diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index f4d5009..8090e51 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
+## v0.216.0 — one physical disk, one verdict (2026-08-14, R-335)
+**MinAgent: 0.129.0**
+
+**Found on live hardware within two hours of the v0.215.0 deploy, by reading the artefact the release
+itself introduced.** The first two hourly checks on demo-hp logged *"3 disk(s) evaluated"* while the
+persisted `disk-health-state.json` held only **two** records. The discrepancy was the bug: demo-hp's
+`c11-scratch` and `felhom-backup` are the same physical NVMe (`/dev/nvme0n1`) and resolve to the same
+`diskKey`, so one disk was walked twice in a single run.
+
+**Why that was not cosmetic.** The loop writes a disk's new record before the next entry reads it, so
+the SECOND copy of an aliased disk consumed the FIRST copy's write as its prior. The disk therefore
+**sustained against itself** and reached **Hiba on a FIRST sighting** — defeating truth-table row 6,
+the rule the whole v0.215.0 ladder is built on and the one thing standing between a one-hour benign
+excursion and a false critical alert. It would also have emitted **two identical events** for one
+drive. Nothing fired on demo-hp because all three entries are healthy with zero counters, so the fault
+was latent, not active — but any aliased disk developing a single pending sector would have gone
+straight to Hiba.
+
+**Fix:** `RunDiskHealthCheck` evaluates each `diskKey` **once per run** (`internal/web/disk_health.go`).
+Both entries are still marked `seen`, so neither is mistaken for a disappeared disk, and the card still
+renders **both** storage rows — the dedup is about state and alerts, not display.
+
+**Pinned by `TestDiskCheck_SameDiskTwiceIsEvaluatedOnce`**, which asserts the first sighting stays
+Figyelmeztetés and silent, that the stored prior is not this run's own write, that the second run emits
+exactly ONE event, and that the card still shows two rows. Companion red-proof run and reverted:
+deleting the guard makes the first sighting emit `Kind:2` (Hiba-from-sectors) at 8 sectors — the exact
+false critical described above.
+
+This is the shape §3 of the workspace rules warns about: the release's own positive observable
+("N disks evaluated") disagreed with its own persisted artefact, and only reading BOTH exposed it.
+
 ## v0.215.0 — the disk alert that never sent (2026-08-14, R-328..R-333)
 **MinAgent: 0.129.0** (unchanged — every field this reads has been on the wire since agent v0.94.0/0.95.0)
 
diff --git a/controller/internal/web/disk_health.go b/controller/internal/web/disk_health.go
index 5e2bd58..5601be2 100644
--- a/controller/internal/web/disk_health.go
+++ b/controller/internal/web/disk_health.go
@@ -201,6 +201,21 @@ func (s *Server) RunDiskHealthCheck(ctx context.Context) error {
 			continue
 		}
 		key := diskKey(d)
+		// ONE physical disk can appear as SEVERAL storage entries — on demo-hp the same NVMe is both
+		// `c11-scratch` and `felhom-backup`, and both resolve to the same durable id. They must be
+		// evaluated ONCE per run, for two reasons:
+		//
+		//  1. Correctness. The loop writes this run's record before the next entry reads it, so the
+		//     second copy of the same disk would consume the FIRST copy's write as its prior — i.e.
+		//     the disk would sustain against itself and reach Hiba on a FIRST sighting, defeating the
+		//     entire sustain rule (truth-table row 6).
+		//  2. One disk, one alert. Two entries would otherwise emit two identical events.
+		//
+		// Found on live hardware after the v0.215.0 deploy: the check logged "3 disk(s) evaluated"
+		// while the persisted state held two records. Pinned by TestDiskCheck_SameDiskTwiceIsEvaluatedOnce.
+		if seen[key] {
+			continue
+		}
 		seen[key] = true
 		prev := s.diskHealth.records[key]
 		prior := s.priorFor(key)
diff --git a/controller/internal/web/disk_health_test.go b/controller/internal/web/disk_health_test.go
index 16e7c4d..eca6e16 100644
--- a/controller/internal/web/disk_health_test.go
+++ b/controller/internal/web/disk_health_test.go
@@ -554,6 +554,62 @@ func TestDiskCheck_DisappearedDiskIsForgotten(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// ── One physical disk, several storage entries ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// FOUND ON LIVE HARDWARE (demo-hp, 2026-08-14): the check reported "3 disk(s) evaluated" while the
+// persisted state held only TWO records, because `c11-scratch` and `felhom-backup` are the same NVMe
+// and resolve to the same durable id.
+//
+// That aliasing was a real defect, not a cosmetic one. The loop writes this run's record before the
+// next entry reads it, so the second copy of a disk consumed the FIRST copy's write as its prior —
+// the disk sustained against ITSELF and reached Hiba on a first sighting, defeating truth-table row 6
+// entirely, and emitted two identical events while doing it.
+//
+// Red-proof: delete the `if seen[key] { continue }` guard in RunDiskHealthCheck → the first run
+// reaches Fail and emits, and both assertions below fail.
+func TestDiskCheck_SameDiskTwiceIsEvaluatedOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newDiskHarness(t)
+	// Two storage entries, ONE physical device — identical durable id, as the agent really reports it.
+	twice := func() []agentapi.DiskInfo {
+		sm := &agentapi.SmartSummary{Health: agentapi.SmartPassed,
+			PendingSectors: smartPtr(8), OfflineUncorrectable: smartPtr(8), ReallocatedSectors: smartPtr(0)}
+		return []agentapi.DiskInfo{
+			{Name: "c11-scratch", Type: "local-dir", BackingDevice: "/dev/nvme0n1", DurableID: "uuid:nvme-1", Smart: sm},
+			{Name: "felhom-backup", Type: "local-dir", BackingDevice: "/dev/nvme0n1", DurableID: "uuid:nvme-1", Smart: sm},
+		}
+	}
+	h.set(twice()...)
+	h.run(t)
+
+	// FIRST sighting: silent, and Figyelmeztetés — a disk must not sustain against its own alias.
+	if n := len(h.events()); n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("first sighting of an aliased disk must be silent, got %d: %+v", n, h.events())
+	}
+	rec := h.record(t, "uuid:nvme-1")
+	if rec == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no record for the aliased disk")
+	}
+	if agentapi.DiskVerdict(rec.Verdict) != agentapi.DiskVerdictWarn {
+		t.Errorf("first sighting verdict = %d, want Warn — the disk sustained against its own alias",
+			rec.Verdict)
+	}
+	if rec.PriorSawUncorrectable {
+		t.Error("the prior used on a first sighting must be empty, not this run's own write")
+	}
+
+	// SECOND run: now genuinely sustained → exactly ONE event, not one per storage entry.
+	h.set(twice()...)
+	h.run(t)
+	if n := len(h.events()); n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("one physical disk must produce ONE event, got %d: %+v", n, h.events())
+	}
+
+	// Both entries still render on the card — dedup is about state and alerts, not display.
+	if rows := h.s.diskHealthRows(context.Background()); len(rows) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("card must still show both storage entries, got %d rows", len(rows))
+	}
+}
+
 // An unreachable agent changes nothing at all — no state churn, no alarm, no error.
 func TestDiskCheck_UnreachableAgentIsInert(t *testing.T) {
 	h := newDiskHarness(t)