Parts 1-2 shipped + deployed (v0.69.0); Part 3 not needed (sqlite3 export); Part 4-A re-attach safety already unit-proven; Part 4-B destructive 9201 drill prepared + operator-gated (pre-flight green), not executed by CC. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
4.9 KiB
REPORT — S5: host-loss DR (recovered WG-key install + directive→PLAN; safe halves shipped)
Date: 2026-07-04 · Class: implementation (safe halves) + diagnosis + a prepared, operator-present destructive drill (NOT executed by CC). Design of record: doc-06 §3.5 + S5 row; doc-01 §9.
1. Baselines & commits (felhom-agent → main)
Start: 567cf9f (v0.68.0). bd4bced v0.69.0 — the two safe DR halves (Parts 1-2). This commit
— REPORT + CONTEXT + doc-06 S5 row.
2. Part 1 (SAFE, shipped) — install the recovered WG key
wgtunnel.InstallRecoveredKey(stateDir, privB64) writes an escrow-recovered WG private key (32-byte
base64, re-encoded canonical) to the key file so the tunnel re-establishes with the same
identity/pubkey → same hub /32, no fresh keygen. CREATE-ONLY — refuses if a key file exists (a
present key may be a live identity); the value is never logged. Wired into
--selftest=identity-consume -install-wg-key (opt-in; installs bundle.WGPrivateKey after
UnwrapIdentityBundle; a pre-S3 blob with no WG key → logged fallback to fresh keygen + re-register,
which keeps the /32 via hub re-key-in-place).
Test + red-proof: install→EnsureKey LOADS it (same pubkey, no keygen); a second install REFUSES
(create-only — red-proofed against dropping the exists-check); invalid key → error, nothing written.
3. Part 2 (SAFE, shipped) — consume restore_directive → PLAN
New internal/dr: the host_loss restore_directive (was logged-and-ignored in syncer.go) is
consumed via the desired.Syncer.AddConsumer raw seam into an inspectable RestorePlan — per
guest {vmid, archive, target storage, sizing}, per drive {durable_id → expected mount}, + the
offsite PBS coord. Derive-and-surface only: the Consumer holds NO restore/destroy dependency, so
"execute nothing" is structural. guest_loss/absent → no plan; recipe fetched on-demand (rare
directive) via a fresh Collect.
Test + red-proof: host_loss builds the expected plan; guest_loss/absent/nil-recipe → none
(red-proofed against a relaxed mode gate); the consumer surfaces on host_loss + clears otherwise +
consults the recipe only then. Full go test ./... green; deployed 0.69.0; -install-wg-key flag
live; daemon starts clean (dr consumer wired).
4. Part 3 — hub escrow export: NOT needed
The operator has a clean blob-export path already: sqlite3 … "SELECT writefile('/tmp/blob', blob), writefile('/tmp/idblob', identity_blob) FROM host_escrow WHERE host_id='demo-felhom-01'" on a
kubectl cp'd hub.db. No hub change (respects the read-only-unless-no-clean-way gate).
5. Part 4-A — re-attach wrong-disk safety: ALREADY PROVEN (no new probe built)
The re-attach matcher is storage.ResolveStorageDevice (the uuid:<fs-uuid> scheme DR drives use).
Its wrong-disk guard is unit-established: TestResolveStorageDevice_ToleratesDeviceLetterMove (a
MATCHING UUID resolves to the current /dev path) + TestResolveStorageDevice_AbsentAndScheme (an
absent/mismatched UUID ERRORS — "skips a gone drive instead of fail-mounting"; a bare node /
non-uuid: scheme is refused). It resolves ONLY the exact UUID's symlink — never a "nearest" disk.
Combined with S4.1's restore-to-scratch proof, the composition's safety is established; a new live
scratch+marker-drive probe would add confidence but not new safety, so it was not built (recorded).
6. Part 4-B — the destructive in-place 9201 drill: PREPARED + OPERATOR-GATED (not executed)
Pre-flight GREEN (non-destructive): offsite ct/9201 snapshots present (the restore source);
9201 running; the escrow blob is on the hub (383 B + 499 B identity, offsite key b0:fe:2a…),
exportable via sqlite3 writefile; S4.1 already proved 9201 restores from offsite (pass:true).
The destructive drill (destroy 9201 → restore in place from offsite → re-attach the data drive by
durable_id) is operator-present + STOP-gated: the operator runs the R-consume steps
(escrow-consume + identity-consume -install-wg-key, R via env — CC never runs these, §9-4a)
and confirms the destroy at the STOP checkpoint. Prepared procedure + the go/no-go is with the
operator (destroying the live demo controller is their decision, even with the backup confirmed
recoverable).
7. NOT yet live-validated / observations
- The live consume→install→tunnel→restore pipeline (the Part 4-B drill) — operator-present, pending the operator's go-ahead + R-run. Parts 1-2 are unit-proven + deployed; their live consume path is exercised only in that drill (R-gated).
- Deferred (per slice scope): guest_loss DR; hub-driven full-auto DR (the hub issuing recovery-mode + directive itself); multi-guest host-loss. true-CGNAT-SIM retest still parked.
- Observation: the DR plan is surfaced via structured log +
Consumer.LastPlan(); a report field (so the hub/operator sees the plan without the box's journal) is a small future refinement.