Files
felhom-agent/internal/reconcile/engine.go
T
admin 1af21a6cac v0.4.0: slice 4 Phase B — reversibility gate + signed-op consuming layer
The security core of slice 4: hub-supplied intent is no longer trusted for
destructive change. The gate fronts the per-guest queue's executor, so every
mutation passes it. Reuses internal/authz for all crypto (surface untouched).

- Classifier (doc 03 §4): benign vs destructive by provenance + data-bearing-
  ness, NOT by verb. Destroy/overwrite of customer data is destructive unless
  agent-internal provenance (same-journaled-txn create, or agent-tagged scratch)
  makes it benign — and that provenance is journal-recorded, NEVER hub-sourced.
  Unknown op class fails safe to destructive.
- Reversibility gate: benign -> allowed unsigned; destructive -> requires a
  verified, role-scoped, action-bound operator signature, else pending_signature
  and never executed. Every decision audited (signal, never the guard).
- Signed-op consuming layer over authz.Verifier.Verify (locked pipeline
  untouched): role-scoping (doc 04 §4 — recovery=rotation only, operational=
  ordinary destructive + planned rotation) + op-to-action binding (op+host+
  guest+params must match the gated action).
- Signed-job orchestration: idempotency dedupe by nonce + journal-wrapped
  execution via an injected DestructiveExecutor (nil this slice — inert).
- Crash recovery (Note 1): Engine.Recover consumes the journal InFlight() set at
  startup (resume-or-rollback) — covers an op that crashed after the POST and
  before its terminal record, which idempotency dedupe alone cannot. Added
  TaskStatusOnce to the GuestAPI seam. Wired into daemon startup.
- Note 2: memory comparison canonicalized to MiB (desiredMemoryMiB) so a
  non-MiB-aligned MemoryBytes converges in one pass, not perpetual drift.
- Daemon: builds the verifier from config signers (none = nil verifier, the
  common slice-4 state), the gate (+SlogAudit), runs Recover before mutating.

Adversarial matrix proven against the REAL authz.Verifier with in-test-minted
SSHSIGs (framing replicated in reconcile's test binary; authz untouched, no
signing added to the verify-only package): unsigned job + unsigned desired-state
delta -> pending_signature; unknown signer/expired/replay-across-restart/wrong
host -> typed authz rejections; wrong guest/op/params -> binding_mismatch;
recovery key on ordinary destructive -> role_denied; hub-supplied scratch tag
ignored -> refused; valid+role+target+fresh nonce -> accepted then replay
rejected. Full module race-clean + vet-clean on the Linux build server.

Inert this slice: no destructive deltas served until slice 10; the destructive
path is classified, gated, and tested but not wired to live execution.

CHECKPOINT: Phase B complete (slice 4 done). Awaiting validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 23:56:20 +02:00

283 lines
9.5 KiB
Go

package reconcile
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/proxmox"
)
// Engine converges actual Proxmox state toward the desired state. One Reconcile pass:
// read desired (from the provider), read actual (from Proxmox), Plan the minimal
// benign action set, and dispatch each action onto the per-guest Queue — journaling
// each op for crash-safety. At slice 4 the provider is EmptyProvider, so the action
// set is empty and the pass performs zero mutations (correct and expected).
//
// Concurrency: actions for different guests run in parallel (separate Queue lanes);
// actions for the same guest run serially in plan order. Every Proxmox mutation is
// async-or-sync per the mutate.go contract: a non-empty UPID is WaitTask'd and its
// exitstatus asserted; an empty UPID is a clean synchronous success.
type Engine struct {
api GuestAPI
queue *Queue
journal *Journal
provider DesiredProvider
norm FieldNormalizers
gate *Gate
hostID string
logger *slog.Logger
opSeq uint64 // atomic; makes each op id unique per attempt
}
// EngineOptions configures a new Engine. Norm defaults to DefaultNormalizers, Logger
// to a discard logger, Gate to a no-verifier gate (benign-allow, destructive-pending).
type EngineOptions struct {
API GuestAPI
Queue *Queue
Journal *Journal
Provider DesiredProvider
Norm FieldNormalizers
Gate *Gate
HostID string
Logger *slog.Logger
}
// NewEngine builds an Engine. The Queue is shared (the single §10 choke point); the
// caller owns its lifecycle (Close on shutdown).
func NewEngine(opts EngineOptions) *Engine {
norm := opts.Norm
if norm == nil {
norm = DefaultNormalizers()
}
logger := opts.Logger
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(discard{}, nil))
}
provider := opts.Provider
if provider == nil {
provider = EmptyProvider{}
}
gate := opts.Gate
if gate == nil {
// No verifier configured: benign actions pass, destructive are pending. This is
// the common slice-4 daemon state (no signers pinned, no desired state).
gate = NewGate(nil, opts.HostID, nil, logger)
}
return &Engine{
api: opts.API,
queue: opts.Queue,
journal: opts.Journal,
provider: provider,
norm: norm,
gate: gate,
hostID: opts.HostID,
logger: logger,
}
}
// Result summarizes one Reconcile pass.
type Result struct {
Planned int
Executed int // succeeded
Failed int // errored
Errors []error // one per failed action
}
// Reconcile runs one convergence pass. It returns an error only on a pass-level
// failure (can't read desired/actual); per-action failures are counted in Result and
// do not abort the pass (other guests still converge).
func (e *Engine) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) (Result, error) {
desired, err := e.provider.Desired(ctx)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("reconcile: desired state: %w", err)
}
actual, err := e.readActual(ctx)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("reconcile: actual state: %w", err)
}
actions := Plan(desired, actual, e.norm)
res := Result{Planned: len(actions)}
if len(actions) == 0 {
e.logger.Debug("reconcile: no drift, no actions",
"desired_guests", len(desired.Guests), "actual_guests", len(actual.Guests))
return res, nil
}
// Every mutation passes the reversibility gate before the queue (doc 03 §4).
// Reconcile only produces benign actions, so each is allowed unsigned — but the
// gate is genuinely in the path: a destructive class here would be refused
// (pending_signature) and never dispatched. A gate refusal counts as a failed
// action (it should not happen for the benign reconcile set).
type dispatched struct {
act Action
ch <-chan error
}
var sent []dispatched
for i := range actions {
act := actions[i]
dec := e.gate.Authorize(intentForAction(e.hostID, act), nil)
if !dec.Allowed {
res.Failed++
res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Errorf("reconcile: gate refused %s vmid %d: %s",
act.Kind, act.VMID, dec.Reason))
e.logger.Error("reconcile: gate refused a benign action (unexpected)",
"vmid", act.VMID, "kind", act.Kind, "reason", dec.Reason)
continue
}
sent = append(sent, dispatched{act: act, ch: e.queue.Submit(act.VMID, func() error { return e.execute(ctx, act) })})
}
for _, d := range sent {
if err := <-d.ch; err != nil {
res.Failed++
res.Errors = append(res.Errors, err)
e.logger.Error("reconcile: action failed",
"vmid", d.act.VMID, "kind", d.act.Kind, "err", err)
} else {
res.Executed++
e.logger.Info("reconcile: action applied",
"vmid", d.act.VMID, "kind", d.act.Kind, "reason", d.act.Reason)
}
}
return res, nil
}
// execute dispatches one benign action against Proxmox and journals its lifecycle.
// Reconcile actions carry NO idempotency key (convergent — safe to re-run on drift);
// crash-safety comes from the in-flight journal records, not idempotency suppression.
func (e *Engine) execute(ctx context.Context, act Action) error {
opID := e.nextOpID(act)
e.append(JournalEntry{OpID: opID, VMID: act.VMID, Kind: string(act.Kind),
Params: act.Params, State: OpStarted, At: time.Now().UTC()})
var upid string
var err error
switch act.Kind {
case ActionStart:
upid, err = e.api.Start(ctx, act.VMID)
case ActionStop:
upid, err = e.api.Stop(ctx, act.VMID)
case ActionSetConfig:
upid, err = e.api.SetConfig(ctx, act.VMID, act.Params)
default:
err = fmt.Errorf("reconcile: unknown action kind %q", act.Kind)
}
if err != nil {
e.append(JournalEntry{OpID: opID, VMID: act.VMID, Kind: string(act.Kind),
State: OpFailed, At: time.Now().UTC()})
return fmt.Errorf("reconcile: %s vmid %d: %w", act.Kind, act.VMID, err)
}
// Record the task id (if any) before awaiting it, so a crash mid-wait is
// detectable on restart and the task status can be re-checked.
e.append(JournalEntry{OpID: opID, VMID: act.VMID, Kind: string(act.Kind),
UPID: upid, State: OpTaskRunning, At: time.Now().UTC()})
if upid != "" {
st, err := e.api.WaitTask(ctx, upid, proxmox.WaitOptions{})
if err != nil { // WaitTask already errors on a non-OK exitstatus
e.append(JournalEntry{OpID: opID, VMID: act.VMID, Kind: string(act.Kind),
UPID: upid, State: OpFailed, At: time.Now().UTC()})
return fmt.Errorf("reconcile: %s vmid %d: %w", act.Kind, act.VMID, err)
}
if st.ExitStatus != "OK" { // defensive — WaitTask should have errored
e.append(JournalEntry{OpID: opID, VMID: act.VMID, Kind: string(act.Kind),
UPID: upid, State: OpFailed, At: time.Now().UTC()})
return fmt.Errorf("reconcile: %s vmid %d: exitstatus=%s", act.Kind, act.VMID, st.ExitStatus)
}
}
// upid == "" is the synchronous path (slice-4 proven for SetConfig description).
e.append(JournalEntry{OpID: opID, VMID: act.VMID, Kind: string(act.Kind),
UPID: upid, State: OpSucceeded, At: time.Now().UTC()})
return nil
}
// readActual reads observed state from Proxmox: run-state from the list, sizing +
// description from per-guest config. A GuestConfig read failure keeps the run-state
// (SpecKnown=false) rather than dropping the guest — matching the collector.
func (e *Engine) readActual(ctx context.Context) (ActualState, error) {
lxc, err := e.api.ListLXC(ctx)
if err != nil {
return ActualState{}, err
}
guests := make(map[int]ActualGuest, len(lxc))
for _, g := range lxc {
a := ActualGuest{VMID: g.VMID, Run: normRun(g.Status)}
cfg, err := e.api.GuestConfig(ctx, g.VMID)
if err != nil {
e.logger.Warn("reconcile: GuestConfig failed; spec unknown (run-state kept)",
"vmid", g.VMID, "err", err)
} else {
a.SpecKnown = true
a.Cores = cfg.Cores
a.MemoryMiB = cfg.Memory
a.Description = guestDescription(cfg)
}
guests[g.VMID] = a
}
return ActualState{Guests: guests}, nil
}
// Run reconciles once immediately, then on every interval tick until ctx is done. A
// per-pass failure is logged and the loop continues (drift is corrected next tick).
// At slice 4 (EmptyProvider) every pass is a logged no-op.
func (e *Engine) Run(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) error {
e.reconcileOnce(ctx)
t := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer t.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-t.C:
e.reconcileOnce(ctx)
}
}
}
func (e *Engine) reconcileOnce(ctx context.Context) {
res, err := e.Reconcile(ctx)
if err != nil {
e.logger.Error("reconcile: pass failed", "err", err)
return
}
if res.Planned > 0 {
e.logger.Info("reconcile: pass complete",
"planned", res.Planned, "executed", res.Executed, "failed", res.Failed)
}
}
// nextOpID builds a per-attempt unique op id (kind-vmid-seq) for journal correlation.
func (e *Engine) nextOpID(act Action) string {
return string(act.Kind) + "-" + strconv.Itoa(act.VMID) + "-" + nextSeq(&e.opSeq)
}
// nextSeq atomically increments a counter and returns it as a string — the unique
// suffix that distinguishes journal op ids across attempts.
func nextSeq(p *uint64) string {
return strconv.FormatUint(atomic.AddUint64(p, 1), 10)
}
// append journals a lifecycle record, logging (never failing the op on) a journal I/O
// error — the Proxmox op already happened; a missing journal line is a crash-recovery
// degradation, not a reason to abort.
func (e *Engine) append(rec JournalEntry) {
if e.journal == nil {
return
}
if err := e.journal.Append(rec); err != nil {
e.logger.Error("reconcile: journal append failed", "op_id", rec.OpID, "state", rec.State, "err", err)
}
}
// discard is an io.Writer sink for the default no-op logger.
type discard struct{}
func (discard) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }