slice 8A (controller half): bootstrap.json ingestion + pinned agent local-API client (v0.35.0)

internal/bootstrap: first-run bootstrap.json ingestion (decision (c)) — seed
controller.yaml + skip setup; idempotent + fail-safe. internal/agentapi:
minimal pinned local-API client (leaf-cert SHA-256 pin, fails closed). config
LocalAPIConfig; startup /storage connectivity probe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-10 09:47:54 +02:00
parent 086281b582
commit 2a0d9a1b7a
7 changed files with 608 additions and 0 deletions
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// Package agentapi is the in-guest controller's client for the host agent's per-guest local
// API (doc 03 §6, slice 8A). It reaches the agent over the bridge, pinning the agent's
// self-signed leaf by SHA-256 (the same pin convention the agent uses for the Proxmox/PBS host
// certs), and authenticates with the per-guest bearer token. In 8A it exercises GET /storage
// (connectivity + the controller learning its mounts); the full surface (the /backup/due
// quiesce loop) lands in 8B.
package agentapi
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Client talks to one agent local-API endpoint with a pinned leaf + bearer token.
type Client struct {
baseURL string
token string
hc *http.Client
}
// MountInfo mirrors the agent's GET /storage mount entry (doc 03 §6).
type MountInfo struct {
Key string `json:"key"`
Storage string `json:"storage"`
MountPoint string `json:"mount_point"`
Class string `json:"class"` // fast | slow | ""
Backup bool `json:"backup"`
}
// StorageResponse mirrors the agent's GET /storage data payload.
type StorageResponse struct {
VMID int `json:"vmid"`
Mounts []MountInfo `json:"mounts"`
}
// apiResponse is the agent's {ok,data,error} envelope.
type apiResponse struct {
OK bool `json:"ok"`
Data json.RawMessage `json:"data"`
Error string `json:"error"`
}
// New builds a pinned client for endpoint ("host:port") with the given per-guest token and the
// agent leaf-cert SHA-256 fingerprint (hex, ':'-separators tolerated). The pin is the trust
// anchor — the agent serves a self-signed cert, so chain verification is replaced by an exact
// leaf-DER SHA-256 match (fails closed on any mismatch).
func New(endpoint, token, fingerprintHex string) (*Client, error) {
endpoint = strings.TrimSpace(endpoint)
if endpoint == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: endpoint required")
}
if token == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: token required")
}
want, err := normalizeFingerprint(fingerprintHex)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
InsecureSkipVerify: true, // self-signed leaf — the pin below is the real check
VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: TLS pin: peer presented no certificate")
}
got := sha256.Sum256(rawCerts[0]) // leaf DER
if hex.EncodeToString(got[:]) != want {
return fmt.Errorf("agentapi: TLS pin mismatch: agent leaf SHA-256 does not match the bootstrap fingerprint")
}
return nil
},
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
}
return &Client{
baseURL: "https://" + endpoint,
token: token,
hc: &http.Client{
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg},
},
}, nil
}
// Storage calls GET /storage and returns this guest's mounts (connectivity + placement view).
func (c *Client) Storage(ctx context.Context) (StorageResponse, error) {
var out StorageResponse
body, err := c.get(ctx, "/storage")
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &out); err != nil {
return out, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: decode /storage: %w", err)
}
return out, nil
}
// get issues an authenticated GET and unwraps the {ok,data,error} envelope.
func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, path string) (json.RawMessage, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.baseURL+path, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: %w", path, err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: HTTP %d", path, resp.StatusCode)
}
var env apiResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: bad envelope: %w", path, err)
}
if !env.OK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agentapi: GET %s: %s", path, env.Error)
}
return env.Data, nil
}
// normalizeFingerprint lowercases and strips ':'/' ' separators, requiring a 64-hex SHA-256.
func normalizeFingerprint(fp string) (string, error) {
s := strings.ToLower(strings.NewReplacer(":", "", " ", "", "\t", "").Replace(strings.TrimSpace(fp)))
if len(s) != 64 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("agentapi: fingerprint must be a SHA-256 (64 hex chars), got %d", len(s))
}
if _, err := hex.DecodeString(s); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("agentapi: fingerprint is not valid hex: %w", err)
}
return s, nil
}
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package agentapi
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// storageStub serves the agent's {ok,data} envelope for GET /storage, requiring the bearer.
func storageStub(token string) http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("GET /storage", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer "+token {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":false,"error":"unauthorized"}`))
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true,"data":{"vmid":8200,"mounts":[{"key":"mp0","storage":"fast","mount_point":"/var/lib/docker","class":"fast","backup":true}]}}`))
})
return mux
}
func leafPin(t *testing.T, s *httptest.Server) string {
t.Helper()
der := s.Certificate().Raw
sum := sha256.Sum256(der)
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// The correct pin + token reaches /storage and decodes the mounts.
func TestClient_PinnedStorageOK(t *testing.T) {
s := httptest.NewTLSServer(storageStub("TOK"))
defer s.Close()
endpoint := strings.TrimPrefix(s.URL, "https://")
c, err := New(endpoint, "TOK", leafPin(t, s))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new: %v", err)
}
resp, err := c.Storage(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("storage: %v", err)
}
if resp.VMID != 8200 || len(resp.Mounts) != 1 || resp.Mounts[0].Class != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected storage response: %+v", resp)
}
}
// A WRONG pin fails closed — the TLS handshake is rejected before any data flows.
func TestClient_WrongPinFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
s := httptest.NewTLSServer(storageStub("TOK"))
defer s.Close()
endpoint := strings.TrimPrefix(s.URL, "https://")
wrong := strings.Repeat("ab", 32) // 64 hex chars, valid format, wrong value
c, err := New(endpoint, "TOK", wrong)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new: %v", err)
}
if _, err := c.Storage(context.Background()); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a TLS pin failure, got success")
}
}
// A bad fingerprint format is rejected at construction.
func TestClient_BadFingerprintRejected(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := New("host:8443", "TOK", "not-a-fingerprint"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for a non-SHA256 fingerprint")
}
if _, err := New("host:8443", "", strings.Repeat("a", 64)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for an empty token")
}
}
// Colon-separated fingerprints (the agent logs them with ':') are accepted.
func TestClient_AcceptsColonFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
s := httptest.NewTLSServer(storageStub("TOK"))
defer s.Close()
endpoint := strings.TrimPrefix(s.URL, "https://")
pin := leafPin(t, s)
var colon strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < len(pin); i += 2 {
if i > 0 {
colon.WriteByte(':')
}
colon.WriteString(pin[i : i+2])
}
c, err := New(endpoint, "TOK", colon.String())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new with colon fp: %v", err)
}
if _, err := c.Storage(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("storage with colon fp: %v", err)
}
}