Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
3.4 KiB
REPORT — agent v0.146.0 / v0.146.1: the agent's root grants narrowed (R-861), the step bundle (R-880) — 2026-10-05
Brief: "an open-items batch … and the agent permission fix (R-861) as its own Part" (Part F). Full session report:
felhom.eu/REPORT-hub-safety-2026-10-05.md. Design: felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md §3.1.
Evidence: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/, delivery …/partH/.
Baseline and commits
- Baseline
61345790ed(v0.145.0). 6ab1e7cR-861 narrowing → released v0.146.0 (binaryb860af46…, bundle161c737e…) — never vouched, never delivered: a background security review of that commit found three holes.fdd8717the review fixes → released v0.146.1 (binarybadd6c9a2e40c8bfe856d2d1a203443b21b7eb92ecc35d6090ab44518d4d082a, bundle42333e969028867ad8142335e6c1bc4040eec231de0d8d330c2d4b2cf7bc3442). Two releases in one session, against "one release per repo" — the first one was unsafe to deliver.e4b5cf9scripts/build-step-bundle.py(R-880, tooling). Step bundle0.146.1-step1, sha8482851e….
What changed
- Exact sudo patterns for every varying argument list (sudo regex
^…$). Measured with real sudo 1.9.16: the v0.145.0 sudoers allowed 23 of 29 attack lines; v0.146.1 allows 0 and still allows all 64 commands the capability check uses (container, and live on both demo boxes). felhom-priv-apply(new root wrapper in the bundle) installs mount units, dnsmasq drop-ins, the WireGuard config and the OOB sshd config + key only after checking the CONTENT against the agent's own renderers.- Fixed bundle files: the guest pre-start hook and the shared drive parent (script + unit); the agent only checks and registers / enables.
- The signed update is checked as root:
felhom-os-applymodeagent_update(signature, host, window, nonce; the staged bytes read once, hashed, copied to a root-owned dir);felhom-selfupdate-guarded applyleft the agent's sudoers and accepts only that root-owned dir. - The root escrow run pins its paths, refuses a storage id that is a path, and reads its staged files by walking
the path with
openat(O_NOFOLLOW). - NFS/SMB options gain
nosuid,nodev.
Tests
go build/vet/test ./... green; configs/test_felhom_priv_apply.py 32 tests, test_felhom_config_bundle.py (incl.
AgentUpdate, SelfupdateWrapperConfinement, StepBundle), test_felhom_os_apply.py green; Go contract tests feed each
renderer's real output to the checker (internal/privapplytest); TestSudoersRefusesTheR861Injections,
TestManifestCoveredBySudoers (regex-aware). Red-proofs F1–F9 and S1–S3: partF/red-proof.txt (F1's first run did NOT
convict — masked by the name rule — and the test was strengthened; F3's first run errored rather than failed — the test
now asserts cleanly).
Delivered (signed jobs, key felhom-op-1)
Per box: agent_update 0.146.1 → agent_config_update 0.146.1-step1 → agent_config_update 0.146.1. See the session
report §5 for each box's result. Tester 2: offline (DOWN), nothing sent.
Not done / open
- R-861 stays open, narrowed to three named residuals (
03§3.1): the controller-swap image ref is guest-scoped; the felhom-op SSH key is hub-delivered, unsigned (felhom-op's sudo is scoped); the escrow ceremony hands the agent R by design. - R-881: the installer's uninstall does not remove
felhom-priv-apply.