Files
felhom-agent/internal/pbs/client_test.go
T
admin 766500dfc3 v0.6.0: slice 6 Phase B — PBS offsite tier (verify + PBS-API client + reporting)
Spike-proven that backup/restore-to-PBS reuse Phase A unchanged; the only new code is
the verify capability, a small PBS-API client, and PBSSnapshot reporting.

- internal/pbs: fingerprint-pinned, token-authed PBS-API client (Verify/Snapshots/
  TaskStatus, node-from-UPID; secret read from /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw at runtime,
  never logged) + the verify maintenance loop (own cadence, default 6h, NOT gated/journaled,
  like the watchdog) + SnapshotStore.
- hub: PBSSnapshot filled (namespace/type/id/time/size/owner/protected/encrypted/
  verify_state/verify_upid); PBSReporter collector seam; cross-repo golden + bidirectional
  key-set tests; hub handler parses pbs_snapshots + logs a failed-verify WARN.
- backup: report the ACTUAL vzdump mode (parsed from the task log; PVE may downgrade
  snapshot->stop). proxmox.Storage.Username. config PBSVerifyCadence/secret-dir.
  --selftest=pbs-verify. Backup/restore-to-PBS unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 16:53:04 +02:00

162 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package pbs
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// fingerprintOf returns the SHA-256 hex of a TLS test server's leaf cert (what the client pins).
func fingerprintOf(ts *httptest.Server) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256(ts.Certificate().Raw)
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// newPBSTestServer spins up a TLS server routing requests to fn, plus its fingerprint.
func newPBSTestServer(t *testing.T, fn http.HandlerFunc) (*httptest.Server, string) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewTLSServer(fn)
t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
return ts, fingerprintOf(ts)
}
// hostPort splits an httptest URL "https://127.0.0.1:PORT" into host + port for NewClient.
func hostPort(t *testing.T, url string) (string, int) {
t.Helper()
hp := strings.TrimPrefix(url, "https://")
host, port, ok := strings.Cut(hp, ":")
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("bad url %q", url)
}
p := 0
for _, c := range port {
p = p*10 + int(c-'0')
}
return host, p
}
// TestClient_FingerprintPinEnforced is the headline: a WRONG fingerprint is rejected; the
// RIGHT one succeeds (mirrors the slice-1 PVE pin test).
func TestClient_FingerprintPinEnforced(t *testing.T) {
ts, fp := newPBSTestServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[]}`))
})
host, port := hostPort(t, ts.URL)
// Wrong fingerprint → connection rejected at the TLS pin.
wrong := strings.Repeat("ab", 32)
bad, _ := NewClient(Config{Server: host, Port: port, Fingerprint: wrong, TokenID: "u@pbs!t", Secret: "s"})
if _, err := bad.Snapshots(context.Background(), "ds"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "pin mismatch") {
t.Fatalf("wrong fingerprint must be rejected with a pin mismatch, got %v", err)
}
// Correct fingerprint → succeeds.
good, err := NewClient(Config{Server: host, Port: port, Fingerprint: fp, TokenID: "u@pbs!t", Secret: "s"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := good.Snapshots(context.Background(), "ds"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("correct fingerprint should connect: %v", err)
}
}
// TestClient_TokenHeaderAndNeverLogged asserts the auth header is the PBS token form and that
// the secret is not exposed by the client's printed form.
func TestClient_TokenHeaderAndNeverLogged(t *testing.T) {
const secret = "super-secret-token-value-xyz"
var gotAuth string
ts, fp := newPBSTestServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[]}`))
})
host, port := hostPort(t, ts.URL)
c, _ := NewClient(Config{Server: host, Port: port, Fingerprint: fp, TokenID: "felhom@pbs!n100", Secret: secret})
if _, err := c.Snapshots(context.Background(), "ds"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if gotAuth != "PBSAPIToken=felhom@pbs!n100:"+secret {
t.Errorf("auth header = %q, want PBSAPIToken=<id>:<secret>", gotAuth)
}
// The secret lives only in the unexported authHeader and is never handed to a logger (the
// client takes no logger). The "never logged" property of the verify LOOP — which does log
// — is asserted in TestVerifyLoop_NeverLogsSecret (verify_test.go).
}
func TestClient_VerifyParsesUPID(t *testing.T) {
ts, fp := newPBSTestServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost || !strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/admin/datastore/ds/verify") {
t.Errorf("unexpected request %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"UPID:dooplex:00034582:5269BDD7:00000005:6A282176:verify:ds:felhom@pbs!n100:"}`))
})
host, port := hostPort(t, ts.URL)
c, _ := NewClient(Config{Server: host, Port: port, Fingerprint: fp, TokenID: "u@pbs!t", Secret: "s"})
upid, err := c.Verify(context.Background(), "ds")
if err != nil || !strings.HasPrefix(upid, "UPID:dooplex:") {
t.Fatalf("Verify upid=%q err=%v", upid, err)
}
}
func TestClient_SnapshotsMapToHub(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"data":[
{"backup-type":"ct","backup-id":"9001","backup-time":1781014713,"size":2518889256,
"owner":"felhom@pbs!n100","protected":false,
"verification":{"state":"ok","upid":"UPID:dooplex:..:verify:ds:u:"},
"files":[{"filename":"pct.conf.blob","crypt-mode":"encrypt","size":240},
{"filename":"index.json.blob","crypt-mode":"sign-only","size":646}]},
{"backup-type":"ct","backup-id":"9002","backup-time":1781000000,"size":10,"owner":"x",
"files":[{"filename":"root.pxar.didx","crypt-mode":"encrypt","size":10}]}
]}`
ts, fp := newPBSTestServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { w.Write([]byte(body)) })
host, port := hostPort(t, ts.URL)
c, _ := NewClient(Config{Server: host, Port: port, Fingerprint: fp, TokenID: "u@pbs!t", Secret: "s"})
snaps, err := c.Snapshots(context.Background(), "ds")
if err != nil || len(snaps) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("snaps=%d err=%v", len(snaps), err)
}
// First: verified ok, encrypted, RFC3339 time, default namespace.
h0 := snaps[0].ToHub()
if h0.VerifyState != VerifyOK || !h0.Encrypted || h0.Namespace != "root" {
t.Errorf("h0 = %+v, want verify=ok encrypted=true ns=root", h0)
}
if h0.BackupTime != "2026-06-09T14:18:33Z" {
t.Errorf("backup_time = %q, want RFC3339 UTC", h0.BackupTime)
}
// Second: NO verification field → verify_state "none".
if h1 := snaps[1].ToHub(); h1.VerifyState != VerifyNone {
t.Errorf("absent verification must map to %q, got %q", VerifyNone, h1.VerifyState)
}
}
func TestNodeFromUPID(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"UPID:dooplex:00034582:5269BDD7:00000005:6A282176:verify:ds:u:": "dooplex",
"UPID:demo-felhom:00:00:00:00:vzdump:9001:root@pam:": "demo-felhom",
"not-a-upid": "",
"": "",
}
for in, want := range cases {
if got := NodeFromUPID(in); got != want {
t.Errorf("NodeFromUPID(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestNormalizeFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := normalizeFingerprint("3b:95:5a"); err == nil {
t.Error("short fingerprint must error")
}
if _, err := normalizeFingerprint(strings.Repeat("g", 64)); err == nil {
t.Error("non-hex must error")
}
got, err := normalizeFingerprint("3B:95:" + strings.Repeat("a", 60))
if err != nil || strings.Contains(got, ":") || got != strings.ToLower(got) {
t.Errorf("normalize = %q err=%v (want lowercased, colons stripped)", got, err)
}
}