c17cfde236
internal/storage: mkfs executor (Format, device-pinned, narrow FELHOM_FORMAT sudoers) + data-bearing device inspection (InspectDevice/DeviceProbe via blkid+lsblk; conservative — ambiguous=data-bearing). internal/localapi: /disks (+ data-bearing flag), /disks/assign (EnsureMount), /disks/eject (Unmount + dependent guests), /disks/format. SECURITY CENTERPIECE: the agent inspects the device itself; data-bearing format -> ClassStorageWipe gate -> pending_signature refused; the caller's claim is never trusted. Additive (no controller change yet). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
261 lines
9.8 KiB
Go
261 lines
9.8 KiB
Go
package localapi
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/proxmox"
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"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/storage"
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)
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// Disk management (slice 8C, doc 03 §6). The controller's disk-management UX stays in the
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// controller; EXECUTION is the agent's. The security centerpiece: the agent decides
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// data-bearing-ness by INSPECTING THE ACTUAL DEVICE (agent-internal evidence), never from the
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// caller's claim — a compromised controller asserting "this drive is blank" cannot wipe a
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// data-bearing drive. Benign ops (list/assign/eject/format-blank) execute self-serve; a
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// data-bearing format is classified destructive → the gate refuses it `pending_signature` (the
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// operator-signed completion is slice 10).
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// DiskOps is the privileged host-storage surface the disk endpoints need. Satisfied by
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// *storage.SudoHostOps. Optional — the endpoints report "not configured" when absent.
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type DiskOps interface {
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EnsureMount(ctx context.Context, spec storage.MountSpec) error
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Unmount(ctx context.Context, where string) error
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Format(ctx context.Context, device, fstype string) error
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InspectDevice(ctx context.Context, device string) (storage.DeviceProbe, error)
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}
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// StorageGate authorizes a DESTRUCTIVE storage op (a data-bearing wipe/format) through the
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// slice-4 reversibility gate. Satisfied by an adapter over reconcile.Gate in main.go. In 8C an
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// unsigned destructive op returns (false, "pending_signature"); the signed path is slice 10.
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type StorageGate interface {
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AuthorizeWipe(device string) (allowed bool, reason string)
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}
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// GuestLister lists the host's guests (to map a mount to the guests that depend on it for the
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// eject warning). Satisfied by *proxmox.Client.
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type GuestLister interface {
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ListLXC(ctx context.Context) ([]proxmox.Guest, error)
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}
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// ---- handlers ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// DiskInfo is one host drive with its data-bearing flag (for the UI).
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type DiskInfo struct {
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Name string `json:"name"` // PVE storage id
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Type string `json:"type"` // local-dir | usb | lvmthin | …
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State string `json:"state"` // attached | disconnected
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BackingDevice string `json:"backing_device"` // /dev/sdb1, … ("" for network/lvm)
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MountPath string `json:"mount_path"`
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Class string `json:"class"` // fast | slow | ""
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DataBearing bool `json:"data_bearing"` // agent device-inspection verdict (UI hint)
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DataReason string `json:"data_reason,omitempty"`
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}
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// handleDisks lists the host's drives + data-bearing flags (read-only/benign).
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func (s *Server) handleDisks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
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if s.disks == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "disk management not configured on this host")
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return
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}
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targets, err := s.storage.Observe(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "could not read storage view")
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return
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}
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out := make([]DiskInfo, 0, len(targets))
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for _, t := range targets {
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di := DiskInfo{
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Name: t.Name, Type: t.Type, State: t.State,
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BackingDevice: t.BackingDevice, MountPath: t.MountPath, Class: t.ClassHint,
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}
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// Inspect the backing device for the UI's data-bearing hint (the authoritative check
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// is re-run at format time on the actual device).
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if t.BackingDevice != "" {
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if probe, perr := s.disks.InspectDevice(r.Context(), t.BackingDevice); perr == nil {
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di.DataBearing = probe.DataBearing()
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di.DataReason = probe.Reason()
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} else {
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di.DataBearing = true // fail-safe
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di.DataReason = "could not inspect device"
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}
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}
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out = append(out, di)
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}
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writeOK(w, map[string]any{"vmid": vmid, "disks": out})
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}
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type assignRequest struct {
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VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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UUID string `json:"uuid"`
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Where string `json:"where"`
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FSType string `json:"fstype"`
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Options string `json:"options"`
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}
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// handleDiskAssign attaches a drive as a host mount (benign, additive → EnsureMount). Self-serve.
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func (s *Server) handleDiskAssign(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
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if s.disks == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "disk management not configured on this host")
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return
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}
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var req assignRequest
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if !decodeBody(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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if !s.scopedFromBody(w, req.VMID, vmid, r.URL.Path) {
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return
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}
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// EnsureMount validates uuid/where/fstype/options itself (storage/validate.go).
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if err := s.disks.EnsureMount(r.Context(), storage.MountSpec{
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Name: req.UUID, UUID: req.UUID, Where: req.Where, FSType: req.FSType, Options: req.Options,
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}); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("local-api: disk assign", "vmid", vmid, "where", req.Where, "err", err)
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "assign failed: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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writeOK(w, map[string]any{"vmid": vmid, "assigned": req.Where})
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}
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type ejectRequest struct {
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VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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Where string `json:"where"`
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}
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// handleDiskEject safe-unmounts a host mount (benign — data preserved, re-attachable) and returns
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// the guests that depend on it so the controller can warn which apps lose that storage.
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func (s *Server) handleDiskEject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
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if s.disks == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "disk management not configured on this host")
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return
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}
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var req ejectRequest
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if !decodeBody(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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if !s.scopedFromBody(w, req.VMID, vmid, r.URL.Path) {
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return
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(req.Where) == "" {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "where (mountpoint) is required")
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return
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}
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dependents := s.dependentGuests(r.Context(), req.Where)
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if err := s.disks.Unmount(r.Context(), req.Where); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("local-api: disk eject", "vmid", vmid, "where", req.Where, "err", err)
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "eject failed: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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writeOK(w, map[string]any{"vmid": vmid, "ejected": req.Where, "dependent_guests": dependents})
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}
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type formatRequest struct {
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VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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Device string `json:"device"`
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FSType string `json:"fstype"`
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// NOTE: any caller-supplied "blank"/"force" claim is deliberately IGNORED — the agent
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// inspects the device itself (8C invariant).
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}
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// FormatResponse is POST /disks/format.
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type FormatResponse struct {
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VMID int `json:"vmid"`
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Device string `json:"device"`
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Formatted bool `json:"formatted"`
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DataBearing bool `json:"data_bearing"`
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Reason string `json:"reason"`
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}
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// handleDiskFormat is the security centerpiece. The agent INSPECTS the device; if it is
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// data-bearing it is classified destructive and the gate refuses it `pending_signature` — the
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// caller's claim is never trusted. Only a device the agent itself reads as blank is formatted.
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func (s *Server) handleDiskFormat(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
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if s.disks == nil || s.diskGate == nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "disk management not configured on this host")
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return
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}
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var req formatRequest
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if !decodeBody(w, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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if !s.scopedFromBody(w, req.VMID, vmid, r.URL.Path) {
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return
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}
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if err := storage.ValidateBlockDevice(req.Device); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
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return
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}
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if err := storage.ValidateFSType(req.FSType); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
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return
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}
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// AGENT-INTERNAL device inspection — NEVER the caller's claim.
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probe, err := s.disks.InspectDevice(r.Context(), req.Device)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("local-api: format device inspect", "device", req.Device, "err", err)
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// inspect error → fail-safe data-bearing (probe.DataBearing() is true on !Probed)
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}
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if probe.DataBearing() {
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// Destructive: route through the gate. With no operator signature (8C) → pending_signature.
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allowed, reason := s.diskGate.AuthorizeWipe(req.Device)
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s.logger.Warn("local-api: refusing format of a data-bearing device",
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"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "why", probe.Reason(), "gate", reason)
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if !allowed {
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writeStatus(w, http.StatusForbidden, false,
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FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: false, DataBearing: true, Reason: probe.Reason()},
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"device is data-bearing — format requires operator authorization ("+reason+")")
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return
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}
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// A signed completion would land here in slice 10; 8C never reaches it (gate refuses unsigned).
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "data-bearing format is not supported in this slice")
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return
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}
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// Blank device → benign → mkfs.
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if err := s.disks.Format(r.Context(), req.Device, req.FSType); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("local-api: format", "vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "err", err)
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "format failed: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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writeOK(w, FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: true, DataBearing: false, Reason: "blank device formatted " + req.FSType})
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}
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// dependentGuests returns the VMIDs whose config has a mount whose storage backs the ejected
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// mount path — best-effort (a scan failure yields an empty list; the eject still proceeds).
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func (s *Server) dependentGuests(ctx context.Context, where string) []int {
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if s.guestList == nil {
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return nil
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}
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guests, err := s.guestList.ListLXC(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Warn("local-api: eject dependent-scan: list guests", "err", err)
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return nil
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}
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// Map each storage id whose mount path == `where` (from the storage view) → dependents.
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storeForPath := map[string]bool{}
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if targets, err := s.storage.Observe(ctx); err == nil {
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for _, t := range targets {
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if t.MountPath == where {
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storeForPath[t.Name] = true
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}
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}
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}
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var out []int
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for _, g := range guests {
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cfg, err := s.guests.GuestConfig(ctx, g.VMID)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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for _, mp := range cfg.MountPoints() {
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store, mpPath, _ := parseMount(mp)
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if storeForPath[store] || mpPath == where {
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out = append(out, g.VMID)
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break
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}
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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