shouldRecreateOnBoot keyed on Deployed+drive-present alone. Deployed stays
true across a Stop, so a drive-backed app the customer switched off was
silently restarted on every guest reboot (proven live: immich).
Requires len(Containers)>0 as well - R-52's existing-Exited vs absent
distinction. A UI Stop is compose down and removes the containers; a guest
that went down under a running app leaves them. Container STATE is still
deliberately NOT a filter: that would miss a not-yet-restarted or stuck-Exited
app, which is the bug the boot-id path exists to fix.
Evidence sampled before any recreate - recreate's own StopStack erases it.
Honoured Stops counted and logged separately from no-live-bind skips.
R-51: aggregateState's mixed branch returned StateRunning ("partial"), so a stack whose
MAIN container was dead behind live helpers alerted on nothing — immich-server sat Exited
for 18 h, 100 % unreachable, no banner and no app_start_failed (audit F4). New
StateDegraded: a DOWN member whose docker restart policy is always/unless-stopped is a
fault (degraded, a down state); no/on-failure is a finished one-shot and stays benign; an
unreadable policy fails CLOSED. The unhealthy/restarting/paused/unknown exclusions are
byte-identical — folding unhealthy into down is the flapping fix-3 avoided.
R-52: new internal/bootrecon — one bounded start-once sweep at startup (2 attempts, 30 s
apart) for apps an interrupted boot left behind, inside the 90 s boot grace so a success
is silent and a failure still alerts. A zero-container stack is NEVER touched: the UI's
Stop is compose down, so a deliberate stop survives a reboot.
Both features carry a production-path wiring test (the v0.154.0 / v0.91.0 inert-seam
class). The main() assertion is an AST walk, not strings.Contains — the substring version
passed its own red-proof, because a commented-out call still contains the string.
Red-proofs run and restored: mix branch reverted -> "running" on the immich fixture;
boot hook commented out -> wiring test fails; zero-container gate dropped -> the
user-stopped app gets started.
NOTE: controller/cmd/controller/ is matched by .gitignore's `controller` entry, so new
files there need `git add -f` (and ripgrep silently skips main.go without --no-ignore).
Fixes a defect shipped in v0.154.0, found by the operator on the first live
click-through of the new wizard.
backup.Manager carries TWO running booleans. `running` (read by IsRunning) is the
concurrency single-flight, acquired inside the background goroutine — and
RestoreOffboxScratch never acquires it at all. `opRunning` (read by RestoreStatus) is the
display flag, set synchronously by BeginRestoreOp in the handler.
The wizard sourced OpRunning from IsRunning(), so for „Ellenőrzés" and the full-restore
preparation — its two most-used and longest actions, both streaming from restic — the
execution step was unreachable: the page offered all three intents with live buttons
while a restore was running, and the progress banner contradicted the phase strip on the
same screen. Pressing anything there would have been refused by the handler, which is the
exact "offering a control guaranteed to fail" dishonesty R-48 exists to remove.
Fix: restoreOpInFlight(st) behind a documented seam, fed by a SINGLE RestoreStatus() read
per render so the strip, the suppression decision and the running-op name cannot diverge.
Why the tests missed it: the Scenario-E table proved deriveWizardStep behaves correctly
GIVEN OpRunning=true, but nothing proved the handler ever computes true — hollow at
exactly that seam. TestRestoreOpInFlight_UsesDisplayFlagNotConcurrencyFlag now drives a
real Manager through BeginRestoreOp and asserts the render suppresses every form.
Red-proofed against the v0.154.0 shape.
Also: „Eredmény" was a dead label. The strip's highlight is now its own derived Phase,
separate from Step — a finished restore returns to the intent step (everything available
again) while the strip reads „Eredmény" and an outcome card shows the result. Bounded by
restoreResultWindow (10 min) so a stale result cannot look fresh, and bound to the app so
a finished bookstack restore does not light immich's page with bookstack's message. The
card survives a reload; the redirect flash does not.
No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0.
The offsite restore list rendered up to five inline forms per app row. Two of them —
„Helyreállítás az élő adatok közé (csak a hiányzó fájlok)" and „Teljes visszaállítás
(fájlok + adatbázis)" — were sibling buttons whose difference is whether the customer's
data comes back at all. That mis-selection CAUSED the round-2 incident: an operator who
had read the source pressed the missing-only button and /backup/offbox/reconstitute was
never hit (DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19, finding 1).
The rule this establishes: two adjacent controls whose difference is "your data comes
back" vs "your data cannot come back" must never be distinguishable only by layout.
Each row now carries ONE „Visszaállítás…" entry linking to a per-app wizard at
GET /backups/restore/app?name=<app>: three intent CARDS with consequence sentences, a
visible phase strip, danger styling plus the R-43 double-confirm carried over verbatim on
the destructive one, and the pair-honesty panel bound to real OffsiteScratchPair facts.
deriveWizardStep is pure over (op running, size-gate flash, scratch ready); the step is
never accepted from the request, and a running op outranks a stale ?full_prep= so no
commit button survives into a restore. While ANY op runs every mutation form is suppressed
server-side instead of being offered and refused.
No new mutation endpoint: every card posts to the pre-existing /backup/offbox/* handler
with the same field names and gates, and the page works with JavaScript disabled.
internal/{backup,appbackup,selfupdate} untouched. R-45's job registry stays its own item.
Fixes a latent bug found on the way: offboxRedirectTo hardcoded "?" when appending its
flash, which against the wizard's ?name=<app> target would have buried the flash inside
the name value.
No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0.
Closes R-47. No new agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0.
The replay needs a running DB container, so both restore paths started the
WHOLE stack first, giving the application a window to rebuild the very schema
objects the dump was about to create. Measured live on 2026-07-19 (H4,
DIAG-immich-restore-round2): immich-server rebuilt clip_index two seconds
before the dump's CREATE INDEX, the replay aborted "already exists" under
ON_ERROR_STOP=1, and immich reported schema drift. The data survived only
because pg_dump emits COPY before CREATE INDEX.
Both paths now open a DB-ONLY window: only the stack's database service(s)
come up, the dump is replayed with the app still down, and the full start
runs only after the replay exits 0. Fail-closed: a dump with no identifiable
DB service refuses BEFORE the first mutation. Every exit from the window
still does a best-effort full start, so a failed restore never leaves a box
with a database and no application.
New: appbackup.DBServiceNames (yaml.v3 services-map parse — never a line
scan; immich's top-level volume keys are the decoy) sharing dbTypeForImage
with DiscoverDatabases; stacks.Manager.StartStackServices (refuses an empty
list — argument-less `up -d` is a full start); RedeployFromEnv split into
PersistUnitRedeployConfig + its unchanged tail. StackDataProvider's
RecreateStackFromUnit becomes RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit — the hidden
`up -d` inside the old name is what carried the defect on the local path.
19 new tests (ordering plus state-at-replay-time, zero-mutation fail-closed
effects, replay-failure bring-up, parser decoys, empty-list refusal); three
companion red-proofs run and reverted. 23/23 packages green.
Not yet live-validated: STOP-1 supervised reconstitute, golden 0.153.0.
Capture on the box disproved the first theory: macOS DOES send a correct NBNS
query for <NAME><20> and nmbd DOES answer it correctly in 140us (flags 0x8580,
RCODE=0, right address) - macOS just never acts on it. NetBIOS there feeds
legacy browsing, not smb:// URL resolution, so the bare name can never work on
a Mac and nmbd was never the broken part.
felhom-samba 1.1.0 adds avahi + dbus, with avahi-daemon.conf and the _smb._tcp
service file templated from FELHOM_SERVER_NAME so a rename re-advertises. Both
daemons are non-fatal on failure - a discovery gap must not become an outage.
v0.151.0's card offered smb://<NAME> for Mac, which is exactly the dead form;
now smb://<NAME>.local. Windows keeps the flat \\<NAME>, which nmbd serves
correctly. Red-proofed both directions.
NOT claimed: Finder-sidebar discovery - published and answering on the wire,
but not observed working on the test Mac. Recorded OPEN.
TestRenderSambaCompose pinned the literal 1.0.0 tag, so an image bump read as a
renderer regression; now derives from SambaImage and asserts non-:latest.
S-1: /sharing/status coerced idle->running on the PHASE channel, so the first
poll of every steady-state page load reported a terminal job that never ran and
the client's repaint-reload fired ~1.2s apart, forever. The coercion's real duty
(liveness must never be contradicted) belongs to the 'running' LEVEL field
beside it, and is now pinned by its own regression test.
S-4 core: a terminal 'running' is served exactly once, so a REAL bring-up cannot
re-arm the reload on the page it just caused. failed/needs_password/in-flight
are never consumed. Unified async-job feedback stays the ROADMAP item.
S-2/S-5: new connect card with the Windows form, the Mac form and the direct
smb://<IP>, read from the SAMBA container's netns (the controller is on a docker
bridge and would answer 172.x). Derived per render, cached nowhere - the address
is a DHCP lease. Underivable => the line is omitted.
sharing.html's <script> block is byte-identical to v0.150.0. Red-proofed three
ways. 23/23 packages green.
Closes the two findings from DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19. Viktor deleted 11
immich photos to test offsite restore; both runs flashed success and the photos
stayed gone. Two independent defects.
R-43 — no offsite path could restore a database. All three buttons were
file-only: the two "visszaállítás" actions staged to a scratch folder and never
touched postgres, and place-to-live merged only MISSING files. For a DB-indexed
app the bytes returned and the app still could not see them. The dump was
carried INTO every snapshot and could never be replayed OUT of one.
New ReconstituteFromOffsite (/backup/offbox/reconstitute): safety dump → stop →
files overwritten to the snapshot version → start → the snapshot's own dump
replayed → health wait. Two invariants:
- nothing is ever deleted (-a, no --ignore-existing, no --delete): a file
created after the snapshot survives as an extra;
- the undo exists before the act — the pre-restore- dump is verified ON DISK
before anything is stopped, overwritten or replayed; if it cannot be taken
the operation refuses with zero changes.
The replay reads the SCRATCH unit: the live unit is never overwritten, so
replaying from it would replay the current DB over itself and restore nothing.
R-44 — a manual push shipped an unrefreshed dump (up to ~24h old). That day's
predated the customer's account by four hours and probed to asset:0/user:0/
album:0 inside 52MB whose bulk was immich's shipped geodata. Every run, manual
AND nightly, now refreshes dumps + units BEFORE capturing. Order is the
mechanism: the gap can only ADD files the DB does not reference yet, never
remove one it does. Manifests carry offsite_run_id + dumps_at, so coherence is
verifiable at restore time rather than assumed; the periodic refresh carries a
prior stamp forward and never invents one.
Honesty surfaces, all warn-level and none a gate: unstamped (pre-v0.148) pairs
report their skew, ValidateDump gained an EXACT-match accounts-table sniff for
customer-empty dumps, the completion flash states an outcome instead of a
mechanism, and the missing-only button now says what it does NOT do.
11 tests; 5 red-proofs run and reverted. Two of those found real test weaknesses
rather than confirming strength — the first undo mutation was caught by a second
guard, and the first table-matching test did not discriminate between the two
matchers at all. Both tests were rewritten to the cases that separate them.
NOT in scope: R-41's catalog invariant check, nightly cadence, retention, quota
math, tier-2, and v0.147.x progress semantics beyond one added phase line.
Live acceptance (§9) has NOT run: no capability-map flip, customer-restore row
stays MISSING, R-3 stays DRAFT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P9Nn14TWGzKoqAJAiVwC2s
README gains the async-job feedback section, the TOC entries it was missing
(SMB was also absent), and the three new endpoints. CONTEXT records the slice
and, more usefully, that three of its four versions exist because the cards were
watched against real runs — the failure modes were all invisible to unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nn3VgQk9iwEGgyx6QJ2NvE
UI-only; no behavioural or backup/restore surface touched. Green: build, vet,
tests all pass; template_id_gate, emoji_gate, native_confirm_gate,
offbox_rename_gate, mojibake_gate, app_row_dedup_gate all PASS.
Scrollbars (style.css): the platform default reads as a bright chunky stripe
against the navy and competes with the content it scrolls. Now thin and
hairline-coloured — scrollbar-width/scrollbar-color for Firefox AND
::-webkit-scrollbar (8px, thumb --line, hover --text-3, --radius) for
WebKit/Blink, because neither alone covers the browsers customers use. The two
surfaces that actually scroll take their own panel background as the track
(.sidebar -> --bg-2, html -> --bg-0) so the gutter never shows as a lighter
channel. Tokens only, no raw hexes.
Collapsible nav groups (layout.html + style.css, vanilla JS, no framework):
Tárhely, Biztonsági mentés and Megosztás become accordions with a chevron;
exactly one open at a time, clicking the open one closes it. Groups without
sub-items are untouched plain links. Hungarian labels unchanged.
- The header is a real <button>, so keyboard and AT reachability come for free
instead of being simulated with tabindex/role on a div. aria-expanded +
aria-controls + a :focus-visible outline.
- Nothing became unreachable when the header stopped being a link: every
group's landing page is ALSO its first sub-item (/storage -> Meghajtók,
/backups -> Áttekintés, /sharing -> Hálózati megosztás). Checked before the
conversion, not assumed.
- Progressive enhancement: the group containing the active page is rendered
open SERVER-SIDE (.is-open), so the right group is open before any JS runs
and stays open if JS never does. The listener only handles clicks.
- No layout jump: collapse animates grid-template-rows 0fr -> 1fr (with
min-height:0 + overflow:hidden on the sub-list) rather than max-height, so
it animates to the content's REAL height and there is no magic number to
drift when a group gains or loses an item — the specific way a max-height
accordion rots. The toggle reserves its 3px active border as transparent so
becoming active adds no width shift. .18s transitions, and both the collapse
and the chevron rotation are disabled under prefers-reduced-motion.
Pre-existing and deliberately NOT bundled: docker_run_volume_path_gate.py still
fails on internal/appexport/estimate.go:179. That is ROADMAP R-29, unrelated to
this change, verified to fail identically on the untouched tree, and R-29 itself
says not to bundle it into an unrelated feature commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nn3VgQk9iwEGgyx6QJ2NvE
The samba_classify.go SCOPE NOTE and the README KNOWN GAP both described a gap that
R-7b closes; both now describe the sibling-shares-source execution instead.
Records the R-7 slice 1 ship, the four red-proof outcomes, live-validation
evidence, the two bugs live validation caught, and the Part-4 Step-1 enumeration
finding + the reported design fork (share data classified but not yet in a live
backup run — needs a Viktor ruling, suggested R-7b).
report.Waiter holds a hanging GET against hub /api/v1/wait?gen=N (same hub
URL+key as the pusher). On a generation change it fires the v0.139.0
report.Trigger — nothing else; the report ACK delivers everything through the
unchanged machinery. No overall client timeout (held GET); per-request ctx
bounds a dead connection. First-observation records-not-fires; same-gen
timeout fires nothing; errors (incl. 404 from a pre-v0.58.0 hub) back off
5s->5min while the 15-min cycle reconciles. Wired beside the trigger under the
same hubPusher!=nil && Hub.Enabled gate.
Red-proof: disable the baseline branch -> first observation fires
(TestWaiter_FirstObservationRecordsNoFire), run-fail-reverted.
Copy soften: backups_remote/escrow "néhány másodperc, legfeljebb 15 perc".
Pairs with hub v0.58.0. Grounding:
felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16.md
After a completed escrow ceremony the Távoli mentés page showed the yellow
"Helyreállítási kód szükséges" card for ~15 min until the next hub-report ACK
flipped pending→escrowed. Phase-0 diagnosis (read-only) = verdict A (report-cycle
lag), already resolved on the demo box (escrow_state:"escrowed"); hub Hypothesis B
verified false (SaveHostEscrow ON CONFLICT already clears stale_at on upload) → no
hub change.
- settings.OffboxTarget.CeremonyCompletedAt: stamped on the recovery-code claim,
zeroed on the auto-confirmer Flip + the deprecated manual confirm; persisted.
- web/handlers.go: offboxCeremonyWaitState + escrowCeremonyGraceWindow (35m).
- backups_remote.html: info "megerősítésre vár, legfeljebb 15 perc" card → warn
"a megerősítés nem érkezett meg" past the window. Existing branches untouched.
- backups_escrow.html: "Mi történik ezután?" note on the wizard's final step.
- Test web/escrow_wait_state_test.go (truth table + red-proof recorded in REPORT).
No scheduler/agent/hub/endpoint changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
Saving the notifications form with a blank email box while events are enabled
wiped the customer's hub-side alert address (SyncPreferences pushed empty) —
the 2026-07-15 demo incident. settingsNotificationsHandler now refuses that
save before SetNotificationPrefs + hub sync, re-renders a Hungarian error, and
repaints the submitted checkboxes. Empty email + zero events (clear-all) still
proceeds. Tests + red-proof (remove guard -> stored email wiped to empty).
SQ6 over-capture FIXED for classified apps: the userdata root tar is exclude-scoped (keeps only
ancestors/descendants of a SELECTED bind relpath — R1-C, the tier2Reconcile keep-rule); no selected
userdata bind → no root tar (radarr state-only). New appbackup.ComputeFabBuckets (shared
resolveGuardCollapse pipeline; class buckets; guards over ALL classes; no cross-bucket containment).
appexport/fabplan.go: computeFabPlan + tarDirectoryExcluding + fabEstimateSplit. ExportRequest gains
DeselectOptional/OptInExcluded (both start handlers — two-call-site); mandatory is a server-side
floor. Manifest v1 + import UNTOUCHED; legacy apps byte-identical to v0.130.0. Estimate additive
class split; export UI: locked-mandatory/optional-checkboxes/excluded-opt-in + two-number warning.
All 6 §10 red-proofs verified. 6D Accept #1 now runs against this shape.
tier2_capture.go: classified apps get TierSecondary per-bind legs (paperless copy shrinks — export
drops); legacy apps keep the byte-identical resolver set. v2 relpath-mirroring layout
(backups/secondary/<stack>/{marker LAST, recovery-unit/, hdd/<rel>/, userdata/<rel>/}); N>1 native
(errTier2MultiDir/tier2AppDataName deleted). Migration=delete-and-rebuild + reconcile; all RemoveAll
via tier2SafeRemove (refuses outside backups/secondary/). SSD=state-only tier. selectTier2Target
never picks network storage (pinned+auto, F-6C-1). Restore reads v2 behind a marker gate.
Part 0: offbox_enlarge_blocked is a persisted one-time Load seed (opt-out sticks), not a getter
append. Part 0.5: offsite restore scratch prefers a local (non-network) path.
Full v2 test suite + all 10 §10 red-proofs verified. Destructive writes bounded to backups/secondary/.
Task 2 of the backup-classification-redesign arc. Ships the referential-
coupling classification as DATA + PARSER + PURE CLASSIFIER, deliberately
inert — no backup tier changes behavior. Task 3 (tier policy engine) and
Task 4 (manual .fab UI) consume it.
- appbackup/classify.go: BackupSpec/BindSpec/ComposeBind/ClassifiedBind;
ClassifyBinds (SQ5 two-level default — explicit beats :ro; unlisted
writable→mandatory, unlisted :ro→excluded; nil spec→legacy/false);
ValidateBackupSpec (whole-block-reject on any defect, first defect named).
- stacks/classify_binds.go: ParseComposeClassifiableBinds — ${VAR}-relative
binds + :ro flag (NOT ParseComposeHDDMounts/ExportDataMounts, the traps).
- Metadata.Backup + LoadMetadata as the single validation choke point (bad
catalog block → nil + one ERROR → legacy, within one sync cycle).
- Manager.ClassifiedBinds + StackDataProvider.GetStackClassifiedBinds seam
(delegated by stackAdapter, nil-stubbed in every fake) — wired + tested
now so Task 3 consumes a tested seam.
INERT: full pre-existing suite green with zero test-logic edits. +14 tests;
red-proofs RP-1..RP-4 confirmed. The 13 catalog backup: blocks ship in the
same app-catalog change (this controller deploys first).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A45Qop8YY8tS94bz63LFne
The controller assumed an app's HDD appdata dir is always appdata/<stackName>.
paperless-ngx writes appdata/paperless (stack paperless-ngx), so every consumer
keying by stack name silently missed it via a stat-and-skip. One canonical
resolver appbackup.AppDataDirNames derives the real dir name(s) from the app's
compose ${HDD_PATH} binds; all consumers use it.
- F-S2 (tier-2): RunTier2 mirrors the resolved appdata/<name> (paperless docs
got NO tier-2 copy before). Tier2Info size + RestoreTier2Files live dir use it.
WARN when a declared appdata dir is absent. New tier2Mirror seam.
- F-S3 (migrate, NEW): all six per-app appdata legs (collision/size/copy/verify/
cleanup/skip-set) now loop resolved names. scope="app" migration of paperless
previously copied nothing and left an empty media dir (scope="all" was saved by
the merge walk). WARN on missing declared dir in the copy leg.
- Multi-dir (N>1) refusal: tier-2 backup/info/restore refuse loudly (Hungarian);
migrate supports N. No catalog app hits it today; lifted by Task 3.
- Display: storage page sums resolved dirs.
- Truth repair: the v0.130.0 "tier-2 copies the namespace wholesale" claim is
false; corrected in CHANGELOG + main.go export-adapter comment.
+9 tests; red-proofs RP-1..RP-5 all confirmed. Controller-only, no agent/hub
coupling. Task 1 of the backup-classification-redesign arc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A45Qop8YY8tS94bz63LFne
The customer sets + owns the dashboard password via a hub-emailed one-time
claim code. An unclaimed box (code hash present, no password) serves ONLY the
claim page — every other route → claim page (302) or 401, so a Day-0 box is
never open on the internet. A set password disables the gate (auth wins).
Reset rides the same code engine (login "Elfelejtett jelszó"). Legacy-open
(no password, no hash) shows a red transition banner until the hub delivers a
hash. Report ACK caches the code state idempotently by generation; report
carries claimed (set-only). --print-reset-code root escape hatch. Requires
hub v0.50.0. Gate-coverage signature test + 4 red-proofs proven.
F8: share row fuses the shipped v0.117 classifier (fuseNetHealth) so it agrees with
the stacks stub badge (one classification, two surfaces). F4: mapped_uid range check
1..65533 at the door. §3 fork = option B (controller-only). Live-validated on 9201.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017CDMFpFx84pfviCTVuGGhf
resticStep escalates a restic lock error to `unlock --remove-all` + one
retry (safe: single-writer repo — sub-account isolation + single-flight
mutex); plain `unlock` is stale-only and can't clear a crash lock across a
container-hostname change. Pre-run stale unlock hygiene on run+restore.
C1: NewManager flips a persisted LastStatus=running to a truthful error.
Both red-proofed (A reproduces the exact campaign backup failure).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Pairs with agent v0.77.0. StageEscrowSecret pushes the repo password to the
agent (POST /escrow/stage-secret) at offsite-enable → EscrowState="pending".
Atomicity gate: RunOffboxBackup (scheduler + handler) refuses until
EscrowState="escrowed" (operator POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow after the
escrow ceremony) — no un-recoverable offsite ciphertext can exist. DR:
POST /backup/offbox/inject-password pre-places a recovered 64-hex password 0600
(honored by WriteOffboxSecrets' IsNotExist guard; refuses clobber without
force). DR recipe gains non-secret offsite_restic coords (DRResticCoord); SFTP
key regenerated at DR, not escrowed. New settings.OffboxTarget.EscrowState.
Tests + atomicity & inject companion red-proofs green; UI gates pass. NOT yet
live-validated (supervised ceremony).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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