8033a522cd
- reconcile: ClassAgentUpdate op class; always Destructive (no provenance
blesses replacing the root-adjacent binary). classify test + companion
(TestClassify_AgentUpdateAlwaysDestructive).
- opsign: `-op agent_update` with -agent-version + -sha256 (isHex64-validated);
params {version,sha256}. isHex64 test (Group D).
- config: SelfUpdateConfig{URLTemplate,Username,Token,StateDir,DwellSeconds}
+ WithDefaults + Token redaction.
- internal/selfupdate: Executor (download → verify vs the SIGNED sha → sudo -n
wrapper `apply`; sha is the only integrity root — mismatch refuses + removes,
agent untouched); Manager (startup dwell → `commit`; version-mismatch → no
commit + loud WARN + marker left for report visibility; shutdown-before-dwell
leaves pending). WrapperRunner seam → tests never shell out.
- hub report: additive selfupdate_pending(+version) via SetSelfUpdateReporter
seam; both omitempty (Wireguard precedent) so the cross-repo golden contract
stays byte-stable — no hub change.
- capability manifest: 3 non-critical FELHOM_SELFUPDATE probes.
- main.go: updateExec appended to the executor chain; commit-manager wired to
the report seam + MaybeCommit goroutine after core init.
Tests: Group A (executor happy/sha-mismatch+companion/bad-params/wrapper-fail),
B (agent_update rides the real gate: pinned-key executes, non-pinned +
retarget rejected), C (commit/version-mismatch/no-pending/shutdown), D (opsign).
C2 companion red-proof verified (neutered Go verify → bad binary reaches apply
→ test fails), reverted. Full go test ./... green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
121 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
121 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package signedjobs
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/ed25519"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
"encoding/base64"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"encoding/pem"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/authz"
|
|
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
|
|
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// In-test SSHSIG minter (mirrors internal/reconcile/mint_test.go's framing) so the runner tests
|
|
// exercise the REAL authz.Verifier + reconcile.Gate over genuinely-signed blobs — a positive case
|
|
// verifying proves the framing, and the adversarial cases (non-pinned/replay/expired/retarget/
|
|
// forged) exercise the real rejection path end-to-end. Production authz stays verify-only.
|
|
|
|
const sshsigMagic = "SSHSIG"
|
|
|
|
type sshsigBlob struct {
|
|
Version uint32
|
|
PublicKey string
|
|
Namespace string
|
|
Reserved string
|
|
HashAlgo string
|
|
Signature string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func signedDataForTest(ns string, msg []byte) []byte {
|
|
h := sha256Sum(msg)
|
|
body := ssh.Marshal(struct {
|
|
Namespace string
|
|
Reserved string
|
|
HashAlgo string
|
|
Hash []byte
|
|
}{ns, "", "sha256", h})
|
|
return append([]byte(sshsigMagic), body...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func mintArmor(pubMarshaled []byte, namespace string, message []byte, sign func([]byte) ssh.Signature) []byte {
|
|
sb := &sshsigBlob{Version: 1, PublicKey: string(pubMarshaled), Namespace: namespace, Reserved: "", HashAlgo: "sha256"}
|
|
sig := sign(signedDataForTest(namespace, message))
|
|
sb.Signature = string(ssh.Marshal(&sig))
|
|
raw := append([]byte(sshsigMagic), ssh.Marshal(sb)...)
|
|
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "SSH SIGNATURE", Bytes: raw})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type testSigner struct {
|
|
pub ssh.PublicKey
|
|
line string
|
|
sign func([]byte) ssh.Signature
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func newTestSigner(t *testing.T) testSigner {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
sshPub, err := ssh.NewPublicKey(pub)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
return testSigner{
|
|
pub: sshPub,
|
|
line: string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(sshPub)),
|
|
sign: func(d []byte) ssh.Signature {
|
|
return ssh.Signature{Format: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519, Blob: ed25519.Sign(priv, d)}
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s testSigner) allowed(t *testing.T, keyID string, role authz.KeyRole) authz.AllowedSigner {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
as, err := authz.NewAllowedSigner(keyID, role, s.line)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("NewAllowedSigner: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return as
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mintJob builds a hub.JobWire carrying a signed storage_wipe envelope from the given signer.
|
|
func mintJob(t *testing.T, s testSigner, jobID, host, guest, keyID, paramsJSON string, issued, expires time.Time) hub.JobWire {
|
|
return mintJobOp(t, s, "storage_wipe", jobID, host, guest, keyID, paramsJSON, issued, expires)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mintJobOp is mintJob with an explicit op class (for non-wipe ops, e.g. agent_update ride-along).
|
|
func mintJobOp(t *testing.T, s testSigner, op, jobID, host, guest, keyID, paramsJSON string, issued, expires time.Time) hub.JobWire {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
blob, err := authz.CanonicalBlob(op, host, guest, keyID, randNonce(), paramsJSON, issued, expires)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("CanonicalBlob: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
sig := mintArmor(s.pub.Marshal(), authz.Namespace, blob, s.sign)
|
|
env := Envelope{OpBlobB64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(blob), SigArmored: string(sig)}
|
|
envJSON, _ := json.Marshal(env)
|
|
return hub.JobWire{JobID: jobID, BlobB64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(envJSON)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func randNonce() string {
|
|
var b [16]byte
|
|
rand.Read(b[:])
|
|
const hexd = "0123456789abcdef"
|
|
out := make([]byte, 32)
|
|
for i, x := range b {
|
|
out[i*2] = hexd[x>>4]
|
|
out[i*2+1] = hexd[x&0x0f]
|
|
}
|
|
return string(out)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func sha256Sum(b []byte) []byte {
|
|
h := sha256.Sum256(b)
|
|
return h[:]
|
|
}
|