1af21a6cac
The security core of slice 4: hub-supplied intent is no longer trusted for destructive change. The gate fronts the per-guest queue's executor, so every mutation passes it. Reuses internal/authz for all crypto (surface untouched). - Classifier (doc 03 §4): benign vs destructive by provenance + data-bearing- ness, NOT by verb. Destroy/overwrite of customer data is destructive unless agent-internal provenance (same-journaled-txn create, or agent-tagged scratch) makes it benign — and that provenance is journal-recorded, NEVER hub-sourced. Unknown op class fails safe to destructive. - Reversibility gate: benign -> allowed unsigned; destructive -> requires a verified, role-scoped, action-bound operator signature, else pending_signature and never executed. Every decision audited (signal, never the guard). - Signed-op consuming layer over authz.Verifier.Verify (locked pipeline untouched): role-scoping (doc 04 §4 — recovery=rotation only, operational= ordinary destructive + planned rotation) + op-to-action binding (op+host+ guest+params must match the gated action). - Signed-job orchestration: idempotency dedupe by nonce + journal-wrapped execution via an injected DestructiveExecutor (nil this slice — inert). - Crash recovery (Note 1): Engine.Recover consumes the journal InFlight() set at startup (resume-or-rollback) — covers an op that crashed after the POST and before its terminal record, which idempotency dedupe alone cannot. Added TaskStatusOnce to the GuestAPI seam. Wired into daemon startup. - Note 2: memory comparison canonicalized to MiB (desiredMemoryMiB) so a non-MiB-aligned MemoryBytes converges in one pass, not perpetual drift. - Daemon: builds the verifier from config signers (none = nil verifier, the common slice-4 state), the gate (+SlogAudit), runs Recover before mutating. Adversarial matrix proven against the REAL authz.Verifier with in-test-minted SSHSIGs (framing replicated in reconcile's test binary; authz untouched, no signing added to the verify-only package): unsigned job + unsigned desired-state delta -> pending_signature; unknown signer/expired/replay-across-restart/wrong host -> typed authz rejections; wrong guest/op/params -> binding_mismatch; recovery key on ordinary destructive -> role_denied; hub-supplied scratch tag ignored -> refused; valid+role+target+fresh nonce -> accepted then replay rejected. Full module race-clean + vet-clean on the Linux build server. Inert this slice: no destructive deltas served until slice 10; the destructive path is classified, gated, and tested but not wired to live execution. CHECKPOINT: Phase B complete (slice 4 done). Awaiting validation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
130 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
130 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package reconcile
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/authz"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
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)
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// In-test SSHSIG minter for the gate's adversarial matrix. It replicates the ~40 lines
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// of SSHSIG framing (porting internal/authz/sshsig.go + mint_test.go) so reconcile's
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// tests can produce valid AND adversarial signatures with now-relative timestamps.
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// This lives only in reconcile's test binary — production authz is untouched (no
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// signing capability is added to the verify-only security package), and the verifier's
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// unexported clock (not injectable cross-package) is why we mint live rather than reuse
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// the committed fixed-window fixture.
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//
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// The minted bytes round-trip through the REAL authz.Verifier, so a correct framing is
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// proven by the positive case verifying.
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const sshsigMagic = "SSHSIG"
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type sshsigBlob struct {
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Version uint32
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PublicKey string
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Namespace string
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Reserved string
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HashAlgo string
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Signature string
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}
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// signedData recomputes the SSHSIG signed bytes: "SSHSIG" || marshal(ns, reserved,
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// hash, H(message)). Mirrors authz.signedData exactly (sha256).
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func signedDataForTest(ns string, msg []byte) []byte {
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h := sha256.Sum256(msg)
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body := ssh.Marshal(struct {
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Namespace string
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Reserved string
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HashAlgo string
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Hash []byte
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}{ns, "", "sha256", h[:]})
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return append([]byte(sshsigMagic), body...)
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}
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// mintArmor builds an armored SSHSIG over message using sign.
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func mintArmor(pubMarshaled []byte, namespace string, message []byte, sign func([]byte) ssh.Signature) []byte {
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sb := &sshsigBlob{Version: 1, PublicKey: string(pubMarshaled), Namespace: namespace, Reserved: "", HashAlgo: "sha256"}
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sig := sign(signedDataForTest(namespace, message))
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sb.Signature = string(ssh.Marshal(&sig))
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raw := append([]byte(sshsigMagic), ssh.Marshal(sb)...)
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return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "SSH SIGNATURE", Bytes: raw})
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}
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// nonce returns a fresh 128-bit hex nonce (doc 04 §2.1: ≥128-bit random).
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func nonce() string {
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var b [16]byte
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if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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const hexdigits = "0123456789abcdef"
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out := make([]byte, 32)
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for i, x := range b {
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out[i*2] = hexdigits[x>>4]
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out[i*2+1] = hexdigits[x&0x0f]
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}
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return string(out)
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}
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// canonicalBlob builds an op blob in the doc 04 §2.1 canonical field order (keys
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// sorted at every level, no insignificant whitespace).
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func canonicalBlob(op, hostID, guestID, keyID, nonce, paramsJSON string, issued, expires time.Time) []byte {
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if paramsJSON == "" {
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paramsJSON = "{}"
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}
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return []byte(fmt.Sprintf(
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`{"expires_at":%q,"issued_at":%q,"key_id":%q,"nonce":%q,"op":%q,"params":%s,"target":{"guest_id":%q,"host_id":%q}}`,
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expires.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), issued.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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keyID, nonce, op, paramsJSON, guestID, hostID))
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}
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// testSigner is a fresh ed25519 operator key: its public key, an authorized_keys line
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// to pin it, and a sign closure.
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type testSigner struct {
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pub ssh.PublicKey
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line string
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sign func([]byte) ssh.Signature
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}
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func newTestSigner(t *testing.T) testSigner {
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t.Helper()
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pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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sshPub, err := ssh.NewPublicKey(pub)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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return testSigner{
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pub: sshPub,
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line: string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(sshPub)),
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sign: func(d []byte) ssh.Signature {
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return ssh.Signature{Format: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519, Blob: ed25519.Sign(priv, d)}
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},
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}
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}
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// allowed builds a pinned AllowedSigner for this key with the given id+role.
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func (s testSigner) allowed(t *testing.T, keyID string, role authz.KeyRole) authz.AllowedSigner {
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t.Helper()
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as, err := authz.NewAllowedSigner(keyID, role, s.line)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewAllowedSigner: %v", err)
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}
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return as
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}
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// mint builds a SignedOp (canonical blob + armored sig) for this signer.
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func (s testSigner) mint(op, hostID, guestID, keyID, nonce, paramsJSON string, issued, expires time.Time) *SignedOp {
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blob := canonicalBlob(op, hostID, guestID, keyID, nonce, paramsJSON, issued, expires)
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sig := mintArmor(s.pub.Marshal(), authz.Namespace, blob, s.sign)
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return &SignedOp{Blob: blob, Sig: sig}
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}
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