@

v0.129.0: CAMPAIGN-4 fixes — rate-limiter key (F-B) + volume-blind estimate (F-A) + no-op claim status (F-C)

F-B (MED, security): shared clientIP(r) helper (XFF first-hop, else SplitHostPort
host, else raw) replaces requestIP + the duplicated inline derivation in handleLogin,
so login AND escrow re-auth key on the port-stripped host IP — distinct direct
connections no longer evade the failed-attempt counter. XFF-trust out of scope (commented).

F-A (MED, honesty): volumeSizer seam reads volume size from a container view
(docker run --rm -v vol:/vol:ro alpine du -sb /vol), replacing the host-path du that
returned 0 inside the containerized controller. Failed read -> size_unknown +
fits_on_dest forced false (never "fits"). Export pre-flight hard-aborts only on a
KNOWN doesn.t-fit. HDD branch unchanged.

F-C (LOW-MED): escrowClaimAPIHandler relays agent 404 -> clean 404 and 409 -> 409;
410 and genuine-unreachable 502 unchanged (was: 404 fell through to 502).

Tests + red-proofs: ratelimit_ip_test.go (F-B x6), estimate_volsize_test.go (F-A x3),
TestEscrowClaim_ProxySemantics +3 (F-C). Alpine busybox du -sb verified prod-valid.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LbMm4T7Ayzs1unB9pN6Uqd
@

controller/internal/web/auth.go

@@ -148,12 +148,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Rate limit: check failed attempts from this IP
-	ip := r.RemoteAddr
-	if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
-		ip = strings.Split(fwd, ",")[0]
-	}
-	ip = strings.TrimSpace(ip)
+	// Rate limit: check failed attempts from this host. clientIP strips the ephemeral port
+	// (CAMPAIGN-4 F-B) so distinct direct connections from one host share a key and the counter
+	// actually accrues; XFF first-hop still wins for proxied clients.
+	ip := clientIP(r)
 
 	s.loginAttemptMu.Lock()
 	attempt := s.loginAttempts[ip]