F7/R-53: app_export.html built the app's public URL as '<sub>.{{$.CSRFToken}}',
so the "Megnyitás" link was wrong for every app with a subdomain and a session
CSRF token was written into a URL. Template now uses {{$.Domain}}, and
exportPageHandler supplies the key — it builds its own data map instead of
going through baseData, which is where every other page gets it. The page's
real CSRF path (csrfH() reading the meta tag) is correct and untouched.
The 7 red internal/backup tests are green again, with no behaviour change.
TestTier2V2_* / TestSharesTier2* all failed for one environmental reason:
Tier-2's off-drive guard asks system.SamePhysicalDevice (st_dev equality)
whether a target is really a second disk, and every t.TempDir() here shares one
filesystem — so the guard correctly refused the fixture's "two drives" and the
tests never reached their subject ("nincs másik fizikai meghajtó").
Seam in the package's existing style: a nil-defaulted Manager.samePhysicalDevice
field + sameDevice wrapper, seven call sites routed through it. Nil resolves to
system.SamePhysicalDevice, so production is byte-for-byte unchanged; only the two
fixtures inject a fake modelling one drive per directory subtree. No assertion
weakened, nothing skipped/renamed/deleted; all 7 mutation-proved.
Also: the ssh->pct-exec ASCII-grep and heredoc-credential traps are now in
CLAUDE.md's live-validation section.
Found by LIVE VALIDATION, not by a unit test: the first demo tier-2 run pushed
'Masodlagos mentes elkeszult: _shares' — the reserved key reached Hungarian
customer/operator copy.
Mapped at the SOURCE of the notification (RunSharesTier2's tier2Notify calls) so no
future notifier wiring can reintroduce it, plus DisplayStackName at the main.go
wiring as idempotent defense in depth. Regression test added with a red-proof.
ONE additional restic call tagged [felhom-offbox, _shares] carrying the payload
staging dir + every mandatory share folder. Hooked into runOffboxInternal AFTER the
per-app loop and BEFORE retention, so forget --group-by host,tags covers the _shares
group with no flag change. Reuses resticStep, the caller's repo-ensure and
single-flight, and the SAME enlargement-gate arithmetic.
- quota gate degrades the push to MANIFEST-ONLY, never to nothing
- EnlargedBlocked keeps the RAW _shares key (templates index by it); the display
mapping applies only at the notification + Hungarian-prose boundaries
- OffboxTarget gains SharesLastRun/Status/Count for per-tier page truth
- zero-toggle notice suppressed when the shares leg provided coverage
- reserved-name defense: an app keyed _shares is excluded from the run loudly
RED-PROOFS RUN AND REVERTED (all fired):
1. shares leg appends into the app's argv -> isolation test FAILS
2. mandatory->offsite mapping inverted -> Scenario A + B FAIL
3. manifest-only degradation dropped -> Scenario C FAILS
Sibling shares source for the local cross-drive tier. Reuses the tier2Mirror seam,
selectTier2TargetFrom (narrow source-drive seam extracted from selectTier2Target),
tier2ReconcileRoots (pure extraction), tier2SafeRemove, the marker-LAST discipline
and the recordTier2* helpers. Per-app paths are untouched.
- shares_payload.go: deterministic _shares-manifest.json + best-effort passdb capture
- tier2_shares.go: per-source-drive legs -> cross-drive target, payload, marker LAST
- infra.SambaContainerName/SambaPassdbVolume/Mount: single source of truth for the
container identity (renderer, stacks execs, backup execs, monitor all read it)
- RESERVED-NAME finding: ValidateSMBShareName did NOT exclude a leading underscore,
so "_shares" was an accepted share name. Now refused; RunAllTier2 additionally
skips a "_shares" stack loudly as defense in depth.
- fix: shareSourceDrive returned a slash-normalised path, which made the target
selector's source-drive equality check miss (a group could target its own drive)
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