The unit's data files are stamped with the versions that wrote them; the capture keeps the
definition the data belongs to; a restore never starts data under another version's
definition (unit restores refuse a mismatch; the off-site restore writes the snapshot's
definition); every tier's time is its data's; the conversion-copy release needs a dump on
the new engine. File-browser sync single-flight + no empty kept folder (R-695); the kept
view joins the folder's owning group, language switch resyncs (R-691); a restore-generated
login is not shown as the password (R-694). Red-proofs in
felhom.eu/documentation/audits/version-travel-2026-09-26/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The guarded update gains a folder copy of the app's named volumes, taken
after the pull where the app stops anyway (decision 19, chosen by the
2026-09-23 bake-off). On a failed health check the box undoes: every copy
validated by its finished-marker first, volumes refilled, definition and pin
from the job's own pre-update copies, the old version checked with the OLD
.felhom.yml probe. It holds only if the undo fails, and the hold sentence
says so and what state the data is in. Bind-mounted folders are never
touched.
- R-637 built; R-638/R-640/R-641 do not arise with a folder copy; R-639
(pre-update copies incl. .felhom.yml kept until the undo is over).
- journal phases copying/undoing with power-cut recovery.
- app.yaml last_update_undone + one line on the app page (hu/en).
- R-642: start/restart never answer "completed".
- Removal deletes kept undo copies.
MinAgent unchanged (0.131.0). Nine red-proofs in REPORT.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
R-630 (P1): waitUpdateHealthy kept the probe inside `if hc != nil && len(hc.Checks) > 0`, and when
findProbeContainer returned "" its else set last="no probe container" and LOOPED - the settle path
sat in the outer else, unreachable. So verifying could only time out and failAndHold then stopped a
working app. Measured on paperless-ngx: three containers healthy, failed at +313.0s, front door 404
after. It now falls through to the same settle path with a WARN naming the candidates.
The probe target is decidable now: HealthCheckConfig.Container plus findProbeContainerMeta resolve
by exact stack name -> explicit container -> a UNIQUE prefix -> nothing with the candidates
returned. The old rule took the FIRST prefix match. A skipped stack records why instead of silence.
R-634 (half): RemoveStack refused on the !Deployed FLAG while the machine had containers, a compose
file and an app.yaml. It now asks whether anything EXISTS. The mechanism producing the bad record is
still not diagnosed and R-634 stays open for it.
R-633/R-626: RemoveStack consults UpdateGuards.Busy and IsUpdating and refuses with the app's own
sentence - the product already refused this clash for update and for restore. And because `down`
returning 0 is a request not a result, the project is watched for 25s afterwards, anything carrying
its label is removed by name with its labels logged, and the answer carries `verified`.
R-621: failAndHold writes compose logs --tail 400 into <stackdir>/hold-logs/<ts>/ BEFORE the down
that destroys them. Two existing tests pin the compose sequence and correctly caught the new step;
their expectations are updated with the reason that the ORDER is the assertion.
R-614: RemoveStack calls ClearUpdateState.
NOT in this release: R-625 (a held app still renders an Update button). Named, not half-done.
Three new sentences, each born as a key in both bundles. Four red-proofs seen failing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
179 Hungarian sentences were built deep inside a package with fmt.Errorf and printed by
whoever caught them: too late to translate where they are shown, too early where they are
made. Every one now carries its key across that gap. ZERO Hungarian error literals remain.
util.MsgError does three things at once, each earned:
- Error() is the Hungarian, byte for byte, so every un-converted printer is unchanged;
- errors.Is answers for the kind AND for a wrapped cause (KindErrorf dropped the cause);
- an error ARGUMENT renders recursively, so "formázás sikertelen: %w" translates whole.
A foreign error — restic, docker, ssh, the stdlib — prints verbatim. It is not ours.
76 display sites go through errText, and TestNoErrErrorInPageOutput convicts any that do
not. memoryVerdict returns an error rather than a sentence, so the deploy's 409 and the
household's language come from one value; UpdateRefusal gained a Cause to carry it.
Plurals, one rule, stated once: a key with .one/.other takes its COUNT first. Not a
per-call-site flag — the producer somebody forgot would read "3 app is not running". The
guard caught a real key collision (alert.deadapp.one) the day the rule landed.
TWO DEFECTS FOUND IN MY OWN TOOLING, recorded rather than quietly fixed. The bulk converter
silently dropped multi-line concatenations, damaging 7 producers — and the parity gate could
not see it, because every surviving fragment WAS a real base literal while the CALL had lost
text; two behaviour tests caught it. And the counting script was case-sensitive, so it said
"0 left" while five remained.
MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). No hub release needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Operator ruling 2026-09-13. The update precondition walks Tier 2, Tier 1
(own recovery unit, "helyi") and Tier 3 (off-site, 15 s bound; unreachable
counts as absent with a WARN) and leans on the first FRESH copy; the
backup_max_age rule applies to whichever tier is chosen. No copy anywhere:
back up first. Refused only when nothing exists and no backup can be taken.
RunAppBackupNow tolerates a Tier-2 failure (WARN) and marks the captured
unit proven current. The hold names the tier (második meghajtó / saját
meghajtó / távoli mentés) and the date; pre-v0.239.0 holds keep their text.
A successful off-site restore now lifts an update hold. The backups page
still uses Tier2UnitRestorePoint unchanged.
Scenarios G-M tested; red-proofs M, L, the tail and the off-site clear in
felhom.eu documentation/audits/rulings-r472-r475-2026-09-13/.
POST /api/stacks/{name}/update is now a guarded job answering 202:
cheap refusals (hold — R-439, busy, migration, deploying, memory via the
deploy's own memoryVerdict, a fixed 2 GB disk floor, and no restorable
Tier-2 copy) → backup-first when the proven copy is older than
update.backup_max_age (24h) → safety dump BEFORE the pin moves → pin →
pull (failure puts the pin back) → up → health (.felhom.yml check or 60 s
settle, update.health_timeout 5m). Not healthy → the app is stopped and
HELD (RestoreHold reason update_failed, same store and gate as R-379) and
the page names the backup to restore from; the pin stays. Success is only
ever update_phase=done after health (R-443). UpdateStack is deleted.
The restorable-unit predicate is EXTRACTED to backup.Tier2UnitRestorePoint
and shared with the backups page (row pinned unchanged). The copy is aged
by the last successful Tier-2 copy, not the manifest created_at — measured
on demo-hp that created_at moves only on definition changes.
Crash safety: update-journal.json before each phase; RecoverUpdates before
the boot sweep, ResumeInterruptedUpdates after the guards are wired.
Three unattended start paths ignored a hold and now honour it: the
drive-return gate (restart + boot recreate) and the nightly volume dump.
The nightly capture and Tier-2 run skip held apps so the restore point
survives. No automatic rollback — measured per-app; route back = restore.
Tests A–H across stacks/backup/api/web/cmd; six red-proofs seen to fail.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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