clear_hold (D64 = B) + the box command through the running controller (R-1343), R-1340, R-1341 — tests red first; commit only
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- clear_hold: a fifth verb in the closed operator-action list; lifts a hold of any reason in the RUNNING
  controller (memory + settings.json together), forgets the update's held flag, drops a waiting put-back
  from the app-stop marker (copy kept). Refused on a bad name or no hold. No new event type.
- --clear-restore-hold asks the running controller over <data dir>/ctl/hold.sock (unix, 0600, peer uid
  checked, no TCP); edits settings.json only when no controller answers, and says so (in-guest restart).
- R-1340: the operator's HELD STOPPED mail is built from the hold record (restore kind, mixed cause,
  failed put-back step, database replay or not, kept copy) — never the option-C database story by default.
- R-1341: the OOM WARN line once per new kill (container, start time, kill count); event unchanged.
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admin committed 2026-10-29 12:49:46 +01:00
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@@ -82,12 +82,13 @@
| `restoreOpBlocked` | controller/internal/web/restore_wizard.go | `() (msg string, blocked bool)` | THE refusal gate before starting ANY restore | **Use this, never a bare `IsRunning()`.** It reads BOTH flags: `RestoreStatus().Running` (set synchronously by `BeginRestoreOp`, true for the whole off-box restore) and `IsRunning()` (the concurrency flag, the only one the nightly backup holds). **R-351: all seven handlers read only `IsRunning()`, which the goroutine acquires AFTER the handler returns — a second press started a second run and was told „…elindult".** Returns the Hungarian refusal, which names the running app and a route | **R-360 (v0.226.0): `offboxVerifyCopyDeleteHandler` was the LAST holdout and its doc comment claimed it already did this — the sentence is why nobody looked. `IsRunning()` is FALSE for the whole of a verification restore, so the copy a restore was writing into could be deleted from the UI (observed live 2026-08-21 22:35). No app-name comparison: refusing during ANY restore is stronger and uniform.**
| `Server.beginRestoreOp` → `backup.TryBeginRestoreOp` / `RestoreBusy` (R-1256 H6) | controller/internal/web/restore_wizard.go; controller/internal/backup/opstatus.go | `(op, stack) (msg string, ok bool)` / `(op, stack) (busy, mirrorApp string)` | THE way a restore op begins: the check for every other operation (a restore op, the backup run, a second-drive copy) and the record in ONE step under `m.mu` — the mirror asks under the same lock (`beginTier2Run`) | **Never call `BeginRestoreOp` from a handler** (`TestR1256_H6_NoHandlerBeginsARestoreUnchecked`): `restoreOpBlocked` asked early can be stale by the time the form is read, and a mirror that began in between ran beside the restore. `restoreOpBlocked` stays as the EARLY refusal; the kept loads begin inside `LoadKeptApp` / `LoadKeptOffsite` and return `ErrRestoreBusy` |
| `Manager.RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt` / `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` + `UnitRestoreResult` (R-353 v0.226.0; R-102 v0.229.0) | controller/internal/backup/restore_unit.go | `(stack, unitDir string) (UnitRestoreResult, error)` / `(stack string) (…)` | THE local recovery-unit restore, and the facts its surface must state | **Returns a RESULT, not just an error** — volumes replayed, DBs replayed, and what the manifest LISTED. The Manifest* counts are load-bearing: zero-replayed has two causes (the backup held no data / the backup listed data that did not come back) and they are opposite news. Pair it with `unitRestoreOutcomeMsg`; do NOT write a new sentence. **A claim about the APP is forbidden on this path** — it has no `SafetyDump` discriminator, unlike the off-site twin (CONTEXT.md ruling, 07-backup-architecture §6.3). `restoreDockerVolumes` now returns `(int, error)`; `restoreDockerVolumesFrom` is unchanged and still the shared implementation. **R-102: `…At` holds the whole body and takes the unit DIRECTORY; the one-argument form is the thin caller naming the primary unit.** THE SOURCE MOVES; THE DESTINATION DOES NOT — `GetAppDrivePath` still resolves where the data lands. The R-47 mutation order, the unit-over-guest secret precedence, the fail-closed data-key gate and the no-unit `RestoreApp` fallback are all pinned and unchanged. The volume leg goes through the R-354 `volumeReplayFrom` seam so the source directory is assertable without Docker |
| `Manager.putBackAfterFailedRestore` + `liveVolumeCopy` (R-893 option A, v0.336.0) | controller/internal/backup/offbox_restore_undo.go | `(stack, cause, live, copy, volumesMoved, filesPlaced, restart, holdKey) error` | THE restore undo — off-site (v0.336.0) and, since D22 (unreleased), the LOCAL unit restore (`RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAtWith`, so also the second drive's and a kept load): the live volumes it will replace, measured before the stop (`planLiveVolumeCopy`), copied right after it (`copyLiveVolumes`), poured back on any failure | One copy per restore under `<ns>/backups/restore-undo/<app>/` (no capture set reads `backups/`); the put-back uses the restore's own `volumeReplayFrom`/`restoreDockerVolumesFrom`, so there is one volume-replay implementation. A put-back that fails sets `keep` and HOLDS (option C) — never start on volumes that are not known to be back. Seams for tests without Docker: `undoVolumeProbeFn`, `undoVolumeTarFn`, `undoVolumeRemoveFn`; operator notice `SetRestorePutBackNotify` (leg `restore-put-back`). Pinned by `r893_putback_test.go` and `r1177_local_putback_test.go` |
| `Manager.putBackAfterFailedRestore` + `liveVolumeCopy` (R-893 option A, v0.336.0) | controller/internal/backup/offbox_restore_undo.go | `(stack, cause, live, copy, volumesMoved, filesPlaced, restart, holdKey, restoreKind) error` (R-1340: `restoreKind` = `settings.RestoreKindOffsite`/`Local`; a failed put-back records its step in the hold's `MixedCause`/`FailedStep`/`DBReplay`) | THE restore undo — off-site (v0.336.0) and, since D22 (unreleased), the LOCAL unit restore (`RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAtWith`, so also the second drive's and a kept load): the live volumes it will replace, measured before the stop (`planLiveVolumeCopy`), copied right after it (`copyLiveVolumes`), poured back on any failure | One copy per restore under `<ns>/backups/restore-undo/<app>/` (no capture set reads `backups/`); the put-back uses the restore's own `volumeReplayFrom`/`restoreDockerVolumesFrom`, so there is one volume-replay implementation. A put-back that fails sets `keep` and HOLDS (option C) — never start on volumes that are not known to be back. Seams for tests without Docker: `undoVolumeProbeFn`, `undoVolumeTarFn`, `undoVolumeRemoveFn`; operator notice `SetRestorePutBackNotify` (leg `restore-put-back`). Pinned by `r893_putback_test.go` and `r1177_local_putback_test.go` |
| `Manager.SweepUnusedRestoreCopies` (R-1256 H8) | controller/internal/backup/restore_copy_sweep.go | `(now) []string` | THE only AUTOMATIC remover of a restore copy nothing names any more (`restore-copy-sweep`, every 6 h); the household's „Törlés most" is `DeleteRestoreCopy` (D62, restore_copies.go — same „needed" rule via `restoreCopyNeededFor`, check + removal under `m.mu`) | Removes a copy only when ALL hold: older than 30 days (D62), the app has no restore hold of ANY kind, the app-stop marker is readable and does not name the app, no restore op runs. It answers „no" when it cannot answer — a held or waiting copy is support's way back |
| `CrashPutBack` + `Manager.persistUndoForCrash` + `AppStopGuard.SetUndo` (D22 / R-1195, v0.338.0) | controller/internal/backup/restore_crash_putback.go | `NewCrashPutBack(stop, writeDef, logger)`; `PutBackInterruptedRestore(stack, undoDir) error` | A restore cut by a power loss is put back at start: the copy (volumes + `definition/` + `undo.json`) is recorded in the app-stop marker once whole; `Recover` pours it back BEFORE the restart | Call `persistUndoForCrash` right after `copyLiveVolumes` in any new restore path. `Recover` runs before the backup manager exists, so the put-back is wired in main.go with `stackMgr.StopStack` and the stack adapter's definition writer. A failed put-back = a FAILED recovery (app not started, marker kept). The household reads `note.restore.interrupted_put_back` (`LoadRestoreRecordAfterRecovery`). Pinned by `TestR1195_*` |
| `tier2CaptureSetFull(...) (legs, missing, warns, classified)` + `keptCopyRels` + `dropKeptCopiesUnder` (R-1252, unreleased) | controller/internal/backup/tier2_capture.go, tier2_kept.go | `classified` = the legs come from a VALID backup block | **The second-drive reconcile deletes only under a valid classification**; a rejected or absent block keeps every dest dir; kept copies (D25) are always in the keep set; a mirror deleted by Remove drops its kept records | A new reconcile caller must take `classified` and the kept rels too — never reconcile against the legacy legs. A rejected block is told by `Manager.BackupBlockRejected` (stacks; via the adapter's optional `BackupBlockRejected` method) and signalled once a day (`SetTier2SettingsUnreadableNotify`). Pinned by `r1252_rejected_block_keeps_copies_test.go` |
| `holdreport.Reporter` + `settings.RestoreHold.Why` / `WireReason` (D53, unreleased) | controller/internal/holdreport/holdreport.go · controller/internal/settings/settings.go | `New(store, notifier.PushEvent, logger)`; `Tick(now)` from the scheduler | Tells the hub every hold in place (`app_held`), every hold gone (`app_hold_cleared`), each again daily | **One observer of the hold store — never a send inside a hold writer.** A new hold writer needs nothing here. The hold sentence is `RestoreHold.Why()` (one per reason) — never a second copy. Pinned by `internal/holdreport/holdreport_test.go` |
| `AppStopGuard.ResumePutBack` / `ResumeWaitingPutBacks` + `HoldReasonPutBackPending` (R-1251, unreleased) | controller/internal/backup/appstop_putback_wait.go | `ResumePutBack(stack) bool` (true = nothing owed, the caller may start); `ResumeWaitingPutBacks() []string` (puts back, then starts through the gated starter) | A cut restore's copy on a drive that is not bound is WAITING: Recover writes the restore hold `putback_pending` (copy in `SafetyDump`) and starts nothing; the put-back runs when the drive binds, before any start | **Any new path that starts an app when its drive arrives calls `ResumePutBack` first** (the boot recreate and `restartStacks` do, in web via `Server.resumePutBack`). Every other start path is covered by the hold store it already honours — do not add a second check. A failed put-back (at start or on resume) writes the D20 hold (`restore_mixed`) and drops the app from the marker. Needs `SetHolds` + `SetUndoReachable` before `Recover` (main.go). Pinned by `r1251_putback_waits_test.go`, `TestR1251_DriveStartPathsPutBackBeforeTheyStart`, `TestR1251_MainWiresThePutBackWait` |
| `AppStopGuard.ClearHoldByOperator` + `clearHoldNow` / `listenHoldCtl` / `clearRestoreHoldCLI` (D64 = B, R-1343, unreleased) | controller/internal/backup/hold_clear.go · controller/cmd/controller/holdclear.go | `ClearHoldByOperator(stack) (RestoreHold, error)`; `clearHoldNow(deps, stack, who) (msg, error)` | THE operator's hold clear, any reason — the hub's `clear_hold` and the box command `--clear-restore-hold` both go through `clearHoldNow` in the RUNNING controller | **Never clear a hold from a second process** — the running controller's next save writes it back (R-1343, measured). The box command reaches the running controller over `<data dir>/ctl/hold.sock` (unix, 0600, peer uid checked; never TCP/HTTP). A `putback_pending` clear also drops the app from the app-stop marker (the copy stays). Refusals (`ErrHoldBadStack`, `ErrNotHeld`) change nothing. The update's in-memory held flag goes via `stacks.Manager.ForgetUpdateHeld`. Pinned by `cmd/controller/holdclear_test.go` |
| `Manager.RestoreTier2Unit` + `Tier2Coverage.CanRestoreUnit` / `Tier2CopyDate` (R-102/R-103, v0.229.0) | controller/internal/backup/tier2_restore.go | `(stack string) (UnitRestoreResult, error)` / `() bool` / `() (string, bool)` | THE full restore from the SECOND DRIVE's mirror, and the predicate that gates it | **Do NOT widen `CanRestore()`** — it answers only "can the additive file restore run?" and one predicate answering two questions is R-356. Fail-closed: `tier2UnitIsOpenable` requires a parseable manifest, because a directory is not a package. The single-writer flag is taken INSIDE `RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt` — a second `acquireRunning()` here would refuse the restore it guards. `Tier2CopyDate` prefers the SUCCESS anchor over the attempt clock (R-101) and reports which it returned |
| `unitRestoreOutcomeMsg` + its three message constants (R-353, v0.226.0) | controller/internal/web/handlers.go | `(app string, res backup.UnitRestoreResult) string` | THE customer sentence for a completed LOCAL restore | Twin of `reconstituteOutcomeMsg`; copy its SHAPE (clauses earned by having done the thing, no filesystem path, base names only), never its text. The constants are named because `r353_unit_outcome_test.go` asserts them verbatim — a silent edit is how an honest message drifts back into a comforting one, which is the documented history of the sentence it replaces |
| `offsiteNoSpaceMsgFmt` + `offsiteSizeUnknownMsg` (R-357, v0.226.0) | controller/internal/backup/offbox_restore.go | two consts | EVERY headroom refusal on the off-site restore surface | **All four gates share these** (prepare, scratch, place, and the destructive reconstitute). A customer meeting one wording on one path and a different one on another has to work out whether it is the same problem. **The reconstitute gate uses NO ×1.1 margin** — it copies a measured tree; `OffboxRestorePrepareFull`'s ×1.1 predicts a download. **Fail closed when either probe reads ≤ 0**: `free < need` with `need == 0` is FALSE, so an unmeasurable input sails through — a gate present and inert |
@@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ Cross-repo edges:
| timeAgo switch body ×2 | controller/internal/web/funcmap.go `timeAgo` vs `timeAgoStr` (identical formatting logic) |
| Budapest timezone loader ×4 | controller/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go `getBudapestLocation` vs controller/internal/web/funcmap.go `getTimezone` vs controller/internal/quiesce/quiesce.go `budapestLocation` vs controller/internal/api/kept_install.go `budapest` (v0.277.0, the kept choice's dates) (v0.168.0 window gate — Budapest wall-clock, kept local to avoid a scheduler↔quiesce import edge) |
| JSON writers ×5, 3 envelope shapes | api `writeJSON`; web `writeDiskJSON`, `jsonResponse`/`jsonError`, `writeDebugJSON` |
| Safe-name validators ×4 | controller/internal/web/validate.go `validStackName`; controller/internal/api/router.go `validStackParam` (same body — api↔web import cycle); controller/internal/backup/offbox.go `isSafeStackName`; controller/internal/appexport/validate.go `ValidateSegment` (strictest) |
| Safe-name validators ×5 | controller/internal/web/validate.go `validStackName`; controller/internal/api/router.go `validStackParam` (same body — api↔web import cycle); controller/internal/backup/offbox.go `isSafeStackName` (exported as `IsValidHoldStack` for the hold commands); controller/internal/report/opactions.go `validHoldStack` (same alphabet as `isSafeStackName` — report cannot import backup; clear_hold's argument check); controller/internal/appexport/validate.go `ValidateSegment` (strictest) |
| DB wait/import ×2 | controller/internal/appbackup/dbdump.go `waitDBReady`/`ImportDump` vs controller/internal/appexport/restore.go `waitForDB`/`importDBDump` |
| qBittorrent Web API login ×2 | controller/internal/mediawire/mediawire.go `qbLogin` (writes the drive wiring) vs controller/internal/upwatch/explain.go `QBittorrent.login` (reads every minute; keeps its session cookie, which mediawire's per-run login does not need) |
| compose exec ×2 | controller/internal/stacks/manager.go `composeExecCustomEnv` vs controller/internal/appexport/restore.go `composeExecEnv` (the latter has ctx+timeout; the former has the userdata belt) |