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docs: CONTEXT + REPORT for v0.190.0 (R-157 A / R-170 / R-171)
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authentik Default Admin
2026-08-02 20:34:48 +02:00
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CONTEXT.md
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> >
> Ask Claude Code: "Please update CONTEXT.md with what we did today" > Ask Claude Code: "Please update CONTEXT.md with what we did today"
Last updated: 2026-08-02 (v0.190.0 — R-157 A · R-170 · R-171: boot recovery finished)
> **2026-08-02 — v0.190.0 (R-157 mechanism A · R-170 · R-171).** Three items, one live validation
> cycle, because all three are boot behaviour and all three are proven by hard-resetting the box.
>
> **DIAGNOSE BEFORE THEORISING — and the first diagnosis was a FALSE NEGATIVE.** A hole was reasoned
> out of the v0.189.0 diff (a drive-gate-stopped app has zero containers and `desired_state: running`,
> so it now reads as a boot orphan) and confirmed on hardware BEFORE any fix was written. **Attempt 1
> produced `no boot-orphaned apps` and would have been reported as a disproof.** It was a race:
> unmounting only the parent bind is healed by the agent within ~60 s, so the drive gate's startup
> reconcile restarted the apps **one second before** the sweep looked. Holding the drive genuinely
> absent reproduced the defect immediately. **"It didn't happen this time" is not a mechanism.**
>
> **The confirmation moved the severity in BOTH directions.** The write hazard did not materialise —
> compose failed `mkdir …/userdata: permission denied` because the unbound mountpoint is
> host-root-owned and the guest is unprivileged. **That protection is ACCIDENTAL**: no code chose it,
> no test pinned it, and it is one `chown` or one privileged guest away from gone. But the harm that
> DID occur was not in the hypothesis and is real on every box: two wasted attempts and a **false
> dead-app alarm for an app the drive gate is deliberately holding**.
>
> **The fix already existed one path over.** `startGatedByMissingDrive` (the API) refuses a customer's
> start on an absent drive; the sweep bypassed it by calling `Manager.StartStack` directly.
> **`StartStack` HAS NO GATE OF ITS OWN** — carry this: every caller that is not the customer must
> decide for itself whether the app may run. New consumer-side `bootrecon.StartGate`, fail-safe
> (cannot determine ⇒ do not start).
>
> **Widening a window makes previously-unreachable overlaps reachable — a design input, not an
> afterthought.** The old T+5 s sweep never met a quiesce or an in-flight app-data operation; a 50 s
> window can. All three holders answer ONE seam because they differ only in the reason string.
>
> **A TEST REJECTED MY FIRST CONSTANT, and the comment says so.** `settle + budget + one retry` must
> fit inside `deadAppBootGrace`; 60 s gave 95 s against 90 s. The budget is 50 s **because a test said
> so** — recorded in the code rather than presented as taste. Widening the grace was rejected: it
> hides a late recovery instead of reporting one (`recordLateRecovery`).
>
> **THE FIX HAD ITS OWN DEFECT, FOUND LIVE AND NOT BY REVIEW.** The window sampled `GetStacks()` — the
> Manager's map, refreshed by the scheduler every **10 s** — every 5 s, so two identical samples could
> mean *the cache did not update*. Observed: a container removed ~5 s before the window closed was
> still in the sampled fleet and the sweep logged `no boot-orphaned apps` for an app that had none.
> `sampleBootFleet` now refreshes first. **Generalise: a settle detector is only as good as the
> freshness of what it samples — if the source is cached, refresh it, or you are watching the cache
> settle rather than the system.**
>
> **R-170:** `shouldRecreateOnBoot` reads intent with the identical three-way table; absent keeps the
> old `hasContainers` behaviour exactly; `presentStable` untouched and still load-bearing. Its comment
> argued at length FOR the count and was rewritten. Agreement pinned from BOTH sides against one
> fixture table (an import cycle prevents testing the two gates together).
>
> **Live: 6/6 hard resets** (every app back; the customer-stopped app down all six), settle times
> 10/40/10/10/15/15 s. Sharpest evidence: same app, same box — missed at 18:08:35, recovered at
> 18:18:50. R-170 proven in one reboot (calibre-web recreated, immich left stopped). 27/27 packages;
> 7 red-proofs. Detail: `REPORT.md`.
Last updated: 2026-08-02 (v0.189.0 — R-166 / D-b: the box stops guessing what the customer wanted) Last updated: 2026-08-02 (v0.189.0 — R-166 / D-b: the box stops guessing what the customer wanted)
> **2026-08-02 — v0.189.0 (R-166, operator decision D-b).** When an app was not running the box had > **2026-08-02 — v0.189.0 (R-166, operator decision D-b).** When an app was not running the box had
REPORT.md
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# REPORT — v0.189.0: the box stops guessing what the customer wanted (R-166 / decision D-b) # REPORT — v0.190.0: boot recovery finished, and a regression v0.189.0 opened (R-157 A · R-170 · R-171)
**Overwritten** per the standing rule. The prior contents (the R-168 CI workflow, same day) have **Overwritten** per the standing rule; the prior contents (v0.189.0 / R-166, same day) have their
their durable record in `CHANGELOG.md`. durable record in `CHANGELOG.md`.
**Session:** 2026-08-02 · **Repos touched:** `felhom-controller` (v0.188.0 → **v0.189.0**), **Session:** 2026-08-02 · **Repos:** `felhom-controller` v0.189.0 → **v0.190.0**, `felhom.eu` (docs
`felhom.eu` (docs only — **no hub change, no hub version bump**) · **Live target:** demo box only, no hub bump) · **Live target:** demo box `felhom-pve` guest **9201** · **No STOP point.**
`felhom-pve` guest **9201** · **No STOP point; nothing destructive; no customer data touched.**
--- ---
## 1. Confirmed baselines — matched §1 exactly on arrival ## 1. Baselines and the five timing constants — all matched §1 on arrival
| Repo | `main` @ arrival | Expected (§1) | Match | | Repo | `main` @ arrival | Expected | Match |
|---|---|---|---| |---|---|---|---|
| `felhom-controller` | `e7c44c0e0f91d21d92b1dafda3979bf382182c1f` | `e7c44c0e0f91` | ✅ | | `felhom-controller` | `344660942015da292e5bfdf98c457124b6f633a1` | `344660942015` | ✅ |
| `felhom.eu` | `c04ea4f6c2b1554f7d5b4f9fbe7b0066c37b4ea1` | `c04ea4f6c2b1` | ✅ | | `felhom.eu` | `5c97fbc397f2148ea4d5c98d4de06e3dc8b69a91` | `5c97fbc397f2` | ✅ |
Both trees clean (`git status --porcelain` empty, `HEAD == origin/main`) before the build. | Constant | Value | Confirmed at | Match |
|---|---|---|---|
| `bootReconcileSettle` | `5 * time.Second` | `cmd/controller/main.go:1264` | ✅ |
| `DefaultAttempts` | `2` | `internal/bootrecon/bootrecon.go:46` | ✅ |
| `DefaultRetryDelay` | `30 * time.Second` | `internal/bootrecon/bootrecon.go:49` | ✅ |
| `deadAppBootGrace` | `90 * time.Second` | `cmd/controller/main.go:1238` | ✅ |
| drive-gate tick | `30 * time.Second` | `internal/web/intermediary.go:339` | ✅ |
## 2. The four §4.9 facts, re-confirmed at source — none had drifted No drift. Both trees clean before the build.
| Fact | Confirmed at | Result | ## 2. Part 0's verdict — **CONFIRMED**, and the first attempt was a false negative
|---|---|---|
| `AppConfig` has no desired-run field; `Deployed` means *installed* | `internal/stacks/deploy.go:97-107` — five fields: `Deployed`, `DeployedAt`, `Env`, `LockedFields`, `EmailEnabled` | **Held** |
| `StopStack` runs `compose down` (removes containers) | `internal/stacks/manager.go:1056` → `m.composeExec(dir, "down")` | **Held** |
| `DumpAppVolumesSafe` stops/dumps/starts with no `defer`, no marker, no journal | `internal/backup/backup.go:682-707` — plain statements, no `defer` anywhere | **Held.** Same shape at `internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:279` and `internal/appexport/export.go:232` |
| `aggregateState` already walks every container; any unhealthy/mixed result wins | `internal/stacks/manager.go:~782` | **Held — D-b's every-container requirement was already met and was NOT re-implemented** |
**One fact the spec did not list, and it mattered more than any of them:** `SaveAppConfig` **The sweep DOES start an app whose data drive is absent.** Observed on 9201, both attempts:
(`deploy.go:742`) rebuilt `AppConfig` from a **five-field struct literal**. Adding a sixth field
without noticing would have dropped `desired_state` on **every** save, across **nine** call sites —
see §12.
## 3. Files created / modified ```
17:22:07 [gate] drive ABSENT /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1 — stopped+blocked 2 app(s): [calibre-web immich]
17:22:34 [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [calibre-web] — up to 2 attempt(s)
17:22:34 [stacks] Starting stack: calibre-web
17:22:35 [bootrecon] attempt 1/2: start "calibre-web" failed after 0.4s: exit code 1
17:23:05 [bootrecon] attempt 2/2: start "calibre-web" failed after 0.4s: exit code 1
17:23:05 [bootrecon] gave up after 2 attempt(s): recovered=[] still down=[calibre-web] (the dead-app alarm now owns these)
```
**Created** All four preconditions were verified first: drive mounts **0**, containers **0**,
- `controller/internal/stacks/desiredstate.go` — constants, `SetDesiredState`, `DesiredStateOf`, `BackfillDesiredState`, `isObservedUp` `desired_state: running`, `deployed: true`.
- `controller/internal/backup/appstop_marker.go` — `AppStopGuard`, `AppStopMarker`, `AppStopRecovery`, reasons
- `controller/internal/stacks/desiredstate_test.go`, `controller/internal/bootrecon/desiredstate_test.go`, `controller/internal/backup/appstop_marker_test.go`, `controller/internal/api/desiredstate_intent_test.go`, `controller/cmd/controller/appstop_wiring_test.go`
**Modified** **RUN 1 WAS A FALSE NEGATIVE AND IS REPORTED BECAUSE IT PRODUCED A MECHANISM.** Unmounting only the
- `controller/internal/stacks/deploy.go` — `DesiredState` field; **`SaveAppConfig` → copy-and-overlay**; `DeployStack` records `running`; `UpdateOptionalConfig`'s redeploy branch records `running` parent bind is **healed by the agent within ~60 s** (`/dev/sdb` is still mounted at `/mnt/hdd_1`), so
- `controller/internal/api/router.go` — `desiredStateForAction` + the intent write in `actionStack` the drive gate's startup reconcile re-attached and restarted the apps at `17:18:47` — **one second
- `controller/internal/bootrecon/bootrecon.go` — `isBootOrphan` rewritten on intent; package doc updated before** the sweep looked at `17:18:48` and logged `no boot-orphaned apps`. Reporting that as a
- `controller/internal/backup/backup.go` — `appStop` field, guard construction, `SetAppStopGuard`/`AppStopGuard`, `DumpAppVolumesSafe` bracketed disproof would have been wrong: it is a race that went the safe way. Run 2 held **both** mounts off
- `controller/internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go` — `Begin` + a `restartStack` closure covering all four bring-up paths for the duration and reproduced the defect immediately.
- `controller/internal/appexport/export.go` — consumer-side `appStopGuard` seam + `SetStopGuard`
- `controller/cmd/controller/main.go` — guard construction + `Recover` before the bootrecon goroutine, backfill, `NotifyBackupFailed` reporting, `exportStopGuard` adapter, `.fab` restore records `running`
- `CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md`, `REUSE.md`, `controller/README.md`
- `felhom.eu`: `CONTEXT.md` (S-12), `CLAUDE.md`, `STATUS.md`, `documentation/architecture/00-capability-map.md`, `documentation/architecture/02-controller-module-map.md` (**new §0a — the S-1 contract**), `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md`
## 4. Commits pushed to `main` **The confirmation moved the severity in both directions.**
- The **write** hazard did NOT materialise. Compose failed with
`mkdir /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata: permission denied`; `find` showed only the bare directory
and `df -h /` was unchanged at `25G / 28%` before and after. The mechanism: with the drive unbound
the mountpoint is **host-root-owned** (`uid=0 gid=0 mode=755`) and guest 9201 is an **unprivileged**
LXC, so container root (uid 100000) cannot create the subdirectory. **This protection is accidental**
— no code chose it, no test pinned it, and it depends on the guest staying unprivileged and the
mountpoint staying root-owned (when the drive IS bound, that same path shows `uid=100000`). One
`chown` away from gone, and its removal would be invisible until data landed on the wrong disk.
- The harm that **did** occur was not in the hypothesis and is real on every box: two wasted attempts,
a leftover `Created` container per attempt, and a **false dead-app alarm for an app the drive gate
is deliberately holding** — the noise class R-97/F-A1 exist to prevent.
**A second asymmetry, found while restoring the box:** the API's own start path already refuses this —
`{"ok":false,"error":"A(z) /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1 tárhely jelenleg nem elérhető …"}` from
`startGatedByMissingDrive`. The rule existed; the sweep bypassed it by calling `Manager.StartStack`
directly. Full evidence: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md`.
**Consequence:** Part 3 applied and was implemented **first**, before the window widened.
## 3. Files modified / created; commits
**Created:** `controller/internal/bootrecon/drivegate_test.go`,
`controller/cmd/controller/bootwindow_test.go`, `controller/internal/web/recreate_intent_test.go`,
`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md`
**Modified:** `bootrecon/bootrecon.go` (StartGate seam, held filter, `Result.HeldByDrive`),
`cmd/controller/main.go` (settle window, `sampleBootFleet`, `recordLateRecovery`, `bootDriveGate`,
wiring), `stacks/deploy.go` (`Manager.DriveLive`), `backup/appstop_marker.go` (`HeldStacks`),
`web/intermediary.go` (`shouldRecreateOnBoot` + `bootStack.desired` + counters),
`web/intermediary_test.go`, `cmd/controller/appstop_wiring_test.go`, `CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md`,
`REUSE.md`, `controller/README.md`; `felhom.eu`: `CONTEXT.md` (S-13), `STATUS.md`,
`architecture/00-capability-map.md`, `architecture/02-controller-module-map.md`,
`backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `backlog/ROADMAP.md`
| Repo | Commit | Subject | | Repo | Commit | Subject |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| `felhom-controller` | `dbcb306` | v0.189.0 — desired state + the app-stop crash marker (R-166 / D-b) | | `felhom-controller` | `582135f` | v0.190.0 — the boot settle window, both gates on intent, and R-171 |
| `felhom-controller` | `a8f7c61` | docs: CONTEXT + REPORT for v0.189.0 (R-166) | | `felhom-controller` | `dcc3363` | boot window: sample REFRESHES first — a cached fleet made 'settled' meaningless |
| `felhom.eu` | `5c97fbc` | docs: R-166 SHIPPED — the desired/in-flight/observed split (D-b) | | `felhom-controller` | `4bad6e0` | CHANGELOG: the boot window's sample refreshes first |
| `felhom.eu` | *(docs commit, this session)* | docs: R-157 A / R-170 / R-171 closed |
Direct to `main`, no branches, no `Co-Authored-By`. The pre-push hook ran the gate entry point Direct to `main`, no branches, no `Co-Authored-By`. Pre-push hook green; **`--no-verify` NOT used.**
(`--fast`) and passed; **`--no-verify` was NOT used.**
## 5. Tests and red-proofs ## 4. Tests and red-proofs
**27/27 packages green before and after; +37 test functions across 5 packages.** **27/27 packages green; +25 test functions across 3 packages.** `go build ./... && go vet ./... &&
Full `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` → **rc=0**, run to completion twice. go test ./...` → **rc=0**. Timing is tested by shrinking the window constants — **never by sleeping**.
Test run and commit were **never** combined in one command (standing rule 1). Test runs and commits were never combined in one command.
Every red-proof below was **observed FAIL, then the mutation was reverted and a control run passed.** Every red-proof observed **FAIL**, then reverted with a passing control run.
| # | Test | Mutation applied | Result | | # | Test | Mutation | Result |
|---|---|---|---| |---|---|---|---|
| **B** | `TestReconcile_DesiredRunning_ZeroContainers_IsRecovered` + `TestIsBootOrphan_DecisionTable` | restored `len(s.Containers) > 0 && IsDownState(...)` in the `DesiredStateRunning` branch | **FAIL** ✅ | | **A** | `TestBootWindow_LateSettlerIsSweptOnASettledFleet` | restored the single-sweep shape (deleted the sampling loop) | **FAIL** ✅ — the sweep was handed the `starting` frame |
| **C** | `TestReconcile_LegacyNoDesiredState_BehavesExactlyAsBefore` + `..._AppConfigPresentButFieldAbsent...` | made the `default:` (absent) branch return `len == 0 \|\| IsDownState(...)`, i.e. absent treated as running | **FAIL** ✅ — *"a LEGACY app with no recorded intent and zero containers was started 1 time(s)"* | | **B** | `TestBootWindow_BudgetEndsAForeverChangingFleet` | removed the `time.Since(started) < budget` condition | **FAIL** ✅ — *"did not terminate on a forever-changing fleet"* (a genuine hang; the fixture was changed to CYCLE first, because a fixture whose frames stop changing terminates by settling and would not have reached the hang) |
| **D** | `TestBackfillDesiredState_RunningIsRecorded_AmbiguousIsLeftAlone` + `..._NeverWritesStopped...` | deleted the `if !isObservedUp(s)` guard | **FAIL** ✅ — *"exited (state=exited) was backfilled to \"running\""* | | **C** | `TestBootWindow_CustomerStoppedAppSurvivesEveryPass` | dropped the `DesiredStateStopped` branch from `isBootOrphan` | **FAIL** ✅ — *"started 2 time(s) by the widened window"* |
| **E** | `TestDumpAppVolumesSafe_MarkerCoversTheWholeStopStartWindow`, `..._Interrupted_RecoveryBringsTheAppBack`, `..._FailedRestartKeepsTheMarker` | deleted the production `m.appStop.Begin(...)` call from `DumpAppVolumesSafe` | **FAIL** ✅ (3 tests) | | **D** | `TestShouldRecreateOnBoot_IntentTable` + `_AgreesWithBootrecon` + `RecreateDriveBackedApps_Recorded` | restored `&& hasContainers` | **FAIL** ✅ (3 tests, incl. the cross-gate disagreement assertion) |
| **H** | `TestSaveAppConfig_PreservesEveryKnownFieldAcrossLoadSave` + `TestSetDesiredState_PersistsStoppedToDisk` | restored the field-by-field `saveCfg := AppConfig{...}` literal | **FAIL** ✅ — *"desired_state was LOST across load→save"* | | **G** | `TestReconcile_DriveAbsentApp_IsNeverStarted` + `_UndeterminableDrive_` + `_HeldByAnyHolder_` | removed the start-gate check from `Run` | **FAIL** ✅ — *"an app whose data drive is ABSENT was started 1 time(s)"* |
| **§8.2** | `TestActionStack_RecordsIntentBeforeActing` | moved the intent write **below** the action switch | **FAIL** ✅ | | **H** | `TestMainWiresBootDriveGate` | **commented out** `SetDriveGate(...)` | **FAIL** ✅ — while `grep -c` still returned **1**, i.e. a `strings.Contains` test would have passed |
| **I (seam)** | `TestMainWiresAppStopRecovery` + `TestAppStopRecoveryPrecedesTheBootReconciler` | **commented out** `appStopGuard.Recover()` in `main.go` | **FAIL** ✅ — and `grep -c "appStopGuard.Recover()" main.go` still returned **1**, i.e. a `strings.Contains` test would have passed. The AST walk is what bites. | | **I** | `TestBootWindow_EverySampleRefreshesTheStatus` | removed `RefreshStatus()` from `sampleBootFleet` | **FAIL** ✅ — *"refreshed 0 time(s) for 4 samples"* |
### The hollow test I caught and fixed **One defect in my own fix, caught by my own test:** `TestBootWindow_CommonCaseFitsInsideTheDeadAppGrace`
rejected the first budget at `5 + 60 + 30 = 95 s > 90 s`. The budget is 50 s **because a test said
so**, and the code comment records that rather than presenting the number as taste.
Scenario E's first version called `m.appStop.Begin(...)` itself and then recovered — and it ## 5. The window shape, and its justification against the 90 s grace
**PASSED under red-proof E** while its two siblings failed. It proved the marker type worked, not
that `DumpAppVolumesSafe` uses it. Rewritten to drive the real function with a simulated hard abort
(`GetDockerVolumes` panics, unwinding past the restart *statement* — which is the point, since a
`defer` is not crash-safety). It then failed the same red-proof correctly.
## 6. The §8.1 table — every row proven by test | Constant | Value | Why |
`TestIsBootOrphan_DecisionTable` (10 sub-tests, all green; the whole table fails under red-proof B):
| `desired_state` | containers | state | Expected | Sub-test |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `stopped` | 0 | stopped | not an orphan | `stopped/no containers` ✅ |
| `stopped` | 2 | exited | not an orphan | `stopped/down containers` ✅ |
| `stopped` | 2 | running | not an orphan | `stopped/running` ✅ |
| `running` | 0 | — | **ORPHAN** | `running/no containers` ✅ |
| `running` | 2 | exited | **ORPHAN** | `running/down containers` ✅ |
| `running` | 2 | degraded | **ORPHAN** | `running/degraded` ✅ |
| `running` | 2 | running | not an orphan | `running/up` ✅ |
| absent | 0 | — | **not an orphan (legacy)** | `absent/no containers` ✅ |
| absent | 2 | exited | **ORPHAN (legacy)** | `absent/down containers` ✅ |
| absent | 2 | running | not an orphan | `absent/up` ✅ |
Plus `TestIsBootOrphan_ExistingGuardsSurviveTheRewrite` — `Protected`, `Deploying` and `!Deployed`
still refuse at the strongest desired state, because the rewrite reordered the terms and a reorder is
how a guard silently disappears.
## 7. Build, deploy, gates
```
build.sh 0.189.0 --push → gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.189.0 (145M)
guest 9201: docker pull → /etc/felhom-controller-image → systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap
```
Verified live: `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.189.0 | Up … (healthy)`.
`python3 controller/scripts/controller_gates.py` — **all 8 gates OK** (template-id, emoji,
native-confirm, offbox-rename, app-row-dedup, mojibake, docker-v, reuse-refs: 133 cited paths,
126 exact / 6 suffix / 1 cross-repo, 0 failures).
## 8. Live validation on the demo box — method, and the observables
**Method: endpoint-level** (`claude-in-chrome` is not available on DooPlex). The **exact request the
UI's „Leállítás"/„Indítás" buttons make** was driven — `layout.html:231`,
`POST /api/stacks/<name>/<action>` with `X-CSRF-Token`, session-authed through traefik. No server
logic was skipped; only rendering. **The rendered click-through remains the operator's manual check.**
Two traps hit, both already in project memory: curl's cookie jar drops `felhom_session` (handled by
hand, one cookie), and the controller is not published on `:8080` — it sits behind traefik on `:443`
with `Host: felhom.demo-felhom.eu`. The credential-bearing helper was deleted afterwards (§14).
### Flow 0 — the backfill, on four real legacy app.yaml files
```
[INFO] [stacks] desired-state backfill: 4 app(s) recorded as running, 0 left unrecorded …
```
`bookstack`, `immich`, `docmost`, `calibre-web` — all deployed, all observed up, all with **no**
`desired_state` before the upgrade, all converged to `desired_state: running` on disk.
### Flow 1 — a customer's Stop survives a restart (Scenario A)
```
action_response={"ok":true,"message":"Stack calibre-web stop completed"}
[INFO] [stacks] desired state for calibre-web recorded as "stopped" (was "running") ← 16:45:51
[INFO] [stacks] Stopping stack: calibre-web ← 16:45:51
```
The intent line **precedes** the stop line — §8.2 observed live, not only structurally.
- `app.yaml` on disk: **`desired_state: stopped`**
- `docker ps -a --filter name=calibre` → **empty** (`compose down` removed the containers)
- controller restarted → `[bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: no boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start)`
- `docker ps -a` → **still empty. The app stayed down.**
### Flow 2 — the power-cut shape is recovered (Scenario B — the point of the release)
Started from the UI endpoint → `desired_state: running`, `calibre-web Up 8 seconds`. Then the R-157
shape was created out-of-band: `docker rm -f calibre-web` → `containers_now: 0`, `app.yaml` untouched
at `running`. Controller restarted:
```
[INFO] [stacks] desired-state backfill: 0 app(s) recorded as running, 0 left unrecorded …
[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [calibre-web] — up to 2 attempt(s)
[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation attempt 1/2: started "calibre-web" (took 0.2s)
[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation complete: 1 app(s) recovered in 1 attempt(s): [calibre-web]
```
`calibre-web Up 56 seconds (healthy)`. **Before v0.189.0 this app was invisible to the reconciler.**
### Flow 3 — a legacy app.yaml behaves exactly as before (Scenario C)
`desired_state` deleted from `calibre-web/app.yaml` (`desired_state_lines: 0`), containers removed
(`containers: 0`), `deployed: true` kept. Controller restarted:
```
[INFO] [stacks] desired-state backfill: 0 app(s) recorded as running, 1 left unrecorded (state ambiguous — legacy boot behaviour retained)
[INFO] [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: no boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start)
```
App **not** started; `grep -c "^desired_state" app.yaml` → **0**, i.e. `stopped` was **never
inferred**. Byte-identical to pre-v0.189.0 behaviour, with a positive observable for both halves.
**Not live-validated, deliberately, and stated rather than rounded up:** the app-stop marker's
recovery leg. It is unit-proven and red-proofed, but nobody killed the controller mid-backup on real
hardware. The capability map records it as **IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE**.
## 9. Every customer-intent entry point found
A census of all 14 `StartStack`/`StopStack` call sites was run (`grep -rn --include=*.go`, tests
excluded). **Four are the customer; ten are machines.**
| # | Intent point | Records | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `internal/api/router.go` `actionStack` | start/restart/update → `running`; stop → `stopped` | the primary one, named in §1.3 |
| 2 | `internal/stacks/deploy.go` `DeployStack` | `running` | named in §1.3 |
| 3 | `internal/stacks/deploy.go` `UpdateOptionalConfig` (redeploy branch only) | `running` | **found, not assumed** — an API endpoint ending in `compose up -d`; the non-deployed branch starts nothing, so it expresses no opinion |
| 4 | `cmd/controller/main.go` `exportAdapter.SaveEncryptedAppConfig` | `running` | **found, not assumed** — the `.fab` import path, which then starts the app (`appexport/restore.go:461`) |
**Confirmed: no machine-initiated caller writes desired state.** The machine callers —
`quiesce/quiesce.go:494`, `backup/backup.go:688`, `backup/restore.go:55`, `backup/restore_unit.go:252`,
`backup/tier2_restore.go:177`, `backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:279`, `appexport/export.go:232`,
`appexport/restore.go:366`, `stacks/migrate.go:707`, `web/intermediary.go:186,430`,
`web/storage_handlers.go:526`, `bootrecon/bootrecon.go:135` — were each read and none touch it.
## 10. Marker coverage — all three sites, none left out
| Site | Covered | How |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| `backup/backup.go` `DumpAppVolumesSafe` | ✅ | `Begin` before the stop; `End` only on a successful restart; cleared on a **failed stop** (nothing was stopped, so nothing is owed) | | `bootReconcileSample` | 5 s | fine enough to see a container settling at T+40 s within one sample; ~12 cheap calls on a quiet boot |
| `backup/offbox_reconstitute.go` | ✅ | `Begin` before the stop; one `restartStack` closure replaces all **four** bring-up paths, so the success path cannot silently skip the clear | | `bootReconcileStableFor` | 3 identical samples (15 s) | one sample cannot tell "settled" from "sampled between two docker events"; three spans a container exiting and its restart policy re-creating it |
| `appexport/export.go` | ✅ | consumer-side two-method seam; `main.go`'s `exportStopGuard` supplies the reason, so `backup.ReasonAppExport`'s value exists in exactly one place | | `bootReconcileBudget` | 50 s | **binding constraint:** `settle 5 + budget 50 + one DefaultRetryDelay 30 = 85 s` < `deadAppBootGrace 90 s`, so a successful recovery stays SILENT |
**Nothing was left out.** All three share **one** guard over **one** file: `main.go` builds it, Terminates on **whichever comes first** — settled, or budget — and the log says which, because
`backup.Manager.SetAppStopGuard` receives it, `Exporter.SetStopGuard` receives it. A second guard "settled and found nothing" and "ran out of time still churning" are different facts. Sampling is
over the same path would be one file with two owners — the shape this marker was kept out of read-only apart from the status refresh; exactly **one** sweep runs, on a settled fleet, with the
quiesce's file to avoid. per-app attempt bound untouched. Sweeping per sample was rejected: the sweep's own `StartStack`
changes the fleet, so it would never observe a settled one.
## 11. The operator event path (§2.4) — reachable, used, no new channel **§8.3 chosen design: allow the window, report a late recovery.** `recordLateRecovery` emits a
`LATE RECOVERY` WARN naming the apps when a recovery lands past the grace. The grace was **not**
widened — that hides a late recovery rather than reporting it.
**Reachable, but not from where `Recover` runs.** `Recover` must complete before the boot-reconcile ## 6. §8.2, row by row
goroutine (`main.go:~236`) and the notifier is not constructed until `~307`. Rather than wire a seam
that would fire after the fact — the "built but never wired" shape with four recorded instances here
— `Recover` **returns** an `*AppStopRecovery` and `main.go` reports it once the notifier exists.
It rides the **existing** `backup_failed` event type (`notifier.NotifyBackupFailed`). A new type | Stopped by | Sweep starts it? | How answered |
would need the hub's `allowedEventTypes` + `customerMessages` pair changed — a wire change, and this |---|---|---|
release ships **no hub change**. The call is guarded by `if appStopRecovery != nil` so a healthy boot | the customer (`desired_state: stopped`) | **No** | already handled by `isBootOrphan`; **re-proven** — unit (`TestBootWindow_CustomerStoppedAppSurvivesEveryPass`, red-proofed) and live in **6/6** hard resets |
pages nobody; `TestMainReportsTheInterruptedOperation` asserts both the call and the guard. | a quiesce for a backup | **No** | **exclusion WIRED** — `bootDriveGate.MayStart` consults `quiesce.SuppressedStacks()`, the set the quiesce loop already publishes for this exact question |
| the backup app-stop guard | **No** | **exclusion WIRED** — new read-only `AppStopGuard.HeldStacks()`. Its `Recover` completes before this goroutine starts, so a marker seen here belongs to an operation running **now**, not a crashed one |
| the drive-absent gate | **No** | **exclusion WIRED** — Part 3; settings flags (same signal as the API gate) **plus** the live `Manager.DriveLive` mountpoint check, because the flags can lag inside the boot window |
| an interrupted boot | **Yes** | the point of the change |
## 12. Does `app.yaml` round-trip unknown keys? — MEASURED: **no** All three holders answer **one** seam because they differ only in the reason string. `TestReconcile_HeldByAnyHolder_IsNeverStarted` covers all three; none is answered by "it probably won't happen".
`TestSaveAppConfig_UnknownYAMLKeysAreDropped` writes an `app.yaml` containing ## 7. The hard-reset log — every run individually
`future_field: keep-me`, loads it, saves it, and reads the file back: **the key is gone.** The
round-trip goes through the struct, so `yaml.Unmarshal` discards unmodelled keys before
`SaveAppConfig` ever sees them. Pre-existing, not widened by R-166, and now stated in
`SaveAppConfig`'s own comment — it is why **every** writer must load-then-save rather than construct.
**What WAS fixed is the more dangerous half.** `SaveAppConfig` rebuilt `AppConfig` from a five-field **Shipped build (v0.190.0 with the refresh fix), the six that count:**
struct literal — the **R-100 shape**, which v0.181.0 shipped two live instances of. `desired_state`
would have been dropped on every save across **nine** call sites, so a customer's Stop would have
been erased by the next unrelated `app.yaml` write (an email-toggle change, an optional-config edit,
the encryption migration). Replaced with copy-and-overlay (`saveCfg := *cfg`), safe by construction
and pinned by `TestSaveAppConfig_PreservesEveryKnownFieldAcrossLoadSave` + red-proof H.
## 13. `OPEN-ITEMS.md` rows opened / closed / re-ranked | Run | Window verdict | Apps back (immich · calibre-web · docmost) | `bookstack` (desired=stopped) |
- **R-166 → SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE.** Both blocking facts recorded with their answers: (a) the
crash-safe journal pattern **did** already exist (quiesce, migrate) but covered **none** of the
app-data path — `DumpAppVolumesSafe` had no marker, no journal and not even a `defer`; (b) the
SQLite store is reachable and **deliberately unused**, because `metrics.db` is optional by design
and operational state must not live in a store built to be dropped.
- **R-157 → mechanism B CLOSED, mechanism A remains** and is now the whole row (READY, S). A is a
pure timing fix (the sweep observes ~5 s after start and never re-checks). Recorded: **B's fix
makes A cost more**, since the sweep now has more it could legitimately recover.
- **R-170 → NEW.** `shouldRecreateOnBoot` (`internal/web/intermediary.go:131`) still ends in
`&& hasContainers` — R-157 mechanism B, one gate over, for drive-backed apps. **Established free:**
`grep -ro "R-170\b" documentation/ *.md` → **0 hits**. Not acted on (§16).
- `ROADMAP.md` gained matching R-166/R-170 rows and an updated R-157; `STATUS.md`'s "an app can stay
switched off and nothing says so" line was rewritten, not extended.
## 14. Teardown
**This task provisioned nothing** — no VM, no guest, no scratch app, no storage. The one app used for
validation (`calibre-web`) already existed and was **restored to its original state**: started
through the same UI endpoint, `desired_state: running` on disk, `calibre-web Up … (health: starting)`,
15 containers running on the box, controller healthy on 0.189.0. The credential-bearing helper script
was deleted from **both** the guest (`/tmp/act.sh` plus its scratch HTML) and DooPlex; `ls` confirms
`No such file or directory`.
## 15. CI
| Repo | Run ID | `head_sha` | Conclusion |
|---|---|---|---| |---|---|---|---|
| `felhom-controller` | **17** | `dbcb306f` (the code push) | **success** | | F1 | settled after **10 s** | all 3 ✅ | 0 containers ✅ |
| `felhom-controller` | **18** | `a8f7c61d` (CONTEXT + REPORT) | **success** | | F2 | settled after **40 s** | all 3 ✅ | 0 containers ✅ |
| `felhom.eu` | **19** | `5c97fbc3` (the docs push) | **success** | | F3 | settled after **10 s** | all 3 ✅ | 0 containers ✅ |
| F4 | settled after **10 s** | all 3 ✅ | 0 containers ✅ |
| F5 | settled after **15 s** | all 3 ✅ | 0 containers ✅ |
| F6 | settled after **15 s** | all 3 ✅ | 0 containers ✅ |
Checked by pulling the run list and matching `head_sha` to each commit, **not** by trusting the **6/6 for both the recovery and the customer-stop.** An earlier six on the pre-refresh build were
absence of a failure email — which is exactly the check now added to `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md`'s also 6/6 (settle times 50/30/20/50/25/10 s) but are **not** counted as the deliverable, because the
end-of-session list (§N.6). Run 19 was polled until it left `running` rather than read once while build changed afterwards.
still in flight.
## 16. Observations — noticed, documented, NOT acted on **The settle times are themselves the evidence for mechanism A:** the window waited 10–50 s where the
old code decided at a fixed 5 s. Two pre-fix runs settled at 50 s — the full budget — i.e. the old
sweep would have decided 45 s too early.
1. **R-170 (filed).** The drive-backed boot gate still infers a Stop from a container count. Left **The sharpest evidence is a same-app, same-box before/after**, because 6/6 clean runs only show
alone deliberately: the task scoped `bootrecon` and named this gate nowhere, and shipping two boot nothing regressed:
behaviour changes under one live validation is one too many. Its consequence is **bounded, not
zero** — `bootrecon` now recovers the app on intent seconds later, so what is actually lost is the ```
gate's *recreate-against-the-rebound-drive* step, which matters when an app needs recreating pre-fix 18:08:35 boot window: fleet settled after 25s — sweeping
rather than merely starting. 18:08:35 Boot reconciliation: no boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start) ← calibre-web had ZERO containers
2. **`app.yaml` cannot carry an unmodelled key** (§12). Pre-existing; documented in-code rather than post-fix 18:18:50 boot window: fleet settled after 10s — sweeping
fixed, since fixing it means an inline catch-all map on a struct holding encrypted secrets. 18:18:50 Boot reconciliation: 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [calibre-web]
3. **The `.fab` restore adapter constructs a fresh `AppConfig`** (`main.go`), so it does not benefit 18:18:52 attempt 1/2: started "calibre-web" (took 1.7s)
from copy-and-overlay — it is a genuinely new record. Correct today; noted because any future 18:18:52 complete: 1 app(s) recovered in 1 attempt(s): [calibre-web]
field added to `AppConfig` must be considered there explicitly. ```
4. **Part 3 (UI) — N/A: no user-visible string changed.** No template, funcmap, badge, copy or
notifier-message change. The v0.164.0 `StateStopped` suppression is untouched and still correct: That miss is what exposed the cache defect in §4 (red-proof I).
an app the customer stopped is still not an alarm, and it is now not a recovery candidate either —
for a *recorded* reason instead of an inferred one. ## 8. Which gate reads what afterwards — both answer intent
5. **`aggregateState` already satisfies D-b's every-container requirement** and was deliberately not
re-implemented. The backfill's `isObservedUp` is an allow-list of up-states rather than **R-170 proven live in a single reboot**, both halves, on drive-backed apps with **zero containers**:
`!IsDownState`, because that negation would call a crash-looping or unreadable stack "up" and seed
a durable record from it. ```
18:20:11 [gate] live bind confirmed — recreating drive-backed app calibre-web (state=stopped) onto /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1
18:20:12 [gate] 1 drive-backed app(s) left stopped on purpose (recorded Stop, or a legacy app.yaml at zero containers)
→ calibre-web desired=running containers=1 (recreated — pre-R-170 this was SKIPPED: hasContainers=false)
→ immich desired=stopped containers=0 (left alone)
```
The boot sweep then logged `no boot-orphaned apps` — the two gates agreeing rather than fighting.
Structurally, agreement is pinned from **both sides** against one identical fixture table
(`TestBothBootGatesAgreeOnIntent` in `bootrecon`, `TestShouldRecreateOnBoot_AgreesWithBootrecon` in
`web`), because an import cycle prevents calling the two from one package.
## 9. `OPEN-ITEMS.md` rows
- **R-157 → CLOSED** (both mechanisms), with the repeat count as evidence, not one clean boot.
- **R-170 → CLOSED**, with the live both-halves reboot.
- **R-171 → NEW and CLOSED the same session**, marked a regression from v0.189.0. **ID established
free before minting:** `grep -ro "R-171\b" documentation/ *.md` → **0 hits**.
- `ROADMAP.md` collapsed to match; `STATUS.md`'s power-cut line moved from "What's broken" to "What
works right now" with the repeat count, plus one dated bullet.
## 10. Teardown and CI
**Provisioned nothing** — no VM, no guest, no scratch app, no storage. The apps used for validation
already existed and were **all restored**: `bookstack`, `immich`, `calibre-web`, `docmost` all
`desired=running` and running, 15 containers, controller `0.190.0` healthy. The drive is remounted
(`/dev/sdb` at both `/mnt/hdd_1` and `/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1`), and the temporary unmount-holder
loops are gone (`ps aux | grep -c '[u]mount …'` → **0**). The credential-bearing helper was deleted
from the guest (`/root/act.sh`, `/tmp/act.sh`) and from DooPlex.
CI run number/task id for the final push and its conclusion: recorded in §11 below.
## 11. Observations — noticed, documented, NOT acted on
1. **`Manager.StartStack` has no drive gate of its own**, and now has fourteen callers. The API path
guards it (`startGatedByMissingDrive`), the boot sweep now guards it (R-171), and the remaining
machine callers each decide for themselves. Pushing the check *into* `StartStack` was NOT done —
it would break the legitimate callers that must start an app on a drive the gate is mid-way
through re-attaching (the drive gate's own `Return` branch is one). Recorded because the next
person to add a caller needs to know the gate is per-caller.
2. **The agent heals an unmounted drive within ~60 s** while its block device is present. This is
correct behaviour and it is why the Part 0 diagnosis needed the drive held off, but it also means
**"unmount to simulate an absent drive" does not work on this platform** — worth knowing before
the next drive-absence test.
3. **The accidental permission protection** (§2) is untested and unowned. Not pinned by a test here
because a test asserting it would enshrine an accident; the fix removes the dependency on it
instead. If a privileged guest is ever shipped, this is the note to re-read.
4. **`recreateBootStaleApps` runs before the boot sweep and can fix the same app first**, which is
why several runs logged `no boot-orphaned apps` after the gate had already acted. Not a defect —
the gates agree — but it means the sweep's log alone under-reports how much recovery happened.