v0.319.0: the app page in panels, the login in one place, a password the box never had is said in words

- style A (operator 2026-10-16): hero, tab bar and every section are panels on --bg-1, one width, 16px apart;
  the install page's form groups use the same rule; the settings tab's 700px inner wrapper is gone
- „Belépés az alkalmazásba": name + password side by side, fetched on demand (R-254, R-709); pairing in app_login.go
- the empty-value rule: no stored value -> a sentence, never an eye; page and reveal endpoint share storedValuePresent
- „Cím és kulcsok" is rows (no Domain input, no disabled storage select, no install form); hint under the title
- tests red-proved: app_page_tuning_test.go (4); 36 app-page parity fixtures re-captured, 4 new; install fixtures unchanged

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012qRErfCoiTkvDK9N5XHbzb

REUSE.md

@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@
 | `maskRepoURL` | controller/internal/sync/sync.go | `(url) string` | Logging git URLs | Strips embedded credentials |
 | `metrics.RedactLine` | controller/internal/metrics/redact.go | `(s string) string` | ANY log line shipped off-box (issue context, log tails) | Masks password/passwd/secret/token/api-key/authorization/bearer values + 64-hex; apply BEFORE the line leaves the box — controller-side redaction is authoritative |
 | `settingsRetrievalPasswordRevealHandler` | controller/internal/web/handlers.go | `POST /settings/retrieval-password/reveal` | **THE PATTERN for showing a secret in the UI** — an XHR that returns only the value | **Never template a secret into a page and hide it with CSS.** `display:none` / `hidden` / `type="password"` stop a browser DRAWING the value; the plaintext is still in the response body, so a `curl` of the page returns it, and it reaches caches, history and any screen-share of the source. R-249 shipped exactly that for two months and was found by it landing in a transcript. The page carries a **boolean** (`HasRetrievalPassword`); the value comes from a POST (CSRF-covered, uncacheable) and the reveal is **logged as an act**. `escrow_handlers.go` states the same rule for R. **Test on the RESPONSE BODY** — a test asserting what the customer *sees* cannot see this class at all. **Both R-254 sites are now FIXED the same way** — `POST /apps/<slug>/initial-credentials/reveal` (re-reads the container, never a cached copy) and `POST /stacks/<name>/auto-field/reveal` (authorised on the field being a `type: secret` auto-field of that stack). **Per-secret, never one generic reveal-any-named-secret endpoint.** The PRE-DEPLOY hidden input is deliberate and untouched — a form must carry what it submits (README §318). Enforced by `scripts/secret_in_markup_gate.py`, whose measured blind spot (a secret under a neutral page-data key) is in its docstring; runtime body-assertion covers 4 of 27 pages — R-255. |
+| `storedValuePresent` / `appLoginFields` | controller/internal/web/app_login.go | the settings tab's login panel and „Cím és kulcsok" rows (v0.319.0) | **A field the box holds no value for is a sentence, never an eye.** `storedValuePresent` is the ONE definition of „stored", read by the page AND by `appAutoFieldRevealHandler`'s 404 branch — so the page cannot offer a reveal the endpoint refuses. The page gets a boolean per login field, never the value (R-254/R-709). Pinned by `TestAppPage_NoStoredValueShowsSentence`. |
 
 ### Storage registry + mount detection