docs: v0.83.0 REPORT/CONTEXT/README — scoped Traefik serversTransport for self-signed HTTPS backends
This commit is contained in:
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ The controller stands up its own base stack — **traefik** (reverse proxy), **c
|
||||
|
||||
cloudflared is only deployed when a tunnel token is configured. **Triggers**: a first-boot goroutine (after stack init) and an unconditional call on every `system-health` tick (self-heal — cheap when healthy thanks to the idempotency). `monitor.EffectiveProtected` mirrors the cloudflared condition so a LAN-only node (no tunnel token) doesn't report a perpetual "protected container not running" FAIL.
|
||||
|
||||
**Backend transports — self-signed HTTPS backends (`ensureServersTransports` → `RenderServersTransports`, v0.83.0).** Traefik talks **HTTP** to app backends by default, which is correct for every catalog app that serves plain HTTP. The exception is an app that serves its **own self-signed TLS** on the internal docker bridge (the first is Crafty, HTTPS-only on `:8443`): Traefik must speak `https` to it *and* skip verifying a per-container self-signed cert (no CA to verify against; the hop never leaves the host). `insecureSkipVerify` is **not settable via Docker labels** in traefik v3 — it must live in static/file config — so `EnsureBaseStack` writes a file-provider dynamic file `dynamic/serverstransports.yml` defining a **named** transport `insecure-skip-verify` (write-if-changed; hot-loaded by the file watcher). An app **opts in per-service** via two catalog labels — `loadbalancer.server.scheme=https` + `loadbalancer.serverstransport=insecure-skip-verify@file` (the `@file` suffix is the cross-provider reference). Backend verification stays the default (ON) for every other service — there is deliberately **no global `insecureSkipVerify`** in `traefik.yml`. This write runs **outside** `ensureTraefik` (which early-returns when traefik is already up) so an established node still materializes the file on a self-heal tick.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Mount prerequisite (Section-G):** the controller writes these stacks under `/opt/docker/stacks` *inside its container*, but `docker compose up` runs on the **guest** Docker daemon. The golden's controller-bootstrap (`felhom-agent` `build-golden.sh`) therefore bind-mounts that path **same-path** (`-v /opt/docker/stacks:/opt/docker/stacks`) so the daemon resolves every relative bind source — without it, all bind-mounted stacks (base infra and customer apps) silently break.
|
||||
|
||||
**Controller routing + the wildcard cert anchor (`wireController` → `RenderControllerRoute`, v0.41.1 / v0.42.1).** filebrowser self-registers with traefik via Docker labels + `traefik-public` membership baked into its compose; the controller can't (it's started by the golden bootstrap *before* `traefik-public` exists, and the v2 `bootstrap.json` carries no domain — that comes from the hub pull). So `EnsureBaseStack` wires the controller **post-pull**: it `docker network connect traefik-public felhom-controller` and writes a traefik file-provider route `dynamic/controller.yml` (`Host(felhom.<domain>) → http://felhom-controller:8080`, write-if-changed). When DNS-01 ACME is configured, that route is **also the wildcard-cert anchor**: its router-level `tls.domains: *.<domain>` makes traefik **proactively obtain the wildcard `*.<domain>` + apex via Cloudflare DNS-01 at startup** (an entrypoint-level `http.tls.domains` does *not* trigger issuance in traefik v3 — only a router-level `tls.domains` does). Every other router then serves that one real wildcard cert by SNI — no per-app `certresolver` labels. This is what lets a LAN client reach the box directly at `*.<domain>` with the real cert (the `felhom-agent` split-horizon resolver depends on it).
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user