reconcile: full verdicts (Parts 1-5) + H10 plaintext-secret evidence test

C3 = MOOT-by-architecture (whole-LXC PBS DR; GetAppDrivePath systemDataPath fallback). 7 HIGH survivors: C2/H5/H6/H7/H8 FIXED, C3 MOOT, H10 PARTIAL/LIVE (tag added a WARN but still persists plaintext on crypto.Encrypt failure — failing test proves it). MOOT bucket C1/H9/H11 + file-gone Lows confirmed gone-and-not-migrated (agent watchdog + agent backup checked). M/L mechanical triage tables. Merged fix list: CTRL-001 > deploy.go slice (CTRL-T2-1 + H10) > AGENT-001 (spike) > M2. Tallies: FIXED 5 / MOOT 11 / LIVE 1 (H10) + M2(CTRL-T3-1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 18:47:29 +02:00
parent d91bb03145
commit de7c8ab358
2 changed files with 267 additions and 12 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package stacks
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestSaveAppConfigH10PlaintextOnEncryptFailure is a RECONCILE evidence test for
+// BUGHUNT finding H10 (v0.30.3) at commit eea235b. The `// H10 fix` comment in
+// SaveAppConfig (deploy.go:661) only ADDED A WARN LOG; on a crypto.Encrypt
+// failure the code still FALLS THROUGH and persists the secret value in
+// plaintext:
+//
+//	if enc, err := crypto.Encrypt(encKey, v); err == nil { ...; continue }
+//	} else { log.Printf("[WARN] ... saving as plaintext") }   // deploy.go:662
+//	saveCfg.Env[k] = v                                        // deploy.go:665 — plaintext persisted
+//
+// A bad-length encKey makes aes.NewCipher (inside crypto.Encrypt) return an
+// error, exercising that branch. This test asserts the SAFE invariant ("a
+// sensitive value must never be written to app.yaml in plaintext"). It FAILS at
+// the recorded commit — evidence that the tagged fix is observability only, not
+// fail-closed. Do NOT weaken this test; the fix is to RETURN an error instead of
+// falling through to the plaintext write.
+func TestSaveAppConfigH10PlaintextOnEncryptFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	const secret = "supersecret-pw-do-not-leak"
+	cfg := &AppConfig{
+		Deployed: true,
+		Env:      map[string]string{"DB_PASSWORD": secret},
+	}
+
+	// Non-nil but invalid-length key (5 bytes) → aes.NewCipher fails →
+	// crypto.Encrypt returns an error → SaveAppConfig hits the H10 branch.
+	badKey := []byte("short")
+
+	if err := SaveAppConfig(dir, cfg, badKey, []string{"DB_PASSWORD"}); err != nil {
+		// SaveAppConfig currently does NOT error on encrypt failure; if a future
+		// fix makes it fail-closed by returning an error, that is the desired
+		// behavior and this test should be updated to assert the error instead.
+		t.Fatalf("H10 (would-be-fixed): SaveAppConfig returned an error on encrypt failure: %v — "+
+			"if this is the new fail-closed behavior, update the test to assert it", err)
+	}
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "app.yaml"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading app.yaml: %v", err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(data), secret) {
+		t.Fatalf("H10: app.yaml contains the secret in PLAINTEXT after a crypto.Encrypt failure "+
+			"(SaveAppConfig logged a WARN but still persisted it at deploy.go:665). app.yaml:\n%s", data)
+	}
+}