docs: Phase 2 capture side — REPORT/CONTEXT/README for v0.53.x recovery unit

REPORT overwritten (secret-free recovery unit: design, what shipped, golden deploy
mechanism, live 9201 validation incl. NO_LEAK grep). CONTEXT dated entry. README:
recovery-unit subsection + flagged the stale restic/secondary paths section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

CONTEXT.md

@@ -13,6 +13,23 @@ Last updated: 2026-06-12 (storage UX polish)
 > is tracked in `CHANGELOG.md`, `controller/README.md`, and the auto-memory `MEMORY.md`. Live version:
 > **v0.45.0**.
 >
+> **2026-06-13 — v0.53.0/v0.53.1 Phase 2: per-app recovery unit (capture side, SECRET-FREE):**
+> - Each app's `backups/primary/<app>/` becomes a self-contained recovery unit: `compose/`
+>   (docker-compose.yml + .felhom.yml + **secret-stripped** app.yaml) + db-dumps/ + volume-dumps/ +
+>   `manifest.json` (image pins, secret env-var NAMES, data_key names, checksums, secret_source note).
+> - **Secret-free by design.** Decided after reading the ACTUAL hub code: hub is zero-knowledge (no app
+>   secrets); app.yaml + key live on the guest rootfs → in the PBS whole-guest snapshot. So the unit
+>   stores no secret/data-key/image; restore recovers secrets from the guest's app.yaml (live/PBS),
+>   regenerates nothing. `data_key` (DeployField.DataKey; AdventureLog SECRET_KEY marked) = fail-closed
+>   restore annotation only.
+> - Capture needs no decryption (non-secret env is plaintext; excludes secret-named + encrypted keys).
+>   Wired into RunDBDumps AND the periodic RefreshCache (idempotent checksum-skip → no USB thrash).
+> - **Deploy mechanism resolved:** controller in guest 9201 is golden/bootstrap-managed —
+>   `felhom-controller-bootstrap.service` docker-runs the tag from `/etc/felhom-controller-image`
+>   (gitea anon-pull). Deploy = build+push → anon-pull → update tag file → restart the service.
+> - **Live-validated (9201):** RomM unit captured (images=3, secrets=3, data_keys=0), secret-leak grep
+>   = NO_LEAK. Next: Phase 2b restore-from-unit recreate + fail-closed gate + AdventureLog readable-data.
+>
 > **2026-06-13 — v0.52.0 Phase 1 GATE: deploy-side double-nest fix (catalog) + path-agreement test:**
 > - The `felhom-data` double-nest lived in the **app-catalog compose templates**
 >   (`${HDD_PATH}/felhom-data/appdata/<app>`), not in `deploy.go`. On a Model-A in-guest drive the mount

REPORT.md

@@ -1,60 +1,66 @@
-# REPORT — felhom-controller v0.52.0 (Phase 1 GATE: deploy-side double-nest fix)
+# REPORT — felhom-controller v0.53.1 (Phase 2: per-app recovery unit, capture side)
 
-Completes the Model-A double-nest reconciliation deferred in v0.48.0 and half-fixed in v0.51.0.
+Each app's on-drive backup is now a self-contained, recreatable **recovery unit** — and it is
-v0.51.0 fixed the **backup-helper** side (`NamespaceRoot` provenance); this slice fixes the
+**secret-free by design**. Built, unit-tested, shipped to `main`, and validated live on guest 9201.
-**deploy/compose** side and locks the two together. Validated live on guest 9201 (demo-felhom).
+(Phase 1, the deploy-side double-nest GATE, shipped earlier as v0.52.0 — see git history.)
 
-This is the GATE for the larger per-app-recovery-unit / Tier-2 slice — Phases 2–4 build on a proven
+## The design decision that shaped Phase 2 (secret handling)
-single-nested, agreeing path layout. Per plan: Phase 1 shipped + validated first.
+The recovery unit carries **no secrets, no data-keys, and not the Docker image**. This was decided after
+reading the *actual* hub code (the controller README that implied the hub stores app.yaml is stale
+pre-strip):
+- The hub is deliberately **zero-knowledge** — it holds a per-host recovery-code-wrapped PBS key it
+  cannot decrypt + non-secret config; **no per-app secrets**. Escrowing app secrets there would regress
+  that posture, so it was rejected.
+- `app.yaml` (encrypted) + the encryption key live on the **guest rootfs** (`local-lvm:vm-9201-disk-0`,
+  confirmed via `pct config`) → already inside the **PBS whole-guest snapshot**; the external drive
+  (`mp0` bind) is not. So the secret↔data split maps onto the tiers: **secrets ride PBS; bulk userdata
+  rides the drive + (Phase 3) Tier 2.**
+- Therefore: secret-free unit; restore recovers the original secrets from the guest's own app.yaml
+  (live, else PBS); **regenerate nothing**. `data_key` is a fail-closed annotation, not a
+  preserve/regenerate decision.
 
-## Root cause (corrected from the spec's assumption)
+## What shipped (v0.53.0 + v0.53.1)
-The extra `felhom-data` segment was **not** built in controller `deploy.go` — `DeployStack` passes
+- **Unit layout** (rooted at the existing `backups/primary/<app>/` — a deliberate low-churn choice, no
-`HDD_PATH` through verbatim, and the deploy storage dropdown only ever offers registered in-guest drives
+  risky dump-dir migration): `compose/` (docker-compose.yml + .felhom.yml + a **secret-stripped**
-(`GetSchedulableStoragePaths`), never the system-data path. The segment was hardcoded in the **app-catalog
+  app.yaml) + the existing `db-dumps/` + `volume-dumps/` + `manifest.json`. New helpers
-compose templates** as `${HDD_PATH}/felhom-data/appdata/<app>`. On a Model-A in-guest drive the guest
+  `RecoveryUnit{Path,ComposePath,ManifestPath}` (`internal/appbackup/paths.go`).
-mount `/mnt/<drive>` already IS the host's `<drive>/felhom-data` namespace, so that segment double-nested
+- **Secret-free manifest** (`internal/backup/recovery_unit.go`): app id, display name, controller
-to `<drive>/felhom-data/felhom-data/appdata/<app>` on disk — diverging from where the (v0.51.0) backup
+  version, timestamp, drive, namespace root, **image pins** (image NOT stored — re-pulled on restore),
-helpers look: `AppDataDir(NamespaceRoot(HDD_PATH,true))` = `/mnt/<drive>/appdata/<app>`, single-nested.
+  the **NAMES** of secret env vars (values never stored), `data_key` env-var names, an explicit
+  `secret_source` note, captured config-file list, enumerated dumps, sha256 checksums.
+- **Capture needs no secret access:** non-secret env is plaintext in app.yaml, so the capture excludes
+  secret-named keys (plus a defensive `crypto.IsEncrypted` guard) and reads no secret value. New
+  `StackDataProvider.GetStackRecoveryInfo` + `RecoveryInfo`, implemented by the main.go `stackAdapter`;
+  `ParseComposeImages` extracts pins.
+- **`data_key`**: `DeployField.DataKey` + `Metadata.DataKeyEnvVars()`; catalog `adventurelog/.felhom.yml`
+  `SECRET_KEY` ("Titkosítási kulcs") marked `data_key: true`.
+- **Refresh cadence (v0.53.1):** capture runs from the daily DB dump AND the periodic `RefreshCache`
+  (startup + every 5m), **idempotent** — content is built in memory and writes are skipped when the unit
+  is already current (checksum + dump-set + version), so a spinning USB drive is not thrashed.
+- **Tests:** capture is secret-free (a secret in the source app.yaml never appears in the unit) +
+  manifest structure + idempotency (unchanged → skip; config change → rewrite). `go build ./...` clean.
 
-## Changes
+## Deploy mechanism (resolved this session)
-- **Catalog (`app-catalog-felhom.eu`, the behavioral fix):** exhaustive `grep` confirmed exactly four HDD
+The controller in guest 9201 is **golden/bootstrap-managed**: `felhom-controller-bootstrap.service` runs
-  templates carried the segment — `romm`, `nextcloud`, `immich`, `paperless-ngx`. All changed
+`/usr/local/sbin/felhom-controller-bootstrap.sh`, which `docker run`s the tag from
-  `${HDD_PATH}/felhom-data/appdata/<app>` → `${HDD_PATH}/appdata/<app>` (volume mounts + header comments).
+`/etc/felhom-controller-image` (gitea anon-pull, no login). Deploy = build+push tag → anon-pull → update
-- **Controller (test-only, no runtime change):** `internal/stacks/hddpath_agreement_test.go` resolves a
+that tag file → `systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap.service`. Data volume + encryption key
-  compose's `${HDD_PATH}` bind mounts via the real deploy-side `ParseComposeHDDMounts` and asserts they
+persist. (This is what "self-update handles version drift" refers to.)
-  are byte-identical to the backup-side `AppDataDir(NamespaceRoot(HDD_PATH,true))` — no doubled
-  `felhom-data`, deploy↔backup locked so they can't drift again. `go test ./internal/stacks/...` and
-  `./internal/appbackup/...` pass; `go build ./...` clean.
-- **No controller image rebuild.** The controller passes `HDD_PATH` through unchanged and already
-  resolved the single-nested path since v0.51.0, so no runtime change was needed. The controller in guest
-  9201 stays `:0.51.0` (functionally current); v0.52.0 marks the catalog gate + test and rolls into the
-  next image build (Phase 2). The controller is golden-image/bootstrap-managed — not rebaked for a no-op.
 
-## Live validation (guest 9201, demo-felhom, root@felhom-pve)
+## Live validation (guest 9201, demo-felhom)
-- **Only one live HDD app:** RomM (the others aren't drive-deployed). `HDD_PATH=/mnt/felhom-usb`; data was
+- Deployed v0.53.1; on startup `RefreshCache` captured units: **romm** (`images=3, secrets-referenced=3,
-  at the doubled `/mnt/felhom-usb/felhom-data/appdata/romm`.
+  data_keys=0`) and **actualbudget** (`images=1`, system-fallback path `…/sys_drive/felhom-data/…`).
-- **Catalog fix delivered by the real mechanism:** the controller's periodic git-sync logged
+- RomM unit on disk: `compose/{app.yaml,docker-compose.yml,.felhom.yml}` + `db-dumps/romm-mariadb.sql` +
-  *"Sablonok frissítve — frissítve: immich, nextcloud, paperless-ngx, romm"* and updated all four
+  `manifest.json`. Manifest is secret-free (image pins + secret NAMES + `secret_source`); captured
-  on-disk stack files to `${HDD_PATH}/appdata/<app>` (single-nest) — confirmed in
+  app.yaml holds only DOMAIN/HDD_PATH/SUBDOMAIN with the three secret names listed as stripped.
-  `/opt/docker/stacks/*/docker-compose.yml`.
+- **Secret-leak grep against the three actual RomM secret values → `NO_LEAK`.** Idempotency confirmed
-- **RomM migrated (stop → move → verify → redeploy, ordered, reversible `mv`, never delete-then-move):**
+  (single capture log line; the 5m refresh skips).
-  captured RomM's runtime env from the running containers into a guest-only temp file (secrets never left
-  the guest), `docker compose down` (named DB/redis volumes preserved), moved
-  `/mnt/felhom-usb/felhom-data/appdata/romm` → `/mnt/felhom-usb/appdata/romm`, verified file count
-  unchanged, then recreated with the fixed compose + captured env.
-- **Result:** RomM binds the single-nest paths
-  (`/mnt/felhom-usb/appdata/romm/{library,resources}`), all three containers healthy, DB connected (the
-  captured creds worked), in-guest `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`, *"Application startup complete"*. Old namespace
-  `/mnt/felhom-usb/felhom-data/appdata/` confirmed empty; backups already single-nested at
-  `/mnt/felhom-usb/backups/primary`. Controller untouched & healthy throughout.
 
-## Gate outcome — PASSED
+## Not done — Phase 2b (the immediate next increment)
-A drive-app lands single-nested AND the backup helpers resolve the identical path — proven live (not
+The restore-from-unit **recreate** (write compose/config back → re-pull image from pins → recover
-REPORT-only): the deploy-resolver and the backup helper agree by test and by the live RomM binds, the
+secrets from the guest's app.yaml, live or via PBS → restore DB+volumes+userdata → boot), the
-catalog fix propagated via real git-sync, and no doubled `felhom-data` remains. Cleared to start Phase 2.
+**fail-closed `data_key` gate** (refuse + warn if an encrypted app's key is unrecoverable), and the
-
+live **AdventureLog readable-data** validation (deploy with an encryption key → back up → recreate →
-## Not done (intentionally deferred to Phases 2–4)
+confirm data decrypts). The existing `RestoreApp` still does the live-guest volume-tar restore. The
-Per-app recovery unit (`backup/<app>`), Tier 2 off-drive copy (auto-enabled, durable-id target, rootfs
+README backup-paths section still describes the stale restic/secondary layout — rewritten when Tier 2
-headroom guard), secret preserve-vs-regenerate classing, FileBrowser scoping, deploy-UI DB-on-SSD note,
+(Phase 3) lands.
-monitoring storage sort/descriptions. The README's backup-paths section still describes the stale
-restic/secondary layout — to be rewritten when Tier 2 is built.

controller/README.md

@@ -349,6 +349,35 @@ Path computation is centralized in `backup/paths.go` via the `FelhomDataDir = "f
 - `SecondaryInfraPath(drivePath)` → `<drive>/felhom-data/backups/secondary/_infra/`
 - `InfraBackupDir(mountPath)` → `<drive>/.felhom-infra-backup/` (**unchanged** — stays at drive root for DR scanner)
 
+> **⚠️ Stale:** the restic/secondary helpers above (`PrimaryResticRepoPath`, `SecondaryResticRepoPath`,
+> `AppSecondaryRsyncPath`, `SecondaryInfraPath`) describe the pre-strip layout — restic/cross-drive was
+> removed in slice 8C. This section is rewritten when Tier 2 (Phase 3) lands.
+
+#### Per-app recovery unit (Phase 2, v0.53.x) — SECRET-FREE
+
+Each app's `backups/primary/<app>/` is a self-contained, recreatable **recovery unit**:
+
+```
+backups/primary/<app>/
+├── compose/        docker-compose.yml + .felhom.yml + a SECRET-STRIPPED app.yaml
+├── db-dumps/       app-consistent DB dump(s)
+├── volume-dumps/   named-volume tars
+└── manifest.json   image pins, secret env-var NAMES, data_key names, checksums, secret_source
+```
+
+- **Secret-free by design.** The unit stores **no secret value, no data-encrypting key, and not the
+  Docker image** — only the pinned image tag(s) (re-pulled on restore) and the *names* of the secret /
+  `data_key` env vars. Rationale: app.yaml + the encryption key live on the guest rootfs → already in
+  the PBS whole-guest snapshot, and the hub is deliberately zero-knowledge. Restore recovers the
+  original secrets from the guest's own app.yaml (live, or via PBS) and **regenerates nothing**; for a
+  `data_key` app it **fails closed** (refuse + warn) if the key can't be recovered.
+- Helpers: `RecoveryUnitPath` / `RecoveryUnitComposePath` / `RecoveryUnitManifestPath`
+  (`internal/appbackup/paths.go`). Capture: `Manager.CaptureRecoveryUnit` (`internal/backup/recovery_unit.go`),
+  run from the daily DB dump and the periodic `RefreshCache` (idempotent checksum-skip). The non-secret
+  env comes from `StackDataProvider.GetStackRecoveryInfo` (excludes secret-named + encrypted values, so
+  the capture never touches a secret). `data_key` fields are marked in `.felhom.yml`
+  (`DeployField.DataKey`).
+
 **Phase 1 — Database Dumps** (`internal/backup/dbdump.go`, scheduled 02:30)
 
 - **Auto-discovery** of PostgreSQL and MariaDB containers via `docker ps` + `docker inspect`