R-616 (on top of R-615): the catalog clone stores no credentials

Replaces 365eff6 for main, which now carries R-615 (0b349e2). The plain URL is cloned; the Basic credentials ride per git command as http.<origin>.extraHeader via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT. R-615's origin compare now compares credential-free forms against the configured URL, so a set token never re-clones; a stored origin with user:token@ is rewritten without it. Pinned by TestR616_* incl. TestR616_TokenSetSameRepoNoRecloneOriginClean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
2026-10-05 21:38:24 +02:00
parent 6fac245d24
commit 28a5203d01
2 changed files with 239 additions and 21 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+package sync
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"log"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-616: the catalog credentials must never be stored in the clone. A fake https remote is served from
+// a local repository through git's own url.<base>.insteadOf (in a test-only HOME), so the real clone
+// and fetch paths run with no network: git REWRITES the URL it dials but STORES the URL it was given —
+// which is exactly the URL the product chose, credentialed or not.
+func r616Fixture(t *testing.T) (s *Syncer, logs *bytes.Buffer, src string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
+		t.Skip("git not on PATH")
+	}
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	src = filepath.Join(root, "src")
+	run := func(dir string, args ...string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
+		cmd.Dir = dir
+		if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("git %v: %v\n%s", args, err, out)
+		}
+	}
+	home := filepath.Join(root, "home")
+	os.MkdirAll(home, 0o755)
+	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
+	t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", filepath.Join(home, ".config"))
+	t.Setenv("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1")
+	gitcfg := "[user]\n\tname = t\n\temail = t@example.invalid\n" +
+		"[url \"file://" + src + "\"]\n" +
+		"\tinsteadOf = https://user:tok-SECRET@catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git\n" +
+		"\tinsteadOf = https://catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(home, ".gitconfig"), []byte(gitcfg), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	os.MkdirAll(src, 0o755)
+	run(src, "init", "-q", "-b", "main")
+	os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(src, "README"), []byte("x\n"), 0o644)
+	run(src, "add", "README")
+	run(src, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init")
+
+	s = newTestSyncer(t, "https://catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git")
+	s.cfg.Git.Username = "user"
+	s.cfg.Git.Token = "tok-SECRET"
+	logs = &bytes.Buffer{}
+	s.logger = log.New(logs, "", 0)
+	return s, logs, src
+}
+
+func storedOrigin(t *testing.T, dir string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	out, err := exec.Command("git", "-C", dir, "config", "--get", "remote.origin.url").Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read origin: %v", err)
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+}
+
+func TestR616_CloneStoresNoCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	s, logs, _ := r616Fixture(t)
+	if err := s.gitCloneOrPull(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("clone: %v", err)
+	}
+	origin := storedOrigin(t, s.cacheDir)
+	if strings.Contains(origin, "@") || strings.Contains(origin, "tok-SECRET") {
+		t.Errorf("the clone's stored origin carries credentials: %q", origin)
+	}
+	cfgBytes, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(s.cacheDir, ".git", "config"))
+	if strings.Contains(string(cfgBytes), "tok-SECRET") {
+		t.Errorf(".git/config holds the token in the clear:\n%s", cfgBytes)
+	}
+	// A pull (fetch + reset) still works on the clean clone.
+	if err := s.gitCloneOrPull(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pull: %v", err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(logs.String(), "tok-SECRET") {
+		t.Errorf("the token reached the log:\n%s", logs.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// A clone made BEFORE the fix (origin with userinfo) is scrubbed on the next pull.
+func TestR616_PreFixCloneIsScrubbedOnPull(t *testing.T) {
+	s, logs, _ := r616Fixture(t)
+	cmd := exec.Command("git", "clone", "-q", "--depth", "1", "--branch", "main",
+		"https://user:tok-SECRET@catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git", s.cacheDir)
+	if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pre-fix clone: %v\n%s", err, out)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(storedOrigin(t, s.cacheDir), "tok-SECRET") {
+		t.Fatal("fixture: the pre-fix clone should carry the token")
+	}
+	if err := s.gitCloneOrPull(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pull: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := storedOrigin(t, s.cacheDir); got != "https://catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git" {
+		t.Errorf("stored origin not scrubbed: %q", got)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(logs.String(), "tok-SECRET") {
+		t.Errorf("the token reached the log:\n%s", logs.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// The credentials still reach git: the header is scoped to the remote's origin and carries the same
+// Basic pair the URL form sent. Checked with git's own URL matcher, no network.
+func TestR616_AuthHeaderScopedToTheRemote(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
+		t.Skip("git not on PATH")
+	}
+	s := newTestSyncer(t, "https://catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git")
+	if env := s.gitAuthEnv(); env != nil {
+		t.Errorf("no credentials configured -> no auth env, got %v", env)
+	}
+	s.cfg.Git.Username, s.cfg.Git.Token = "user", "tok-SECRET"
+	env := s.gitAuthEnv()
+	want := "Authorization: Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("user:tok-SECRET"))
+	match := func(url string) string {
+		cmd := exec.Command("git", "config", "--get-urlmatch", "http.extraHeader", url)
+		cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), env...)
+		out, _ := cmd.Output()
+		return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+	}
+	t.Setenv("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1")
+	t.Setenv("HOME", t.TempDir())
+	if got := match("https://catalog.example.invalid/admin/catalog.git"); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("header for the remote = %q, want the Basic pair", got)
+	}
+	if got := match("https://other.example.invalid/x.git"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("the header must not reach another host, got %q", got)
+	}
+	s.cfg.Git.RepoURL = "/local/path/catalog"
+	if env := s.gitAuthEnv(); env != nil {
+		t.Errorf("a non-https remote gets no auth env, got %v", env)
+	}
+}
+
+// R-616 × R-615: with a token set and the SAME repository configured, repeated syncs never re-clone
+// (the configured URL carries no credentials to differ from the stored origin) and the stored origin
+// stays free of '@'. A re-clone is detected by a marker file planted inside the cache: RemoveAll would
+// take it with it.
+func TestR616_TokenSetSameRepoNoRecloneOriginClean(t *testing.T) {
+	s, logs, _ := r616Fixture(t)
+	if err := s.gitCloneOrPull(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("clone: %v", err)
+	}
+	marker := filepath.Join(s.cacheDir, ".git", "r616-no-reclone")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(marker, []byte("x"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		if err := s.gitCloneOrPull(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("pull %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(marker); err != nil {
+		t.Error("the cache was RE-CLONED on a same-repo sync with a token set")
+	}
+	if o := storedOrigin(t, s.cacheDir); strings.Contains(o, "@") {
+		t.Errorf("stored origin carries credentials: %q", o)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(logs.String(), "re-cloning") || strings.Contains(logs.String(), "tok-SECRET") {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected re-clone or token in the log:\n%s", logs.String())
+	}
+}
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
@@ -300,7 +301,10 @@ func (s *Syncer) gitCloneOrPull() error {
 		// Clone
 		s.logger.Printf("[INFO] [sync] Cloning %s → %s", s.cfg.Git.RepoURL, s.cacheDir)
 		args := []string{"clone", "--depth", "1", "--branch", s.cfg.Git.Branch}
-		repoURL := s.buildRepoURL()
+		// R-616: clone the PLAIN URL — git persists the clone URL as `origin`, so a credentialed URL
+		// left the token readable in .git/config and printed by any `git remote -v`. The credentials
+		// ride per command in the environment instead (gitAuthEnv).
+		repoURL := s.cfg.Git.RepoURL
 		args = append(args, repoURL, s.cacheDir)
 		if s.isDebug() {
 			s.logger.Printf("[DEBUG] [sync] git clone URL: %s, branch: %s, cacheDir: %s", maskRepoURL(repoURL), s.cfg.Git.Branch, s.cacheDir)
@@ -312,22 +316,25 @@ func (s *Syncer) gitCloneOrPull() error {
 	s.removeGitLockFiles()

 	// R-615: the clone remembers the repository it was made from. A changed `git.repo_url` used to be
-	// INERT — every later fetch went to the stored origin and reported success. Compare and follow:
-	// a different repository (credentials aside) → drop the cache and clone the new one; the same
-	// repository with different credentials (a rotated token) → point origin at the new URL.
+	// INERT — every later fetch went to the stored origin and reported success. Compare and follow: a
+	// different repository (credentials aside) → drop the cache and clone the new one.
+	// R-616: credentials are NEVER part of the stored origin (they ride per command, gitAuthEnv), so the
+	// comparison is between credential-free forms, and a stored origin that still carries a
+	// `user:token@` (a clone made before R-616) is rewritten without it. A rotated token therefore needs
+	// no origin change at all. Pinned by TestR616_TokenSetSameRepoNoRecloneOriginClean.
 	if cur, err := s.gitOutput(s.cacheDir, "config", "--get", "remote.origin.url"); err != nil {
 		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [sync] cannot read the catalog cache's origin (%v) — fetching from it as before", err)
-	} else if want := s.buildRepoURL(); cur != want {
-		if stripURLCreds(cur) != stripURLCreds(want) {
-			s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [sync] git.repo_url changed (cache was cloned from %s, config says %s) — re-cloning the catalog cache from the configured repository (R-615)", maskRepoURL(cur), maskRepoURL(want))
-			if err := os.RemoveAll(s.cacheDir); err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("removing the catalog cache for a re-clone: %w", err)
-			}
-			return s.gitCloneOrPull()
+	} else if want := s.cfg.Git.RepoURL; stripURLCreds(cur) != stripURLCreds(want) {
+		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [sync] git.repo_url changed (cache was cloned from %s, config says %s) — re-cloning the catalog cache from the configured repository (R-615)", maskRepoURL(cur), maskRepoURL(want))
+		if err := os.RemoveAll(s.cacheDir); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("removing the catalog cache for a re-clone: %w", err)
 		}
-		s.logger.Printf("[INFO] [sync] catalog repository credentials changed — updating the cache's origin (R-615)")
-		if err := s.gitCmd(s.cacheDir, "remote", "set-url", "origin", want); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("git remote set-url: %w", err)
+		return s.gitCloneOrPull()
+	} else if clean := stripURLCreds(cur); clean != cur {
+		if err := s.gitCmd(s.cacheDir, "remote", "set-url", "origin", clean); err != nil {
+			s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [sync] could not remove stored credentials from the catalog clone origin (%s): %v", maskRepoURL(cur), err)
+		} else {
+			s.logger.Printf("[INFO] [sync] removed stored credentials from the catalog clone origin (R-616): now %s", clean)
 		}
 	}

@@ -362,14 +369,50 @@ func (s *Syncer) removeGitLockFiles() {
 	}
 }

-// buildRepoURL constructs the repo URL with optional auth credentials.
-func (s *Syncer) buildRepoURL() string {
-	url := s.cfg.Git.RepoURL
-	if s.cfg.Git.Username != "" && s.cfg.Git.Token != "" {
-		// Inject credentials into HTTPS URL: https://user:token@host/path
-		url = strings.Replace(url, "https://", fmt.Sprintf("https://%s:%s@", s.cfg.Git.Username, s.cfg.Git.Token), 1)
+// gitAuthEnv returns the environment that authenticates one git command, or nil when no credentials
+// are configured or the remote is not HTTPS.
+//
+// R-616: the credentials used to be injected into the clone URL (https://user:token@host/…), which
+// git then stored as the clone's `origin` — a plaintext token in <data>/catalog-cache/.git/config,
+// printed by every `git remote -v`. They now travel as an `http.<scheme://host/>.extraHeader`
+// carrying the same HTTP Basic credentials the URL form sent, set through GIT_CONFIG_COUNT (git ≥
+// 2.31; the runtime image is bookworm, 2.39). The environment is neither persisted by git nor in
+// the process argv nor in any log line here. The header is scoped to the remote's own origin so a
+// redirect to another host never receives it. Pinned by TestR616_CloneStoresNoCredentials.
+func (s *Syncer) gitAuthEnv() []string {
+	u, p := s.cfg.Git.Username, s.cfg.Git.Token
+	if u == "" || p == "" {
+		return nil
 	}
-	return url
+	origin := httpsOrigin(s.cfg.Git.RepoURL)
+	if origin == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	basic := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(u + ":" + p))
+	return []string{
+		"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1",
+		"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http." + origin + ".extraHeader",
+		"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=Authorization: Basic " + basic,
+	}
+}
+
+// httpsOrigin returns "https://host[:port]/" for an https URL (userinfo dropped), or "" otherwise.
+func httpsOrigin(raw string) string {
+	rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(raw, "https://")
+	if !ok {
+		return ""
+	}
+	host := rest
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(rest, '/'); i >= 0 {
+		host = rest[:i]
+	}
+	if i := strings.LastIndexByte(host, '@'); i >= 0 {
+		host = host[i+1:]
+	}
+	if host == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return "https://" + host + "/"
 }

 // copyTemplates copies docker-compose.yml and .felhom.yml from the catalog cache
@@ -696,6 +739,9 @@ func (s *Syncer) runGitInDir(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) er
 	if dir != "" {
 		cmd.Dir = dir
 	}
+	if env := s.gitAuthEnv(); env != nil {
+		cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), env...)
+	}

 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
 	cmd.Stdout = io.Discard