504eae018b24d0b91955bcbebe79345a3b13bfb5
29 Commits
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 admin
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48f3336956 |
v0.254.0 — the saved notes follow the language, and the switch becomes a globe (R-557 slice 2 release C; SLICE 2 CLOSED)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 23s
The notes a background run SAVES — last night's backup line, the last error, the proof result, the restore outcome — are written in the BOX's language at the moment they are written. A household that switches sees the previous run's note in the old language until the next run rewrites it: the operator's §16 option 1, stated rather than hidden. EndRestoreOp no longer receives a Hungarian literal from anywhere. The language switch is a globe. Two text links wrapped in the sidebar footer and asked the reader to recognise "Magyar"/"English" as links; a globe is the one symbol every web user already reads as "language", so nobody has to read Hungarian to escape Hungarian. It is <details>/<summary> — a menu with no script, drawn inline because the icon sprite lives only in layout.html and the visitor pages have their own shell. Those visitor pages get the same globe, and a visitor's choice stays theirs: a display-only felhom_lang cookie that langFor reads ONLY when there is no session. A signed-in household can never inherit a language a previous visitor picked in the same browser. POST /lang is CSRF-exempt for a narrow reason written at the exemption — its only achievable effect is the language of the page the victim's own browser shows them — and safeBackPath refuses //evil.example as well as https://, because "starts with /" alone is not the test. §16 taken: a successful claim carries the cookie into the household's setting. TWO PARITY EXCEPTIONS, MEASURED: 106 fixtures compared with a real diff — exactly two change shapes (the dashboard footer, the globe in the shells) and 5 byte-identical, which are the three pages that must not change. I INTRODUCED A DEADLOCK AND THE SUITE CAUGHT IT BY HANGING. UpdateOffboxStatus holds the settings write lock while running its callback; boxLang() wants the read lock; sync.RWMutex is not reentrant. On a real box an off-site run would have hung forever HOLDING the settings lock. Fixed by resolving the language before the callback, and guarded by a test that names the file and line in a second instead of hanging for 25 minutes. MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS |
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admin
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7c05b59708 |
v0.253.0 — errors carry the key of the sentence they are (R-557 slice 2 release B)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 24s
179 Hungarian sentences were built deep inside a package with fmt.Errorf and printed by whoever caught them: too late to translate where they are shown, too early where they are made. Every one now carries its key across that gap. ZERO Hungarian error literals remain. util.MsgError does three things at once, each earned: - Error() is the Hungarian, byte for byte, so every un-converted printer is unchanged; - errors.Is answers for the kind AND for a wrapped cause (KindErrorf dropped the cause); - an error ARGUMENT renders recursively, so "formázás sikertelen: %w" translates whole. A foreign error — restic, docker, ssh, the stdlib — prints verbatim. It is not ours. 76 display sites go through errText, and TestNoErrErrorInPageOutput convicts any that do not. memoryVerdict returns an error rather than a sentence, so the deploy's 409 and the household's language come from one value; UpdateRefusal gained a Cause to carry it. Plurals, one rule, stated once: a key with .one/.other takes its COUNT first. Not a per-call-site flag — the producer somebody forgot would read "3 app is not running". The guard caught a real key collision (alert.deadapp.one) the day the rule landed. TWO DEFECTS FOUND IN MY OWN TOOLING, recorded rather than quietly fixed. The bulk converter silently dropped multi-line concatenations, damaging 7 producers — and the parity gate could not see it, because every surviving fragment WAS a real base literal while the CALL had lost text; two behaviour tests caught it. And the counting script was case-sensitive, so it said "0 left" while five remained. MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS |
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admin
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5270bad76e |
v0.252.0 — the sentences the program builds follow the language (R-557 slice 2 release A)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 23s
Slice 1 translated the dashboard's markup. The sentences the program BUILDS were still Hungarian literals in Go, so an English household clicked an English button and was answered in Hungarian. 226 of them move into the bundle here. A flash was the hard part: it travels inside the redirect URL and is rendered by a DIFFERENT request, so it now carries a bundle key plus its parameters. A link minted by an older controller carries prose and is shown verbatim — never a raw key, never dropped. Also converted: page data and view-model text, the internal/api JSON answers, the alert banners (Alert.MessageKey, rendered on the way out of GetAlerts), 237 country names at display, and the four page titles built around an app name (R-566 closed). Hungarian is byte-identical, and that is measured rather than read: scripts/i18n_go_parity.py freezes every Go literal at the base commit (7 467) and refuses a key whose Hungarian is not that text, byte for byte. Three decoys, each seen to convict. Its own first version filtered the capture through an ASCII-Hungarian word list and missed seven real literals — the R-565 class. The filter is gone. Nothing on the wire moved, and wire goldens now hold it there: the report's health warnings and every notify event message stay Hungarian, because the hub MAILS the controller's sentence when it has no entry of its own. Slice 3 (R-558) owns those. MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS |
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admin
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c00fed6db3 |
R-553: four decisions stop reading their own Hungarian words (sites 1-4)
Every Hungarian sentence is byte-identical; each decision now reads a signal set where the message is
made. util.KindErrorf builds the same bytes fmt.Errorf did while carrying a sentinel for errors.Is.
- Deploy status (api/router.go): deployStatusFor() by kind — stacks.ErrAlreadyDeployed (409),
ErrRequiredField / ErrPathMissing / ErrNotEnoughMemory (400). The „kötelező" / „memória" /
"does not exist" / "already deployed" text chain is gone.
- Off-site failure class (backup/offbox.go): ErrOffsiteQuota replaces the „tárhelykeretet" match. The
restic/ssh signatures stay text matches on purpose — that output is not ours and is not translated.
- Alert placement (web/alerts.go): monitor.HealthReport carries WarningKinds parallel to Warnings;
the "not on a separate drive" warning is inline by KIND. The hub report is untouched (builder.go
copies Status/Issues/Warnings only) — pinned by a wire test.
- Stale off-site note (web/handlers.go): settings LastWarningKind + backup.OffboxWarnNoAppsSelected.
The text test survives ONLY for kind == "" (a box whose last run predates 0.251.0) and is removed
when R-570 closes; slice 2 must not translate that producer before then.
Tests (all red-proofed by restoring the pre-fix predicate — see the audit's redproofs.txt):
TestR553_Deploy_DecisionSurvivesWordingChange, TestR553_DeployHandlerUsesTheKind,
TestR553_DeployProducersCarryKindAndKeepTheirWords (through the real DeployStack),
TestR553_OffsiteQuota_{Decision,HeadLine}SurvivesWordingChange, TestR553_OffboxRunRecordsTheKind,
TestR553_StorageWarningsCarryKindsAndKeepTheirWords, TestR553_DiskWarningPlacementSurvivesWordingChange,
TestR553_HubReportWarningsAreUnchangedOnTheWire, TestR553_StaleNote*, TestR553_WarningKindIsPersistedAndCopied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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admin
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b8af72764d |
R-353/R-357/R-358/R-360: the restore tells the truth (v0.226.0)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 11s
Four defects on the restore surface, all proven on demo-hp during the 2026-08-21 backup-truth drill, all still in shipped code. They share one acceptance idea: a restore surface must state what it actually did, and must refuse what it cannot do. VERSION NOTE. The task specifying this targeted v0.224.0 against baseline |
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admin
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5ce3a44645 |
v0.218.0: attribute a DB container by its compose project, and replay volumes on the off-site restore
gates / gates (push) Successful in 11s
R-355 (first, because it is the only one where data can be lost for good). paperless-ngx's PostgreSQL was dumped into backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps/ — a directory for a stack that does not exist, on the system drive — while the app's own unit recorded db_dumps: null. The same misattribution reached writeSafetyDump, so a destructive restore of that app took NO undo copy and the fail-closed refusal was never reached. Fixed by reading the compose project label, which is the stack name by construction (compose runs with cmd.Dir set to the stack dir and no -p). The old derivation stays as the fallback and an unresolvable attribution is now loud. Catalogue sweep, proven able to convict: one affected app of 53. The fix is in the controller, not the catalogue. R-354. ReconstituteFromOffsite skipped every unit placement and the volume archives live inside the unit, so the off-site restore had no volume leg at all — proven live with planted files: calibre-web's 1,422,848-byte config archive was in the unit, the snapshot and the checking folder, and the restore reported success without it. For the 40 of 53 apps that declare no data drive that archive is the whole dataset. restoreDockerVolumesFrom is the local path's own replay with an explicit directory: ONE implementation, two callers. Volumes replay before the database and inside the stopped window. VolumesReplayed reaches the message. The comment beside the skip was half false and is corrected; the half that still holds — the live unit is the local path's source — is named, and scenario D fingerprints the whole live unit across the operation. Seven red-proofs, each asserted applied and reverted. Two found defects in the tests, not the code: scenario D passed with the unit guard removed because the fingerprint had been narrowed and was blind to the unit root. |
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admin
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985388c6e9 |
R-351: the restore compares where the backup says the data lived; second press cannot start a second run
gates / gates (push) Successful in 10s
Part 3 (not droppable) and the engine half of Part 2. No version bump yet - one bump and
one bake at the end of the session.
PART 3a - a second press really did start a second run. Established with a test BEFORE any
change: both offboxReconstituteHandler and offboxPlaceHandler answered "...elindult" and
overwrote the first restore's op/stack. Cause: every restore handler gated on
backupMgr.IsRunning() - the CONCURRENCY flag, which the restore goroutine acquires AFTER the
handler returns (offbox_reconstitute.go:180, offbox_restore.go:393). Seven sites. The wizard
had read the correct flag since v0.154.0 and said so in a comment; the handlers never moved.
New Server.restoreOpBlocked() reads BOTH flags - the display flag covers the whole off-box
restore, the concurrency flag is the only one the nightly backup holds - and the refusal now
names the running app and a route.
PART 3b - the page DOES refresh; the defect was the RESULT. backups_shared.html gated the
terminal result on a page-local sawRunning flag, so a restore that finished before the page
was opened, or inside one 3s poll, was shown to nobody. The 2026-08-21 OpenGist restore took
8.666s and no screen ever said it completed - the answer existed only in docker logs.
RestoreOpStatus.LastRecent now carries the server's verdict. The 10-minute window moved to
internal/backup as RestoreResultWindow and internal/web's constant is an alias: one
expression, two surfaces. Also removed the wizard's self-contradiction, which said the state
refreshes automatically AND that you must refresh the page.
PART 2 (engine) - every recovery unit manifest has carried drive and namespace_root since
schema 1, and NO non-test code read either back. The reconstitution opened the manifest and
took only the coherence stamp, then resolved its destination from the live app. A restore
into a different destination succeeded silently under a green message. New
backup/offbox_placement.go: CheckPlacement (pure, total), PlacementMismatchMessage,
recordedPlacementFromScratch. Compared before the safety dump and before the first byte.
A mismatch is NAMED and refused; ackPlacementChange lets the customer proceed deliberately -
a separate field from confirm=1, because one click must not carry two decisions. An UNKNOWN
recording is never a mismatch: refusing on an absence would strand every pre-field unit.
The not-installed refusal (R-253) now names the drive the backup recorded.
RED-PROOFS, each mutation asserted applied and reverted to 0:
B both guards removed (count asserted 2) -> the restore WAS seen starting with no drive
attached: no error, full 3.00s run, wrote into /tmp/mutant-destination
C Mismatch forced false -> the silent divergent restore returned
E Known() forced true -> the fabricated empty prefill appeared
D Mismatch forced true -> 8 ordinary reconstitute tests broke, proving reachability both ways
Note on D: the existing fixtures write a schema-1 manifest with NO drive, so they are
scenario-E shaped. The matching case is covered in the scenario table, not by them.
Gates 11/11 OK. Suite 28 packages ok. Hungarian verified as hex, no BOM, no mojibake sentinels.
NOT in this commit, still open: Part 2's scenario-A prefill UI, Part 1's deploy-page
visibility line, Part 1's specification document, Part 4's measurement.
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admin
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c6b69d888e |
v0.205.0 — a run that skipped an app the customer selected is not successful (R-234)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 21s
THE VERDICT. The R-203 block already said "a warning beside a success is read as a success" and applied it to ONE of the two shapes it describes: an app missing a declared mandatory FOLDER made the run incomplete, while an app skipped ENTIRELY still reported ok. Both do now. Which skips count, decided by measurement: selected+deployed with no recovery unit YES; selected but NOT deployed no (named, with what to do — a box left amber by an app somebody removed is a status nobody reads); disconnected/decommissioned drive no (own signal); nothing selected no. LastSuccess and SnapshotCount still record what WAS captured. THE FILED MECHANISM WAS NOT THE MEASURED CAUSE, and saying so is the point. §3 stated that toggling an app on leaves it without a bundle so the first run skips it. Measured on demo-hp: the run's own pre-dump phase calls captureAllRecoveryUnits for every DEPLOYED stack, through admitApp, before the push — a unit moved aside was RECREATED and the run reported ok. That state does not survive a run. What actually produced the 2026-08-06 sequence: the manual run was dropped by the single-flight while an earlier run was still going. runOffboxBackup returned nil, the handler had already answered "A tavoli mentes elindult", and the card then showed the PREVIOUS run's green verdict — read as covering the app just selected. The decision is now taken synchronously in the handler and a dropped request says so. The nightly path still returns nil on purpose: nobody asked, and it retries. §7.3 measured before deciding: CaptureRecoveryUnit writes a few KB of compose + manifest, only ENUMERATES dumps rather than creating them, is idempotent and does NOT stop the app — and already runs inside the off-site run. So there is no wait to remove for a deployed app and NOTHING was built. 28 packages ok, 9/9 gates. Four red-proofs, each asserted to have applied. Fixture note: the shared provider's ListDeployedStacks returned nil, so Scenario A first passed for the wrong reason; fixed with an opt-in deployed set that defaults to nil. |
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admin
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53e9bf0224 |
v0.204.0 — the restore list is keyed on the store (R-237); the size gate stops refusing in silence (R-238)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 26s
R-237: /backups/restore listed apps that are CURRENTLY DEPLOYED and CURRENTLY TOGGLED ON for future off-site backups. A rebuilt box has neither, so a household that had just lost everything was shown nothing to restore while the repository held their snapshots — measured live on the R-201 re-walk. To restore an app you had to select it, to select it you had to have installed it, and to know what to install you had to see the backup you could not see. The store is now the source of the list (offsite_restore_list.go), built on the existing R-193 OffsiteInventoryList. Installed-ness became a property OF a row, never a filter on it. Every case is answered rather than hidden: a snapshot for an app that is not installed is offered and says it will reinstall first; an installed app with no snapshot is shown as having nothing; an unreadable store renders as UNKNOWN (R-225's rule, one screen over) AND keeps the action, because "we could not look" is not "there is nothing"; no-target is its own state. The felhom-offbox and _shares marker tags are excluded from the app list. R-238 classified as a HARNESS ARTIFACT: mode=full without confirm=1 is step 1 of a deliberate two-step — it starts no job by design and redirects carrying &full_prep=<app>, which deriveWizardStep requires to reveal the commit. A driver that did not carry it forward landed back on the intent step. The operator's browser run completed the same restore. The wizard's precedence rules were NOT re-keyed: a stale ?full_prep= must never resurrect a commit button mid-restore. The residue WAS real and is fixed: neither branch of that step wrote anything to the log, so a refusal — including by the headroom gate — left no trace on the box. Both branches now log, and so does the concurrent-op refusal. resolveWizardApp is removed: it was dead once the gate moved, and its test pinned the defect's behaviour (an untoggled app refused), which would have read as policy. 28 packages ok, 9/9 gates OK. Three red-proofs, each asserted to have applied. |
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admin
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c7446f2d6a |
R-225/R-227/R-228 Parts 2-4: unknown is not zero, the gateway speaks Hungarian, the set-aside is visible
R-225 — an unread store said '0 pillanatkép / 0 / 50 GB' above a card stating it held backups under another key. An SFTP listing found snapshot f3d9cd67 and 12 535 KB really there; snapshot_count and repo_size_bytes were simply ABSENT and the zero value spoke for them. StatsKnown is now NAMED, for the same reason OffsiteInventory.Empty is: zero is what an unread store and an empty one both look like, and on the wire 'absent' and '0' are the same bytes. The fill bar renders only when the fill is known — a 0%-wide bar is a picture of emptiness, and a picture is a claim. A measured zero still says zero. R-227 — WHICH LAYER ANSWERS: traefik, and this repo generates its config. But traefik v3 serves no static files, so a branded proxy page needs a new always-up container for every 502 on the box — out of proportion, and scoped in the report rather than built. Shipped instead: the unlock posts via fetch and answers a gateway failure in Hungarian without leaving the page. Progressive enhancement — with no JS the plain POST is unchanged and still shows the proxy's error, which the report says plainly rather than implying otherwise. R-228 — the set-aside history was recorded in orphaned_renamed_to and read by nobody: a census found zero references in any template or handler, while 12 535 KB sat at that path. It is surfaced as two facts and stops. It does NOT promise the history can be reopened, because it cannot be by anyone today (R-199's inventory is unbuilt) — and the set-aside CONFIRMATION copy was corrected for the same reason: 'a helyreállítási kód nélkül többé nem lesznek megnyithatók' implied that WITH the code they could be. The field's own comment called it 'recovery-code-recoverable', which was the same over-promise in the code. Tests: scenarios F, G, H as render tests per branch of each gate. Red-proofs, each demonstrated failing then restored: remove the StatsKnown guards (F, 'R-225 RETURNED: an unread store reports a snapshot COUNT of zero'), delete the set-aside block (H). The F assertion on the fill bar is scoped to the bar's own container — a bare width:0% search matched unrelated elements and would have passed for the wrong reason. 28 packages ok, vet clean, all controller gates OK (the emoji gate caught a warning sign in a template comment). |
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admin
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2e936f43bf |
R-204 item 3: a restore says what it restored, and what it did not (v0.198.0)
mode=unit restores the recovery unit — the app's definition, configuration and database dumps — and NOT the customer's own files: RestoreOffboxScratch passes --include <unit path> and the userdata in the same snapshot is excluded by it. The outcome was one sentence for both modes and named neither scope, so on the last step of a disaster recovery the customer was told the app had been restored after the thing they were looking for had not been. restoreScratchOutcomeMsg states what came back, what did not, and the next step that gets it. The wizard's intent card states its scope before the choice. The full-restore size gate is untouched and pinned as unchanged; the default stays unit, since all three wizard forms set mode explicitly. |
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admin
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e000e201af |
R-100: record the offsite last-SUCCESS anchor (v0.181.0)
LastRun records an attempt, not a result. New OffboxTarget.LastSuccess, set only on the success branch via the pure offboxAnchorAfterRun rule, carried to the hub as last_success. Closes two silent-wipe sites (settings save, hub re-apply). |
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admin
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3a9d744360 |
v0.154.0 — R-48: one restore entry per app, and the intent is a described choice
The offsite restore list rendered up to five inline forms per app row. Two of them —
„Helyreállítás az élő adatok közé (csak a hiányzó fájlok)" and „Teljes visszaállítás
(fájlok + adatbázis)" — were sibling buttons whose difference is whether the customer's
data comes back at all. That mis-selection CAUSED the round-2 incident: an operator who
had read the source pressed the missing-only button and /backup/offbox/reconstitute was
never hit (DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19, finding 1).
The rule this establishes: two adjacent controls whose difference is "your data comes
back" vs "your data cannot come back" must never be distinguishable only by layout.
Each row now carries ONE „Visszaállítás…" entry linking to a per-app wizard at
GET /backups/restore/app?name=<app>: three intent CARDS with consequence sentences, a
visible phase strip, danger styling plus the R-43 double-confirm carried over verbatim on
the destructive one, and the pair-honesty panel bound to real OffsiteScratchPair facts.
deriveWizardStep is pure over (op running, size-gate flash, scratch ready); the step is
never accepted from the request, and a running op outranks a stale ?full_prep= so no
commit button survives into a restore. While ANY op runs every mutation form is suppressed
server-side instead of being offered and refused.
No new mutation endpoint: every card posts to the pre-existing /backup/offbox/* handler
with the same field names and gates, and the page works with JavaScript disabled.
internal/{backup,appbackup,selfupdate} untouched. R-45's job registry stays its own item.
Fixes a latent bug found on the way: offboxRedirectTo hardcoded "?" when appending its
flash, which against the wizard's ?name=<app> target would have buried the flash inside
the name value.
No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0.
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admin
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062357f778 |
v0.148.0 — coherent snapshot pairs + an offsite restore that actually restores (R-43 + R-44)
Closes the two findings from DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19. Viktor deleted 11
immich photos to test offsite restore; both runs flashed success and the photos
stayed gone. Two independent defects.
R-43 — no offsite path could restore a database. All three buttons were
file-only: the two "visszaállítás" actions staged to a scratch folder and never
touched postgres, and place-to-live merged only MISSING files. For a DB-indexed
app the bytes returned and the app still could not see them. The dump was
carried INTO every snapshot and could never be replayed OUT of one.
New ReconstituteFromOffsite (/backup/offbox/reconstitute): safety dump → stop →
files overwritten to the snapshot version → start → the snapshot's own dump
replayed → health wait. Two invariants:
- nothing is ever deleted (-a, no --ignore-existing, no --delete): a file
created after the snapshot survives as an extra;
- the undo exists before the act — the pre-restore- dump is verified ON DISK
before anything is stopped, overwritten or replayed; if it cannot be taken
the operation refuses with zero changes.
The replay reads the SCRATCH unit: the live unit is never overwritten, so
replaying from it would replay the current DB over itself and restore nothing.
R-44 — a manual push shipped an unrefreshed dump (up to ~24h old). That day's
predated the customer's account by four hours and probed to asset:0/user:0/
album:0 inside 52MB whose bulk was immich's shipped geodata. Every run, manual
AND nightly, now refreshes dumps + units BEFORE capturing. Order is the
mechanism: the gap can only ADD files the DB does not reference yet, never
remove one it does. Manifests carry offsite_run_id + dumps_at, so coherence is
verifiable at restore time rather than assumed; the periodic refresh carries a
prior stamp forward and never invents one.
Honesty surfaces, all warn-level and none a gate: unstamped (pre-v0.148) pairs
report their skew, ValidateDump gained an EXACT-match accounts-table sniff for
customer-empty dumps, the completion flash states an outcome instead of a
mechanism, and the missing-only button now says what it does NOT do.
11 tests; 5 red-proofs run and reverted. Two of those found real test weaknesses
rather than confirming strength — the first undo mutation was caught by a second
guard, and the first table-matching test did not discriminate between the two
matchers at all. Both tests were rewritten to the cases that separate them.
NOT in scope: R-41's catalog invariant check, nightly cadence, retention, quota
math, tier-2, and v0.147.x progress semantics beyond one added phase line.
Live acceptance (§9) has NOT run: no capability-map flip, customer-restore row
stays MISSING, R-3 stays DRAFT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P9Nn14TWGzKoqAJAiVwC2s
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admin
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b5d78d1e0f |
v0.147.0 — feedback slice 1: pressing a button says something
The systemic complaint, twice in one evening: you press a button and nothing happens. No progress, no ETA, no named result. Three worst offenders, fixed on the two patterns already here (deploy 3-step panel, storage-init status poll). No new framework — that is a ROADMAP item; three targeted cards ship tonight. 4a — a verification restore names its result. The flash said the app had been restored "to a verification folder on the drive"; which folder, on which drive, was invisible, so the customer could not go and look at what they had just asked for. Full path now. The restore page gained a listing of existing verification copies (app, size, date, path) — nothing anywhere showed these, so they piled up and the only way to find them was SSH — each with a double-confirmed delete. That delete is the only one this release adds, so it names a STACK, never a path: the Manager resolves the name inside a backups/offsite-restore root it computed itself and refuses anything landing outside. Red-proofed — neutralise the name guard and stack:"" resolves to the offsite-restore ROOT and takes every copy with it. Refusals are asserted as non-effects. 4b — Megosztás enable shows what it is waiting for. Enabling ran ReconcileSamba synchronously inside the POST handler; on a golden without felhom-samba baked that is compose pulling ~100MB, i.e. minutes of an apparently-hung form post followed by "Beállítás mentve." whether or not anything came up. Detached + polled now, distinguishing "képfájl letöltése" from "indítás" — decided BEFORE the work starts, since afterwards the image is always present. Success is probed, not inferred (compose up -d exits 0 on a crash-loop). The password form starts the same job: with UserSet false reconcile deploys nothing, so on a fresh box that is where the pull actually happens. 4c — "Távoli mentés most" streams real progress. restic was already reporting bytes and percent; the runner seam used CombinedOutput() and discarded them. The manual run now passes --json and scans stdout line-by-line: total bytes, percent, current app. Manual only — the nightly stays silent, pinned by a test that fails if it ever passes --json. The poll now arms unconditionally, closing a race the manual trigger always ran: the redirect rendered before the goroutine wrote LastStatus=running, so the poll never armed and the page sat static during the very run just started. Red-proofed twice. Also closes the golden/controller infra-image drift at the source: infra.Images() derives from the existing pins and --print-infra-images exposes it, so the golden bake can stop carrying its own copy. That copy had already drifted — felhom-samba was never added, so the golden baked 3 of 4, which is why enabling Megosztás pulled at runtime in the first place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nn3VgQk9iwEGgyx6QJ2NvE |
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admin
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900c870212 |
feat(shares): R-7b Parts 4-6 — shares restore, samba liveness, UI truth-up
Part 4 — restore: RestoreSharesScratch + PlaceSharesRestore as SIBLINGS of the
per-app scratch/place pair. Files merged missing-only (never overwriting), each
destination PREFIX-ASSERTED against registered LIVE storage roots; definitions
merged with existing-wins; ReconcileSamba via a seam (backup must not import
stacks); credential restored best-effort into the samba named volume.
New routes POST /backup/shares/{restore,place} + a restore-page entry that renders
'Megosztasok', never the raw reserved key.
Also adds scratchJoin: reconstructing an absolute captured path under a scratch
must strip the volume name rather than rely on filepath.Join.
Part 5 — liveness: EffectiveProtected gains a settings-backed dynamic extra so the
samba CONTAINER (not the stack name — they differ) is watched exactly while sharing
is on. FINDING: the issue -> health 'fail' -> existing health_critical event ->
alert -> Hungarian degradation e-mail path needs NO further change, and introduces
no new event type, so the allowlist gotcha does not apply.
Part 6 — UI: per-tier backup status lines on the Megosztas page (amber only on
deviation). Verified the two warning-prose sites (offbox_capture/tier2_capture)
only ever receive per-app stack names, so no mapping is needed there.
RED-PROOFS RUN AND REVERTED (both fired):
4. prefix-assert removed -> place-guard traversal test FAILS
5. dynamic samba extra removed -> Scenario E enabled-case FAILS
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admin
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596505ed64 |
v0.142.0: offsite repo continuity — orphaned-repo guard (A) + run-status auto-refresh (C)
- Part A: classify restic cat-config failure (wrong-password=orphaned vs no-repo vs other); ORPHANED state + Hungarian card + offbox_repo_orphaned/reset events (once, not nightly); reset = move-aside (never delete) + init, unclaimed auto / claimed confirm. Red-proofs TestOffbox_OrphanDetection_* + ConfirmedReset. - Part C: GET /backup/offbox/status + poll on backups_remote → flips Fut→Rendben/Hiba without manual reload. |
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admin
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fe9266f53f |
feat(report): v0.139.0 — immediate out-of-cycle hub report on user actions (Direction 1)
New report.Trigger (buffered-1 chan + worker; quiet 2s, min spacing 15s, trailing-edge coalescing) generalizes the v0.70.0 geo out-of-band push. One canonical fire closure in main.go; wired: geo save/sync + app deploy/remove/delete (api reportPushNow), escrow recovery-code claim, notification-prefs save, app-email toggle, offsite config + per-app toggle, customer claim (web SetReportTrigger seam, nil-safe, fired only after a successful local commit). 15-min hub-report cycle untouched as the reconciliation backbone; hub.enabled=false stays a strict no-op. Tests: trigger engine (2 red-proofs), seam fires-after-commit-only, nil-seam no-ops. |
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admin
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120332103a |
feat(escrow): v0.138.0 — "awaiting hub confirmation" waiting state
After a completed escrow ceremony the Távoli mentés page showed the yellow "Helyreállítási kód szükséges" card for ~15 min until the next hub-report ACK flipped pending→escrowed. Phase-0 diagnosis (read-only) = verdict A (report-cycle lag), already resolved on the demo box (escrow_state:"escrowed"); hub Hypothesis B verified false (SaveHostEscrow ON CONFLICT already clears stale_at on upload) → no hub change. - settings.OffboxTarget.CeremonyCompletedAt: stamped on the recovery-code claim, zeroed on the auto-confirmer Flip + the deprecated manual confirm; persisted. - web/handlers.go: offboxCeremonyWaitState + escrowCeremonyGraceWindow (35m). - backups_remote.html: info "megerősítésre vár, legfeljebb 15 perc" card → warn "a megerősítés nem érkezett meg" past the window. Existing branches untouched. - backups_escrow.html: "Mi történik ezután?" note on the wizard's final step. - Test web/escrow_wait_state_test.go (truth table + red-proof recorded in REPORT). No scheduler/agent/hub/endpoint changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp |
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admin
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2d20859858 |
Offsite tier policy engine: mandatory userdata, raw-data quota, restore rework (Task 3a, v0.134.0)
Each toggled app's offsite push = one multi-path restic snapshot (recovery unit + TierOffsite mandatory userdata via ComputeCaptureSet); legacy/undeployed stay unit-only. Loud capture gaps (SP-3.4: restic 0.14.0 silently skips missing paths). Quota = stats --mode raw-data (SP-1; displayed size drops once). Pre-push enlargement gate blocks the userdata enlargement over-quota (unit-only push continues; EnlargedBlocked; edge-triggered notify). forget --group-by host,tags on both sites (SP-2). Restore reworked: scratch off the rootfs + headroom gate (F-A1), unit-only default via --include, size-first full, place-to-live missing-only merge (never --delete). UI: unit/full-two-step/place actions + per-app blocked note; route POST /backup/offbox/place. HUB FLAG: offbox_enlarge_blocked event needs hub allowlist for push delivery. +13 tests; all 10 §10 red-proofs verified. No tier-2/.fab/hub/agent changes. |
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admin
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0ece2ba85c |
controller: backups IA split — four sub-pages (Áttekintés /backups, Távoli mentés /backups/remote, Alkalmazások /backups/apps, Visszaállítás /backups/restore); sections MOVED verbatim (backups_split_move_check.py enforces vs df7ad37); shared data builder extracted; offbox restore-to-verify relocated to the restore page; flash redirects + tier-3 anchors + tier2 back-link retargeted
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GzammAMzsJTgpQHqxwM2bC |
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admin
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a00afcc79d |
controller: Tier-3 rename — customer-facing 'NAS-mentés' branding becomes 'Távoli mentés' (backups page, offbox flashes, quota copy); manual-target form generalized to any SFTP target; offbox_rename_gate.py enforces zero regressions
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GzammAMzsJTgpQHqxwM2bC |
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admin
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febf6757dc |
v0.108.0: hub-verified escrow auto-confirm on current-password hash match (SLICE 3)
EscrowAutoConfirmer flips pending->escrowed ONLY when sha256(local repo password) matches the ACK's restic_pw_sha256 (blob-presence alone never confirms — red-proofed). Mismatch warns once per hash naming the ceremony; never un-confirms; wipes the staged secret on flip. Pinned cross-repo hash vector; manual confirm deprecated to a legacy-blob fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6 |
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admin
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a38c743926 |
v0.107.0: key-auth-first bridge + staged-secret wipe on escrow confirm
Key-auth-first: a KeyAuthProber seam lets the bridge skip consume+install when the already-installed key still authenticates (pinned to the freshly verified host key) — descriptor changes on provisioned guests no longer loop on consume-404. Fingerprint verify still precedes everything. Wipe-on-escrowed: confirm-escrow now calls the agent's new DELETE /escrow/stage-secret (v0.78.0) best-effort, closing the hygiene gap where a ceremony-less confirm left the staged password file behind. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6 |
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admin
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0b09a799cb |
v0.105.0: fork-4 offsite password custody — hand-off + atomicity gate + DR inject + coord
Pairs with agent v0.77.0. StageEscrowSecret pushes the repo password to the agent (POST /escrow/stage-secret) at offsite-enable → EscrowState="pending". Atomicity gate: RunOffboxBackup (scheduler + handler) refuses until EscrowState="escrowed" (operator POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow after the escrow ceremony) — no un-recoverable offsite ciphertext can exist. DR: POST /backup/offbox/inject-password pre-places a recovered 64-hex password 0600 (honored by WriteOffboxSecrets' IsNotExist guard; refuses clobber without force). DR recipe gains non-secret offsite_restic coords (DRResticCoord); SFTP key regenerated at DR, not escrowed. New settings.OffboxTarget.EscrowState. Tests + atomicity & inject companion red-proofs green; UI gates pass. NOT yet live-validated (supervised ceremony). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6 |
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admin
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908e4b906a |
v0.104.0: off-box unit discovery (durable, deployment-independent) + no-silent-success
offbox located each toggled app's recovery unit via AppNamespaceRoot→GetAppDrivePath, which reads the app's LIVE app.yaml HDD_PATH and silently falls back to systemDataPath when the app isn't deployed → looked on the wrong drive, backed up nothing, reported ok/0 (DIAG root cause). Now: - discoverOffboxUnit/offboxCandidateNSRoots scan the durable storage registry (schedulable non-decommissioned paths ∪ systemDataPath) for backups/primary/<app>, independent of deploy state; newest-by-manifest-CreatedAt wins on drive churn. - RunOffboxBackup: runOffboxInternal returns (backedUp, missing, err); 0-of-N toggled → hard error + operator alert; partial → ok + new OffboxTarget.LastWarning (shown on /backups, preserved across config edit). - AppNamespaceRoot + primary WRITE paths unchanged. - 6 non-hollow tests (A-E + edge) + both companion red-proofs run (reverted). - NOT yet live-validated against the Storage Box (spike creds torn down). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6 |
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admin
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c529a455af |
feat(backup): async restore family — no proxy-timeout error page on a succeeding restore (v0.102.0)
Re-adjudicates F4: /backup/restore, /backup/tier2/restore, /backup/offbox/restore blocked the HTTP request until completion, so through cloudflared's 100s cap a customer got an error page while the restore succeeded (offbox worse — bounded on r.Context(), canceling the SFTP restore mid-flight). Convert all three to the offboxRun async shape: fast-path IsRunning refuse, background goroutine (offbox ctx off r.Context() -> Background+30m), instant redirect. Add mutex- guarded op-status (opstatus.go) + GET /api/backup/restore-status + a 3s-polling backups.html banner (neutral running, red on failure). Restore single-flight unchanged. Tests + red-proof (sync handler blocks indefinitely vs <500ms async). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6 |
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admin
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5e0625410a |
security(offbox): validate host/user/repo before the ssh exec (option-injection guard)
Background commit review flagged command/option injection: operator-provided host/user/ repo_path flow into restic's ssh -s sftp command. Reject leading '-' (ssh option injection, e.g. -oProxyCommand) + metacharacters/traversal; OffboxConfigured fails closed on an invalid target. Companion test covers the injection cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs |
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admin
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2a7deadc93 |
controller v0.93.0: NAS Part B off-box backup target (restic-over-SFTP)
Encrypted restic repo over SFTP for the app-data tier (the off-site 3-2-1 leg). A dead NAS fails fast via -oConnectTimeout (spike Q8), never hangs the runner; secrets are 0600 files (ride DR via PBS whole-CT); init-if-absent, retention forget --prune, restore, single-flight, per-app toggle + UI. restic re-added to the image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs |