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docs: REPORT for v0.150.0 (green gate restored, F7 export-link fix, dhclient cleanup)

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# REPORT — remote-site remediation (F1/F2/Immich) + dashboard backup-card fix (F3)
# REPORT — green-gate restoration + F7 export-page fix + remediation-arc cleanup
**Date:** 2026-07-20 · **Repo:** felhom-controller (v0.148.0 → **v0.149.0**) · Trunk, pushed to `main`.
**Origin:** `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (findings F1–F7).
**Run class:** implementation (Part 2) + supervised operational remediation (Part 1).
**Date:** 2026-07-20 · **Repo:** felhom-controller (v0.149.0 → **v0.150.0**) · Trunk, pushed to `main`.
**Origin:** the three open hygiene items from the 2026-07-20 remediation arc (REPORT §Green gate,
§Observations) + R-53.
---
@@ -10,248 +10,236 @@
| Repo | Baseline @ start | Gate | After |
|------|------------------|------|-------|
| felhom-controller | `9d00177` | `HEAD == origin/main`, tree clean ✔ | `c059fe4` (code+CHANGELOG+CONTEXT), then this docs commit |
| felhom.eu | `648ee67` | `HEAD == origin/main` ✔ | docs commit (audit addendum, ROADMAP, capability map) |
| felhom-controller | `4646be1` | `HEAD == origin/main`, tree clean ✔ | `9f436c8` (code), then this docs commit |
| felhom.eu | `30fd9d3` | `HEAD == origin/main` ✔ | `1e11819` (ROADMAP) |
Deployed controller **before**: `felhom-controller:0.148.0` (Up, healthy) — matched the baseline.
Deployed controller **after**: `felhom-controller:0.149.0` (Up, healthy).
Deployed controller **before**: `felhom-controller:0.149.0` (Up, healthy) — matched the baseline.
Deployed controller **after**: `felhom-controller:0.150.0` (Up 6 seconds, healthy).
---
## 2. Part 1 — remote-site remediation, evidence chain
## 2. Part 1 — the 7 red `internal/backup` tests
### 2.1 Pre-flight — the situation had already moved
### 2.1 Classification (1.1) — one class, not several
The router reservation had taken effect before this run began: `vmbr0` already held
**`192.168.0.162`, but via DHCP** (`dhclient.vmbr0.leases` stamped 08:13 CEST). Nothing had retried
the agent since systemd gave up at 07:25.
The spec's duplicate-address STOP needed interpretation rather than obedience:
`ping -c1 192.168.0.162` **answered** — because the host answers *itself*. The genuine test is from
another node: ARP for `.162` seen from guest 9201 resolved to `68:1d:ef:5d:a6:64`, which **is** this
host's own vmbr0 MAC. No duplicate → the STOP did not apply. `ip neigh` on the host was empty (a host
does not ARP its own address), consistent with the same conclusion.
### 2.2 Interfaces diff (`.bak-2026-07-20` → new)
One stanza; `bridge-ports` / `bridge-stp` / `bridge-fd` and every other line preserved byte-for-byte:
```diff
auto vmbr0
-iface vmbr0 inet dhcp
+iface vmbr0 inet static
+ address 192.168.0.162/24
+ gateway 192.168.0.1
bridge-ports enp1s0
```
Gateway taken from the **live** default route, not from the spec. Tabs verified with `cat -A`.
Applied detached: `setsid ifreload -a >/tmp/ifreload-2026-07-20.log` → log contained only
`Killed old client process` (the vmbr0 dhclient exiting).
### 2.3 Post-flip verification
The v0.149.0 REPORT's device-identity hypothesis is **confirmed**, and the code said so in Hungarian
without anyone having to infer it. `TestSharesTier2MirrorsBothClasses` failed with:
```
inet 192.168.0.162/24 scope global vmbr0 (no "dynamic" flag → static)
default via 192.168.0.1 dev vmbr0 proto kernel onlink
curl https://gitea.dooplex.hu → 200
tailscale: dooplex … active; direct 37.191.56.193:45127
LastStatus:no_target
LastError:/tmp/…/hdd_1: nincs másik fizikai meghajtó — a 2. mentéshez 2. meghajtó szükséges
```
Because the address was unchanged (.162 → .162) connectivity never blipped; cloudflared needed no
reconnect and the public dashboard kept serving.
Tier-2's whole purpose is to refuse a target on the source disk; it asks
`system.SamePhysicalDevice` → `isSameBlockDevice` → `statA.Dev == statB.Dev`
(`internal/system/mounts_linux.go:225`). On DooPlex every `t.TempDir()` lands on one filesystem, so a
fixture's `hdd_1` and `hdd_2` share an `st_dev`, the guard correctly refuses, and the test can never
reach the behaviour it exists to check. **The tests were right and the code was right — the
environment could not express the fixture's premise.**
### 2.4 Agent recovery — Scenario A satisfied
| Test | Failing assertion | Root-cause class |
|---|---|---|
| `TestSharesTier2MirrorsBothClasses` | shares not mirrored; payload + marker missing; `LastStatus != ok` | device-identity |
| `TestSharesTier2SkipsDeadMountAndContinues` | "the healthy share must still be mirrored" | device-identity |
| `TestSharesTier2ReconcilePrunesRemovedShare` | precondition: dest dir absent after first run | device-identity |
| `TestSharesTier2NotifierNeverLeaksReservedKey` | "precondition: the notifier should have fired" | device-identity |
| `TestTier2V2_MigrationAndMarkerLast` | flat `appdata/` not removed; legs not mirrored; no marker | device-identity |
| `TestTier2V2_Reconcile` | stale sibling / unrelated dirs not reconciled away | device-identity |
| `TestTier2V2_NetworkExclusion` | picked `…/sys/felhom-data` instead of the local drive | device-identity |
```
systemctl reset-failed felhom-agent; systemctl start felhom-agent
→ active, ActiveEnterTimestamp Mon 2026-07-20 08:40:11 CEST
→ LISTEN 192.168.0.162:8443 users:(("felhom-agent",pid=72859))
→ level=INFO msg="local-api server listening" addr=192.168.0.162:8443
→ wg-felhom latest handshake: 1 minute, 16 seconds ago (< 3 min)
```
**No test failed for a non-environmental reason** — no real defect was found hiding behind the red,
so there is no §1.1 STOP finding.
Controller side: **zero** `agentapi` / `no route to host` / `channel not verified` lines in the next
5 minutes — explicitly **not** the "agent active but controller still erroring" wrong outcome the
scenario names. On an authenticated fetch of the real dashboard the red
**„A tárolókezelő ügynök nem elérhető"** banner is **gone**; the only `alert-warning` strings left on
the page are two modal "this cannot be undone" confirmations.
### 2.2 Fix — tool 2 (minimal seam), once, for all seven
The one remaining agent WARN is the pre-existing F6 (`/etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw:
permission denied`) — not a new failure reason, so no STOP.
Tool 1 (test-only) was considered and rejected: the only way to get two genuinely distinct devices
on this host is to place one fixture drive on `/mnt/5_hdd` and the other on `/tmp`, which hard-codes
DooPlex's disk layout into the tests — non-hermetic, and it would re-break on any other machine. Tool
3 (`t.Skip`) would have hidden seven real assertions behind an environment excuse.
### 2.5 F2 — gap closed (and it closed itself first)
Restoring the agent was sufficient: the quiesce loop found the overdue whole-guest backup and ran it
**unprompted** — the strongest available evidence that the seam is healthy end to end.
```
06:40:36Z [quiesce] backup due — quiescing 3 stack(s): [bookstack calibre-web immich]
06:40:45Z backup job backup-9201-1784529645204076480 started
06:40:55Z … snapshotted — resuming app early (8B.2)
06:42:52Z … done
```
A manual app-data run followed through the real UI endpoint (`POST /api/backup/run`, authenticated
session + `X-CSRF-Token` read from the page's `<meta>` — the call the „Teljes mentés" button makes):
```
06:45:27Z DB dump: bookstack-db → bookstack-mariadb.sql (55.9 KB, 228ms, 41 tables)
06:45:28Z DB dump: immich-postgres → immich-postgres.sql (49.9 MB, 1.28s, 66 tables)
06:45:44Z Volume dump: calibre-web/…_config → 360.0 KB
06:45:55Z / 06:45:58Z / 06:45:59Z immich ml_cache 785.5 MB, postgres_data 241.5 MB, redis_data 6.6 MB
06:46:10Z App-data backup completed: 2 databases (50.0 MB total), 3 volume dump(s) (43.348s)
```
**T = 2026-07-20 06:46:10Z** (completion; newest dump artifact 06:45:28Z). All 12 containers verified
`Up (healthy)` afterwards — every stack the run stopped for a safe volume dump came back.
### 2.6 Immich — RESOLVED, plus a correction to the audit
Started via `POST /api/stacks/immich/start` → all four containers `Up (healthy)`.
**Correction:** the audit's §3.3 probe used the wrong hostname. The traefik router rule is
``Host(`photos.demo-felhom.eu`)``, not `immich.demo-felhom.eu`. The container-down diagnosis stands
(and the 404 was genuinely traefik having no backend), but that specific probe URL was invalid. On
the correct host: **`https://photos.demo-felhom.eu` → 200** in 0.28 s.
---
## 3. Part 2 — the F3 fix
**File:** `controller/internal/web/handlers.go`, `dashboardHandler` backup block.
`dashboard.html:116` branches on `{{if .BackupStatus}}` and reads `.Success` / `.LastRun`, but the
handler never set that key — so the `{{if}}` arm was unreachable and the „Még nem futott"
else-branch rendered unconditionally on **every** box. The adjacent „Adatbázisok: N mentve" row kept
working because it reads `DBDumpStatus`, which *was* passed: exactly the contradiction seen live.
Verified before editing: `DBDumpStatus` exposes precisely the `LastRun time.Time` / `Success bool`
the template consumes, and `dashboard.html` is the **only** consumer of `BackupStatus` (the
`debug.html` hits are unrelated JS function names). Added inside the existing `if s.backupMgr != nil`:
**The seam** (`internal/backup/backup.go`) — one field + one wrapper, modelled on the package's
existing `tier2Mirror` / `tier2SSDFits` / `sharesPassdbCapture` nil-defaulted field seams:
```go
data["BackupStatus"] = fullStatus.LastDBDump
samePhysicalDevice func(a, b string) bool // nil → system.SamePhysicalDevice
func (m *Manager) sameDevice(a, b string) bool {
if m.samePhysicalDevice != nil { return m.samePhysicalDevice(a, b) }
return system.SamePhysicalDevice(a, b)
}
```
No template change, no new view-model, no change to what "utolsó mentés" means. `*DBDumpStatus`
nil/non-nil maps exactly onto the template's branch, so a fresh box still reads „Még nem futott".
**Seam justification (one line, per §9.4):** the off-drive predicate is the single environmental fact
the tier-2 tests cannot supply on a one-filesystem host; routing it through a nil-defaulted field
makes it injectable while leaving production on the identical `st_dev` call.
### Files changed
Nil-check lives in the wrapper rather than in `NewManager` deliberately: `newSharesEnv` builds
`&Manager{…}` by literal, so a constructor-only default would leave the field nil and panic.
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `controller/internal/web/handlers.go` | +1 assignment (+4 comment lines citing the audit) |
| `controller/internal/web/dashboard_backup_card_test.go` | **new** — 3 tests + 2 helpers |
| `CHANGELOG.md` | v0.149.0 entry (newest on top) |
| `CONTEXT.md` | remediation + v0.149.0 block |
| `REPORT.md` | this file (overwritten) |
Seven call sites now go through `m.sameDevice(...)`: `tier2.go` ×5 (`selectTier2TargetFrom` ×3,
`RunTier2`, `Tier2Info`), `tier2_shares.go` ×1 (`RunSharesTier2`), `backup.go` ×1
(`hasOffDriveTarget`). Behaviour with a nil seam is byte-for-byte the previous code.
**Test-side** (`device_seam_test.go`, new): `oneDrivePerSubtree` models one drive per directory
subtree — two paths share a device only when one contains the other, which is exactly how real
mountpoints behave. Installed in the two fixtures only (`newTier2V2`, `newSharesEnv`).
Nothing was weakened: the guard still runs and still refuses same-device targets — the
same-drive refusal test `TestSharesTier2NeverTargetsItsOwnSourceDrive` passes under the seam, and it
is the test that would catch a fake that simply said "always different".
**Surviving `t.Skip`s: none.** No test was skipped, deleted, renamed, or had an expected value
changed.
### 2.3 Scenario B — mutation table
Every one of the seven had the defect it guards re-introduced in **production** code, one at a time,
then reverted:
| Test | Mutation | Result |
|---|---|---|
| `TestSharesTier2MirrorsBothClasses` | skip the payload mirror to the target | **FAIL** ✔ |
| `TestSharesTier2SkipsDeadMountAndContinues` | stop skipping `Disconnected/Decommissioned` drives | **FAIL** ✔ (`dead-mount share reached a mirror call`) |
| `TestSharesTier2ReconcilePrunesRemovedShare` | `tier2ReconcileRoots` → no-op | **FAIL** ✔ |
| `TestSharesTier2NotifierNeverLeaksReservedKey` | pass `SharesPseudoStack` raw on the success path | **FAIL** ✔ (`the reserved key reached the notification boundary raw: "_shares"`) |
| `TestTier2V2_MigrationAndMarkerLast` | skip the old-flat-`appdata/` migration cleanup | **FAIL** ✔ |
| `TestTier2V2_Reconcile` | `tier2ReconcileRoots` → no-op | **FAIL** ✔ |
| `TestTier2V2_NetworkExclusion` | disable the auto `sp.IsNetwork()` skip | **FAIL** ✔ |
Honest note on method: my first attempt at two of these mutated the wrong code path (the
mirror-failure notify branch instead of the success one; the unregistered-root skip instead of the
disconnected-drive one) and both tests stayed green. That was a bad mutation, not a hollow test — the
corrected mutations bite, and the notifier one reproduces that test's own documented red-proof
verbatim. Tree verified free of mutation residue afterwards (`grep -c "// MUT:"` → 0).
### 2.4 Scenario A — green gate, twice
| Run | Command | Result |
|---|---|---|
| build / vet | `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...` | **OK** |
| 1 | `go test ./... -count=1` | **exit 0 — 23 packages ok, 0 FAIL** |
| 2 | `go test ./... -count=1` | **exit 0 — 23 packages ok, 0 FAIL** |
`grep -c SKIP` over run 2 → **0**. The gate is genuinely green, not green-by-omission.
---
## 4. Tests and the red-proof
## 3. Part 2 — F7 / R-53, the export page
The tests drive the **real handler** through `ServeHTTP` (not the template alone), backed by a real
`backup.Manager` whose per-drive dump scan finds a planted `.sql` file — so they bite on the handler
wiring, which is what the red-proof requires.
`app_export.html` L93 read `var domain = '{{.Stack.Meta.Subdomain}}' ? '{{…}}.{{$.CSRFToken}}' : '';`
— the session CSRF token where the customer domain belongs.
**A spec premise turned out to be wrong, and the fix needed one more line than planned.** §5 states
`{{$.Domain}}` is "set by `baseData`". It is (`handlers.go:120`) — but `exportPageHandler`
(`handler_export.go`) never calls `baseData`; it builds `{"Stack", "Drives"}` and `executeTemplate`
injects only `CSRFField` / `CSRFToken`. Swapping the token alone would have rendered an empty
domain — trading a wrong link for a broken one. So the fix is two lines:
- template: `{{$.CSRFToken}}` → `{{$.Domain}}`;
- handler: `"Domain": s.cfg.Customer.Domain` added to the map, mirroring `baseData`'s own line.
`csrfH()` and the meta-tag CSRF flow are the correct usage and are untouched.
**Tests** (`app_export_domain_test.go`, new — v0.149.0's render harness): the `var domain` line is
isolated first so an assertion cannot match the token where it legitimately appears (the meta tag).
| Scenario | Test | Result |
|---|---|---|
| B — real dump ⇒ its timestamp | `TestDashboardBackupCard_ShowsLastRun` | **PASS** |
| C — no dump ⇒ still honest, no `0001-01-01` | `TestDashboardBackupCard_FreshBoxStaysHonest` | **PASS** |
| D — failed run ⇒ „Sikertelen" | `TestDashboardBackupCard_FailedRunShowsSikertelen` | **PASS** |
| C — joined from the customer domain, token absent | `TestAppExportDomainUsesCustomerDomainNotCSRFToken` | **PASS** |
| C — empty-subdomain branch still `''` | `TestAppExportDomainEmptyWithoutSubdomain` | **PASS** |
**Companion red-proof (§10).** Deleted `data["BackupStatus"] = fullStatus.LastDBDump` from
`dashboardHandler` and re-ran:
**Red-proof:** restored the pre-fix template line → both tests fail, showing the defect verbatim:
```
--- FAIL: TestDashboardBackupCard_ShowsLastRun (0.21s)
dashboard_backup_card_test.go:118: card must show the real last run "2026-07-19 03:30", got: …
dashboard_backup_card_test.go:121: a box WITH a dump must not claim it never ran, got: …
--- FAIL: TestAppExportDomainUsesCustomerDomainNotCSRFToken
export link must be built from the customer domain, got:
var domain = 'photos' ? 'photos.deadbeefcafebabe…' : '';
the CSRF token must NEVER appear in the export URL, got: … (same line)
--- FAIL: TestAppExportDomainEmptyWithoutSubdomain
```
Scenario B failed on **both** assertions (C and D correctly still passed — they do not depend on the
handler line for their outcome). Line restored; suite re-run green.
Template restored; both green.
Scenario D asserts the template branch directly rather than through the handler: the failure flag
lives only in the manager's in-memory run state, unreachable from the `web` package without shelling
out to docker. That limitation is stated in the test's own comment, not hidden.
**Live verification (Scenario C)** — authenticated endpoint fetch of the real export page
`/stacks/immich/export` (no browser on DooPlex), ASCII-safe grep per the new gotcha:
**Test count: 736 → 739 (+3).**
```
line 237: var domain = 'photos' ? 'photos.demo-felhom.eu' : '';
meta tag: csrf-token" content="f7f928f1… ← the token lives here, and only here
```
### Green gate — honest result
`go build ./...` **OK** · `go vet ./...` **OK** · `go test ./...` → **22 packages ok, 1 FAIL**.
The failing package is `internal/backup` with 7 tests (`TestTier2V2_*`, `TestSharesTier2*`). **These
are pre-existing and unrelated to this change** — verified by checking the baseline commit `9d00177`
out into a throwaway `git worktree` and running the same tests there: **identical failures with none
of my changes present**. They look environment-dependent on DooPlex (the tier-2 tests reason about
distinct physical devices, and every `t.TempDir()` here lands on the same filesystem) — the same
class as the recorded "Windows green gate silently red" lesson. `internal/web`, the package this
change touches, is **green**.
I did not attempt to fix them: out of scope for this task, and quietly absorbing a red gate would be
worse than reporting it.
The rendered link is correct and the token appears nowhere in it. Note this also confirms the
handler-side `Domain` key, which the render tests alone could not prove.
---
## 5. Build / deploy / live verification
## 4. §3.4 — the orphaned `dhclient`
Evidence first. Exactly one match, on an interface that does not exist:
```
build.sh 0.149.0 --push → Build complete ✓ gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.149.0 (145M)
pct exec 9201: docker pull … && echo … > /etc/felhom-controller-image
&& systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap.service
docker ps → gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.149.0 Up 5 seconds (healthy)
BEFORE: 1922 /sbin/dhclient -pf /run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases eth0
PPID 1652, started Mon Jul 20 07:25:30 (boot)
interfaces: lo enp1s0 wlp2s0 tailscale0 vmbr0 wg-felhom veth9201i0 ← no eth0
vmbr0: iface vmbr0 inet static / address 192.168.0.162/24 ← no dhclient should run at all
neither /run/dhclient.eth0.pid nor /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases existed
```
**Scenario B, live on the real dashboard** — authenticated endpoint fetch of the rendered page
(no browser on DooPlex; `claude-in-chrome` unavailable per CLAUDE.md):
```html
<span class="backup-label">Utolsó mentés:</span>
<span class="backup-value"><span>2026-07-20 06:45</span></span>
<span class="backup-label">Adatbázisok:</span>
<span class="backup-value">3 mentve</span>
```
The identical page rendered „Még nem futott" before the deploy. The card shows 06:45 (newest dump
artifact) rather than 06:46 (run completion) because the deploy restarted the controller and cleared
the in-memory run state, so it renders from the dumps on disk — the honest value, and precisely the
path that must never fabricate a timestamp when there are no dumps.
Killed. Re-checked immediately and again ~25 min later: `pgrep -a dhclient` → **none, no respawn**.
`vmbr0` still `192.168.0.162/24`, `felhom-agent` still `active`. No other host mutation.
---
## 6. Not done / open
## 5. Files changed
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| **Durable F1** — control plane pinned to a LAN literal | **OPEN → R-50** (island-bridge, **spike-first**). Today's static `.162` is a *window mitigation*: it still assumes the site's subnet is `192.168.0.0/24` and `.162` is free |
| **F4** — dead-primary alerting in multi-container apps | **OPEN → R-51** (constraint recorded: must NOT simply fold `unhealthy` into down — that reverts fix-3) |
| **F5** — boot desired-state reconciliation | **OPEN → R-52** (includes root-causing the `unless-stopped` non-resurrection; the evidence is gone, so it needs a fresh repro) |
| **F6** — agent cannot read the PBS `.pw` | **OPEN, already tracked** as R-39's remaining item (b). No duplicate item minted |
| **F7** — `app_export.html` CSRF-token-as-domain | **OPEN → R-53** |
| `internal/backup` 7 red tests | **OPEN, pre-existing** — not investigated (out of scope) |
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `internal/backup/backup.go` | seam field + `sameDevice` wrapper; 1 call site routed |
| `internal/backup/tier2.go` | 5 call sites routed through the seam |
| `internal/backup/tier2_shares.go` | 1 call site routed; unused `system` import dropped |
| `internal/backup/device_seam_test.go` | **new** — `oneDrivePerSubtree` |
| `internal/backup/tier2_v2_test.go`, `shares_test.go` | seam injected in the two fixtures (1 line each) |
| `internal/web/templates/app_export.html` | 1 token: `{{$.CSRFToken}}` → `{{$.Domain}}` |
| `internal/web/handler_export.go` | `"Domain"` added to the export page's data map |
| `internal/web/app_export_domain_test.go` | **new** — 2 tests + 2 helpers |
| `CLAUDE.md` | 2 gotchas in the live-validation section |
| `CHANGELOG.md` / `CONTEXT.md` / `REPORT.md` | v0.150.0 bookkeeping |
Capability map gained a **PARTIAL** row: *"Box survives a site/network change (relocation, different
subnet, DHCP re-lease) with the control plane intact"*, citing the audit and pointing at R-50/51/52.
**Commits:** felhom-controller `9f436c8` (code) + this docs commit; felhom.eu `1e11819` (ROADMAP).
---
## 7. Observations (noticed, not acted on)
## 6. ROADMAP corrections (felhom.eu)
1. **An orphaned `dhclient` runs on the host for a non-existent `eth0`** (`pgrep -a dhclient` →
`/sbin/dhclient … eth0`, pid 1922) while no `eth0` exists in `ip addr`. Harmless today, but it is
leftover state of exactly the kind that makes a future network change confusing to diagnose.
2. **Accented grep patterns are unreliable through the `ssh → pct exec → bash -c` chain.** A search
for „nem elérhető" returned a false `0` while the string was present — which reads exactly like
"the banner cleared". The page content is fine; the *pattern* gets mangled in transit. Use
ASCII-only substrings for any grep that gates a conclusion. This nearly produced a wrong
"banner gone" claim before an ASCII re-check caught it.
3. **The controller password contains `'` and `!`.** A helper script written via an unquoted heredoc
had its `!!` mangled by history expansion and produced one failed login (visible in the controller
log as `[WARN] [web] Failed login`). The proven-safe form is the inline `-d "password=$PW"` the
audit run used.
4. The guest journal is **volatile** (current boot only) and the controller's logs are lost on
container recreate — which is why F5's root cause could not be established after the fact. Worth
knowing before any post-mortem that depends on in-guest history.
- **R-50 factual correction.** The entry claimed an address move needs the cert's SAN set to cover
the new address. Read against source (`internal/agentapi/client.go` L105–129): the controller→agent
leg sets `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and replaces chain verification with a `VerifyPeerCertificate`
that does a raw **SHA-256 match on the leaf DER**. Hostname/SAN never enters verification on this
leg, so an address move most likely needs **no cert re-issuance** — only the endpoint the guest
dials. The entry now says so, and still requires the spike to confirm it empirically.
- **R-53 collapsed** to its one-liner + **SHIPPED (controller v0.150.0)**, noting the handler-side
`Domain` key as part of the fix.
---
## 7. Not done / open
R-50 (durable F1 — spike-first, not started), R-51, R-52, R-39(b)/F6 — all untouched, as scoped.
---
## 8. Observations (noticed, not acted on)
1. **Four files in `internal/backup` are not `gofmt`-clean at HEAD** — `offbox_3a_test.go`,
`recovery_unit.go`, `tier2.go`, `tier2_v2_test.go`. I verified this is **pre-existing** (checked
each file's HEAD blob through `gofmt -l` before my edits) and left them alone: `gofmt` is not part
of the green gate (`build`/`vet`/`test`), and reformatting them would have buried this task's real
diff in noise. Worth a one-shot `gofmt -w` pass in its own commit.
2. **`system.SamePhysicalDevice` is mount/device-granular, not disk-granular** — its own doc comment
says two partitions on one physical disk look "different" here, with the agent's durable-id as the
stronger guarantee. Unchanged by this work, but it means the tier-2 off-drive promise is
partition-level on a box that partitions one disk.
3. **The tier-2 tests silently stopped exercising their subject rather than failing loudly at the
premise.** Each failed on a downstream assertion ("share was not mirrored") instead of on "this
fixture needs two devices and this host has one". A fixture-level precondition check would have
turned a week of ambiguous red into one clear message.