tests (ordering plus state-at-replay-time, zero-mutation fail-closed
effects, replay-failure bring-up, parser decoys, empty-list refusal); three
companion red-proofs run and reverted. 23/23 packages green.
Not yet live-validated: STOP-1 supervised reconstitute, golden 0.153.0.
The proceed-path for a missing RESETTABLE secret redeployed the app with the
secret blank (compose "Defaulting to a blank string" → exit 1, live-hit in the
2026-07-04 drill Phase 5). Now the restore generates a fresh credential instead:
- stacks.Manager.GenerateSecretForField: replacement value from the field's
catalog generate spec via the deploy flow's generateValue (no logic copied);
refuses data-keys (defense-in-depth), spec-less and non-secret fields.
- backup.Manager.SetSecretGenerator seam (wired in main.go), consulted in
RestoreFromRecoveryUnit AFTER the untouched fail-closed gate, for missing
names NOT in DataKeyEnvVars. The generated value rides fullEnv into
RecreateStackFromUnit → RedeployFromEnv → SaveAppConfig, so it persists
encrypted in the guest app.yaml and round-trips on the next backup/restore
(no second write path). reconcileRestoreSecrets stays pure and untouched.
- WARNs now discriminate: "generated replacement for X (credential was reset)"
vs "X unrecoverable and has no generator — app may fail to start". Values are
never logged (asserted in test).
- Residual case (documented, not pretended away): if a restored volume tar
carries the OLD internal credential hash, the app may still fail auth until a
manual in-DB reset — generation fully fixes only the fresh-init case.
Companion red-proof: pre-fix behaviour (generation skipped) fails
TestRestoreGeneratesMissingResettableSecret on the non-empty DB_PASSWORD
assertion (verified, reverted). Data-key gate proven unreachable by generation
in TestRestoreGenerationNeverReachesDataKeys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
The restore paths (RestoreFromRecoveryUnit + the RestoreApp fallback) repopulated
Docker volume tars but NEVER replayed the captured <stack>-<dbtype>.sql dump, so
DB-resident data (e.g. rows in a DB whose data dir is a bind mount) did not come
back — the romm marker round-trip in the audit lost the row.
New appbackup.ImportDump (read-side counterpart to DumpOne) replays a .sql/.sql.gz
into the running DB using the live container's OWN discovered credentials (no env
threading; reuses DiscoveredDB + getMariaDBPassword). backup.reimportDBDumps
orchestrates it AFTER volume restore + stack bring-up, so the logical dump WINS
over any volume-tar copy of the DB (operator-chosen precedence). pg_dump
--clean --if-exists and mariadb-dump (default --add-drop-table) make replay
idempotent; psql ON_ERROR_STOP=1 surfaces real import errors.
Also: volume-restore per-volume failures and DB-import failures now SURFACE (the
restore returns an error) instead of a swallowed WARN, so a failed data restore
cannot read as success.
Tests (restore_db_test.go, injectable discover/import seams): imports when dump+DB
present, failure surfaces, no-dump skips discovery, dump-but-no-matching-DB is a
non-fatal skip. Live DB round-trip to be validated post-deploy.
Restore recreates an app from its on-drive unit + the guest's own secrets,
regenerating nothing. reconcileRestoreSecrets (pure, unit-tested) merges the unit's
non-secret env with secrets recovered from the live app.yaml and FAILS CLOSED if a
data-encrypting key is unrecoverable (refuse — a PBS whole-guest restore is needed —
rather than regenerate and corrupt). Resettable secrets missing → warn + proceed.
- backup: RestoreFromRecoveryUnit (manifest -> recover secrets -> gate -> restore
volumes -> recreate definition + redeploy w/ re-pull); falls back to volume-only.
- seams: RecoverStackSecrets/RecreateStackFromUnit (adapter +encKey),
stacks.RedeployFromEnv. Wired into /backup/restore.
- tests: gate (refuse/proceed/verbatim) + data_key parsing.
Gate + reconcile + data_key parsing unit-tested; capture live-validated (v0.53.1).
Full readable-data e2e vs AdventureLog needs the auth-gated dashboard restore — pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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