MinAgent: 0.131.0 (unchanged). Needs hub v0.118.0+, which shipped first and
tolerates a box that sends none of this - every box in the fleet is that box
until this release reaches it.
The hub writes a household's e-mails in their language now, but about a third
of those mails carry a sentence the BOX composed, naming a drive, an app or a
number. The hub cannot translate one. So the box sends it twice.
- message_customer on POST /api/v1/event, omitempty. A HUNGARIAN household
sends nothing extra at all, so its payload stays byte-for-byte what every box
sends today and the hub's fallback path keeps being the one production
exercises rather than a branch nobody takes.
- 19 producers render both sentences from ONE bundle key. `message` stays
Hungarian always: it is what the operator is mailed and what the hub logs.
- customer.language bootstraps a new box - stored choice, then config, then
Hungarian. The config value is NEVER written into settings.json: that would
record a choice the household never made.
The Hungarian did not move, measured twice: the wire golden from the slice-2
base commit, and the Go parity gate over all 19 new keys.
Three guards had to learn the change and one caught me: the test seam now
carries the new field; the R-329 severity register reported two dynamic sites
as no longer existing the moment they moved off PushEvent (the walk now checks
36 severity literals, up from 20); and TestConfigLanguageIsWiredInMain reads
main.go, because cmd/ is gitignored and ripgrep does not.
A mistake, named: the first pass dropped displayName from three producers,
which would have mailed customers "Alkalmazás telepítve: %!s(MISSING)". Caught
reading the diff; now pinned by a test that refuses %!/MISSING/%s/%d in either
language.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
POST /api/stacks/{name}/update is now a guarded job answering 202:
cheap refusals (hold — R-439, busy, migration, deploying, memory via the
deploy's own memoryVerdict, a fixed 2 GB disk floor, and no restorable
Tier-2 copy) → backup-first when the proven copy is older than
update.backup_max_age (24h) → safety dump BEFORE the pin moves → pin →
pull (failure puts the pin back) → up → health (.felhom.yml check or 60 s
settle, update.health_timeout 5m). Not healthy → the app is stopped and
HELD (RestoreHold reason update_failed, same store and gate as R-379) and
the page names the backup to restore from; the pin stays. Success is only
ever update_phase=done after health (R-443). UpdateStack is deleted.
The restorable-unit predicate is EXTRACTED to backup.Tier2UnitRestorePoint
and shared with the backups page (row pinned unchanged). The copy is aged
by the last successful Tier-2 copy, not the manifest created_at — measured
on demo-hp that created_at moves only on definition changes.
Crash safety: update-journal.json before each phase; RecoverUpdates before
the boot sweep, ResumeInterruptedUpdates after the guards are wired.
Three unattended start paths ignored a hold and now honour it: the
drive-return gate (restart + boot recreate) and the nightly volume dump.
The nightly capture and Tier-2 run skip held apps so the restore point
survives. No automatic rollback — measured per-app; route back = restore.
Tests A–H across stacks/backup/api/web/cmd; six red-proofs seen to fail.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
R-399: monitoring.integrity.read_data_subset defaults to 100%. A pack damaged
without changing its size made plain `restic check` report "no errors were found"
on demo-hp 2026-08-30; every read-data form caught it. Cost on that 134 MB store:
35.0s structure vs 39.2s at 100%. "off" (any case) is the off token; empty means
not-configured, therefore the default; a malformed value falls back to the DEFAULT,
never to structure. A completed check over 5 minutes logs a WARN naming the
duration, the depth and R-401 — operator log only, no hub event, no depth change.
The depth is now recorded with the verdict (LastIntegrityDepth; empty = NOT
RECORDED, never "structure").
R-400: 24 debug-page references, 17 dispatched, 7 dead — three of which fetched on
page LOAD, so those panels were permanently blank. backup/crossdrive implemented;
backup/infra, hub/infra-push, dr/infra-status, storage/watchdog-status and both
storage/simulate-* deleted with their panels and JavaScript.
scripts/debug_route_gate.py fails in both directions and is registered after the
seven were resolved. 18 referenced, 18 dispatched, none orphaned.
Corrections: the dead-field warning in report/types.go said the controller runs no
integrity check and the notifiers are called from nowhere — both false since
v0.227.0. controller.yaml.example gains its missing integrity: block.
integrityCheckTimeout's "ships OFF" comment rewritten.
Nothing ever verified that the off-site copies are still readable. The
whole-guest tier has verify jobs; the tier holding the customer's documents and
photos had none -- the complete set of restic verbs this controller used
contained no `check`. We would have found out at restore time, with a customer
waiting. On 2026-08-21 a deliberately damaged pack was caught at once by plain
`restic check`; we had never run it.
R-397: NotifyIntegrityOK/NotifyIntegrityFailed existed with no caller, the hub
allowlists both event types and carries the Hungarian text for both, the
settings checkbox exists, and the debug button posts to /api/debug/backup/
integrity. Everything was built except the part that runs. SIXTH instance of
that shape in this project.
THE HAZARD SHAPES THE WHOLE DESIGN. resticStep self-heals a crash lock by
running `unlock --remove-all` and retrying, and its own comment records why that
is safe: every caller holds the in-process single-flight mutex, so any lock it
meets is stale. A check that did not take that flag could meet a LIVE prune's
lock from this same box, remove it, and retry over the top of it. So the check
TAKES THE FLAG and SKIPS rather than waits -- waiting would pin the nightly
backup behind it, and a skip costs nothing because due-ness makes tomorrow try
again. TestR359_SkipsWhenRunningFlagHeld asserts the NON-EFFECTS: restic never
invoked, `unlock` never in any argv. Its red-proof prints the real thing --
restic running `check` while the flag was held.
DUE-NESS, NOT A WEEKDAY. Daily job, weekly behaviour: "is the last successful
check older than 7 days?" not "is it Sunday?". R-341 is exactly the other shape,
a dated check quietly missed and never caught up. No Weekly primitive added.
THREE OUTCOMES, NOT TWO. Skipped, Unreachable and failed are different facts.
"I could not look" is not "I looked and it is broken" -- R-339 already owns
reachability, and a second alarm for the same fact trains the operator to
discount the one alarm that means the backups are damaged. A timeout is
unreachable, never damage. A failure advances due-ness (a broken store must not
be re-checked nightly); a skip and an unreachable store do not.
Success is severity `info`, which severityNotifies DROPS -- it mails NOBODY, by
design. A weekly success e-mail is how people stop reading their alerts.
The customer gets a SENTENCE; restic's words go to the log, truncated (R-379:
615 bytes of raw database text reached a customer once). read-data-subset ships
OFF and a malformed value is refused at read time rather than handed to restic,
where one typo would fail the whole check.
Published on OffboxReportStatus, NOT on report.BackupReport's IntegrityOK --
those were retired by R-331 YESTERDAY and TestBackupReport_DeadFieldsStayZero
still passes unmodified.
Also: the monitoring page stopped promising a Sunday job that never existed, and
the debug button got its dispatch case.
PART 0 WAS NOT BUILT, AND R-398 WAS MY OWN MISTAKE. The seam it asked for
already exists: offboxRunner/SetOffboxRunner/m.runner() has been injectable
since the off-site tier shipped, and other tests drive restic-backed paths
through it. A resticStepFn seam would have been WORSE here -- it would replace
the `unlock --remove-all` escalation and hide it from the assertions that must
see it. R-358's AST ordering test is converted to a real execution test instead,
which immediately surfaced something the AST walk could not: unlockStale
legitimately runs before the restore.
Four red-proofs, each printing the pre-fix behaviour. Green gate: 28 packages,
rc 0. All 12 controller gates OK.
gofmt -w across the controller tree (46 files) so gofmt -l is empty — disarms the
formatting landmine where a targeted edit + accidental gofmt -w swept ~46 unrelated
files. Pure formatting: whitespace + gofmt's optional-semicolon removal in reflowed
inline closures. One doc comment reworded ('' -> 'the empty string') to avoid gofmt's
Go-1.19 doc-comment typographic substitition ('' -> curly quote) muddying its meaning.
No build/vet/test behavior change.
ensureSamba joins EnsureBaseStack after filebrowser, gated on SMB.Enabled
(cloudflared conditional precedent); reconcile is idempotent (unchanged config +
running container = ZERO compose calls, asserted via seam). Atomic tmp+fsync+
rename config writes. Password applied via smbpasswd on STDIN (never argv/log/
settings). Disable = compose down, volumes + folders KEPT. samba added to
IsProtectedStack in code (controller.yaml is golden-generated and predates it),
which also makes the app-backup loops correctly skip it.
The customer sets + owns the dashboard password via a hub-emailed one-time
claim code. An unclaimed box (code hash present, no password) serves ONLY the
claim page — every other route → claim page (302) or 401, so a Day-0 box is
never open on the internet. A set password disables the gate (auth wins).
Reset rides the same code engine (login "Elfelejtett jelszó"). Legacy-open
(no password, no hash) shows a red transition banner until the hub delivers a
hash. Report ACK caches the code state idempotently by generation; report
carries claimed (set-only). --print-reset-code root escape hatch. Requires
hub v0.50.0. Gate-coverage signature test + 4 red-proofs proven.
On startup reconcile the hub-served offsite: descriptor into a key-only offbox
target. internal/offsiteapply.Bridge: verify-pin box host key vs host_fingerprint
(NO blind TOFU) → consume the one-time password (single-use, never logged) →
sshpass ssh-copy-id -s -f install + verify → configure offbox → EscrowState=pending
(fork-4 via Manager.ApplyOffsiteTarget) → persist a descriptor-hash marker LAST.
Idempotent + fail-safe. Seams faked in tests; both red-proofs run+reverted.
Dockerfile + sshpass. NOT yet live-applied (supervised end-to-end next runbook).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
loadAndParse + LoadFromBytes ran os.ExpandEnv over the whole YAML before parse;
a bcrypt hash ($2a$10$...) is full of $word sequences that get replaced with
empty env values, silently corrupting web.password_hash on load (a silent
auth-integrity bug: $2a$10$N9qo8uL... -> "a0"). Remove both ExpandEnv calls;
parse raw bytes. The typed applyEnvOverrides path (FELHOM_WEB_PASSWORD_HASH) is
the sanctioned env mechanism and is unchanged. Tests + red-proof.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Gap 1: third shim listener :2526, plaintext, does NOT advertise STARTTLS (TLSConfig
nil) — for opportunistic-STARTTLS clients with no cert-skip (cal.com, nextcloud).
Gap 2: SMTPMapping tls_mode (picks port 2525/2526/2465) + from_domain_var (split
local-part + domain for nextcloud's MAIL_FROM_ADDRESS/MAIL_DOMAIN). Default keeps
existing apps on 2525. Hub untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bug fixes:
- Add applyEnvOverrides to LoadFromBytes (M05)
- Set state=failed on compose-up failure in selfupdate (M16)
- Clamp usableMB to min 0 in memory check (M22)
- Remove "manual" schedule from triggerAllCrossBackups (M23)
- Add mmcblk device handling for partition paths (M21)
- Fix stripPartition for mmcblk devices (L25)
- Fix TruncateStr for UTF-8 and negative maxLen (L05/L06)
- Fix AllDone to return false for empty restore plans (L14)
- Fix PushOnce to return actual errors (L39)
- Restore pending events on save failure in DrainPendingEvents (M03)
- Add duplicate check in AddStoragePath (M04)
- Call CleanupTempMounts after drive scan (H13)
- Log SetStep save errors (M25)
Hardening:
- Guard scheduler Start() against double-start (M14)
- Acquire mutex in scheduler Stop() before reading cancel (L24)
- Cap log lines parameter to 10000 (L31)
- Require POST for logout (L32)
- Use sync.Once for Server.Close() (L49)
- Panic on crypto/rand.Read failure in setup CSRF (L40)
- Validate Bearer token against Hub API key in CSRF (H16 fix)
- Replace custom hasPrefix with strings.HasPrefix (L13)
- Replace simpleHash with crc32.ChecksumIEEE (L48)
Cleanup:
- Remove dead imageName function (L02)
- Remove dead detectHostIPViaRoute function (L03)
- Rename shadowed copy variable to cp (L07)
- Copy DefaultEnabledEvents in GetNotificationPrefs early return (L09)
- Update BUGHUNT.md with comprehensive audit results
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add internal/assets package that downloads and caches app assets from
Hub API with SHA-256 change detection. Assets resolve from synced cache
first, falling back to baked-in directory. Daily sync schedule +
on-demand POST /api/assets/sync endpoint.
Config: assets.sync_enabled + assets.sync_schedule (default 05:00)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New controller features:
- Web-based setup wizard replaces docker-setup.sh interactive config
- Dual listener: :8080 (Traefik) + :8081 (direct HTTP for LAN)
- Drive scanner finds .felhom-infra-backup/ on all block devices
- Hub recovery pull (GET /api/v1/recovery/{id}) with retrieval password
- Fresh install: Hub config download or manual wizard
- CSRF protection, state persistence, Hungarian UI
- Local infra backup written to all connected drives after each backup cycle
- .felhom-infra-backup/backup.json + metadata.json with SHA256 checksum
- Hub verification: parse customer_blocked from report push response
- Limited mode after 7 days without verification
- Recovery info page on Settings + recovery-info.txt file generation
- Pending events queue: DR events sent to Hub on next report push
- docker-setup.sh v6.0.0: removed interactive wizard, minimal controller.yaml only
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- POST /api/config/apply: accepts YAML body from Hub, validates and
writes controller.yaml atomically (tmp+rename)
- GET /api/config/hash: returns SHA256 hash of current config file
- Report payload now includes config_hash field for Hub comparison
- Config endpoints use same dual auth as self-update (session OR Bearer)
- config.LoadFromBytes() for validation without file I/O
- config.FileHash() helper for SHA256 computation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Major refactor of backup and storage paths:
- Per-drive restic repos at <drive>/backups/primary/restic/
- Per-app DB dumps at <drive>/backups/primary/<app>/db-dumps/
- Remove global BackupDir, DBDumpDir, ResticRepo config fields
- Add SystemDataPath config (fallback for apps without HDD)
- New backup/paths.go with pure path computation helpers
- Add GetStackHDDPath to StackDataProvider interface
- Restic methods now accept repoPath as parameter
- Cross-drive backup uses new secondary path structure
- Rename storage/ to appdata/ in scripts and compose templates
- Update protected HDD paths (storage → appdata + backups)
- Simplify backup UI (remove global path displays)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 (Monitoring & Health):
- Central job scheduler replacing ad-hoc goroutines (internal/scheduler)
- CPU usage collector via /proc/stat background sampling (internal/system/cpu_linux.go)
- Temperature reading from /sys/class/thermal + /host/sys (Docker mount)
- Load average from /proc/loadavg
- Healthchecks.io-compatible HTTP pinger (internal/monitor/pinger.go)
- System health checks: disk, memory, CPU, temp, Docker, protected containers (internal/monitor/healthcheck.go)
Phase 3 (Backups):
- Database auto-discovery via docker ps + docker inspect (internal/backup/dbdump.go)
- Database dumping via docker exec (pg_dump / mariadb-dump) with atomic writes
- Restic backup integration with auto-password generation (internal/backup/restic.go)
- Backup orchestrator: DB dumps + restic snapshots + weekly prune (internal/backup/backup.go)
- Manual backup trigger via dashboard button and POST /api/backup/run
Dashboard UI:
- CPU usage bar with load average display
- Temperature with colored indicator dot
- Backup status card with last run time, DB count, repo stats
- "Mentés most" button for manual backup trigger
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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