The notes a background run SAVES — last night's backup line, the last error, the proof
result, the restore outcome — are written in the BOX's language at the moment they are
written. A household that switches sees the previous run's note in the old language until
the next run rewrites it: the operator's §16 option 1, stated rather than hidden.
EndRestoreOp no longer receives a Hungarian literal from anywhere.
The language switch is a globe. Two text links wrapped in the sidebar footer and asked the
reader to recognise "Magyar"/"English" as links; a globe is the one symbol every web user
already reads as "language", so nobody has to read Hungarian to escape Hungarian. It is
<details>/<summary> — a menu with no script, drawn inline because the icon sprite lives
only in layout.html and the visitor pages have their own shell.
Those visitor pages get the same globe, and a visitor's choice stays theirs: a display-only
felhom_lang cookie that langFor reads ONLY when there is no session. A signed-in household
can never inherit a language a previous visitor picked in the same browser. POST /lang is
CSRF-exempt for a narrow reason written at the exemption — its only achievable effect is the
language of the page the victim's own browser shows them — and safeBackPath refuses
//evil.example as well as https://, because "starts with /" alone is not the test. §16 taken:
a successful claim carries the cookie into the household's setting.
TWO PARITY EXCEPTIONS, MEASURED: 106 fixtures compared with a real diff — exactly two change
shapes (the dashboard footer, the globe in the shells) and 5 byte-identical, which are the
three pages that must not change.
I INTRODUCED A DEADLOCK AND THE SUITE CAUGHT IT BY HANGING. UpdateOffboxStatus holds the
settings write lock while running its callback; boxLang() wants the read lock; sync.RWMutex
is not reentrant. On a real box an off-site run would have hung forever HOLDING the settings
lock. Fixed by resolving the language before the callback, and guarded by a test that names
the file and line in a second instead of hanging for 25 minutes.
MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
MEASURED FIRST, then fixed. On the shipped v0.229.0, on demo-hp, an app's Tier-2 copy went from
120 082 104 B (4 database dumps + 3 named-volume tars) to 7 036 B (none of either) in ONE nightly
run, and the run recorded itself a success: 'Tier 2 copied docmost -> ... (14.9 KB, 0 leg(s), 0s)'.
Evidence: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/DRILL-r403-tier2-delete-2026-08-31/.
The mechanism was three individually-correct lines: RunTier2 guards the unit leg with os.Stat only
(does the folder exist), rsyncMirror is rsync -a --delete, and nothing between them compared source
to destination. An EMPTY unit is a folder that exists.
THE GUARD. One predicate, unitCarriesData/unitIsHollow (r403_hollow.go), asking the MANIFEST and
never the byte size - a big compose tree with no dumps is dangerous, a tiny unit for a tiny app is
fine. Fail closed on an absent or unparseable manifest. RunTier2 skips the unit leg when the source
is hollow AND the destination is not; the other legs still run, the run is not failed, and the skip
is recorded for the SURFACE (CrossDriveBackup.UnitLegSkipped + UnitPackageDate) as well as logged.
--delete STAYS and shrinking stays legal. 07 section 8 row 5's derived-copy rule is unchanged; the
fence is exactly one shape. TestR403_DataLegShrinkIsUnaffected is the guard on the guard.
THE HONESTY. A preserved package is older than the run that preserved it, so the card carries a
notice and the unit-restore confirm names the PACKAGE's date - read from the mirrored manifest's own
created_at, not from the status record - plus a clause saying why it is older.
THE CAUSE. RestoreTier2Unit now refills a hollow or absent primary unit from the mirror it just
restored from, INSIDE the call before returning. The hollow manifest was written two seconds after
a restore by the 5-minute capture job; any follow-up job races it. The capture itself is NOT guarded:
a capture describing an empty drive as empty is correct, and with the primary refilled there is no
hollow state left to describe. Never over a complete primary, never after a failed restore.
recordTier2Success and tier2UnitConfirmMsg keep their old signatures as thin callers, so no existing
test needed editing. New seam unitRehydrate, separate from tier2Mirror on purpose.
22 new Go tests. Red-proofs run and reverted: A6 (predicate -> size threshold), B1 (guard removed ->
the copy's 3 files are DELETED and the seam is called), B6 (a general never-shrink rule -> the shrink
case fails), C2 (only-when-hollow dropped -> the complete primary is overwritten).
F7/R-53: app_export.html built the app's public URL as '<sub>.{{$.CSRFToken}}',
so the "Megnyitás" link was wrong for every app with a subdomain and a session
CSRF token was written into a URL. Template now uses {{$.Domain}}, and
exportPageHandler supplies the key — it builds its own data map instead of
going through baseData, which is where every other page gets it. The page's
real CSRF path (csrfH() reading the meta tag) is correct and untouched.
The 7 red internal/backup tests are green again, with no behaviour change.
TestTier2V2_* / TestSharesTier2* all failed for one environmental reason:
Tier-2's off-drive guard asks system.SamePhysicalDevice (st_dev equality)
whether a target is really a second disk, and every t.TempDir() here shares one
filesystem — so the guard correctly refused the fixture's "two drives" and the
tests never reached their subject ("nincs másik fizikai meghajtó").
Seam in the package's existing style: a nil-defaulted Manager.samePhysicalDevice
field + sameDevice wrapper, seven call sites routed through it. Nil resolves to
system.SamePhysicalDevice, so production is byte-for-byte unchanged; only the two
fixtures inject a fake modelling one drive per directory subtree. No assertion
weakened, nothing skipped/renamed/deleted; all 7 mutation-proved.
Also: the ssh->pct-exec ASCII-grep and heredoc-credential traps are now in
CLAUDE.md's live-validation section.
Found by LIVE VALIDATION, not by a unit test: the first demo tier-2 run pushed
'Masodlagos mentes elkeszult: _shares' — the reserved key reached Hungarian
customer/operator copy.
Mapped at the SOURCE of the notification (RunSharesTier2's tier2Notify calls) so no
future notifier wiring can reintroduce it, plus DisplayStackName at the main.go
wiring as idempotent defense in depth. Regression test added with a red-proof.
Sibling shares source for the local cross-drive tier. Reuses the tier2Mirror seam,
selectTier2TargetFrom (narrow source-drive seam extracted from selectTier2Target),
tier2ReconcileRoots (pure extraction), tier2SafeRemove, the marker-LAST discipline
and the recordTier2* helpers. Per-app paths are untouched.
- shares_payload.go: deterministic _shares-manifest.json + best-effort passdb capture
- tier2_shares.go: per-source-drive legs -> cross-drive target, payload, marker LAST
- infra.SambaContainerName/SambaPassdbVolume/Mount: single source of truth for the
container identity (renderer, stacks execs, backup execs, monitor all read it)
- RESERVED-NAME finding: ValidateSMBShareName did NOT exclude a leading underscore,
so "_shares" was an accepted share name. Now refused; RunAllTier2 additionally
skips a "_shares" stack loudly as defense in depth.
- fix: shareSourceDrive returned a slash-normalised path, which made the target
selector's source-drive equality check miss (a group could target its own drive)
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