6 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	5ce3a44645	v0.218.0: attribute a DB container by its compose project, and replay volumes on the off-site restore ... R-355 (first, because it is the only one where data can be lost for good). paperless-ngx's PostgreSQL was dumped into backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps/ — a directory for a stack that does not exist, on the system drive — while the app's own unit recorded db_dumps: null. The same misattribution reached writeSafetyDump, so a destructive restore of that app took NO undo copy and the fail-closed refusal was never reached. Fixed by reading the compose project label, which is the stack name by construction (compose runs with cmd.Dir set to the stack dir and no -p). The old derivation stays as the fallback and an unresolvable attribution is now loud. Catalogue sweep, proven able to convict: one affected app of 53. The fix is in the controller, not the catalogue. R-354. ReconstituteFromOffsite skipped every unit placement and the volume archives live inside the unit, so the off-site restore had no volume leg at all — proven live with planted files: calibre-web's 1,422,848-byte config archive was in the unit, the snapshot and the checking folder, and the restore reported success without it. For the 40 of 53 apps that declare no data drive that archive is the whole dataset. restoreDockerVolumesFrom is the local path's own replay with an explicit directory: ONE implementation, two callers. Volumes replay before the database and inside the stopped window. VolumesReplayed reaches the message. The comment beside the skip was half false and is corrected; the half that still holds — the live unit is the local path's source — is named, and scenario D fingerprints the whole live unit across the operation. Seven red-proofs, each asserted applied and reverted. Two found defects in the tests, not the code: scenario D passed with the unit guard removed because the fingerprint had been narrowed and was blind to the unit root.	2026-08-22 09:43:22 +02:00
admin	985388c6e9	R-351: the restore compares where the backup says the data lived; second press cannot start a second run ... Part 3 (not droppable) and the engine half of Part 2. No version bump yet - one bump and one bake at the end of the session. PART 3a - a second press really did start a second run. Established with a test BEFORE any change: both offboxReconstituteHandler and offboxPlaceHandler answered "...elindult" and overwrote the first restore's op/stack. Cause: every restore handler gated on backupMgr.IsRunning() - the CONCURRENCY flag, which the restore goroutine acquires AFTER the handler returns (offbox_reconstitute.go:180, offbox_restore.go:393). Seven sites. The wizard had read the correct flag since v0.154.0 and said so in a comment; the handlers never moved. New Server.restoreOpBlocked() reads BOTH flags - the display flag covers the whole off-box restore, the concurrency flag is the only one the nightly backup holds - and the refusal now names the running app and a route. PART 3b - the page DOES refresh; the defect was the RESULT. backups_shared.html gated the terminal result on a page-local sawRunning flag, so a restore that finished before the page was opened, or inside one 3s poll, was shown to nobody. The 2026-08-21 OpenGist restore took 8.666s and no screen ever said it completed - the answer existed only in docker logs. RestoreOpStatus.LastRecent now carries the server's verdict. The 10-minute window moved to internal/backup as RestoreResultWindow and internal/web's constant is an alias: one expression, two surfaces. Also removed the wizard's self-contradiction, which said the state refreshes automatically AND that you must refresh the page. PART 2 (engine) - every recovery unit manifest has carried drive and namespace_root since schema 1, and NO non-test code read either back. The reconstitution opened the manifest and took only the coherence stamp, then resolved its destination from the live app. A restore into a different destination succeeded silently under a green message. New backup/offbox_placement.go: CheckPlacement (pure, total), PlacementMismatchMessage, recordedPlacementFromScratch. Compared before the safety dump and before the first byte. A mismatch is NAMED and refused; ackPlacementChange lets the customer proceed deliberately - a separate field from confirm=1, because one click must not carry two decisions. An UNKNOWN recording is never a mismatch: refusing on an absence would strand every pre-field unit. The not-installed refusal (R-253) now names the drive the backup recorded. RED-PROOFS, each mutation asserted applied and reverted to 0: B both guards removed (count asserted 2) -> the restore WAS seen starting with no drive attached: no error, full 3.00s run, wrote into /tmp/mutant-destination C Mismatch forced false -> the silent divergent restore returned E Known() forced true -> the fabricated empty prefill appeared D Mismatch forced true -> 8 ordinary reconstitute tests broke, proving reachability both ways Note on D: the existing fixtures write a schema-1 manifest with NO drive, so they are scenario-E shaped. The matching case is covered in the scenario table, not by them. Gates 11/11 OK. Suite 28 packages ok. Hungarian verified as hex, no BOM, no mojibake sentinels. NOT in this commit, still open: Part 2's scenario-A prefill UI, Part 1's deploy-page visibility line, Part 1's specification document, Part 4's measurement.	2026-08-21 21:04:16 +02:00
admin	8dbbc98ff2	v0.207.0 — R-249: the retrieval passphrase leaves the page body; R-252/R-253: two refusals learn to say what to do ... R-249. settings_security.html rendered the passphrase into a display:none span behind a Megjelenit button. That toggle stops a browser DRAWING the value and nothing else — the plaintext was in the response body of every render, so a curl of the page returned it. Found by exactly that: it landed in a session transcript while driving the documented rebuild path. The codebase already stated this rule for the recovery code and this page did not follow it (escrow_handlers.go: 'reveal (claim XHR only — R is NEVER templated server-side into HTML)'). The page now carries only HasRetrievalPassword; the value comes from POST /settings/retrieval-password/reveal — CSRF-covered because POST, no-store, and LOGGED as an act, which reading it off the markup never was. The tests assert the RAW RESPONSE BODY. Every test that asked what the customer sees passed while the bytes carried the secret; that is why this survived. Census: the render-then-hide pattern appears twice more — app_info.html (a real per-install app password in a hidden span) and deploy.html. Filed as R-254, NOT fixed here. R-252. A rebuilt box keeps its drives but loses their REGISTRATION. The restore page now states that before the customer presses anything, says the backups and drives are both still there, and links to Tarhely > Meghajtok. Page and resolver ask ONE question — HasRestoreDestination() reads the same GetSchedulableStoragePaths() the scratch resolver reads. R-253. The list promised 'a visszaallitas elobb ujratelepiti' three lines above a refusal that fired BECAUSE the app was not installed. The promise was the wrong half: reconstitution writes to the app's own GetStackHDDPath, which exists only once the CUSTOMER has chosen a drive at deploy time. Auto-reinstalling would mean the product making that choice for them. Copy now says to install first and routes to /stacks/<app>/deploy. Both notices are conditional — a healthy box renders as before, pinned by a test that fails if either becomes unconditional.	2026-08-07 18:04:26 +02:00
admin	dbcb306fcf	v0.189.0 — desired state + the app-stop crash marker (R-166 / D-b) ... The box stops inferring the customer's intent from a container count and reads what they actually asked for. Part 1 — desired state. AppConfig gains a tri-state `desired_state` (""/running/stopped), written ONLY by the customer's own action: the API action switch, DeployStack, UpdateOptionalConfig's redeploy branch, and the .fab import. Intent is written BEFORE the act and a failed write REFUSES the act. StartStack/StopStack are deliberately not writers — 14 callers, only 2 are the customer. bootrecon.isBootOrphan now reads intent instead of len(Containers)>0, which closes R-157 mechanism B (a power cut or interrupted deploy left an app with zero containers, read as a deliberate stop, and stranded silently). ABSENT MEANS UNKNOWN, NEVER "running": every pre-v0.189.0 app.yaml reads absent, so the legacy fallback is byte-identical to the old rule. A running-only startup backfill converges the unambiguous cases; `stopped` is never inferred. Part 2 — backup.AppStopGuard, a persisted marker over every stop→work→start window (volume dump, offbox reconstitute, .fab export). Its own file, never quiesce's. Written before the stop, cleared only after a restart that succeeded, kept when one fails. Recover() completes before the boot reconciler is launched and returns its outcome, which main.go reports on the existing backup_failed event once the notifier exists. A defer is not the mechanism — a SIGKILL runs none (Campaign 8 fault 10). Also: SaveAppConfig rebuilt AppConfig field-by-field (the R-100 shape) and would have dropped desired_state on every save across nine call sites. Replaced with copy-and-overlay. Measured: app.yaml does not round-trip unknown YAML keys. No hub change, no agent coupling, no user-visible string. 27/27 packages green; 7 red-proofs observed FAIL then restored.	2026-08-02 18:40:17 +02:00
admin	78ff991f1c	v0.153.0 — R-47: the DB replay no longer races the app, on BOTH restore paths ... Closes R-47. No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0. The replay needs a running DB container, so both restore paths started the WHOLE stack first, giving the application a window to rebuild the very schema objects the dump was about to create. Measured live on 2026-07-19 (H4, DIAG-immich-restore-round2): immich-server rebuilt clip_index two seconds before the dump's CREATE INDEX, the replay aborted "already exists" under ON_ERROR_STOP=1, and immich reported schema drift. The data survived only because pg_dump emits COPY before CREATE INDEX. Both paths now open a DB-ONLY window: only the stack's database service(s) come up, the dump is replayed with the app still down, and the full start runs only after the replay exits 0. Fail-closed: a dump with no identifiable DB service refuses BEFORE the first mutation. Every exit from the window still does a best-effort full start, so a failed restore never leaves a box with a database and no application. New: appbackup.DBServiceNames (yaml.v3 services-map parse — never a line scan; immich's top-level volume keys are the decoy) sharing dbTypeForImage with DiscoverDatabases; stacks.Manager.StartStackServices (refuses an empty list — argument-less `up -d` is a full start); RedeployFromEnv split into PersistUnitRedeployConfig + its unchanged tail. StackDataProvider's RecreateStackFromUnit becomes RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit — the hidden `up -d` inside the old name is what carried the defect on the local path. 19 new tests (ordering plus state-at-replay-time, zero-mutation fail-closed effects, replay-failure bring-up, parser decoys, empty-list refusal); three companion red-proofs run and reverted. 23/23 packages green. Not yet live-validated: STOP-1 supervised reconstitute, golden 0.153.0.	2026-07-20 17:01:52 +02:00
admin	062357f778	v0.148.0 — coherent snapshot pairs + an offsite restore that actually restores (R-43 + R-44) ... Closes the two findings from DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19. Viktor deleted 11 immich photos to test offsite restore; both runs flashed success and the photos stayed gone. Two independent defects. R-43 — no offsite path could restore a database. All three buttons were file-only: the two "visszaállítás" actions staged to a scratch folder and never touched postgres, and place-to-live merged only MISSING files. For a DB-indexed app the bytes returned and the app still could not see them. The dump was carried INTO every snapshot and could never be replayed OUT of one. New ReconstituteFromOffsite (/backup/offbox/reconstitute): safety dump → stop → files overwritten to the snapshot version → start → the snapshot's own dump replayed → health wait. Two invariants: - nothing is ever deleted (-a, no --ignore-existing, no --delete): a file created after the snapshot survives as an extra; - the undo exists before the act — the pre-restore- dump is verified ON DISK before anything is stopped, overwritten or replayed; if it cannot be taken the operation refuses with zero changes. The replay reads the SCRATCH unit: the live unit is never overwritten, so replaying from it would replay the current DB over itself and restore nothing. R-44 — a manual push shipped an unrefreshed dump (up to ~24h old). That day's predated the customer's account by four hours and probed to asset:0/user:0/ album:0 inside 52MB whose bulk was immich's shipped geodata. Every run, manual AND nightly, now refreshes dumps + units BEFORE capturing. Order is the mechanism: the gap can only ADD files the DB does not reference yet, never remove one it does. Manifests carry offsite_run_id + dumps_at, so coherence is verifiable at restore time rather than assumed; the periodic refresh carries a prior stamp forward and never invents one. Honesty surfaces, all warn-level and none a gate: unstamped (pre-v0.148) pairs report their skew, ValidateDump gained an EXACT-match accounts-table sniff for customer-empty dumps, the completion flash states an outcome instead of a mechanism, and the missing-only button now says what it does NOT do. 11 tests; 5 red-proofs run and reverted. Two of those found real test weaknesses rather than confirming strength — the first undo mutation was caught by a second guard, and the first table-matching test did not discriminate between the two matchers at all. Both tests were rewritten to the cases that separate them. NOT in scope: R-41's catalog invariant check, nightly cadence, retention, quota math, tier-2, and v0.147.x progress semantics beyond one added phase line. Live acceptance (§9) has NOT run: no capability-map flip, customer-restore row stays MISSING, R-3 stays DRAFT. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P9Nn14TWGzKoqAJAiVwC2s	2026-07-19 12:21:16 +02:00