Tier-2 mirrors each app's whole recovery unit to <dest>/backups/secondary/<app>/recovery-unit/ on
every run and has done for months. Nothing read it. In the one failure Tier-2 exists for - the
primary drive is lost, and the primary unit with it - the surviving copy could not be opened by any
action in the product (07-backup-architecture 6.3, 7.2).
Part 1.2: RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt(stack, unitDir) holds the whole body; RestoreFromRecoveryUnit is
the thin caller naming the primary unit. ONE implementation, two callers. The SOURCE moves; the
DESTINATION does not - live Docker volumes, the live database container, the guest's definition, all
unchanged. The R-47 mutation order, the secret reconciliation with unit-over-guest precedence, the
fail-closed data-key gate and the no-unit fallback with CountsUnknown are untouched.
reimportDBDumpsAtCtx is the bounded-context twin of reimportDBDumpsFrom; the 35-minute bound is now
named once so the two paths cannot drift. The R-354 volume-replay seam is reused rather than a second
one invented, which is what lets the acceptance test assert the volume leg's source directory.
Part 1.3: RestoreTier2Unit resolves the recorded copy, refuses fail-closed unless the mirror carries a
parseable manifest - a directory is not a package - and delegates. The single-writer flag is taken
inside RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt, not beside it.
Part 2.1: Tier2Coverage gains UnitRestorable and the copy's dates. CanRestore() is NOT widened; it
still answers only 'can the file restore run?'. One predicate answering two questions is R-356, which
refused 40 running apps for months.
Tests: A2-A6 and B1-B5, plus two non-regression guards. The Tier-2 fixtures build their mirror with
the production RunTier2, so the claim is 'the copy Tier-2 writes is the copy this restore reads'.
Red-proofs: A5 (swap volumes/recreate -> fails on the order), B2 (point the reader back at the
primary -> fails with the mirror never reaching the redeploy, and with permission denied once the
primary tree is unreadable).
Both are the system reporting healthy while the customer is not, and both live in the same
status-derivation code. Neither is fixed by making the system quieter.
C9-F1 (HIGH) — Tier-2 writes recovery-unit/ on EVERY run and RestoreTier2Files has never read
it (tier2_restore.go:101-104 reads hdd/ + userdata/ only). Phase 0 enumerated all 53 catalog
templates against both demo boxes: 43 apps have NO readable subtree, so the button stopped the
app, restored 0 files, restarted it and said "Nincs hiányzó fájl — minden fájl megvan a helyén."
— at the moment the customer pressed it because files were missing, with 156 MB of BookStack's
data unread in the same copy. 9 apps have file legs but never their DB or volumes, so the same
sentence was also a clean bill of health over data never opened (immich: 1.3 GB Postgres unit).
Honesty half shipped: a pre-flight coverage check refuses UP FRONT without stopping the app and
NAMES the action that works; a run that proceeds claims only what it EXAMINED and discloses that
the database and volumes are not covered. Completeness is filed as C9-F1b — routing to the
Tier-1 unit restore puts a destructive operation behind a non-destructive button, so its confirm
copy has to carry that difference. C9-F4 filed: nothing reads the Tier-2 recovery-unit/ mirror,
so the second local copy that exists for drive loss is unreachable by any customer action.
C9-F2 (HIGH) — a crash loop was counted as working. StateRestarting is deliberately NOT added to
IsDownState (that alarms on every deploy fleet-wide, the over-correction F-A1 nearly cost us); a
sustained run becomes down after crashLoopAfter = 5m, set above the 120s deploy timeout, Mealie's
60s start_period and R-97b's 180s grace. The dashboard counter uses the same predicate, so it no
longer contradicts the alarm on the same screen. README's claim that faults "still surface as
restarting" was a wish with no test — corrected in place; it is the seventh such instance.
Six red-proofs observed, including the one that matters most: adding StateRestarting to
IsDownState fails the brief-restart test with "every deploy and update would page the operator".
go test ./... rc=0, 27 packages, run and read separately from this commit.
tier2_capture.go: classified apps get TierSecondary per-bind legs (paperless copy shrinks — export
drops); legacy apps keep the byte-identical resolver set. v2 relpath-mirroring layout
(backups/secondary/<stack>/{marker LAST, recovery-unit/, hdd/<rel>/, userdata/<rel>/}); N>1 native
(errTier2MultiDir/tier2AppDataName deleted). Migration=delete-and-rebuild + reconcile; all RemoveAll
via tier2SafeRemove (refuses outside backups/secondary/). SSD=state-only tier. selectTier2Target
never picks network storage (pinned+auto, F-6C-1). Restore reads v2 behind a marker gate.
Part 0: offbox_enlarge_blocked is a persisted one-time Load seed (opt-out sticks), not a getter
append. Part 0.5: offsite restore scratch prefers a local (non-network) path.
Full v2 test suite + all 10 §10 red-proofs verified. Destructive writes bounded to backups/secondary/.
The controller assumed an app's HDD appdata dir is always appdata/<stackName>.
paperless-ngx writes appdata/paperless (stack paperless-ngx), so every consumer
keying by stack name silently missed it via a stat-and-skip. One canonical
resolver appbackup.AppDataDirNames derives the real dir name(s) from the app's
compose ${HDD_PATH} binds; all consumers use it.
- F-S2 (tier-2): RunTier2 mirrors the resolved appdata/<name> (paperless docs
got NO tier-2 copy before). Tier2Info size + RestoreTier2Files live dir use it.
WARN when a declared appdata dir is absent. New tier2Mirror seam.
- F-S3 (migrate, NEW): all six per-app appdata legs (collision/size/copy/verify/
cleanup/skip-set) now loop resolved names. scope="app" migration of paperless
previously copied nothing and left an empty media dir (scope="all" was saved by
the merge walk). WARN on missing declared dir in the copy leg.
- Multi-dir (N>1) refusal: tier-2 backup/info/restore refuse loudly (Hungarian);
migrate supports N. No catalog app hits it today; lifted by Task 3.
- Display: storage page sums resolved dirs.
- Truth repair: the v0.130.0 "tier-2 copies the namespace wholesale" claim is
false; corrected in CHANGELOG + main.go export-adapter comment.
+9 tests; red-proofs RP-1..RP-5 all confirmed. Controller-only, no agent/hub
coupling. Task 1 of the backup-classification-redesign arc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A45Qop8YY8tS94bz63LFne
Closes the engine half of drill finding F2: user files under appdata/<stack>
had no customer recovery path (operator copy-back only).
- RestoreTier2Files(stack): single-flight with backup/restore; ALL refusals
before any stop (no Tier-2 record / LastRun empty / copy dir absent →
"nincs másodlagos fájlmásolat"; Tier-2 drive disconnected; live drive
disconnected/decommissioned — Hungarian, flash-ready); source is the
RECORDED CrossDriveBackup.DestinationPath (never a fresh selectTier2Target);
stop → copy → start → waitForHealthy; copy/restart errors surface (F17).
- rsyncRestoreMissing: rsyncMirror's exec shape with the OPPOSITE-direction
flags: -a --ignore-existing --itemize-changes — existing live files are
never overwritten, nothing is ever deleted (the --delete trap this task
exists to avoid). Count = ">f" itemize lines (pure countRestoredFiles).
- restoreFilesCopier seam so orchestration tests never shell out; the one
FS-level test of the real rsync is LookPath-guarded (runs on the Linux
build server + live validation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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